



## **MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Mayor and City Council

**From:** Billy Grogan, Chief of Police

**Date:** October 30, 2023

**Subject: Presentation of BerryDunn Police Department Operations & Management Assessment**

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### **ACTION**

Accept the Final Report of the BerryDunn Police Department Operations & Management Assessment.

### **BACKGROUND/SUMMARY**

On July 25, 2022, the City Council approved a contract with BerryDunn for them to provide a comprehensive review of the Dunwoody Police Department. This review examined the operations and staffing requirements of the department. The review also examined the allocation of personnel, a review of policies and practices, a review of the patrol work scheduled, combined with collecting a lot of data related to police operations.

Deputy Chief Carlson was the point of contact for the BerryDunn study. The Project Manager assigned from BerryDunn was Michele Weinzel.

During the project, BerryDunn conducted more than 50 interviews with staff, government officials, and select community members identified by DPD. Community members also had the opportunity to provide direct feedback through several in-person and virtual town hall meetings and through online feedback to BerryDunn via Social Pinpoint, a customized website provided by BerryDunn.

Staff from the Dunwoody Police Department completed an in-house workforce survey and provided BerryDunn with substantial information through numerous other data-gathering instruments.



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BerryDunn also conducted significant analysis of current data and new data generated as part of this assessment and produced a series of findings and recommendations.

In addition to the Final Report, I have attached the Operational Assessment Reference Materials (OARM), which provides additional supporting documentation, and the SDI report, which contains all the tables referenced in the report.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

Staff recommends the City Council accept the final recommendations submitted by BerryDunn and move forward with the implementation of those recommendations.



# City of Dunwoody, GA

## Police Department Operations & Management Assessment

Version 1.1



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## Project Overview

In October 2022, the City of Dunwoody (City), Georgia contracted with BerryDunn to conduct an operational assessment of the Dunwoody Police Department (DPD). During the project, BerryDunn conducted more than 50 interviews with staff, government officials, and select community members identified by DPD. Community members also had the opportunity to provide direct feedback through several in-person and virtual town hall meetings and through online feedback to BerryDunn via Social Pinpoint, a customized website provided by BerryDunn. Staff from the DPD completed an in-house workforce survey and provided BerryDunn with substantial information through numerous other data-gathering instruments. Finally, BerryDunn conducted significant analysis of current data and new data generated as part of this assessment and produced a series of findings and recommendations.

Studies of this nature are predisposed toward the identification of areas requiring improvement, and accordingly, they have a propensity to present what needs work without fully acknowledging and highlighting positive aspects of an organization. This report follows a similar progression. Because of the numerous recommendations contained within this study, those consuming this report might mistakenly conclude that the Police Department is in poor condition. BerryDunn wishes to state the opposite quite clearly. Although this report contains several areas for improvement and the DPD has faced some challenges in recent years, BerryDunn made many positive observations of the DPD, some of which are examples of best practices that other agencies would do well to emulate. Examples of best practices within the DPD include:

- Ongoing leadership engagement in which sections of leadership books are read at staff meetings with all supervisors and different members provide feedback each week about how the information in the sections that were read is relevant and applicable to DPD.
- The DPD requires all supervisors to be trained on the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Pillars
- Monthly supervisor meetings use a consensus approach to implement suggested ideas
- A Risk Analysis Board that evaluates certain circumstances (e.g., damage to City property, officer-involved motor vehicle crashes) and makes recommendations to the chief of police on policy and/or procedural change suggestions
- The City provides a \$800 per month pay incentive for officers to live in Dunwoody

Notwithstanding the findings and recommendations outlined in this report, the DPD is a generally efficient and effective agency with a commitment to community policing, and staff provided BerryDunn with several examples of collaborative problem-solving efforts. Staff at all levels present a high level of commitment and pride in their work.

The DPD provided BerryDunn access to staff and all data at its disposal, without reservation or hesitation. It was evident to the BerryDunn team that the command staff at the DPD want what is best for the agency and the community, and they are willing to take the necessary steps to help ensure positive and appropriate change takes place.

This assessment examined more than 20 primary areas of department operation (distributed throughout the chapters of this report), as well as several sub-areas and specialized positions. BerryDunn's analysis determined that several areas within the Police Department require adjustment to assist the DPD in meeting service demands, improving operational efficiency, and sustaining positive relationships and trust between the Police Department and the community. This study provides 33 recommendations, separated into three rank-prioritized categories, following five major themes:

- Leadership, Communication, and Staff Development
- Operations and Policy
- Staffing
- Technology
- Training

This report outlines the process and methodology BerryDunn used to conduct the assessment of the police culture and practices of the DPD. The analysis provided by BerryDunn is balanced, and it fairly represents the conditions, expectations, and desired outcomes studied and those that prompted and drove this assessment. Where external data was used for comparison purposes, references have been provided.

BerryDunn stands behind the core finding statements and purposes of the recommendations provided; however, the DPD might implement those recommendations in several ways. Although BerryDunn has provided guidance and prompts within many of the recommendations, the DPD should select an implementation approach that works best for its culture and environment. BerryDunn also wishes to express its appreciation for the opportunity to collaborate with the City of Dunwoody and the DPD on this important project.<sup>1</sup>

## Relevant Background

The origins of the area now referred to as the City of Dunwoody date back to the early 1830s; however, until somewhat recently, the area was part of DeKalb County and was not officially recognized as a city. Beginning in 2006, efforts began to evaluate the feasibility of incorporating the area into a city. Ultimately, a bill was passed in the Georgia legislature, and on December 1, 2008, Dunwoody officially became a city. In January 2009, the DPD was established.

Prior to 2009, the City had received public safety/police services from the DeKalb County Police Department (DKPD). Many community members and City staff explained to BerryDunn that there had been significant concerns over the level of service the City had been receiving from the DKPD. These concerns were a key factor in establishing Dunwoody as a city, as this

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<sup>1</sup> Portions of this report and the data within it have been reproduced from publicly available documents.



created the opportunity for the City to develop its own police department. The original DPD in 2009 started with 40 sworn officers, which included the current Chief of Police, Billy Grogan. The DPD was established with several seasoned veteran officers, many of which followed Chief Grogan from his prior department.

Establishing a new police department is an uncommon and arduous task. There are many details involved, including those related to personnel, facilities, equipment, and developing all operational policies, practices, and standards. Chief Grogan is the first and only police chief the DPD has had, and this is significant for two reasons. The first relates to his length of tenure. Turnover at the police chief rank is common—for a variety of reasons—and Chief Grogan's length of service, both prior to and with the DPD, is remarkable. The second—and perhaps most significant—point is that Chief Grogan has been involved with the establishment and oversight of every aspect of DPD operations. Although BerryDunn makes numerous recommendations throughout this report, as is common when conducting these studies, the DPD compares favorably as one of the most well-run organizations the BerryDunn team has previously studied. As the primary architect of the DPD, Chief Grogan deserves significant credit for this observed condition.

## Project Introduction and Summary




Within this final report and its appendices, and within two partner documents, BerryDunn has provided various information, tables, and figures as a means to validate and substantiate the observations of the team, as well as the associated recommendations. The two partner documents to this report include the Supplemental Data and Information report (SDI), which contains numerous tables and figures, and the Operational Assessment Reference Material (OARM) report, which includes reference material relevant to the DPD project. BerryDunn will add a footnote when referencing supporting materials in the SDI report or suggest the DPD review a specific section within the OARM for additional information on a given topic.

The formal recommendations from this project can be found in three sections:

- First, a summary of the principal findings and recommendations is provided below. This is intended to provide consumers with a quick reference list of the formal recommendations made in this assessment.
- Second, recommendations are included at the end of each chapter to which they apply. Each chapter recommendation is the result of the topical analysis from that chapter and each includes a summary of the basis for the recommendation.
- Third, for ease of review, each of the full recommendations is included sequentially within the SDI Appendix A.

BerryDunn has separated formal recommendations into three prioritized categories in rank order. The seriousness of the conditions or problems that individual recommendations are designed to correct, their relationship to the major priorities of the community and the department, the probability of successful implementation, and the estimated cost of implementation are the principal criteria used to prioritize recommendations. Table 0.1 provides a description of the priority levels used for the recommendations.

**Table 0.1: Priority Descriptions**

Overall Priorities for Findings and Recommendations	
	<b>Critical/Priority</b> – These recommendations are very important and/or critical, and the agency should prioritize these for action.
	<b>High/Primary</b> – These recommendations are less critical, but they are important and should be prioritized for implementation.
	<b>Medium/Non-Urgent</b> – These recommendations are important and less urgent, but they represent areas of improvement for the agency.

BerryDunn provided all Critical/Priority recommendations to the DPD in an Emergent Issues Memo, midway through this assessment, due to their pressing nature. BerryDunn presented this information early in the process to allow the DPD to take prompt action in these areas, instead of waiting for the development of the full report and findings.


BerryDunn has provided a summary of the full recommendations and findings in the Principal Findings and Recommendations section of this report. The format of this information is provided in Table 0.2.

**Table 0.2: Short Recommendation Format**

Chapter: The Policing Environment		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
1-1	Brief Finding Statement	Succinct Recommendation Statement

This format provides readers with a quick review of the findings and recommendations. The format for the full recommendations is included in Table 0.3. Each finding and recommendation includes a description of the details supporting the recommendation, as well as details regarding areas for agency consideration. Again, BerryDunn has provided each of the full recommendations in the body of the report and in SDI Appendix A.

**Table 0.3: Full Recommendation Format**

[Chapter and Title]		
No.	Issue and Opportunity Description	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter Section:</i>		
1-1	<b>Finding Area: (Finding Statement).</b> Supporting information regarding the finding.	
	<b>Recommendation: (Succinct Recommendation Statement).</b> Additional details concerning the recommendation, including items for consideration.	

## Changing Conditions

The DPD is a dynamic and ever-changing organization. BerryDunn recognizes that numerous changes have taken place since the start of this assessment in late 2021. This includes some areas in which BerryDunn had made formal recommendations. Understandably, it has been necessary to freeze conditions in order to prepare this report. The most current information on the conditions of the organization resides with the command staff of the Police Department, including information on actions that constitute consideration and implementation of the recommendations included in this report.

In addition, the DPD has provided BerryDunn with a brief outline of its actions taken during this assessment, including those that relate to the early recommendations provided. This information is detailed in SDI Appendix B. Notable changes outlined in SDI Appendix B that relate directly to recommendations include:

- Addressing pay and other factors for officer retention
- A focus on new recruiting strategies
- Adding new internal communication strategies for staff awareness
- Updating various policies and improving community transparency
- Facilitating and participating in numerous community engagement activities

The above is a brief summary of the many actions the DPD has taken during this study. BerryDunn found the DPD very responsive to recommendations and suggestions throughout this project.

## Principal Findings and Recommendations

Patrol Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
4-1	The staffing levels in Patrol are not optimized and do not meet operational demands.	The DPD should add three patrol officers to primary CFS response in the UPD, adjusting the allocated total of sworn primary response Patrol staff to 33.

Patrol Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
4-2	The DPD dispatches officers to numerous CFS that do not require a sworn officer response. This volume of activity is impeding the ability to focus officer CFS response to more critical and demanding incidents.	The DPD should begin the process of hiring non-sworn field personnel, typically referred to as community service officers (CSOs), to supplement and augment the capacity of the Patrol Division. BerryDunn recommends the DPD hire four CSO positions to cover two daily shifts during peak CFS hours.

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
10-5	Attrition at the DPD has created a critical workforce shortage, particularly for sworn personnel, and the current hiring and retention practices for the department are not supporting operational needs.	The DPD should examine and revise its recruiting, hiring, and retention practices, to improve its ability to maintain a stable workforce, and to reach and maintain optimal staffing levels.

## High/Primary Findings and Recommendations

Organizational Leadership and Culture		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
2-1	Because of its criticality, all agencies, including the DPD, need to continuously focus on positive, active leadership and communication. This project, and the recommendations that it will produce, provide an additional need, and opportunity, for the DPD to focus on these areas.	The DPD should work collaboratively to develop an intentional and strategic approach to communication and leadership. The DPD should engage in joint discussions to position leaders to manage current operations and to assist with prioritization and implementation of the recommendations produced by this study.

Operations and Staffing		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
3-3	Professional staff assigned to property intake and storage are also responsible for RMS administration. This dual role creates a possible liability for the DPD, as it creates a possible gap in appropriate property and evidence controls. Property and Evidence Unit staff are also responsible for monthly UCR/NIBRS reporting. This is an RMS function, which should be reallocated.	The DPD should reassign RMS administration duties to staff who are not involved in the property intake and storage process. In addition, the DPD should reassign UCR/NIBRS reporting duties and consider any other unit functions that could be allocated to other personnel (e.g., PSRs, administrative position).

Patrol Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
4-4	DPD does not regularly and consistently collect standardized demographic data, such as perceived race and gender, or outcome data (such as searches, warning, citation, etc.) on all non-consensual law enforcement-related contacts in a single database that is easily accessed for analysis.	DPD should collect subject demographic and encounter outcome data from all non-consensual law enforcement-related contacts in a centralized database that can be utilized for meaningful reporting and analysis.

Patrol Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
4-6	The DPD does not currently formally engage the use of solvability factors as an element of conducting a preliminary criminal investigation. The use of solvability factors helps increase the quality of preliminary investigations and can assist decision-makers in determining which cases should receive additional investigation.	The DPD should require the use of solvability factors by all staff who conduct preliminary criminal investigations and complete the associated reports. Solvability factors should be reviewed by patrol supervisors as a part of the incident report approval process and used to assist with the case activation and assignment process.

Investigations Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
6-1	Many reports lack sufficient basis for follow-up and having an Investigations supervisor review these is an inefficient process. DPD's RMS has the capability of utilizing solvability factors to help determine which cases have viable leads that would warrant further investigation.	The DPD should revise its process for reviewing criminal cases to empower appropriate personnel, patrol line supervisors, to save time for Investigations staff. Patrol sergeants, who are responsible for review of all incident reports, should be empowered to close criminal cases without the need for additional review. This decision should be based on the solvability factors (as completed by the originator of the incident report) and the supervisor's review of the substance of the case. Patrol sergeants should either close a case or leave the case open and forward it to Investigations for follow-up investigation.

Investigations Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
6-2	DPD is using an informal method of case monitoring and not maximizing the use of its RMS to incorporate solvability factors and monitor case assignments.	The DPD should take steps to more appropriately use the RMS to track and monitor case assignments as well as progress by investigators and notifications for patrol. Supervisors should be required to conduct periodic case reviews for all open cases and to document case reviews and expectations, consistent with department standards on case updates and expected closure dates.

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
8-1	The RMS in use by the DPD is not fully supporting operational needs. The RMS has multiple limitations, including data entry and data mining, both of which are critical to leveraging data in support of operations and impartial policing.	The DPD should consider pursuing acquisition of a more modern and robust RMS that is capable of supporting its data needs.

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
10-1	Attrition at the DPD has created a shortfall of experience, especially on patrol, and has the potential to contribute to overall staffing shortages. DPD does not have a formal strategic recruiting plan that supports a specific and focused effort at recruiting, utilizing all department employees in the effort.	The DPD should examine and revise its recruiting, hiring, and retention practices and develop a strategic recruiting plan to improve its ability to maintain a stable workforce, and to reach and maintain optimal staffing levels that includes specific steps intended to create an atmosphere that recognizes the long-term value of officers and other staff.

Professional Standards/Internal Affairs		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
11-1	The DPD online complaint portal includes a requirement to acknowledge possible criminal prosecution for false statements, which can have a chilling effect on the filing of complaints and is not in the best interest of the DPD.	BerryDunn recommends DPD remove the admonition about possible criminal prosecution from the online complaint portal.



## Medium/Non-Urgent Findings and Recommendations

Organizational Leadership and Culture		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
2-2	DPD does not have a formal staff development system that includes systems or mechanisms for consistent coaching, mentoring, or succession planning.	BerryDunn recommends DPD develop a formal coaching, mentoring, and succession planning program for staff and that the program be memorialized in policy and executed consistently in practice.

Operations and Staffing		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
3-1	The DPD tasks sworn officers, usually those in formal leadership positions, with various adjunct responsibilities such as fleet, equipment, facilities, accreditation, etc., which consume a great deal of time and energy from sworn staff and may prevent them from fully engaging in basic supervisory responsibilities, or other primary duties, to the extent expected by their role.	<p>The DPD should hire one non-sworn administrative support staff member to support various administrative functions of the department.</p> <p>BerryDunn expects that this position would manage the DPD fleet as well as other administrative functions, and this person could also be cross-trained to support other support staff functions. BerryDunn recommends that the DPD evaluate any functions that could be performed by this position and reallocate them to the new staff member.</p>

Operations and Staffing		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
3-2	PSRs provide numerous support functions for the DPD that promote operational efficiency and effectiveness. Current staffing is insufficient to support operational workloads, particularly during daytime hours.	The DPD should add one PSR position to assist with workload demands. The position should be allocated within the work schedule in a manner that provides support during the period of the day with the greatest need.

Patrol Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
4-3	The DPD does not currently use alternative CFS response, but opportunities exist to utilize alternative CFS response methods and resources.	The DPD should develop a comprehensive alternative CFS response plan and seek approval from the City Council on the new model.

Patrol Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
4-5	The Victim Service Referral Form might not be utilized universally or consistently by department personnel.	The DPD should review the service referral documents and related department policy for victim service referrals to ensure they are consistent with department values and goals. Review policy and accountability mechanisms to ensure victim service referrals are performed consistently and effectively. Institute audit procedures to ensure compliance with policy.

Community Engagement		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
5-1	The DPD does not have clear metrics and expectations for community policing or problem-oriented policing activities, and these efforts are not formally included in its appraisal system. Although the DPD does record COP efforts and these activities are reviewed internally in a monthly report, lack of clear metrics and expectations impedes analysis or accountability functions.	The DPD should establish COP and POP metrics and expectations for all DPD personnel and formally include a review of each individual's activities as part of the appraisal process.

Investigations Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
6-3	The DPD has a high volume of cases that are pending investigations. The DPD needs to address this issue to help ensure citizens are getting the assistance and follow through for investigations that they deserve.	Investigators are carrying caseloads that are unmanageable. Due to the high volume of cases investigators are carrying month to month, there is insufficient time for investigators to do a complete and thorough follow-up to cases that have viable leads. This will lead to cases not being comprehensively investigated, which decreases the chances of a successful prosecution. BerryDunn recommends DPD increase the staffing of CID by three investigators.

Investigations Services		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
6-4	The DPD sees a need for a street crimes problem-solving unit to address narcotics, vice, and other street-level quality of life crime problems. The creation and administration of such a unit requires a detailed strategic plan, specialized training, robust oversight mechanisms, and detailed performance measuring.	BerryDunn supports the DPD's plans to create a specialized street crimes unit tasked with problem-solving for narcotics, vice, and other street-level crime problems and recommends such a unit be initially staffed with three personnel consisting of two investigators and a working sergeant who bears both supervisory and caseload responsibilities.

Operational Policies		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
7-1	The DPD has a policy manual that provides appropriate and relevant guidance for personnel for most critical and emergent operational areas. However, there is one emergent policy that is not addressed because DPD does not have a policy for responding to members of the LGBTQ+ community.	DPD should implement a policy addressing how to respond to persons from the LGBTQ+ community, to include both community encounters and DPD staff members.

Operational Policies		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
7-2	Although the DPD may seek input from internal and external stakeholders on policy development and revision, this process is not formally defined and the DPD does not have a formal collaborative policy development and review process.	The DPD should establish a standing policy development and review committee comprised of a diverse membership that is representative of all internal stakeholders. The DPD should also consider engaging community members in this effort as a pathway supportive of collaborative co-production policing efforts.

Operational Policies		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
7-3	DPD policy is thorough, easy to understand, and covers essential areas of operation, but some of the publicly available policies are not signed and the organization of the policy is not intuitive to navigate.	DPD should ensure all policies disseminated, whether internally or externally, are current and complete and consider re-organizing the policy manual into several categories of related topics for ease of use with a usable table of contents and index.

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
8-2	DPD intends to use crime and intelligence data proactively for data-driven and intelligence-led policing but, until recently, has not consistently utilized data or intelligence in a deliberate or meaningful way.	The DPD should pursue a robust performance measurement and accountability management (CompStat) system utilizing the support and resources provided by BerryDunn. The DPD should formally adopt a data-driven philosophy supported by ILP.

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
8-3	Crime analysis is performing some functions that do not require the skill of a crime analyst and, simultaneously, some functions that would benefit from the skills of a crime analyst are performed by others.	The department should include crime analysis in all supervisor/command staff meetings to reinforce the value of this role. The department should explore additional training for the crime analyst, including DDACTS.

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
8-4	The inner property room where high-risk property such as firearms, narcotics, and money lacks basic security controls.	DPD should enhance property controls for high-risk property items through additional controls like electronic proximity card access, constant video recording, dual physical controls, etc.

Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
9-1	DPD does not have a formal FST program supported by a written manual. Transitioning from line-officer to line-supervisor requires major adjustments for most new supervisors.	BerryDunn recommends DPD implement a formal FST program supported by a written manual that provides a structured training program with a formal field training component supported by competency checkoffs.

Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
9-2	DPD currently does not have a report-writing manual for patrol officers. This contributes to inconsistency in report writing and preliminary investigations.	It is recommended the DPD create and utilize a report-writing manual to help ensure officers properly and adequately document incidents and to add consistency to produced reports, to improve preliminary investigations, and to make the most effective and efficient use of personnel time.

Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
9-3	The department does not have a standardized, transparent process for requesting and receiving training that is supportive of DPD goals or a strategic training plan.	The department should institute a formal training review process, perhaps including an employee-based training committee that reviews training requests relative to DPD goals, policies, and procedures, including alignment and synchronization with a strategic training plan, professional development efforts, and a promotional preparation process.

Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
9-4	Property and CST staff do not have backup if either is off work. They can assist one another but neither is fully trained on the other's job. The DPD should cross-train each of these personnel to help ensure that at least one person who is trained on both job functions is available to assist if, for some reason, Property or CST staff are not available (vacation/illness/injury/etc.).	DPD should cross-train Property and CSTs to provide redundancy, capacity, and scalability.

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
10-2	DPD, like all departments, utilizes discretionary disqualifiers when engaging in the new hire selection process. Such disqualifiers can have complex and unique circumstances for each applicant and represent an opportunity to explore department standards and recruit development.	The DPD should create a panel of employees to review applicant disqualifications for three primary purposes: 1) Review the relevance of the disqualifying standard in general 2) Review the specifics of the disqualified candidate for mitigating factors 3) Review the applicant and disqualifying condition for remediation opportunities

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
10-3	Employee feedback indicates the current promotional process may be inconsistent or unpredictable.	The DPD should enhance existing policy to increase the detail and memorialization of the promotional process. This process should be consistently followed unless formal changes are made to the process.

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Finding	Recommendation
10-4	Authorized hiring levels at the DPD do not account for attrition rates. Hiring for officers at the DPD occurs when there are vacancies, and despite a recent increase in attrition, annual voluntary separations are generally knowable and predictable. Because of the lag time associated with hiring and providing initial training for officers, the DPD is constantly working without its full complement of personnel.	To maintain optimal staffing levels, hiring should always occur at the rate of allocated personnel <i>plus</i> the anticipated attrition rate. In collaboration with City management, the DPD should establish a minimum operational level <i>and</i> a new authorized hiring level (consistent with the findings of this report) that helps ensure continuity of staffing.

# Chapter 1: The Policing Environment

*The Policing Environment: includes an overview of the police setting, the service community, the structure of the government and police agency, personnel data, and crime and service data.*

Examination of the policing environment is an essential prerequisite to informed judgement regarding policing culture, practice, policy, operations, and resource requirements. The geography, service population, economic conditions, levels and composition of crime and disorder, workload, and resources in Dunwoody are salient factors that define and condition the policing requirements, response capacity, and opportunities for innovation. This chapter examines these factors.

The main purpose of any police agency is to help ensure public safety within the community. For the DPD this objective is accomplished primarily through the function of those in the Uniform Patrol Division (UPD). In pursuing its public safety mission, the DPD allocates personnel to investigations and a variety of other positions and roles, which support the UPD and the needs of the department and the community. For 2022, the DPD had authorization for 64 sworn positions and 14 non-sworn positions, for a total of 78 authorized positions. Nine of the 64 sworn positions are allocated to investigations.

When examining staffing levels and allocations and other organizational metrics and measures, it can be helpful to compare one organization against another to illustrate any significant variances between them. As these types of references will be used throughout this report, it will be helpful to explain the origins of these comparative numbers. For this assessment, BerryDunn has used comparative data from a variety of sources, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), and from prior staffing and organizational studies and assessments conducted by BerryDunn and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). The following chapters and sections will reference example cities, or study cities. This data emanates from prior operations and management studies conducted by BerryDunn's project manager, which are publicly available and are considered to be relevant comparative data for this assessment.

Another important resource that BerryDunn references often in this report is the survey of the benchmark cities. Several police chiefs created this annual survey in 1997 as a means to establish comparative statistics. More than 30 agencies are currently contributing data to this survey (many of which are of similar size to Dunwoody), and BerryDunn finds the site valuable and informative.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the value in looking at benchmarks and metrics from other communities, these comparisons have limitations; accordingly, BerryDunn's analysis of various organizational and operational factors relies more heavily on data specific to the agency being studied or assessed.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>



Still, benchmark data and data from other studies help to establish context and to assess the level of agency conformance with other organizations across the industry. Accordingly, because of their strong comparative value, these sources will be referenced at various points within this report.

## I. Service Population

Dunwoody is in DeKalb County, Georgia, is a northern suburb of Atlanta, and is part of the Atlanta metropolitan area.<sup>3</sup> The City is approximately 13.2 square miles and has an estimated population of 51,683. The City population grew by 11.71% between 2010 and 2020,<sup>4</sup> and although projections from census data indicate moderate growth going forward, additional data from the City suggest otherwise. Although population growth itself does not directly create the need for additional police staff or resources, workloads that result from population increases can have this effect. BerryDunn has outlined additional relevant information about expected population increases in the Planned Community Growth section below.

In addition to examining general population numbers, it is also important to consider the demographics of the community. Table 1.1 below shows the demographic breakdown of the City based on the 2020 census. This table shows that the City's population is predominantly white, at 53.84%, with 11.68% African American, 17.1% Asian descent, 12.79% Latino descent, 4.49% other/multiple races, and less than 1% Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or American Indian and Alaska Natives.

**Table 1.1: Community Demographics**

<b>Community Demographics (2020)</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Percent</b>
White	27,824	53.84%
African American	6,036	11.68%
American Indian and Alaska Native	36	0.07%
Asian	8,839	17.1%
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander	17	0.03%
Other/Multiple Races	2,321	4.49%
Hispanic or Latino	6,610	12.79%
<b>Total</b>	51,683	

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Table 1.1 also shows the breakdown of the Hispanic or Latino population in Dunwoody. Although not considered a separate race, those who identify as Hispanic or Latino make up

<sup>3</sup> SDI Figure 1.1

<sup>4</sup> SDI Table 1.1

12.79% of the population within Dunwoody. Race and diversity are important factors as police agencies work toward hiring, recruiting, and staffing police departments that are representative of the communities they serve. Understanding community demographics can also be important in helping the department develop clarity on the need and demands for cross-cultural competency within the police force. In addition, recognizing the ethnic makeup of the community might be an important consideration in terms of the population served for whom English might be a second language.

In addition to community demographics, it is important for communities and police departments to recognize how population age ranges can influence the policing environment. According to 2020 census numbers, the population of Dunwoody reflects a community of working-age people, ages 20 – 54 (50.93%) who are more likely to be using the roadways at the same time during peak commuting hours, necessitating commensurate police presence and response. This working-age population also leaves many empty houses, apartments, and condominiums during working hours, presenting potential targets for criminals. Population age data is also important from a criminal perspective. Nationally, young males ages 15 – 24 perpetrate most violent crimes. In Dunwoody, 11.06% of the population (male and female) are within this age range.<sup>5</sup>

The City also has a significant retirement-age population, with approximately 23.22% of the population aged 55 years and over. This age demographic can also demand a substantial workload for police agencies; however, workload relating to an aging population tends to involve victimization by those who exploit older populations and a different set of service needs. As the community continues to grow, it is important to monitor the evolving population numbers in different age demographics, as significant shifts (either upward or downward) can affect workload volumes.

The position of Dunwoody in relation to Atlanta is also significant, because the population and constituency of Dunwoody is not limited by the geographical confines of the city limits. Due to its proximity to Atlanta, Dunwoody is an active hub of the greater Atlanta area. This includes various metropolitan amenities, as well as the volume of police services that tend to be associated with larger urban communities, and those that often spill over into adjacent areas. Understanding this context is important, because criminals generally ignore geographical boundaries, and large urban areas like Atlanta often have higher serious crime issues. Again, it is common for individuals who commit serious crimes to operate beyond the areas in which they live. Accordingly, the DPD must consider these implications as it provides public safety services on behalf of the City.

As noted, community demographics influence the policing environment; however, the BerryDunn police staffing model does not rely on population as a variant for calculating staff demands. Although BerryDunn recognizes that increases in population typically result in additional workload and these shifts are often predictable and measurable, the most important point is the level of workload that is generated by the population, not the size of the population

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<sup>5</sup> SDI Table 1.2

itself. Accordingly, the optimal staffing levels outlined in this assessment will be based on overall workload demands, project data, and the overall analysis of that data, not population totals. This type of analysis is consistent with industry standards for conducting these assessments.

## Planned Community Growth

During this assessment, the City and DPD provided BerryDunn with information regarding planned community growth. As stated, BerryDunn's workload model relies on understanding workload demands. These are influenced by population; however, variations within community populations can generate different service needs, and understanding these influences is important in determining an appropriate staffing model. BerryDunn provides additional details in Chapter 4 on staff workloads for Patrol and how predicted growth can affect workload demands. In this section, BerryDunn discusses information provided from the City that is related to planned and predicted community growth.

### High Street Development

High Street is a new cosmopolitan city center for Atlanta's Central Perimeter, bringing together in one place everything that makes for an extraordinary urban experience. With active streets, unparalleled connectivity, unique shopping, experiential fine dining, and lively entertainment, High Street is built around a signature park and an engaging public realm that combines retail, leisure, residential, and office uses within an ongoing program of community events—all within a walkable, transit-oriented neighborhood hub. The first anchor to be announced at High Street, Puttshack, a unique, upscale, tech-infused mini golf experience with global food and drink, will open at High Street in 2024 as part of the first phase. Figure 1.1 provides the rendering of the great lawn and the first phase of the High Street Development.

**Figure 1.1: High Street Development Great Lawn – Artist Rendering**



Source: Agency provided

The first phase of High Street is scheduled to open in early 2024. The first phase includes 700 apartments, a massive retail section including restaurants, an open lawn, and office space. The City of Dunwoody has designated this area as an entertainment district, so patrons will be allowed to carry alcohol from one establishment to another in the district. High Street is also planning over 100 public events, concerts, etc., on the great lawn each year. As High Street moves forward with future phases, it plans to add a total of 3,000 housing units, a hotel, retail, and office space to the 35-acre development.

### Campus 244 Development

Campus 244 is an area where restaurants, a hotel, 600,000 square feet of office space, and a great lawn for gathering will be pulled together on a 12-acre site located near I-285 with easy access to Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) which is the rapid transit agency for five primary counties of the greater Atlanta metropolitan area. The City of Dunwoody has also designated this area as an entertainment district, where alcohol can be carried from one business to another. Campus 244 is also expected to have a very active great lawn, hosting 100 events each year, including concerts, events, and other assorted activities. The first phase of this development is expected to be open in the first quarter of 2024, and Campus 244 is expected to build another large office building on-site soon. Figure 1.2 provides a rendering of the Campus 244 Development.

**Figure 1.2: Campus 244 Development – Artist Rendering**



Source: Agency provided



## Other Significant Growth

In addition to the multi-use, housing, retail, and recreational areas mentioned, the City also provided BerryDunn with information on additional planned housing and other development.

### 84 Perimeter Development Area

There is a planned development project that is close to breaking ground across from Perimeter Mall. The developer's plans include constructing a 14-story apartment complex with 225 units in Dunwoody's bustling retail center. The high-end, age-restricted housing project would also include amenities such as a bocce court, pet spa, a Peloton gym, and a game room featuring virtual golf. There are plans for retail shops as well. Figure 1.3 provides a rendering of the 84 Perimeter development area.

**Figure 1.3: 84 Perimeter Development – Artist Rendering**



Source: Agency provided

### Perimeter Center East Development Area

In addition, across from Perimeter Mall on Perimeter Center East is a development by Grubb Properties. This development has not started at this time but will include 900 condos in 14-story buildings, a 20-story office building, a park, and a retail area. Figure 1.4 provides a rendering of the Perimeter Center East development area.

**Figure 1.4: Perimeter Center East Development – Artist Rendering**

Source: Agency provided

### *City of Dunwoody Parks Bond*

The City Council recently voted to place a \$60,000,000 Parks and Trail Bond referendum on the ballot in November 2023. If this bond passes, the City will add two large parks, expand several current parks, add additional park space for two softball fields, and add miles to the City's trail system. If approved, these additions (which would likely be built in the next 2-5 years) could increase the demand for police services, patrols, and community outreach programming for the DPD.

At BerryDunn's request, the DPD provided data regarding expected single-family and multi-housing growth projections for the next five years; see Table 1.2. The development plans—and the residential growth—summarized in Table 1.2 has the potential to affect service demands for the DPD. Again, BerryDunn will provide more detailed analysis of the police service implications of this anticipated growth in Chapter 4.

**Table 1.2: Projected Housing Growth by Type/Year**

Property Growth	Next Year	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
Single-Family Units	11	10	10	10	10
Multi-Housing Units	625	500	225	200	200

Source: Agency Provided Data

## II. Government and Budgets

The City operates within a municipal form of government under a City Council/Manager structure. There are six council members and one mayor who make up the Dunwoody City Council.<sup>6</sup> Each member of the council represents one of three districts in Dunwoody. Posts 1, 2, and 3 are positions that are voted upon by citizens from within the district the council member will be representing. Posts 4, 5, and 6 are elected by the City at large, with each council member being elected to represent a given district. Elections are held on a four-year cycle and are staggered, with only half of the council coming up for vote in any given cycle.

The city manager is responsible for the effective administration and operation of all City services, manages the day-to-day activities of City departments, and maintains necessary intergovernmental relationships with federal, state, and other local governments. DeKalb County School System (DCSS) operates local public schools. The chief of police, who has authority over police operations, reports to the city manager. BerryDunn requested general budget information from the City and the Police Department and was provided with historic and current budget data. The City budget increased by 14.69% over the past five years,<sup>7</sup> while the Police Department budget increased by 11.73%.<sup>8</sup> These numbers are consistent with the community growth of the City.

## III. Police Department Staffing and Organization

At the time this study began, BerryDunn learned that DPD was functionally structured and led by the chief of police and one deputy chief who commands two majors. One major is responsible for UPD and the other major is responsible for Administration and Criminal Investigations. Based on BerryDunn's review, the current organizational structure for DPD provides a functional distribution and grouping of duties and responsibilities and does not appear to need adjustment.<sup>9</sup>

Based on FBI NIBRS data, the number of reported sworn positions for the DPD was 59 in 2018 and 64 in 2022.<sup>10</sup> BerryDunn elaborates further on the Patrol staffing numbers in Chapter 4 of this report but notes the important distinction between the number of positions staffed as opposed to the number allocated. This is important because optimal workload models are predicated on ensuring full staffing to maximize operational efficiency. Personnel fluctuations work against operational efficiency, and it is necessary to minimize them to achieve the best results. Table 1.3 reflects the number of allocated sworn positions for the DPD in 2022, broken out by rank and major unit of assignment.

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<sup>6</sup> SDI Figure 1.2

<sup>7</sup> SDI Table 1.2

<sup>8</sup> SDI Table 1.3

<sup>9</sup> SDI Figure 1.3

<sup>10</sup> SDI Table 1.5

**Table 1.3: Personnel Allocations**

Section	*Total Number
Executive (Chief, Assistant/Deputy Chief)	2
Mid-Rank (Below Chief – Above Sergeant)	6
Sergeants (All – Regardless of Assignment)	11
Patrol Officers (Excludes Supervisors Above)	37
Investigations (Excludes Supervisors Above)	8
<b>Totals</b>	<b>64</b>

Source: Agency Provided

BerryDunn evaluated the DPD personnel allocations provided in Table 1.3 as compared to industry benchmarks and several prior studies. BerryDunn observed that the DPD allocations are comparative and reasonable, and they support operational needs.<sup>11</sup>

## Personnel Deployments

The structured chain of command with police departments provides multiple levels of review, builds in checks on performance and conduct, provides opportunities for professional development, and creates inherent succession planning. Table 1.4 provides the allocated staffing numbers for sworn and non-sworn personnel for the DPD.

**Table 1.4: Staffing Level Allocations by Unit**

Section	Sworn Personnel		Non-Sworn Personnel	
	Supervisor	Officer	Supervisor	Employee
Administration	5	2	1	11
Patrol	12	35	0	0
Investigations	2	8	0	2
<b>*Sub-Totals</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>64</b>		<b>14</b>	

Source: Agency Provided Data

\*Includes vacancies

This table provides a detailed breakdown of the allocations of staff by section and with respect to the number of supervisory personnel in each area. This type of breakdown helps to clarify the organizational structure and span of control for the department. Although there is no hard-and-fast standard, a general rule regarding span of control is one supervisor for every five followers

<sup>11</sup> SDI Table 1.6



(those supervised by someone else), although some have suggested this ratio could be higher, at one supervisor for every eight to ten followers.<sup>12</sup> To a certain extent, the span-of-control number is fluid, based on the personnel being supervised and their relative capabilities. Based on a review of the structure and allocation of DPD personnel, the overall span of control for the DPD is appropriate and reasonable.

## IV. Crimes and Crime Rates

Within the policing industry, the UCR categories established by the FBI have been the standard for decades. Under those standards, crimes were separated into two categories: Part 1 crimes (more serious) and Part 2 crimes (all others). The crimes classified as Part 1 crimes under UCR included: murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. In recent years, the FBI has adopted NIBRS, a new standard for crime reporting by police agencies. The NIBRS standard includes several sub-categories and allows more intricate evaluation of certain crime data, particularly on a national scale. For simplicity purposes, BerryDunn has developed a process to convert NIBRS data into former UCR categories, and Table 1.5 reflects Part 1 crimes and NIBRS data totals for the City and other similarly sized and area communities.

There are a couple important notes about Table 1.5. The first is that some of the cities represented are substantially larger than Dunwoody (over 70,000 population), and as a result, these cities (highlighted in light blue) are not included in the averages and + or – calculations within the table. BerryDunn has included these in the table because they are near Dunwoody and/or because the City and DPD often reference these other agencies in comparative conversations.

The second thing to note about Table 1.5 is the difference between the NIBRS data and the traditional Part 1 crime data. The NIBRS data includes all reported criminal activity, including the traditional Part 1 Offenses, and all new crime reporting categories traditionally considered Part 2 Offenses.<sup>13</sup> However, the Part 1 Offenses are distributed between the Crimes Against Persons and Crimes Against Property categories within NIBRS. Again, BerryDunn has configured Table 1.5 to split out the Part 1 Offenses so that they can be reviewed on a more granular level.

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<sup>12</sup> [http://highered.mheducation.com/sites/007241497x/student\\_view0/part2/chapter4/chapter\\_outline.html](http://highered.mheducation.com/sites/007241497x/student_view0/part2/chapter4/chapter_outline.html)

<sup>13</sup> SDI Figure 1.4

Table 1.5: Crime Rate Comparisons

Dunwoody	Population	NIBRS Totals				Part 1 Offenses							
		Total Offenses	Crimes Against Persons	Crimes Against Property	Crimes Against Society	Homicide	Sex Offenses	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Larceny/Theft	Motor Vehicle Theft	Arson
Johns Creek	85,974	1,014	330	642	42	1	3	3	13	55	615	31	1
Roswell	96,041	3,377	870	2,083	424	5	39	24	255	130	2,180	138	1
Sandy Springs	111,533	4,490	874	3,110	506	8	39	33	147	197	2,673	156	5
Alpharetta	68,954	1,768	297	1,292	179	3	37	11	131	47	665	45	1
Brookhaven	56,770	3,883	1,156	2,352	375	4	52	49	172	156	2,388	146	5
Chamblee	31,254	2,423	626	1,669	128	3	44	41	222	106	1,738	142	3
Gainesville	45,385	3,557	999	2,077	481	4	69	28	126	139	1,918	120	6
Marietta	61,223	3,714	864	2,218	632	3	31	56	199	158	2,475	162	6
Milton	40,781	640	163	424	53	0	9	3	25	20	350	8	1
Newnan	44,023	2,580	805	1,470	305	2	46	18	467	82	1,313	63	3
Peachtree City	36,994	1,023	99	520	404	0	14	2	9	22	593	36	0
Smyrna	57,024	2,886	912	1,808	166	2	41	34	129	122	1,627	101	2
Valdosta	56,844	3,182	1,338	1,680	164	8	29	38	135	101	2,138	111	1
<b>Averages*</b>	<b>49,925</b>	<b>2,566</b>	<b>726</b>	<b>1,551</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>1,521</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>3</b>
Dunwoody	49,621	2,728	455	2,048	225	2	26	30	60	91	1,269	85	0
<b>Study Dept. + or - Avg.*</b>	<b>-304</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>-271</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>-64</b>	<b>-1</b>	<b>-11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>-102</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>-252</b>	<b>-8</b>	<b>-3</b>

Source: FBI NIBRS Data

\*Calculations in the green area exclude the light blue highlighted data.

Looking strictly at the Part 1 Offense data, DPD's numbers are similar but lower than the average of the 10 comparison cities in all categories. For the NIBRS categories, DPD's volume is 37.32% lower than the average of the comparisons in the Crimes Against Persons category. Conversely, DPD's volume is 32.04% higher than the comparison cities in the Crimes Against Property category. Overall, the data in Table 1.5 indicates that reported crime in Dunwoody is relatively similar to the comparison cities.

DPD staff expressed to BerryDunn that several nearby communities, all of which are reflected in Table 1.5, have more officers than the DPD, and on average, DPD officers respond to a higher number of Part 1 Offenses than officers in those agencies. BerryDunn performed an independent analysis of the datapoints the DPD outlined (compared to all the cities listed in Table 1.5) and observed an average of 24.42 Part 1 Offenses per DPD officer. This ratio was

higher than all the comparison cities, who averaged 13.11 per officer. BerryDunn expanded this analysis and considered all offenses and noted that the DPD had a per officer response rate of 42.63. This total was the second highest among the cities examined but was closer to the comparison average of 27.76.<sup>14</sup>

As BerryDunn noted early in this report, comparisons of this nature can be helpful in isolating apparent variations. However, it is important to recognize the complexities of comparing one organization against another. Variations in the number of officers assigned as primary call for service (CFS) responders can significantly affect officer workloads. Similarly, the nature of a CFS (e.g., homicide as opposed to shoplifting) can greatly affect the effort required. Community geography, traffic levels, and time of day (among others) are all salient factors in understanding the policing environment being examined.

The analysis BerryDunn uses to determine staffing levels relies on calculating workloads for staff. These calculations are performed within the environment of the agency being studied (DPD) and compare staff availability against community-generated workloads. The outputs from this process (provided primarily in Chapters 3, 4, and 6) produce optimal staffing calculations that are unique to the agency. BerryDunn has provided additional analysis on DPD staffing in the subsequent chapters and uses this analysis to identify appropriate staffing levels.

BerryDunn examined the number of Part 1 and Part 2 crimes<sup>15</sup> for the City from 2019 to 2021 (as collected from NIBRS). Table 1.6 reflects the Part 1 crime volume for this period.

**Table 1.6: Part 1 Crimes and Clearance Rates**

Part 1 Offenses	2019	2020	2021	2019 to 2020 Pct. Change
Homicide Offenses	2	3	2	0.00%
Sex Offenses (Rape)	28	24	26	-7.14%
Robbery	25	22	30	20.00%
Aggravated Assault	31	53	60	93.55%
Burglary	159	85	91	-42.77%
Larceny	1,643	1,245	1,269	-22.76%
Auto Theft	101	94	85	-15.84%
Arson	0	2	0	N/A
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,989</b>	<b>1,528</b>	<b>1,563</b>	<b>-21.42%</b>

Source: FBI UCR/NIBRS Data

Reported Part 1 crime in the City is down by 21.42% from 2019 to 2021 and up very slightly (2.2%) from 2020 to 2021. Table 1.7 shows the pattern of reported Part 1 and Part 2 crimes in

<sup>14</sup> SDI Table 1.7

<sup>15</sup> SDI Table 1.8

the City from 2019 – 2021. Like Part 1 crimes, reported Part 2 crime is down over this period, and overall reported crimes are down by 17.20%

**Table 1.7: Part 1 and Part 2 Crime Totals**

	2019**	2020**	2021**	2019-2020 Pct. Change	2020-2021 Pct. Change
Part 1 Crimes**	1,989	1,528	1,563	-23.18%	2.29%
Part 2 Crimes**	1,977	1,645	1,721	-16.79%	4.62%
Total	3,966	3,173	3,284	-19.99%	3.50%

Source: NIBRS Data

BerryDunn notes that COVID-19 was an active health concern from 2020 – 2021. Some organizations have suggested that the pandemic reduced overall CFS volumes, including reported crimes. BerryDunn did not study full CFS data for the City for 2019 – 2020, so it is unclear whether the pandemic may have affected the data reflected in Table 1.7. However, BerryDunn has conducted multi-year CFS analyses for other police departments across the pandemic years and has not observed a significant reduction pattern that is attributable to the pandemic. Regardless, BerryDunn is unable to explain the reasons for the noted reductions.

## V. Call for Service Data

In addition to examining crime data, BerryDunn also typically evaluates non-crime service-related data. During this project, BerryDunn learned that the City does not currently record all police-related incident contact information within the records management system (RMS). Best practices dictate that police agencies should record all police-related contacts within their data systems. Collecting this information provides for data analysis and accountability (and BerryDunn has provided a formal recommendation for this in Chapter 4). Because DPD does not consistently record this information within its RMS, there was little value in performing an analysis of RMS data. Instead, BerryDunn examined the service data in the computer aided dispatch (CAD) system. For the dataset evaluated, BerryDunn noted 13,326 service-related incidents.<sup>16</sup> BerryDunn evaluates these data in detail in Chapter 4 but notes that the data reflects categories and workloads consistent with a full-service police agency.

## Summary

Dunwoody is in DeKalb County, Georgia, is a northern suburb of Atlanta, and is part of the Atlanta metropolitan area. The City is approximately 13.2 square miles and has an estimated population of 49,356. The Police Department is authorized for 64 full-time sworn positions and 14 non-sworn staff, and these allocations have been fairly consistent in recent years. The DPD is a relatively new police agency that was formed in 2009 with 40 officers. The current police

<sup>16</sup> SDI Table 1.9

chief helped establish the DPD, and BerryDunn observes that DPD operations are highly consistent with modern and best practices in policing.

The DPD is functionally structured and led by the chief of police and one deputy chief who commands two majors. One major is responsible for UPD and the other major is responsible for Administration and Criminal Investigations. The DPD organizational structure and spans of control appear appropriate for the department.

Crime and service data reviewed by BerryDunn are consistent with an agency like the DPD, particularly one that is positioned adjacent to a major urban area.

The City of Dunwoody is a growing community, with significant planned multi-unit housing, retail, and entertainment centers expected to be developed within the next five years. This growth will affect public safety workloads and will drive the need for additional staff for the DPD.

## Recommendations

BerryDunn has no formal recommendations for this chapter.

## Chapter 2: Organizational Leadership and Culture

*Organizational Leadership and Culture includes a review of organizational communication, ethics, accountability, supervision, management, and leadership philosophy.*

### I. Mission, Vision, Goals, and Objectives

The chief of police is responsible for the development, coordination, and implementation of the mission, core beliefs, and values for the department. These principles underpin the overall purpose of the DPD. At BerryDunn's request, the DPD provided a copy of its mission statement, which is outlined in DPD Policy A-3 and can also be found on the department's website:

The mission of the Dunwoody Police Department is to protect life and property by upholding the law through fair and impartial policing while being a trusted partner with our community in order to reduce crime and create a safer Dunwoody.

The vision statement for the DPD is also included in Policy A-3:

To provide a high level of professionalism, service and excellence in law enforcement while modeling our core values. By doing this, we enable our citizens to live, work and play safely, while enjoying an exceptional quality of life.

The DPD mission statement properly identifies and prioritizes several aspects, including a high level of service, community engagement, quality of life and community safety, and high professional standards for staff. BerryDunn observed that this mission statement was immediately visible on the department's website, centered on the first page. This positioning provides anyone who visits the website with immediate access to the department mission. Like the mission statement, the DPD's vision statement helps clarify what the Police Department wants to be in fulfilling its public safety mission. The vision statement is succinct and provides staff with an understanding of what police administration expects—and hopes to achieve on behalf of the community.

Within the same policy, the DPD outlines goals and activities to be accomplished to support achieving the department's mission. Although the list is appropriate, the items listed essentially describe practices that all modern police agencies should strive to achieve. While these items are helpful—and seeking to accomplish them is commendable—the department would benefit from a set of current goals and objectives to act upon.

During the course of interviews, BerryDunn asked DPD staff about their knowledge of the mission, vision, values, and goals of the department and whether staff felt that these are driving points for organizational leaders in making operational decisions. BerryDunn also asked staff whether these areas are communicated, emphasized, or reinforced within the department.

The response to BerryDunn's inquiries was positive. Most expressed their belief that organizational leaders were conscious of the mission and that the foundational factors of the mission were prominent in the decision-making process. DPD staff's familiarity with the agency's mission, vision, and objectives has improved from previous years but could use some

improvement by reinforcing them more frequently. Although the department has made efforts in this area, ongoing promotion of these concepts is a requisite activity in developing and maintaining a healthy and productive operational culture. BerryDunn encourages the DPD to continue, and to increase, its formal reinforcement of these principles and ideals.

## II. Accountability, Ethics, and Integrity

During interviews with staff, it was clear to BerryDunn that DPD strives to instill strong ethical values and the highest level of integrity in its members and that these concepts are regularly practiced and reinforced. Staff clearly indicated that there is an early intervention system that works with a software system—Guardian—for accountability and complaint tracking. Staff also explained that there is a process for documenting performance, supervision, and mentoring and coaching regularly. However, there is a need to formalize the process of documenting and sharing employee performance issues and corrective responses. Staff expressed that the Internal Affairs (IA) process is fair, but investigations and accountability outcomes could be timelier.

## III. Leadership Style

The BerryDunn team had an opportunity to interact with organizational leaders in various meetings and interviews. Based on the interviews, the review of various department documents and reports, and the observations of the team, BerryDunn found the leadership—at all levels within the department—competent, engaged, and concerned with making decisions that benefit the community and the organization.

Those interviewed described a pattern of leadership internally that is sometimes varied among supervisors and typically contingency/situationally based. Many remarked that there is a good balance in leadership styles throughout the organization, from delegating to directing, and that there is no singular style followed. Staff described a pattern of leadership internally that encourages feedback from all ranks and involves monthly meetings and opportunities for feedback to staff from leadership.

BerryDunn also asked staff about the level of empowerment within DPD. Most of the officers and other line-level staff expressed that they feel empowered to complete their work and that they know they can get help from their supervisor if needed. Staff reported that there is a high level of autonomy, and they do not feel micro-managed. Generally, staff were complimentary of organizational leaders, with several directly complimenting Chief Grogan in particular.

## 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Assessment

Like most police agencies, the DPD desires to provide current, relevant, professional, and best-practices public safety services to its community. The most comprehensive and meaningful publication providing guidance on policing in the modern era is the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Task

Force Report commissioned by then-President Obama and published in 2015.<sup>17</sup> The report provides six pillars for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing and outlines the best and most contemporary industry standards and practices and “ways of fostering strong, collaborative relationships between local law enforcement and the communities they protect.”<sup>18</sup>

The six pillars include:

- Building Trust and Legitimacy
- Policy and Oversight
- Technology and Social Media
- Community Policing and Crime Reduction
- Training and Education
- Officer Wellness and Safety

BerryDunn asked command staff at the DPD to complete a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing survey, designed to assess the operational alignment of the agency against the six primary pillars the task force identified. The survey consisted of 60 questions, separated among the six pillar areas. For each question, command staff were asked to independently assess whether the department regularly engages in practices that are consistent with the task force recommendation area, or whether the department inconsistently does so, or not at all. Given the average scores reflected in its self-review,<sup>19</sup> it is evident that there are opportunities for the DPD to expand its alignment with 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing standards. To maximize those opportunities, BerryDunn recommends the DPD develop a process for pursuing, maintaining, and monitoring the department’s actions in pursuit of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing standards.

Within the context of this survey, it is important to understand that not all the task force recommendations apply equally to each agency. Further, the surveys for this portion of the study were completed independently by command staff based on their interpretation of the task force recommendation and their subjective assessment of the operational aspects of the agency in relation to each topical area (which for some, might be limited). Lastly, there is no specific standard or expected score for any of the pillar areas or the overall rating. Instead, BerryDunn provides this survey as one mechanism for examining and assessing various aspects of the agency, with the intent of encouraging additional discussion and consideration in any areas in which command staff scored the agency low.

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<sup>17</sup> Final Report of The President’s Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing – [http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce\\_finalreport.pdf](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> [https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce\\_finalreport.pdf](https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> SDI Table 2.1



## IV. Communication

Within a policing environment that includes a diversely scheduled 24/7 work force, it is critical to develop communication processes that work to help ensure all messages reach their intended target. This must be done in a timely manner, and it must provide for consistent and accurate messaging. There can never be too many avenues of communication capacity, and redundancy with internal communications can be a positive attribute, especially when combined with operational transparency. Virtually every organization has some level of discord with regard to communication, as does the DPD. Although DPD staff were generally positive about internal communication—noting that it has improved with more frequent updates from the chief—some expressed a desire for further improvement and consistency with all leaders within the organization.

During interviews with staff, BerryDunn inquired about various aspects of organizational communication within the DPD. Staff reported internal communication as an operational challenge, noting that communication between command and multiple units could be more effective. Staff also said communication is better with some supervisors than others but noted that information on critical decisions or operational strategies needs to be consistently shared with staff. Despite mentioning that it could be better, staff did not indicate substantial problems resulting from communication issues. Still, several staff identified this as an area for improvement.

The desire for improved communication and leadership is a common theme at all agencies BerryDunn studies. For the DPD, there is an opportunity to identify positive communication and leadership strategies to manage current operations and to assist with the prioritization and implementation of the recommendations produced by this study. This process will ultimately support any changes that result from this project. Accordingly, BerryDunn recommends the DPD engage in a collaborative process to align operational leaders and develop strategic leadership and communication plans to further organizational goals, objectives, and project recommendations.

## V. Management and Supervision

BerryDunn also explored the issue of supervisor accountability and reporting and asked various supervisors to describe how work performance expectations are communicated to supervisors within the department. Although supervisor duties are outlined in policy and some informal mentoring occurs, there is no formal or consistent process for outlining supervisory roles or expectations for new or promoted supervisors. Despite the lack of a formal process, supervisors explained they have regular meetings with the DPD chain of command—including the chief of police—to discuss and identify priorities.

The lack of a formal process for training supervisors is not unusual; however, there is a significant need to have such a process, especially for new sergeants. For most new sergeants, the transition from line level to supervisor is very difficult, as they find themselves functioning as part of the organizational leadership for the first time.

## Field Supervisor Training

Many organizations have found that developing a field supervisor training (FST) program can be helpful in bridging this gap for new sergeants. This training can include instruction on relevant policies and practices, supervisor expectations and limitations, and other information that aids sergeants in their mission. Because of the vital role they play within the organization, it is critical that new sergeants are positioned for success, and BerryDunn recommends that the DPD develop an FST program. The structure should be tailored to the needs of the DPD and customized based on the duties and responsibilities that sergeants are expected to perform. Additional details on this recommendation have been included in Chapter 9 of this report.

## VI. Mentoring, Coaching, and Succession Planning

During this project BerryDunn examined mentoring and coaching opportunities and succession planning strategies within the DPD. Staff interviewed told BerryDunn that they do not have a formal mentoring program, and the department does not have a formal policy on mentoring, nor a professional development and succession plan.

When high-potential, highly motivated employees are presented with the chance to learn, lead, and/or advance, they will take advantage of those opportunities. With this in mind, it is critical for agencies to cultivate and guide these quality employees, or the agency runs the risk of those employees becoming disenchanted or even seeking to leave the agency for other career opportunities. Currently, the DPD does not have a formal system in place to identify these high-potential employees or a program to cultivate them once identified.

Based on the information provided, it is evident to BerryDunn that some staff members have been mentored in a variety of ways, but the department does not have a consistent methodology for mentoring or developing staff or a policy for a formal mentoring program. Part of the fundamental obligations of a high-performing organization is to help staff learn, grow, and become more effective within their roles. A successful organization must also help prepare staff for promotion to supervisory and command-level positions. To do this effectively, the department must create an atmosphere that not only encourages personnel development, but specifically prepares staff for those opportunities through an intentional process. Accordingly, BerryDunn recommends the development of a formal mentoring program and professional development policy that supports staff in their current roles as well as identifies and develops potential leaders and those who have already been promoted who wish to advance further.

## VII. Performance Appraisals

Departments typically use performance appraisals to engage staff in a process that supports the vision, mission, and values of the department. They are a means by which supervisors formally interact with staff to mentor and promote their success, as well as to identify areas where training might improve performance. Ultimately, the appraisal process should be fair and transparent, develop growth and learning, and identify problems early so that interventions can bring a problem to resolution before it becomes unmanageable. Lastly, supervisors should view

performance appraisals as a helpful tool they can complete in a timely manner, not merely a perfunctory duty.

Performance management and appraisal systems come in a wide variety of structures and formats, but the effective characteristics of such a system generally involve the following key components:

- Specific performance standards are established and communicated
- Performance is reviewed on the basis of results/output (quality, quantity, timeliness)
- Communication and feedback are provided on an ongoing basis<sup>20</sup>

Many organizations use performance appraisal systems to monitor past performance but also as tools to help personnel learn, grow, and develop, whether this relates to their current role or to future roles within the organization. When these elements are included in the performance appraisal process, the following additional components are typically included:

- Coaching
- Mentoring
- Individual development plans<sup>21</sup>

BerryDunn recognizes that performance appraisal systems often receive criticism by those who must be evaluated, and designing a system that is effective and most staff agree with is an arduous task. Although criticism is typical, for the DPD, staff were largely positive about the system in use. Still, the DPD might benefit from reviewing its current system for possible adjustment. Common areas of consideration include:

- Methods to help ensure that supervisors conduct these evaluations consistently, fairly, and objectively
- Officer shift rotations and methods to help ensure that the evaluation of each officer includes a review by each supervisor they have worked for during the evaluation period
- Systems for identifying Key Performance Areas (KPA's) for each job specialty and a mechanism for including and evaluating these
- Goal setting and monitoring and provisions for scheduling and documenting these interactions between the staff member and supervisor
- Monitoring of other key areas identified for the department, such as community policing or leadership, for example

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<sup>20</sup> <https://hr.uiowa.edu/faq/what-are-characteristics-effective-performance-management-program>

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/toolkits/pages/developingemployees.aspx>

Again, staff feedback regarding the current appraisal was positive. However, it is possible the DPD and its staff could benefit from making adjustments to the appraisal form and process, and BerryDunn suggests the DPD consider reviewing the current system with staff for possible revisions.

## VIII. Union/Labor Management

As part of this project, BerryDunn explored labor relations between staff at the DPD and the administration. BerryDunn learned that Police Department staff are not unionized. BerryDunn inquired about any grievances filed by staff regarding City labor practices and learned that no grievances have been filed in the past two years. BerryDunn has no concerns over employer-employee relationships within the DPD. Additionally, none of the staff BerryDunn interviewed expressed a concern in this area.

## IX. Workforce Survey

Workforce perceptions, attitudes, and expectations constitute essential information for understanding the current culture and effectiveness of an organization. This information assists in diagnosing opportunities for constructive change and managing organizational transformation. BerryDunn surveyed the DPD workforce to capture such information and to broaden staff involvement in the study.

### Survey Structure

The electronic survey offered to all staff consisted of a respondent profile (current assignment), 51 content items (opinion/perception), seven organizational climate items, and an open comments option that solicited feedback on what the department does well, what is in need of improvement, and any other comments the respondent wished to provide. The content items section elicited employee responses in 10 different dimensions. Each of the dimension sections of the survey consisted of five or six forced-choice questions. At the request of BerryDunn, the DPD distributed the survey electronically via a link provided through the DPD email system to every member of the agency, sworn and non-sworn, and the chief of police promoted participation. Survey protocols promoted anonymity of the respondents.

### Survey Response

BerryDunn received 66 responses to the survey, out of 78 possible positions, representing an 84.61% return rate (assuming all positions were staffed, which BerryDunn is aware was not the case). Of the 66 completed responses, 58 also submitted narrative replies to at least one of the three open-ended questions. The return rates are statistically significant and indicative of the desire of staff to engage in the process of self-analysis and improvement. Additionally, there

was a balanced response from command, professional staff, patrol, investigations, and specialty positions.<sup>22</sup>

## Survey Analysis – Content Section

Survey results are most useful to isolate conditions and practices that need attention and/or those that offer an opportunity to advance the effectiveness of operations, achievement of outcomes, and the overall health of the workplace. For each content survey dimension, respondents chose between the following responses: never, occasionally, usually, frequently, or always. BerryDunn assigned numeric values of 1 – 5 (with 1 being low or never and 5 being high or always), respectively. In some cases, if the question did not apply, respondents could also choose an N/A response. For each of the 10 dimensions, BerryDunn calculated the weighted average of the responses. Table 2.1 provides these data.

**Table 2.1: Survey Response Categories**

Survey Category	Average	Study Comparisons	
		Range	Average
Leadership	3.76	2.54 to 3.35	2.88
Communication	3.66	2.4 to 3.09	2.71
Accountability and Fairness	3.85	2.49 to 3.16	2.83
Job Satisfaction	4.10	2.81 to 3.73	3.18
Training	3.77	2.24 to 3.51	2.95
Equipment and Technology	3.95	1.95 to 3.37	2.90
Patrol Staffing and Deployment	2.53	1.78 to 2.69	2.18
Investigations Staffing and Assignments	1.97	1.43 to 2.67	2.08
Community Policing/Engagement	3.82	2.76 to 3.73	3.29
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion	4.16	3.55 to 4.05	3.80

Source: Organizational Survey

The scores for the dimensions in Table 2.1 represent the weighted aggregate score from the respondents from multiple questions within the survey. The average response was at or below 2.5 (assessed as a pivotal threshold for responses) for only one category, with one category at 2.53; these categories are highlighted in light blue in the table. The lower numbers suggest a certain level of dissatisfaction or challenge/concern with the current condition. It is noteworthy, however, that eight of the ten categories from the survey registered an aggregate score over

<sup>22</sup> SDI Table 2.2

3.5, and all eight of these categories surpass the high range from prior studies BerryDunn has conducted. These results suggest a healthy climate with high job satisfaction.

## Organizational Climate

The second portion of the survey involved an analysis of the organizational climate using specific survey questions that directly target certain operational areas. By their construction, these questions provide a different vantage point from typical quantitative questions and a readily observable range, both in reference to how the organization currently functions and how it should ideally function based on the opinion of the respondents. These questions engage a 10-point scale, with 1 being low and 10 being high. BerryDunn has provided the response data in Table 2.2.

Because there is no correct or incorrect response, BerryDunn will not provide an analysis here with regard to any specific question or category of the information in Table 2.2. Instead, the department is encouraged to examine the responses below and to consider what adjustments, if any, might be appropriate to respond to the desired level noted by staff who took the survey.

In that analysis, BerryDunn recommends the DPD look closely at the difference between the current rating and the desired rating. A larger delta (or variance) indicates a more significant area of concern and/or need for deeper exploration.

There are three important aspects of the organizational climate survey from Table 2.2 that make this a versatile tool:

1. There is no correct or right response. The responses reflect the collective desires of the staff at the DPD, and as such, they are representative of the current and desired culture of the DPD, as opposed to an arbitrary standard that is set elsewhere.
2. This tool has tremendous utility. The categories in this questionnaire are clear and the agency can easily identify, based on the responses, which areas require focused attention.
3. This tool is brief and easily replicable. The agency can re-administer this survey at various intervals, and the results can help the agency recognize whether its efforts are shifting in one or more of these cultural areas and whether they are successful.

**Table 2.2: Organizational Climate Assessment**

<b>CONFORMITY:</b> The feeling that there are many externally imposed constraints in the organization; the degree to which members feel that there are rules, procedures, policies, and practices to which they have to conform, rather than being able to do their work as they see fit.		
Conformity is very characteristic of the organization	<b>Current</b>	<b>7.27</b>
Conformity should be a characteristic of the organization	<b>Desired</b>	<b>7.05</b>
<b>RESPONSIBILITY:</b> Members of the organization are given personal responsibility to achieve their part of the organization's goals; the degree to which members feel that they can make decisions and solve problems without checking with supervisors each step of the way.		
There is great emphasis on personal responsibility in the organization	<b>Current</b>	<b>8.15</b>
There should be great emphasis on personal responsibility in the organization	<b>Desired</b>	<b>8.97</b>
<b>STANDARDS:</b> The emphasis the organization places on quality performance and outstanding production; the degree to which members feel the organization is setting challenging goals for itself and communicating those goals to its members.		
High challenging standards are set in the organization	<b>Current</b>	<b>7.32</b>
High challenging standards should be set/expected in the organization	<b>Desired</b>	<b>8.61</b>
<b>REWARDS:</b> The degree to which members feel that they are being recognized and rewarded for good work rather than being ignored, criticized, or punished when things go wrong.		
Members are recognized and rewarded positively within the organization	<b>Current</b>	<b>7.11</b>
Members should be recognized and rewarded positively within the organization	<b>Desired</b>	<b>8.98</b>
<b>ORGANIZATIONAL CLARITY:</b> The feeling among members that things are well organized and goals are clearly defined rather than being disorderly or confused.		
The organization is well organized with clearly defined goals	<b>Current</b>	<b>7.61</b>
The organization should be well organized and have clearly defined goals	<b>Desired</b>	<b>9.05</b>
<b>WARMTH AND SUPPORT:</b> The feeling of friendliness is a valued norm in the organization; that members trust one another and offer support to one another. The feeling that good relationships prevail in the work environment.		
Warmth and support are very characteristic of the organization	<b>Current</b>	<b>7.94</b>
Warmth and support should be very characteristic of the organization	<b>Desired</b>	<b>8.91</b>
<b>LEADERSHIP:</b> The willingness of organization members to accept leadership and direction from other qualified personnel. As needs for leadership arise, members feel free to take leadership roles and are rewarded for successful leadership. Leadership is based on expertise. The organization is not dominated by, or dependent on, one or two persons.		
Members accept and are rewarded for leadership based on expertise	<b>Current</b>	<b>7.48</b>
Members should accept and be rewarded for leadership based on expertise	<b>Desired</b>	<b>8.88</b>

Source: Organizational Survey



## Survey Analysis – Qualitative Responses

Within the climate survey, staff were afforded the opportunity to provide open-ended feedback regarding what the department does well, what is in need of improvement, and any other comments they wanted to provide.

Unlike quantitative analysis—which can be easily broken down into numeric representations, ratios, or percentages—qualitative data can be much more difficult to present. The process of evaluating and reporting qualitative data involves looking for similarities in the data and grouping them into a manageable number (usually four to six) of overarching *themes*. Data within these themed areas may be positive, negative, neither, or both—including comments that merely make suggestions. The analysis provided here engages a contemplative process of considering each of the data elements (narrative responses) to determine within which themed area it may be most appropriately categorized, and then to consider the substance of each response in relation to the theme area and the other data within that category. Topics within each theme can certainly impact topics in other themes, and those connections, when significant, have been highlighted in this analysis.

### Qualitative Response Analysis

Of those who took the survey, 87.87% provided a narrative response to one or more questions. The responses included positive feedback, critical observations, and comments regarding opportunities for improvement. Not unexpectedly, responses and feedback were mixed or even conflicting. Respondents provided several specific examples of what is being done well, along with specific recommendations about how areas could be improved, and many responses were lengthy and detailed. The response rate and the detailed level of responses suggests a climate in which employees are aware of working conditions at the department and eager to have a positive influence on efforts to enhance those working conditions and the services provided to the community.

BerryDunn conducted a thorough qualitative review of the survey responses and has summarized the responses into several primary themes, which are provided below.

### Leadership

Based on the qualitative survey responses returned to BerryDunn, the staff at Dunwoody hold leadership with high regard. Those who responded provided valuable information about the perceptions of leadership within the department. Several comments included that the leadership welcomes new employees and does an excellent job of recognizing officers who go well beyond their assigned duties. There is a sense of belonging; every staff member has a voice in the process and can express concerns.

There were, however, concerns about the difference between leadership and supervisory qualities—and the ability to understand the difference between those qualities when making promotional decisions. Respondents indicate that there are leadership books that the command staff has read, but leaders seem to inconsistently apply those leadership concepts.

Respondents suggested that the ability of upper command staff to recognize that a supervisor is



struggling to lead effectively should be addressed so that those supervisors can contribute at a level that benefits the department and its organizational goals.

There was a comment that some leaders within the organization are focused more on their individual goals and values than those of the organization. Responses indicate there is a need for increased focus on the evolution of policing, and being more forward-thinking and progressive, while listening to staff who offer progressive ideas for the future.

Respondents suggested that leaders need to accept the changing employee environment. That new environment includes staff wanting to feel valued when providing suggestions for change, wanting more input on policy changes, and asking for long-term planning for the department. Respondents suggested that DPD leaders should be creating the agency's identity, and rather than following current trends, leaders should explore and broaden the uniqueness of the department.

Overall, comments about leadership within the organization were positive. Observations indicated that the department does an excellent job of treating staff with respect. Respondents proudly report that department has been adaptable to the constantly changing needs of the City, despite resource challenges. Respondents report a positive work environment, and one that treats people with respect and promotes a culture that is positive and focused on community policing.

## Organization

### Communication

There were several comments about communication in the qualitative survey. The observations suggest that overall, communication within the DPD is generally effective. However, some statements indicate a desire for improvements in communication between command staff and the internal divisions, units, and teams. Respondents indicated the need for better two-way communication between command and line staff so that command staff are more aware of challenges within the department.

### Compensation

Compensation was a common concern, with several indicating the need for salary growth to help keep up with surrounding city police departments. There were comments about increasing the reimbursement for housing due to the cost of living and rising housing costs in the City, and there were also remarks that the compensation for sergeants and other supervisory ranks is in need of adjustment. Other comments suggest that the City needs to be competitive with surrounding agencies to retain staff, and there is a need to provide room for career growth that includes pay/rank and performance incentives. Comments suggest that compensation challenges increase the stress of staff due to the inability to make ends meet and the need to work extra jobs to do so.

BerryDunn is aware that during this project, the City has taken several steps to adjust compensation for DPD staff.

## Training

Survey comments suggest that the department is training officers well and that there is a clear investment and commitment to sending officers and staff to advanced training throughout the year. This results in a more confident and capable team. Although there is a commitment to training, requests are reportedly often denied due to staffing shortages (although submitted and reviewed data does not support this assertion). The staffing shortage is reportedly overburdening officers with CFS response and other associated duties, which reduces the time they have available for training.

There were several general comments regarding training:

- There was a suggestion that police services representatives (PSRs) would benefit from having a clear and concise training manual instead of notes and an unorganized system for training.
- Mentoring and coaching would benefit younger officers, allowing information sharing and training between ranks and specialized positions to help support training opportunities.
- Roll calls should also be a training opportunity and used more wisely to review policies and provide information and training to help develop officers daily.
- Police training officers (PTOs) need to train consistently and communicate so that they share the same values and expectations and can be consistent in the delivery of training to new officers.
- There is a need to develop clearer guidelines for how to complete department paperwork, as there is often inconsistency between trainers and supervisors on the correct process and content.

## Equipment

The issue of squad cars came up often throughout the survey with officers indicating a shortage of fleet vehicles and no backup vehicles, which can cause officers to wait for a long time for the next available car.

There were a couple of comments about the facility and where the Police Department is stationed, with some indicating they would prefer a new building with parking that is secure for officers.

## Morale

Staff suggested that increasing the number of officers at the department would improve overall morale within the department. Other than a desire for better pay and more officers, morale was not highlighted as a concern by those who responded to the survey.

## Staffing

Although comments reflect that staffing is improving, it is still challenging. Many noted the need for more patrol officers to help support CFS. Staff commented that they need more officers to meet the demand of a growing city, suggesting they are unable to get everything done the way it should be done due to high workloads. Despite the officer shortage, officers continue to show up daily to serve Dunwoody's residents.

Retaining officers at DPD was also reported as an issue. Respondents suggested there is a need for more specialized units and opportunities for professional advancement like other departments so that employees will stay.

## Qualitative Review Conclusion

The level of sincerity, detail, and sophistication included in the survey responses indicates an organization whose members care deeply about the organization and its success. Similarly, the inclusion of observations about positive aspects of the department reveals honesty and frankness about participation in the survey. This survey produced meaningful information that helps illuminate several themes that affect department performance, including both positive attributes, areas for improvement, and areas that combine some aspects of both. Respondents also provided specific observations and suggestions that can contribute to a meaningful overall agency assessment and assist in the production of effective recommendations for performance enhancement.

## Summary

Leaders within the DPD have demonstrated a commitment to ensuring that the department is operating in an efficient and effective manner, in furtherance of the public safety mission for the organization in serving the community. Although the DPD has an appropriate mission statement, goals, and objectives within its policies, the department would benefit from updating these on a consistent basis and developing a process of ongoing promotion of these concepts.

The DPD is a professional organization that prides itself on being ethical and holding itself and staff members accountable to the community and to each other.

DPD leadership does not engage a singular operational style but instead uses a variety of styles that are situationally based, taking into account the individual and task at hand. Many staff feel empowered and feel they have an opportunity to provide input into operational discussions and decisions that will affect them.

The DPD desires to provide an approach to law enforcement that is highly consistent with industry best practices and the components of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing; however, there are some areas within the six pillars that would benefit from additional focused attention.

As with many other police departments, one area where the DPD could improve pertains to communication. Although the DPD has traditionally used a variety of methods to help ensure robust internal communication, some staff indicate this could be better.

One primary area of focus for the DPD involves the need for mentoring, coaching, and developing staff. BerryDunn recommends the DPD vigorously pursue a staff development plan and a mentoring program.


Although the DPD has an appraisal system, it is generic and may benefit from some adjustment and customization to department needs. Some enhancements to the appraisal system could include more focus on tracking key operational goals and establishing personal goal development, progress, and monitoring components. Although criticism over appraisal systems is common, some additional improvements might be helpful, particularly if these are done in conjunction with developing and implementing a mentoring program and a personnel development plan. BerryDunn recommends the DPD consider possible revisions to the appraisal system.


Through the organizational climate and culture survey, staff identified a number of areas they feel require some attention. Organizational leaders should use this information as a prompt for action to better understand why staff feel this way and to guide internal discussion and decision-making to mitigate any staff concerns. Despite these noted areas, staff were highly complementary of department leaders and co-workers and demonstrated a desire for professionalism and a high level of service to the community.

## Recommendations

This section provides the formal recommendations from this chapter, presented chronologically as they appear within the chapter. Each recommendation table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, and details concerning the findings and recommendations.

**Table 2.3: Chapter 2 Recommendations**

Organizational Leadership and Culture		
No.	Communications and Leadership Strategy	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 2, Section IV: Communication: Organizational Leadership and Culture</i>		
2-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> Because of its criticality, all agencies, including the DPD, need to continuously focus on positive, active leadership and communication. This project, and the recommendations that it will produce, provide an additional need, and opportunity, for the DPD to focus on these areas.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should work collaboratively to develop an intentional and strategic approach to communication and leadership. The DPD should engage in joint discussions to position leaders to manage current operations and to assist with prioritization and implementation of the recommendations produced by this study.	

Organizational Leadership and Culture		
No.	Personnel Development Plan	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 2, Section VI: Mentoring, Coaching, and Succession Planning</i>		
2-2	<p><b>Finding:</b> DPD does not have a formal staff development system that includes systems or mechanisms for consistent coaching, mentoring, or succession planning.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> BerryDunn recommends DPD develop a formal coaching, mentoring, and succession planning program for staff and that the program be memorialized in policy and executed consistently in practice.</p> <p>In order to help ensure success within each operational role and to prepare those within the department for formal supervisory and command-level positions and/or informal leadership opportunities, the department must create an atmosphere that encourages personnel development and specifically prepares staff for opportunities through a deliberate and intentional process.</p>	

## Chapter 3: Operations and Staffing

*Operations and Staffing: includes an analysis of the organizational structure, policing philosophy, support services and specialty assignments, and organizational relationships.*

The structure of the DPD is similar to police departments across the United States, in that it follows a hierarchical chain of command. As noted previously, the department is split into two main divisions: Uniform Patrol Division and Administrative/Investigations, each of which is led by a major who reports to a deputy chief of police.

### I. Organizational Structure

There are many factors to consider in assessing whether the structure of the organization is appropriate and effective. At a minimum, a thorough review of the organizational structure would include the following areas:

1. Spans of control
2. Authority and oversight
3. Grouping of similar duties and responsibilities
4. Functional utility

Because there are a number of significant details and considerations that accompany a detailed review of the organizational structure of a police department, there can also be many possible solutions. This also means there is no standardized or prescriptive design. What is most important is whether the structure is serving its purpose and working for the agency. Based on BerryDunn's review and considering the above criteria, the DPD organizational structure is functional, meets operational needs, and conforms to industry expectations and standards.

### II. Policing Philosophy and Operations

One component of this assessment includes an analysis of the policing philosophy and the prioritized focus of the organization. This is significant because the BerryDunn staffing model includes substantial discretionary time, which functions best in an environment predisposed to promoting community policing. BerryDunn heard that community policing is an important aspect of operational philosophy of the department; this was conveyed both in the kickoff meeting with the command staff and in the interviews conducted with various staff members. Chapter 5 of this report explores and expands upon these issues. In short, various recommendations in this report intend to support a community policing operational philosophy and the ability of staff to carry out that function.

Community-oriented policing, or COP, is a policing strategy that relies heavily on a combination of community involvement in public safety issues, police presence in the community, and collaboration between police and community to address problems that manifest in crime and disorder. Despite the clear expression of community policing as an overarching philosophy and

organizational commitment, for many in Patrol, however, it is not a question of whether they agree with or understand the fundamental COP philosophy—the more pressing issue is how they can find the time to be more proactive in this area. It is evident to BerryDunn that staffing and personnel deployment issues have contributed to difficulties for patrol officers in successfully engaging in meaningful community policing activities on a consistent basis. However, if adjustments are made to staffing and personnel deployments, patrol staff should be afforded more time to perform this vital aspect of work. So, although the department has stressed the importance of community policing throughout the organization, there is work to be done to help ensure that these philosophies filter into daily practice within Patrol in a more thoughtful, intentional, and meaningful manner.

### III. Support Services, Specialty Programs, and Assignments

This section describes the various units and programs within the DPD that provide the resources for officers to do their job and meet the demands of the public. This section will briefly overview the operational divisions and sections that exist for the purpose of supporting the core mission of effectively policing the City. Much of the information from this section was provided directly from the command staff within the DPD. Although BerryDunn mentions them briefly in this section, several areas are addressed in detail later in this report. Those areas include the following:

- Patrol (Chapter 4: Patrol Services)
- Investigations (Chapter 6: Investigations Services)
- Crime Analysis (Chapter 8: Data, Technology, and Equipment)
- Training (Chapter 9: Training and Education)
- Recruiting and Hiring (Chapter 10: Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion)
- Professional Standards/Internal Affairs (Chapter 11: Professional Standards/Internal Affairs)

#### Office of the Chief

The Office of the Chief includes the chief of police, one deputy chief, one executive assistant, and two majors. The chief of police has functional oversight over the entire department and direct oversight over IA, the deputy chief, the majors, and the executive assistant. There are no noted staffing needs for this operational area of the department.

#### IA/Professional Standards

There is currently no full-time non-sworn staff member assigned to IA. There is a complaint process available on the DPD website, and individuals can file a complaint (or a commendation) on the website, in person, or by phone. Complaints received are reviewed for assignment and may be assigned to the employees' chain of command for investigation or to the designated IA investigator. Although there are no personnel assigned full time to IA, the lieutenant over

investigations is responsible for formal IA cases. This lieutenant is responsible for managing the Office of Professional Standards (IA) and reports directly to the chief of police.

## Administrative Services/Criminal Investigations

This area of operations is supervised by a major, and it is broken out into two divisions: Administrative Services and Criminal Investigations. Both of these divisions are led by a lieutenant.

### Administrative Services

The Administrative Services Division assists in the day-to-day operations of the DPD through community outreach, property and evidence management, public information, and general police services to the public. This division is led by a sworn lieutenant and includes three additional sworn officers (including one sergeant) and nine non-sworn staff members (including one supervisor). Significant units in this section include Records, PSRs, Community Outreach/Public Information Office (PIO), and Property and Evidence. The purpose of this unit is to provide overall support to the department by facilitating, planning, directing, and coordinating activities to help ensure the organization and its facilities have the staff and resources needed to operate efficiently. Staff in this division generally work standard business hours, except that PSRs work 12-hour shifts and cover 24 hours, seven days a week.

Although the lieutenant supervises the Administrative Services Division, a sworn sergeant oversees Community Outreach, PIO, and Property and Evidence (among other areas). A non-sworn supervisor oversees Records and the PSRs. DPD Administrative Services Division leaders have indicated the need for additional staffing to manage recruiting and hiring and to support the PSR Unit.

The following list outlines several significant functions performed by the Administrative Services Division:

- Budget and purchasing – (non-sworn) property and evidence technician
- Georgia Criminal Information Center (GCIC) liaison (terminal agency coordinator) (non-sworn) records supervisor
- IT coordination – (non-sworn) property and evidence technician
- Planning, research, and development – sworn and non-sworn supervisors
- Records and clerical – (non-sworn) PSRs
- Court liaison – (sworn) community outreach officer
- Certification (sworn) administrative sergeant
- Wrecker services (non-sworn) PSRs
- Property and evidence (non-sworn) property and evidence technician



- Permits and identification (non-sworn) records/PSRs
- Building maintenance – (non-sworn) executive assistant
- DeKalb County Adult Detention Center liaison (sworn) unit commander
- Training functions (sworn) administrative lieutenant and sergeant
- Recruiting and hiring (sworn) administrative lieutenant and sergeant
- PIO (sworn) administrative sergeant
- Community outreach/PIO (sworn) community outreach officer
- Uniforms and equipment
- Travel

BerryDunn observed that except for the executive assistant to the chief of police, the DPD has no other non-sworn administrative personnel. The administration of fleet, accreditation, recruiting and hiring, and other ancillary duties consumes significant time, energy, and intellectual capacity of assigned sworn personnel, particularly DPD leaders, which distracts them from supervision responsibilities including accountability, coaching, and mentoring. Hiring non-sworn professional staff to attend to these responsibilities represents a growing and promising national trend that reflects the reality that hiring sworn personnel is more difficult, expensive, and takes more time than hiring professional staff. Additionally, the utilization of professional staff often provides greater consistency and tenure in these vital roles that do not require sworn authority to perform. Accordingly, BerryDunn recommends the addition of one non-sworn administrative position. This position would manage the department fleet, support hiring and recruiting, and perform other administrative tasks for the DPD.

### Records/Records Supervisor

This position, which is staffed by one non-sworn supervisor, is responsible for the direct supervision of the PSRs and for ensuring agency compliance with all rules and regulations of the Georgia Criminal Information Center and National Criminal Information Center (GCIC/NCIC). State and national criminal information centers like GCIC and NCIC are information sharing tools and databases for crime-related information such as information about wanted persons, missing persons, protection orders, etc. The records supervisor provides training, initial certification, recertification, and review of work performed for GCIC/NCIC compliance. Additionally, the position is responsible for retrieving police reports; processing citations; verifying, retrieving, entering, and changing information stored on GCIC; dispersing information to police personnel and citizens; and entering and retrieving information on the in-house computer system.

### PSRs

The position is staffed with six non-sworn personnel. PSRs work 12-hour shifts and cover the front desk 24/7. PSRs are responsible for retrieving police reports; processing citations;

verifying, retrieving, entering, and changing information stored on GCIC; dispersing information to police personnel and citizens; and entering and retrieving information on the in-house computer system. Other duties also include, checking on computer records, and filing records generated by the department. PSR staff also monitor and send teletypes (police messages) to and from other agencies and perform various duties at the front desk including operating the telephone switchboard, assisting citizens, bonding people out of jail, assisting the public in obtaining reports and information, collecting money for various services, and answering phones and taking messages for officers. PSRs also verify all information stored on GCIC by monitoring validation reports from GCIC, completing form letters on each entry, and writing supplemental reports to upgrade information. PSRs also run suspended and revoked licenses taken by officers through GCIC for status, complete forms and make copies of reports and licenses, mail original forms to the state and file copies, and conduct criminal history checks as needed to process case files and other requests.

As outlined, the PSRs provide a broad and important array of support functions for the DPD. Accordingly, providing sufficient staffing for this unit is a key factor in supporting overall operations and in doing so efficiently. The allocation of six PSR positions is sufficient for maintaining 24/7 coverage, although leave requests and training may complicate staffing and scheduling. Additionally, current allocations generally provide for only one person per day, per shift, which is insufficient to manage work volumes during the day. BerryDunn recommends adding one full-time PRS position to provide additional support during daytime business hours.

### Community Outreach/PIO

There are two full-time sworn officers assigned to Community Outreach. These personnel are supervised by the Administrative Services sergeant, who also serves as the PIO for the DPD. Community Outreach handles court security on Wednesdays and Thursdays, custody of prisoners, community outreach, the citizens on patrol program, volunteer bailiff, and the citizens police academy. There are no noted staffing needs for this unit.

### Property and Evidence

There are two full time non-sworn professional staff assigned to this unit. Those personnel carry out a variety of functions including, but not limited to, the following:

- Checks all property and evidence entered into computer databases and notifies supervisors of corrections needed
- Compiles, maintains, and issues all departmental equipment and supplies
- Maintains evidence and other property seized or held by the department until final disposition
- Prepares court orders for Superior Court authorizing disposal of all evidence and property, as authorized, when a case has been completed
- Testifies in court regarding chain of custody and any evidence analysis

- Coordinates evidence for court by working with appropriate individuals; creates copies of video and audio recordings for court and members of the public as requested
- Maintains and records chain of custody on all property and evidence taken into department; maintains computer records and written records of all property and evidence
- Orders and stocks all supplies for department and maintains access to department facility keys
- Issues and tracks citation books
- Maintains video recording server; conducts investigations when issuing special permits that require background and driver history checks; approves/disapproves permit requests based on the results of the background investigations; maintains files for each permit issued
- Issues special permits authorized by City ordinance; conducts investigations into the background of those individuals requesting special permits; records approved applications on the computer; maintains business files of businesses that are permitted
- Acts as the system administrator for the departmental RMS and is responsible for coordination of field reporting software
- Completes monthly UCR reporting

The DPD has suggested there is a need for additional non-sworn professional staff to manage workload volumes and enhance efficiency and accuracy within the unit. BerryDunn notes that the list of duties managed by this unit is substantial, and if quantified, would likely suggest the need for additional staff. However, BerryDunn recommends adjusting the allocation of two primary duties of this unit and suggests there may be an opportunity to reallocate other work as well.

Staff in this unit are responsible for various evidence functions, including intake, storage, and tracking. Proper maintenance of evidence intake and storage is a critical element of the criminal justice process. If the chain of evidence is compromised, important evidence could be excluded from a criminal proceeding by the court, and this could result in a failed prosecution. It is evident that the DPD has placed emphasis on this function, and assigned staff are clearly dedicated to their positions. BerryDunn observes, however, that these same staff members are the system administrators for the DPD's RMS.

Proper maintenance and control of evidence and other seized property is a key function for any police department, and it is also a significant liability area. The chain of custody over department-held property is critical for criminal cases, but it is also equally important to help ensure that high-risk property (e.g., drugs, negotiables, firearms) can be tracked and is not illegally removed from the property room. For this reason, those responsible for property intake, storage, and tracking should not act as system administrators for the department's RMS. This level of access could provide the opportunity, intentionally or otherwise, for misallocation of

high-risk property and manipulation of the internal property/evidence tracking systems for the department. Accordingly, BerryDunn recommends the DPD reallocate system administration for the RMS to another person who is not involved in the property and evidence intake and storage process.

In addition to this, BerryDunn notes that this unit is responsible for monthly UCR/NIBRS reporting from the RMS. This function could be reallocated to another person—such as the new RMS administrator—and this would relieve a significant workload from this unit. It is also likely that there could be other administrative functions that could be reallocated from this unit and routed to the PRS Unit and the administrative staff position BerryDunn has recommended. Given these recommendations and adjustments, it is likely that additional staffing would not be required for this unit.

### Community Policing

The Community Outreach Unit is responsible for establishing effective communication with the community through numerous outreach programs. There are two full-time sworn staff assigned to this unit. BerryDunn discusses COP in greater detail in Chapter 5.

### Criminal Investigations

The Criminal Investigations Division (CID) conducts all criminal investigations within the city of Dunwoody. These investigations are initiated through patrol officer contact, incident reports, tipsters, complaints, and agency mutual aid. The unit includes allocation of a major, lieutenant, sergeant crime scene technician, crime analyst, narcotics agent, and seven detectives. CID personnel work Monday through Friday, either 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. or 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Detectives also work a rotating on-call schedule, which includes an on-call detective and supervisor at all times. BerryDunn provides a detailed analysis of the CID in Chapter 6 of this report.

### Uniform Patrol

The Uniform Patrol Division (UPD) is responsible for all CFS response for the City. Patrol staff cover 24 hours per day, 365 days per year, and there are multiple shifts across each day. BerryDunn provides extensive details on the UPD in Chapter 4 of this report, but briefly describes some specialty units within the UPD below.

### Community Response Team (CRT)

The purpose of this unit is to respond to traffic complaints within the community, conduct various traffic details (e.g., crosswalk, distracted driver), and to assist the UPD with CFS, when needed. The CRT is allocated one sergeant and three sworn officers, although at the time of this report, there were two vacancies in this unit.

### K-9

The DPD currently has two K-9s, which involves the use of two sworn officers. This unit is supervised by the sergeant over CRT. K-9s work rotating shifts so that they can spend time on both the day and night shifts.

DPD staff have suggested the addition of two additional K-9s so that one K-9 unit can be deployed with each shift. Although BerryDunn recognizes the value of K-9s as an element of police operations, the DPD has pressing needs for general patrol and investigations, and as noted, also seeks to establish a street crimes unit. Given these operational needs, BerryDunn is not inclined to recommend adding additional K-9s to the DPD at this time.

### Prisoner Transport Officer (PTO)

The DPD staffs two non-sworn positions for prisoner transports, who are supervised by the UPD lieutenant. These staff members transport arrestees to or from court, or pick up arrestees from surrounding agencies, as appropriate. There are no apparent staffing needs for this unit.

## IV. Stakeholder Relationships

As part of this assessment, BerryDunn explored the various stakeholder relationships that affect the operation of the DPD, to include intra-agency (internal units and sections), interagency (other departments), and external stakeholders (professional partners).

### Intra-Agency Relationships

During interviews, DPD staff described internal operations and relationships between units as generally positive. BerryDunn found no evidence to suggest any pattern of internal conflict between units. BerryDunn did note a desire for better communication between the Patrol and Investigations Units. Staff reported this desire not as a problem but as an opportunity to improve and enhance productivity. BerryDunn notes that this is a commonality within police organizations and recommends that the DPD consider departmental communication between units as an important aspect of the overall communications strategy within the department.

### Interagency Relationships

When asked, DPD staff described relationships with area law enforcement as generally positive, including various partnerships on a variety of operational levels. Those interviewed noted they often consult with other agencies on partnerships and projects. Staff did not describe any interagency conflicts.

### Professional Partners

Within the context of this report, the term “professional” refers to other agencies the DPD interacts with on a regular basis, which might include law enforcement agencies or other organizations such as social services prosecutors, probation, advocates, mental health organizations, hospitals, and the medical examiner. At the request of BerryDunn, the DPD convened a group of professional partners to engage discussion concerning the working relationships and interactions between those interested groups and the DPD.

The discussion with these groups was largely positive regarding procedures, practices, and relationships with the DPD and its personnel. All professional partners had positive things to say about the DPD and the relationships between the Police Department and their organizations. It

was evident to BerryDunn that the DPD strives to maintain positive relationships with these professional partners, and the DPD has been responsive to their needs.

## V. Accreditation

Accreditation is a process through which police organizations are evaluated against a set of established criteria that represent typical, standardized, and expected procedures, protocols, policies, and practices of law enforcement agencies. Accreditation provides law enforcement agencies with an opportunity to regularly assess themselves, gauge their conformity with industry standards, and receive feedback that helps prioritize needed changes and improvements for the agencies.

BerryDunn inquired and learned that the DPD is accredited through the Georgia Chiefs of Police Association. Certification lasts for three years, and at the time of this project, the DPD was in the process of renewing its accreditation.

## VI. Communications Center

The DPD uses the ChatComm as its primary public safety answering point (PSAP). ChatComm dispatches police, emergency medical services (EMS), and fire resources for the communities of Dunwoody, Sandy Springs, Johns Creek, and Brookhaven. The DPD has an intergovernmental agreement with ChatComm to provide dispatch services.

BerryDunn asked DPD staff about interactions with ChatComm and was told that other than some minor issues (which are common between police departments and communications centers), the relationship was generally positive. Staff explained that it is not typical for ChatComm to hold calls, but this does occur for short periods when officers are busy. Both DPD and ChatComm staff also explained they did not feel over-response (officers self-dispatching to CFS) was an issue, and supervisors monitor this.

### Call Routing and Dispatching Protocols

When examining CFS response times, there are three primary durations to examine:

- **Lag Time:** This refers to the interval between receipt of the CFS at the communications center and the time the CFS was dispatched to an appropriate officer or other unit.
- **Call Origin to Arrival Time:** This refers to the interval between receipt of the CFS at the communications center and the arrival time at the location of the first responding officer or other responding unit.
- **Dispatch to Arrival:** This refers to the interval between the time the officer or other unit was dispatched to the CFS and the arrival time at the location of the first responding officer or other responding unit.

BerryDunn examined the overall DPD response times by priority as reflected in CAD, and these are outlined in greater detail in Chapter 4. The lag times reflected in the CAD dataset suggest

delays of between three to seven minutes, across all priority CFS types.<sup>23</sup> BerryDunn noted challenges with the configuration of the CAD data provided (which are also outlined in Chapter 4), and it is possible that certain data limitations are skewing the lag times. However, BerryDunn is aware that dispatchers at ChatComm not only take the CFS but also dispatch it, and this may be contributing to delays in dispatching the CFS after its initial receipt. BerryDunn recommends the DPD monitor these times to determine their accuracy, and if accurate, the reasons for the comparatively lengthy lag times, which are typically closer to one to two minutes.

## Alternative Response

Many police agencies use alternative CFS response processes, such as Telephone Reporting Units (TRUs) and online reporting. The DPD does not have a TRU or online reporting. BerryDunn discusses alternative CFS response in greater detail in Chapter 4 and recommends developing these offerings as an option to the public. As a part of that process, BerryDunn suggests that the DPD work with ChatComm to develop protocols to encourage callers to consider these alternatives, where appropriate.

## Summary

The DPD is organized in a hierarchical fashion, similar and consistent with other law enforcement agencies. The DPD has two primary divisions, Uniform Patrol and Administrative/Investigations, each of which is led by a major who reports to the deputy chief of police. The DPD organizational structure is sufficiently supporting operational needs at this time.

Despite the clear expression of community policing as an overarching philosophy and organizational commitment, for many in Patrol, staffing, and personnel deployment issues have contributed to difficulties for patrol officers in successfully engaging in meaningful community policing activities on a consistent basis. If adjustments are made to staffing and personnel deployments as BerryDunn recommends throughout this report, patrol staff should be afforded more time to perform this vital aspect of work.

The DPD uses several professional staff to support department operations and the multiple units within the organization. Based on increasing needs for administrative personnel, BerryDunn is recommending the addition of one non-sworn administrative support staff member to support various administrative functions of the department. Additionally, BerryDunn is recommending the addition of one PSR position to assist with workload demands. The position should be allocated within the work schedule in a manner that provides support during the period of the day with the greatest need.

BerryDunn observes that the Property and Evidence Unit is responsible for system administration of the RMS. To avoid potential opportunities to manipulate property and evidence records, the DPD should reassign RMS administration duties to staff who are not involved in the

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<sup>23</sup> SDI Table 3.1




property intake and storage process. In addition, the DPD should reassign UCR/NIBRS reporting duties from the Property and Evidence Unit and consider any other unit functions that could be allocated to other personnel (e.g., PSRs, administrative position).

The DPD has traditionally had various partnerships with outside law enforcement agencies and other non-governmental organizations and enjoys strong relationships and a collaborative approach to policing with its partners.

## Recommendations


This section provides the formal recommendations from this chapter, presented chronologically as they appear within the chapter. Each recommendation in the table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, and details concerning the findings and recommendations.


**Table 3.1: Chapter 3 Recommendations**

Operations and Staffing		
No.	Professional Support Staff Position	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 3, Section III: Support Services, Specialty Programs, and Assignments</i>		
3-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD tasks sworn officers, usually those in formal leadership positions, with various adjunct responsibilities such as fleet, equipment, facilities, accreditation, etc., which consume a great deal of time and energy from sworn staff and may prevent them from fully engaging in basic supervisory responsibilities, or other primary duties, to the extent expected by their role.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should hire one non-sworn administrative support staff member to support various administrative functions of the department. BerryDunn expects that this position would manage the DPD fleet as well as other administrative functions, and this person could also be cross-trained to support other support staff functions. BerryDunn recommends that the DPD evaluate any functions that could be performed by this position and reallocate them to the new staff member.	

Operations and Staffing		
No.	PSR Staffing	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 3, Section III: Support Services, Specialty Programs, and Assignments</i>		
3-2	<b>Finding Area:</b> PSRs provide numerous support functions for the DPD that promote operational efficiency and effectiveness. Current staffing is insufficient to support operational workloads, particularly during daytime hours.	



Operations and Staffing		
No.	PSR Staffing	Overall Priority
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should add one PSR position to assist with workload demands. The position should be allocated within the work schedule in a manner that provides support during the period of the day with the greatest need.	

Operations and Staffing		
No.	Property and Evidence Duty Assignment Adjustments	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 3, Section III: Support Services, Specialty Programs, and Assignments</b>		
3-3	<b>Finding Area:</b> Professional staff assigned to property intake and storage are also responsible for RMS administration. This dual role creates a possible liability for the DPD, as it creates a possible gap in appropriate property and evidence controls. Property and Evidence Unit staff are also responsible for monthly UCR/NIBRS reporting. This is an RMS function, which should be reallocated.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should reassign RMS administration duties to staff who are not involved in the property intake and storage process. In addition, the DPD should reassign UCR/NIBRS reporting duties and consider any other unit functions that could be allocated to other personnel (e.g., PSRs, administrative position).	

## Chapter 4: Patrol Services

*Patrol Services: includes an analysis of patrol staffing, patrol work schedule and personnel deployments, and response to calls for service.*

The purpose of the DPD's Uniform Patrol Division (UPD) is to identify and hold criminals accountable, reduce crime, reduce the fear of crime, and to use proactive problem-solving methods in conjunction with the community members of Dunwoody. This is accomplished through active patrol, traffic enforcement, driving under the influence (DUI) enforcement, criminal investigations, evidence/crime scene processing, and drug enforcement. The UPD responds to emergency and non-emergency CFS. When not responding to these calls, officers in Patrol use non-obligated time to actively patrol their designated areas within the community. This section of the report provides substantive details concerning the structure of the UPD, along with data and analysis regarding workloads and personnel deployments.

### I. District/Sectors and Personnel Deployment

The authorized staffing levels for the UPD include 36 officers, eight sergeants, and three commanders, which includes one major and two lieutenants.<sup>24</sup> BerryDunn notes that the workload and staffing model for Patrol relies upon calculating the actual time available for those officers who routinely respond to CFS. For the DPD, this includes only those at the officer rank who are assigned to Patrol duties. Of the 36 officers assigned to UPD, 30 are designated as primary CFS responders.

Although Table 1.4 identifies 64 allocated sworn positions, these numbers shifted during the project as personnel left or were added to the department. Although these position vacancies occur in various operational sections within the department (other than Patrol), lack of these resources can negatively affect Patrol workloads.

The DPD separates the City into three geographical Patrol zones.<sup>25</sup> The geography of the City can be an important factor in understanding staffing demands and personnel allocations. As noted previously, the land area of Dunwoody is roughly 13.2 square miles. If the Patrol zones were distributed equally in terms of geography, the average size would be approximately 4.4 square miles; however, the Patrol zones for the DPD vary in size and population.<sup>26</sup> Despite these variations, staff expressed to BerryDunn that the zone structure is functional.

Staffing levels within police departments are always in flux, as are position assignments and unit allocations. BerryDunn notes that *authorized* staffing levels are not the same as *actual* staffing levels. This is important because the workload calculations BerryDunn use in this report (particularly in this section) rely on full staffing of the allocated positions. If one or more positions

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<sup>24</sup> SDI Table 4.1

<sup>25</sup> SDI Figure 4.1

<sup>26</sup> SDI Table D-75

were vacant, these workload obligation calculations would increase in ratio to the number of vacant positions.

The DPD uses 12-hour fixed shift times for the day shift and night shift, with no overlaps in coverage across the shifts.<sup>27</sup> Generally, police departments use a form of shift staggering to help ensure that staff are available during major shift changes, to assist with peak CFS volumes and to adjust staffing levels during periods where CFS volumes are low. The DPD patrol schedule does not include these features, and this is likely contributing to challenging workload levels for UPD staff. BerryDunn will examine coverage and schedule issues more thoroughly later in this chapter.

## II. Patrol Call Load and Distribution of Calls for Service

BerryDunn examines workload data in several places throughout this report; most notably, those that relate to patrol/field staffing requirements and follow-up investigations demands. BerryDunn uses CFS as a primary means to calculate obligated workload within the UPD. CFS data are also critical in analyzing timeliness of police response, geographic demands for service, and scheduling and personnel allocations. For analysis purposes, BerryDunn will provide numerous tables and figures that outline various aspects related to CFS. Table 4.1 shows an abridged list of allocated work captured in CAD for the DPD for 2021.<sup>28</sup>

There are two important aspects of Table 4.1 to highlight. First, BerryDunn has separated the workload provided in this table into categories that indicate Patrol, Patrol Supervisor / Supplanting, Other Units, and Non-Patrol / Unknown, and it is important to understand the distinction between the different categories shown. Patrol refers to those officers who routinely are responsible for handling CFS. Patrol Supervisor / Supplanting refers to those officers who support the Patrol function and who might occasionally answer CFS, but for whom CFS response is not a primary responsibility. Other units would include administrative personnel, or non-sworn personnel, and Non-Patrol / Unknown includes work volume that refers to officers who are not responding to CFS (e.g., prisoner transport), or other agencies (e.g., Brookhaven PD). Although Non-Patrol information relates to work performed by the DPD, it is not considered part of the primary CFS workload, and determining this value is a critical element in exercising the BerryDunn workload calculation formula. Second, the totals in Table 4.1 include both community- and officer-initiated activity. This is noteworthy because the BerryDunn workload model categorically separates these CFS and relies on obligated workload that emanates primarily from community-initiated calls.

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<sup>27</sup> SDI Table 4.2

<sup>28</sup> SDI Table 4.3

**Table 4.1: Patrol and Supplemental Patrol Unit Hours 2021 (Abridged)**

Unit	2021 Hours on Call		
Patrol	Community	Self	Total
Patrol	14165:34:00	6819:17:00	20985:04:00
Patrol Sergeant	572:11:00	549:02:00	1121:13:00
Community Response Team Patrol	56:52:00	382:17:00	439:09:00
Community Response Team Sergeant	39:00:00	354:14:00	393:14:00
K-9 Patrol	283:43:00	388:28:00	672:11:00
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>15117:20:00</b>	<b>8493:18:00</b>	<b>23610:51:00</b>
Patrol Supervisor/Supplanting	Community	Self	Total
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>144:16:00</b>	<b>143:16:00</b>	<b>287:32:00</b>
Other Units	Community	Self	Total
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>21:56:00</b>	<b>192:31:00</b>	<b>214:27:00</b>
Non-Patrol/Unknown	Community	Self	Total
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>79:18:00</b>	<b>807:25:00</b>	<b>886:43:00</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>15362:50:00</b>	<b>9636:30:00</b>	<b>24999:33:00</b>

Source: Police Department CAD Data

Because of the timing of this report and when the project began, BerryDunn utilized 2021 CAD data. BerryDunn also notes that the data in Table 4.1 is an abridged version of the CAD data from 2021 (the full version of this data is provided in SDI Table 4.3). Work effort by Patrol represents approximately 15,117 hours of the approximately 15,362 hours of community-initiated activity shown in Table 4.1. Although other units support the Patrol officers and engage in a certain amount of community-initiated CFS, it is evident that Patrol officers are responsible for the bulk of the obligated time associated with community-initiated CFS.

Arguably, some of the CFS responses allocated in the Patrol category might not relate to CFS that are part of the Patrol obligation, and there are likely CFS that were handled by secondary Supplemental Patrol units, which do relate to primary CFS workload. Similarly, some of the CFS responses within the Non-Patrol category might be in support of a call that Patrol handled. However, without a case-by-case breakdown, it is not possible to be certain of these numbers. Despite the potential for variances in the data, BerryDunn is confident that these allocations and the subsequent calculations accurately reflect the total obligated Patrol response demands, and the variations that might exist within the categories would not significantly affect the categorical totals or the calculations used by BerryDunn to determine staffing levels.

## Methodology

The BerryDunn project team obtained a comprehensive CAD dataset from the DPD for 2021. The dataset contained nearly 75,000 individual line entries in a Microsoft Excel document. The CAD data related to 43,567 total incidents, reflecting 24,999 hours cumulative of work effort. This total number of hours reflected the actual workload hours recorded within CAD, but there were three primary issues inflating these numbers, specifically as they related to obligated patrol workload. First, numerous data did not appear to represent primary response to CFS within Patrol. These data belonged to various specialty units within the department, including prisoner transport, property and evidence, and community policing, to name a few. As part of the analysis process, BerryDunn separated and removed these data.

The second issue involved officer-initiated, as opposed to community-initiated, activity. As noted above, the BerryDunn workload model relies upon a separation of these activities, and accordingly, it was necessary to split these data as part of the analysis. The total number of obligated community-initiated workload hours in the Patrol category was approximately 15,117. The number of officer-initiated workload hours for Patrol was approximately 8,493. Again, these data were split apart from the obligated workload total for Patrol.

The third issue relates to the data within CAD that is not part of the obligated workload for the Patrol officers. These data include both community- and officer-initiated data, which is reflected in Table 4.1 in the Supplanting and Non-Patrol unit categories. As part of the analysis process, BerryDunn separates these data so that only the obligated workload data remains, and this number is used for calculating Patrol staffing needs. Table 4.6 in this chapter illustrates the mathematical calculations BerryDunn used to determine the final workload obligation totals.

As is typical in these types of studies, there were challenges and limitations within the CAD dataset that the DPD provided to BerryDunn. Despite these limitations, BerryDunn processed the dataset and accounted for these difficulties as part of the overall analysis of the CAD data. To be clear, BerryDunn is confident that the workload data and calculations presented provide a reasonable representation of the volume of obligated work that the Patrol Division must manage. Additionally, it is common for CAD datasets to include challenges and variations in the data. BerryDunn also has significant experience in accounting for these variances and in cleaning the CAD database so the data can be used for the required calculations. BerryDunn exercised this experience and applied a proven methodology to prepare the data for final analysis.

As part of this assessment, BerryDunn asked the DPD Patrol officers to complete a worksheet and survey related to CFS they handled during two of their work shifts (BerryDunn did not identify which shifts to record). Based on the self-reported survey provided, Patrol officers reported an average of 2.45 narrative reports per shift, with the average report-writing duration of approximately 37.35 minutes.<sup>29</sup> Note that the time per

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<sup>29</sup> SDI Table 4.4

report is in addition to the on-scene time for each CFS. In prior studies, BerryDunn has found that agencies average approximately two narrative reports per shift with an average report writing time of 34 minutes. The self-reported data from the DPD reflecting the number of reports per shift and the time involved is highly consistent with other departments studied.

Within the same survey, officers reported data related to their workload and type of activity. The data reported from the 20 responses indicate that in total, officers handled 181 CFS, with an average of 9 CFS per shift, each averaging 33.83 minutes.<sup>30</sup> This self-reported data does not include report-writing time but only the on-scene time associated with handling the CFS, including backup responses. BerryDunn notes that based on several prior studies, the average self-reported number of CFS handled per shift was nine, with an average CFS duration of 42 minutes. The amount of time per CFS for the DPD is slightly lower than prior study averages, although the number of CFS per shift at the DPD is identical to prior study averages. BerryDunn elaborates further on average CFS times later in this chapter, including comparisons to other agencies studied.

## Report Processing and Review

During interviews with staff, BerryDunn inquired about the process involved in writing police reports and the review of those reports. The following briefly summarizes the steps in this process.

When an officer receives a report about a crime, when they make an arrest, or when the uniqueness or circumstances of an incident are noteworthy, the officer will generate an incident report. The life cycle of an incident report follows this sequence:

- An officer generates an incident report (whether for an arrest, initial narrative, or follow-up).
- The report is routed to a supervisor who approves it or returns it to the officer for additional work.
- Generally, once the report is approved by the supervisor (reports can be returned to officers for revision), the review process is complete.
- If the names in the report are not in the RMS, the supervisor must go through a name candidating process to enter them.
- Once the report is complete, it will go through NIBRS checks.
- Records staff will review the report and perform any cleanup.
- Once the report is finalized, it is forwarded to the deputy chief.

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<sup>30</sup> SDI Table 4.5

- If needed, the report can be forwarded to Investigations, and officers can also self-refer if they want to do additional work on a case.
- There is no use of solvability factors (which BerryDunn will discuss further in this chapter) at the patrol level.


Although this process is logical on the surface, there are opportunities for improvement. BerryDunn expands this conversation later in this chapter; however, cases are not visible within RMS until after name candidating and approval by the sergeant, and the DPD does not apply solvability factors to the case review process, which likely causes many criminal cases to be routed to Investigations even though they will not be activated for investigation.

### III. Calls for Service Analysis

In this section, BerryDunn will examine the data related to the response to CFS by the DPD, both community- and officer-initiated, and provide a detailed analysis of this information.

CFS response represents the core function of policing, and responding to community complaints and concerns is one of the key measures of effective policing in every community. Leaders can also use data related to CFS to measure the confidence and reliance the public has in their police department. Figure 4.1 includes a graphical depiction of community- and officer-initiated activity within the City for 2021.

**Figure 4.1: Community vs. Officer-Initiated CFS**



Source: CAD Data

Based on the data in Figure 4.1, 56% of Patrol officer volume related to community-initiated activity in 2021, while 44% related to officer-initiated activity. In several recent studies, the average percentage of community-initiated activity was 60%, but the range from these studies was from 40.77% – 78.27%. Based on the data from Figure 4.1, the DPD is in the middle of this range. There can be various explanations as to why the ratio of community- to officer-initiated activity varies so significantly; however, BerryDunn has determined that one of the key factors

that drives these differences relates to staffing issues and the amount of time officers have available to conduct self-initiated work. Despite stated difficulties by Patrol staff in finding time for self-initiated work, the data in Figure 4.1 reflect a reasonable balance between community- and officer-initiated workloads.

Based on the CAD data reviewed, five CFS types make up more than 38% of all CFS time for Patrol. Those CFS types include shoplifting (8.84%), domestic disputes (9.38%), welfare checks (5.62%), information for officers (4.77%), and property damage motor vehicle crashes (9.86%).<sup>31</sup> The five most common incidents by volume include property damage motor vehicle crashes (9.65%), information for officers (8.19%), welfare checks (5.64%), domestic disputes (5.23%), and residential alarms (4.63%).<sup>32</sup> BerryDunn notes that much of this volume could be diverted to other resources, freeing up obligated workloads for Patrol staff. BerryDunn elaborates further on alternative CFS response later in this chapter.

To aid in analyzing the CAD data, BerryDunn separated the data into categories including crime, service, and traffic (including motor vehicle crashes). BerryDunn split the data further into workloads that involve community-oriented CFS versus officer-initiated activity. Based on data BerryDunn reviewed, the largest volume of community-initiated CFS is service-related, comprising 64.28% of all CFS and 58.68% of overall time for Patrol officers.<sup>33</sup> In Table 4.2, BerryDunn has provided a breakdown of the percentage of distribution of CFS by activity category, the percentage of time allocated to each activity category, and the average number of minutes per CFS for each activity category.

**Table 4.2: Time Per Call for Service – Comparisons 2021**

Dunwoody			
Category	% of Total Calls	% of Call Time	Minutes/CFS
Crime	29.83%	37.91%	58.92
Service	64.28%	58.68%	42.32
Traffic	5.89%	3.41%	26.84
*Prior Study Averages			
Category	% of Total Calls	% of Call Time	Minutes/CFS
Crime	39.31%	47.10%	56.74
Service	47.02%	38.76%	39.05
Traffic	13.67%	14.15%	49.04

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

\*Table includes data from prior studies conducted by the IACP

<sup>31</sup> SDI Table 4.6

<sup>32</sup> SDI Table 4.7

<sup>33</sup> SDI Table 4.8




Data in Table 4.2 reflects only Patrol, Patrol sergeants, K-9, and CRT efforts. Within Table 4.2, BerryDunn also provides prior study data for comparison. Although there are variations in the distribution of CFS types and the time spent on each CFS type, BerryDunn observes that the DPD's numbers are well within observed norms.

Examining the cyclical pattern of CFS, whether by month, day of the week, or hour, is an important consideration in helping departments allocate resources efficiently in response to these patterns. To analyze the cyclical patterns of obligated work volumes, BerryDunn split and examined these data from several perspectives. When looking at the data by month,<sup>34</sup> or by day of the week,<sup>35</sup> BerryDunn noted that the variations are not significant enough to warrant adjustments to patrol staffing deployments on a monthly basis.

Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of CFS by hour of the day, including both community-initiated CFS and officer-initiated activities. This figure shows a familiar pattern of activity that BerryDunn has observed in numerous other studies. Based on this table, community-initiated CFS peak around 4 p.m. and dip to their lowest total around 4 a.m. The pattern in Figure 4.2 is important because workload volumes are far greater at the high workload volume point as opposed to the low point. These variations are significant, and they require a work schedule that is distributed appropriately to manage these variations.

**Figure 4.2: Call Volume by Hour of the Day**



Source: Agency Provided CAD Data


<sup>34</sup> SDI Figure 4.2

<sup>35</sup> SDI Figure 4.3

BerryDunn elaborates on the DPD Patrol schedule later in this chapter; however, the DPD generally uses a similar staffing allocation across all hours of the day,<sup>36</sup> and the Patrol schedule would benefit from adjustment in response to the peak CFS demands shown in Figure 4.2. In looking at Figure 4.2, the level of officer-initiated activity for the DPD is comparatively high, as noted previously in reference to Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.3 shows officer-initiated example data from prior studies in comparison to the data from the DPD. The light green bar in Figure 4.3 is an example of the typical officer-initiated pattern from other studies. The data in this table show the volume of officer-initiated activity as a percentage of the overall volume of activity for that hour. The example reflects a shifting percentage of officer-initiated activity, which corresponds to higher community-initiated CFS volumes (as shown in Figure 4.2). For the DPD, the percentages of officer-initiated activity are comparatively high, which suggests that officers are finding time to dedicate to officer-initiated activity, even though those efforts decline during peak CFS periods.

**Figure 4.3: Percentage of Officer-Initiated Activity**



Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

In addition to looking at CFS by month, day, and hour, BerryDunn also examined the distribution percentage of CFS volume by shift blocks throughout the day.<sup>37</sup> The DPD uses two 12-hour shift blocks, 0600 – 1800 (day shift) and 1800 – 0600 (night shift). Day shift volume is 60.09% of the workload for the DPD, with the night shift managing 39.91%. BerryDunn also determined that between 1000 and 2200, 69.13% of the CFS volume for the DPD occurs. In addition to providing this analysis, BerryDunn has also calculated the DPD volume in eight-hour increments across the day. These data show that 83.60% of all CFS volume occurs between 0700 and 2300 (7 a.m. and 11 p.m.) This is a typical distribution of CFS activity.


<sup>36</sup> SDI Table 4.9

<sup>37</sup> SDI Table 4.10

One of the reasons for analyzing CFS volumes by month, day of the week, or hour of the day is to look for patterns that the department can use to analyze personnel allocations and staffing, in hopes of more efficiently deploying personnel during the times when the most activity is occurring. Although BerryDunn favors this type of analysis and acknowledges it is a significant aspect of work schedule design, the volume of activity is not the sole factor to be considered in terms of scheduling personnel. Based strictly on the percentage of CFS across the day, one might consider scheduling only 16.40% of the Patrol staff from 2300 and 0700. However, CFS that occur at night often involve some of the most dangerous activities that the police must deal with, and most of these incidents require multiple personnel. Essentially, patrol work schedule design and personnel deployments must include consideration of various operational aspects to help ensure the workforce is staffed at all hours of the day and is equipped to manage the workload and type of work they will encounter.

As mentioned previously, the DPD uses three patrol zones. Figure 4.4 provides a breakdown of the total volume of community- and officer-initiated volume by patrol zones.

**Figure 4.4: CFS Volume by Zone**



Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

\*All others includes CFS that were not categorized in a specific Zone.

As Figure 4.4 shows, the CFS for each of the zones can vary substantially. The volume in Zone 30 is over 13,000 CFS, while the volume in Zones 20 and 40 are both under 3,000. As mentioned previously, the size of the patrol zones varies, and the population and workloads associated with each zone vary as well. Table 4.3 shows that the zone sizes range from 1.65 square miles to 6.60 square miles in size.

**Table 4.3: Zone Size and Population**

Zone	Area (sq mi)	Population	Percent	Workload	Density
20	6.6	17,849	34.54%	14.85%	2,704.39
30	4.92	24,627	47.65%	67.82%	5,005.49
40	1.65	9,207	17.81%	8.75%	5,580.00

Source: Agency Provided Data, CAD Data

What Table 4.3 also shows is that population—in and of itself—is not necessarily the best determinant for understanding workloads. Zone 20 has the highest population but the lowest population density per square mile. Also, even though it is the largest, Zone 20 only generates 14.85% of the overall workload for Patrol. Conversely, Zone 40 is the smallest in size by geography, but it has the highest population density. BerryDunn expands on workloads later in this chapter, but the data in Table 4.3 is an example of how factors other than population affect operational workloads.

BerryDunn also examined CFS distribution within the zones based on hourly volumes (0600 – 1800 and 1800 – 0600). The CFS volumes vary greatly across the zones and hours of the day,<sup>38</sup> and all these data should be evaluated as part of personnel deployments to help ensure appropriate staffing is allocated in alignment with CFS demands.

As is typical with many police departments, the Patrol schedule for the DPD uses an overscheduling feature, which, in theory, provides additional staff who can be allocated in high-volume areas. BerryDunn will provide additional details and work schedule analysis later in this chapter but based on numerous data provided to and reviewed by BerryDunn, it is evident that the Patrol schedule in use by the DPD does not respond well to peak CFS volumes. There are no shift overlaps, nor are there additional deployments across peak CFS periods of the day. For the DPD, when staffing is at its maximum, there are six patrol officers scheduled during the day shift and five scheduled for the night shift, excluding sergeants.<sup>39</sup>

Given this number, the DPD might expect to have 11 officers working per day (over the two shifts). However, this represents the *maximum* number of personnel scheduled by hour. In reality, the DPD averages roughly four daily patrol shifts, with approximately two patrol supervisors (as opposed to a desire for eleven patrol shifts and four supervisors). Informal daily shift minimums for the DPD are six, plus two supervisors. Although maximum daily staffing is set at 11, BerryDunn learned through interviews and data analysis that, due to staffing shortages, the DPD regularly operates at—or at times below—shift minimums.

There are several key analysis points when considering personnel deployments for Patrol units. These include the volume of activity; type of activity; number of available personnel; geographic

<sup>38</sup> SDI Table 4.11

<sup>39</sup> SDI Table 4.13

patrol boundaries and natural or man-made barriers; traffic patterns; and variations in CFS volume based on month, day of the week, and time of day. One of the more common ways to evaluate personnel deployments, particularly as they relate to community-initiated CFS demands, is to examine CFS response times. Although there are no specific national standards regarding response times, common Priority 1 response times (generally life-threatening and in-progress events) typically range between four and seven minutes. The next level of priority CFS, which generally involve immediate response needs but those that do not fall into the Priority 1 category, range from roughly eight to twelve minutes.

BerryDunn examined the overall DPD response times by priority,<sup>40</sup> and as broken out by zone and priority.<sup>41</sup> None of the response times by the DPD—by zone or priority—were outside of acceptable response standards. BerryDunn also compared DPD response times against data collected from several prior studies, which includes comparisons of Priority 1 and 2 CFS, and all remaining priorities. Response times for the DPD are in line with the comparison studies reflected.

Another metric that BerryDunn routinely examines is how often a Patrol unit assigned to one district/zone must leave that district/zone to take a CFS in another area due to staffing or because the officer in that zone is unavailable for some reason. When an officer responds to a CFS within their zone, the officer is able to return to their Patrol duties immediately after they clear the CFS. Although BerryDunn understands that out-of-zone response will likely always be an operational need at some level, another important consideration is how this contributes to staffing issues.

When an officer must respond out-of-zone to a CFS, three things can happen. First, when an officer leaves their zone to take a CFS and another CFS occurs in the original zone, another officer must leave their zone to take it. This creates a cascading effect, which ultimately affects multiple officers/zones. Second, because of return time, a portion of the time for the officer who responds out of zone is lost time; this is significant. In short, out-of-zone response is inefficient, and it results in a loss of precious staffing resources. Third, out-of-zone response often elongates overall response times because officers often respond to a CFS in their assigned zone while returning from another zone.

BerryDunn determined that out of 18,901 incidents in which a comparison could be made, there were 7,016 primary officer out-of-zone responses (meaning the officer assigned to the zone did not handle the CFS), involving 861 hours of response time.<sup>42</sup> Because return time is generally equal to response time, that means 861 hours were essentially lost due to out-of-zone response; this is equivalent to roughly 1.5 full-time officer positions. More importantly, the time

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<sup>40</sup> SDI Table 4.12

<sup>41</sup> SDI Table 4.13, SDI Table 4.14

<sup>42</sup> SDI Table 4.15

officers spend out of their assigned zone works against geographic policing standards, which seek to encourage community relationships within designated patrol areas.

In examining response times for both in- and out-of-zone responses, BerryDunn observed that response averages were similar for both, and both were comparable to prior study comparisons.<sup>43</sup> Essentially, CFS response times are reasonable, whether in- or out-of-zone, and although some out-of-zone response is occurring, the percentage of out-of-zone response is comparable to other organizations.

## District/Zone Discussion

The above section includes various references to patrol zones. Like many departments, the DPD uses zone boundaries for the deployment of personnel, and this strategy is one that helps ensure that staff are dispersed throughout the community to aid in rapid response to CFS. BerryDunn supports the use of zone structures in this regard, but when used properly and more intentionally, these systems can also contribute to community-policing strategies for the officers, the agency, and the community.

Geographic policing is a term used to describe a proactive, decentralized approach that is designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime by intensively involving the same officer in the same area of the community on a long-term basis so that community members develop trust, thereby enhancing cooperation with police officers. Geographic policing also encourages the assignment of police officers to defined geographic boundaries on a permanent basis to work directly with community members to resolve problems. It is a strategy designed to make individual police officers responsible for the community's policing needs in a defined geographical area, with a service customized to each individual locality, helping to ensure the policing needs of local areas are met.

One of Sir Robert Peel's principles (regarded as the founder of modern policing) is: "The police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and the public are the police."<sup>44</sup> Geographic deployment plans fulfill this principle, enhance customer service, and facilitate more contact between police and community members, thus establishing a strong relationship and mutual accountability. Geographic policing also implies a shift within the department that grants greater autonomy to line officers, which implies enhanced respect for their judgment as police professionals. Accordingly, BerryDunn recommends a strategy for the DPD that supports a consistent zone assignment structure.

## Cover Cars

Part of the data analysis BerryDunn conducted included looking at the amount of time spent on each call by the primary unit and the cumulative amount of time spent on the call by additional

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<sup>43</sup> SDI Table 4.16

<sup>44</sup> [https://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Documents/Peels\\_Principles\\_Of\\_Law\\_Enforcement.pdf](https://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Documents/Peels_Principles_Of_Law_Enforcement.pdf)

units. For 2021, the DPD logged 18,991 distinct CFS, with an additional 20,891 backup responses across those events.<sup>45</sup> Based on these numbers, 47.73% of the data in CAD related to primary officers, and 52.27% was for backup response. If backup was distributed equally across the CFS, then these numbers would indicate that each CFS averages 1.1 backup units. However, backup does not occur equally across all CFS, and many CFS for the DPD have multiple unit responses.

BerryDunn also examined the average on-scene time for the primary units, the average cumulative on-scene time for backup (which may include multiple units per CFS), and the total average CFS time. In looking at these times, BerryDunn notes that backup accounts for 36.30% of the total CFS time.<sup>46</sup> In comparing this data against prior studies, BerryDunn noted that the DPD has one of the lowest primary unit response percentages (47.73%), and accordingly, one of the highest backup unit percentages.<sup>47</sup> The range of the percentage of primary response to CFS from the comparison studies is from 46% – 72%, and the range of backup response is from 28% – 54%. The average from these studies is 56% primary response to 44% backup. BerryDunn notes, however, that although the percentage of CFS in which the DPD engages backup is comparatively high, the cumulative time backup spends as a percentage of the overall CFS volume is comparatively low (36.30%). This suggests that although backup may be frequent, officers do not linger on CFS unnecessarily.

To expand the multi-unit analysis, BerryDunn examined the breakdown of the CFS types that included an average of at least two units responding to each incident.<sup>48</sup> In keeping with contemporary policing standards, multiple responses of three or more units are typically limited to calls of a serious nature. BerryDunn observed that of the categories listed with high unit responses, all appear to be serious enough to warrant the response of multiple personnel. It is also worth mentioning that the unit counts BerryDunn evaluated reflect average responses by CFS type. This means the number of responding units was higher or lower than the reported value in some cases.

BerryDunn also wishes to point out that based on available staffing for the DPD, there is typically only one officer working within a zone. If staffing levels are at the minimum and more than one officer responds to any CFS, any additional responding officers would have to do so from another zone, leaving that zone short (or vacant) in terms of allocated staff. As mentioned previously, this can create a cascading affect, which forces personnel into a pattern of out-of-zone response. Looking at all the backup data provided in the tables mentioned, the number of backup units in ratio to CFS appears reasonable, as does the ratio of backup time from the total number of officers assisting on CFS.

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<sup>45</sup> SDI Table 4.17

<sup>46</sup> SDI Table 4.18

<sup>47</sup> SDI Table 4.19

<sup>48</sup> SDI Table 4.20

As a point of clarification: BerryDunn is firm in its position that officer safety is of paramount importance. Nothing in this section should be construed to suggest that BerryDunn supports limiting unit responses to CFS in a manner that would jeopardize the safety of the officer or the public, or in a way that would interfere with the effective and efficient delivery of police services.

## IV. Patrol Staffing Analysis and Calculations

BerryDunn determines Patrol staffing requirements by evaluating the total workload in hours against hours of officer availability. Officers are not able to work for a variety of reasons, including days off, vacation, sick leave, holiday time, and training obligations. To define staffing needs, deploy officers properly, and evaluate productivity, it is necessary to calculate the actual amount of time officers are available to work. To assist in these calculations, BerryDunn obtained detailed Patrol officer leave data for 2021 from the DPD.

### Patrol Availability

Table 4.4 demonstrates the amount of time Patrol officers have available for shift work. This table starts with the assumption that officers work a 40-hour work week. This computation is 52 weeks x 40 hours = 2,080 hours per year. For Dunwoody, however, the number is higher, based on how their personnel are scheduled. Accordingly, this table uses 2,184 hours as a baseline.

**Table 4.4: Patrol Availability**

<b>Annual Paid Hours</b>	<b>2,184</b>	<b>*Study Averages</b>
<b>Leave Category</b>		
Vacation	54	147
Illness/Sick	40	54
COMP Used	24	43
Holiday	68	89
Bereavement	5	
Family Care	5	
Leave Without Pay	1	
Other Leave	42	
<b>Average Leave Total</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>363</b>
<b>Training</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>Sub-Total (minus)</b>	<b>385</b>	
<b>Average Annual Availability (Hours)</b>	<b>1,799</b>	<b>1,658</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data




Table 4.4 shows that after subtracting leave categories from the total, the average patrol officer is actually available to work 1,799 hours per year (rounded down), not 2,184 hours (or 2,080 hours) as is often thought (understanding that this represents the cumulative average—and individual officer availability can vary greatly). The data in Table 4.4 also reflect average leave times by category from several prior studies. The overall leave totals for the DPD are consistent with the comparisons; however, because the DPD's baseline hours are higher (2,184), their total available time is greater than the average of the prior studies.

In Table 4.6 later in this chapter, BerryDunn provides a staffing analysis that leverages the data from this table. Understanding the actual amount of work time available for officers is central to building a work schedule and for ensuring that adequate shift coverage is attained in relation to CFS needs. It is also a critical component in calculating staffing demands based on an examination of workload against worker capacity.

In addition to understanding how much time officers have available to them for scheduling purposes, it is also important to understand when they are not available, because peaks and valleys in the use of leave time can complicate the process of maintaining coverage within the work schedule. In Figure 4.5 below, the patterns of annual leave for patrol officers are broken down by month.

**Figure 4.5: Annual Leave Hours – Patrol**



Source: Agency Provided Data

\* Annual Leave includes Holiday and COMP time

This figure shows that several months have annual leave time totals that are significantly higher or lower than the other months. Due to these variations, the work schedule should have the flexibility to be adjusted to these patterns so that staffing resources are used efficiently.

## Shift Relief Factor

Another mechanism for understanding the number of officers required to staff a schedule is through determining the *shift relief factor*. The shift relief factor is the number of officers required to staff one shift position every day of the year. Based on the number of available hours for DPD patrol officers (1,695) and the length of the shifts (12 hours), the shift relief factor for the DPD is 2.58.<sup>49</sup> Because the current scheduling model for the DPD includes shift minimums of three officers for the day shift and three officers for the night shift for a minimum total of six daily shifts (excluding supervisors),<sup>50</sup> then the number of officers required to staff the current schedule and allocation of personnel without operating short or using overtime is 15 (2.58 x 6).

This calculation represents the number of personnel needed to staff the current stated shift minimums. However, if the DPD used its desired staff allocations as a baseline (11 shifts), then these numbers would change greatly. If the DPD wanted to maintain scheduling numbers based on the preferred allocations, then the number of officers required would be 28 (2.58 x 11).<sup>51</sup>

Understanding the various issues related to staffing, including the shift relief factor, is important from a scheduling standpoint. Police agencies tend to build their work schedules based on the total number of personnel available, as opposed to the workload capacity of those personnel. The result is an imbalance between the structure of the schedule and the number of hours officers can actually work. Schedules of this nature also typically fail to account for leave patterns and peaks and valleys in service demands. However, these issues can be overcome through the use of a properly designed work schedule (assuming adequate staffing is available). To determine the proper number of officers required for patrol, agencies must first consider how many positions they want to staff at any given time (this should be based on workload demands). Once the department determines this number, it can calculate personnel needs.

Using the available CAD data, BerryDunn calculated the number of minutes required per day to manage the patrol workload. Based on the primary and backup data in CAD, the total number of minutes for all CFS per day is 2,412.<sup>52</sup> The available minutes per day, by officer, are calculated based on a 30% availability of time to dedicate to the obligated workload, based on a 12-hour shift (12 hours x 60 minutes, multiplied by 30% = 216 minutes).<sup>53</sup> Based on these data, the DPD would require 11 officers per day to manage the patrol volume (2,412 divided by 216 = 11.16).

Given the calculations provided, the DPD should be able to cover the workload with 12 daily shifts (rounded up), or with an allocation of 31 patrol officers (when factoring in shift relief; 2.48 x 12 shifts). However, these calculations presume an equal distribution of CFS by location, hour,

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<sup>49</sup> SDI Table 4.21

<sup>50</sup> SDI Table 4.2

<sup>51</sup> SDI Table 4.21

<sup>52</sup> SDI Table 4.22

<sup>53</sup> SDI Table 4.23

day, and month. To more accurately understand the staffing needs of the DPD, there are other factors to consider.

BerryDunn has determined that the average time per CFS for the DPD is 46.36 minutes.<sup>54</sup> Using this number, and a 30% availability factor for patrol officers, DPD officers can be expected to manage approximately five CFS per shift.<sup>55</sup> When these data are examined based on the average number of CFS per shift, the number of required officers is still 31 (based on 12 shifts per day).<sup>56</sup> However, these calculations do not take into account the additional workloads occurring between 1000 and 2200. In Table 4.5, BerryDunn has provided additional calculations that include the peak volumes during this period. When the data in Table 4.5 is examined, a different pattern appears. When peak CFS volume is considered, the minimum number of patrol staff required on either side of this peak volume is reduced. However, the peak volume reflects a need for additional staffing to manage the workload.

**Table 4.5: Daily Officers Required by Shift and Zone**

Current Daily Events	0600-1000	1000-2200	2200-0600	Total	Shift Relief Factor	Total Officers
<b>Zone 20</b>	426	1934	447			
Officers	0.23	1.06	0.24			
<b>Zone 30</b>	1566	9613	2537			
Officers	0.86	5.27	1.39			
<b>Zone 40</b>	265	1315	498			
Officers	0.15	0.72	0.27			
<b>Officers Required</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>2.58</b>	<b>33.54</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

BerryDunn is not suggesting that the numbers above reflect a specific shift layout. In fact, there are many ways to distribute patrol personnel across the shifts. What Table 4.5 illustrates is the significant workload demands through the middle of the day for the DPD and the need to construct a work schedule that accounts for this peak demand.

Another point of analysis of CFS response data involved examining the total number of CFS handled on average by DPD officers, based on staffing totals. The totals for benchmark cities and prior BerryDunn studies show an average annual per-officer CFS volume between 507 and 684. The average number of annual CFS for the DPD is 588.<sup>57</sup> Although the average number of

<sup>54</sup> SDI Table 4.18

<sup>55</sup> SDI Table 4.23

<sup>56</sup> SDI Table 4.24

<sup>57</sup> SDI Table 4.25

CFS handled per officer for the DPD is in the middle of the range, these comparisons presume an equal distribution of CFS by patrol zone and by hour, which is not accurate. As noted in Figure 4.2, most CFS volume occurs in the middle 12 hours of the day. This means that those officers working during these periods experience a per-officer CFS spike, while those working the overnight shift are managing less volume overall. Again, this provides additional evidence of the need to adjust the work schedule to accommodate peaks in CFS volume, and that per-officer averages, while comparatively helpful, do not provide the full context of the work effort.

## Workload Model and Analysis

Measurement standards make it possible to evaluate and define patrol staffing and deployment requirements, and BerryDunn uses a specific model for doing this. The primary standards employed for the DPD assessment include:

- Operational labor
- Administrative labor
- Uncommitted time

In the workload model used by BerryDunn, 30% is allocated to each of the labor areas, with a 10% buffer available to allow for daily variances.

### Operational Labor

Operational labor is the aggregate amount of time consumed by patrol officers to answer CFS generated by the public and to address on-view situations discovered and encountered by officers. It is the total of criminal, non-criminal, traffic, and backup activity initiated by a call from the public or an incident an officer comes upon (obligated workload). When expressed as a percentage of the total labor in an officer's workday, operational labor of first-response patrol officers should not continuously exceed 30%.

As previously indicated, in order to quantify the amount of workload volume, the BerryDunn team conducted a thorough examination of CAD data provided by the DPD. In processing the CAD database for analysis, BerryDunn identified non-CFS response and self-initiated data from the dataset. After processing the CAD data, the data reflected 14,672 hours of community-initiated patrol CFS workload; see Table 4.6. After making these reductions, certain hours (self-initiated criminal activity, supplanting) were added back into the totals, as these hours represented part of the obligated workload. Generally, data within the *supplemental patrol* and *non-patrol* categories are not considered part of the workload for patrol. Units in this area typically include community service officers (CSOs), animal control, task force units, light duty officers, and special traffic units. However, on examination, a significant amount of the data in these categories is likely the result of *supplanting*. In this context, supplanting refers to officers or supervisors who act as primary CFS officers even though this is not part of their general work duties. When this occurs, it reduces the workload burden for patrol, artificially reducing their obligated workload total.

BerryDunn knows supplanting is occurring at the DPD based on conversations with staff (and a review of the CAD data). Several individuals interviewed said there are times when staffing in Patrol is low, and officers from other units (including DPD administration) have had to assist by taking CFS. BerryDunn notes that this is commonplace in law enforcement agencies; however, when this occurs, it makes calculating the obligated workload for patrol more difficult. For the DPD, the amount of estimated supplanting is not substantial, accounting for less than 1% of the obligated workload volume. Nonetheless, supplanting volume is part of the obligated workload, and BerryDunn has added these data back into the model. Based on a full analysis of the CAD data, and considering several variables, BerryDunn developed Table 4.6, which outlines the patrol staffing needs for the DPD.

**Table 4.6: Obligated Workload Model – Patrol 30%**

	<b>Literal Explanation and Formula</b>	<b>Model 1</b>
A-1	Primary Patrol Unit Obligated Hours - Community CFS	9,345
A-2	Back-Up Patrol Obligated Hours	5,327
A-3	Primary Patrol Obligated Hours - Officer-Initiated: Criminal and Motor Vehicle Crashes	482
A-4	Back-Up Patrol Obligated Hours - Officer-Initiated: Criminal and Motor Vehicle Crashes	229
<b>A Subtotal</b>		<b>15,383</b>
A-5	Primary: Non-CFS Responding Officers - Supplanting	44
A-6	Back-Up: Non-CFS Responding Officers - Supplanting	99
<b>A Subtotal</b>		<b>143</b>
<b>A Total</b>		<b>15,526</b>
B	Available Hours per Officer*	1,799
C	Authorized Strength in Patrol	30
D	Current Patrol Hours Available (B*C)	53,970
E	Current % Obligated to Citizen CFS (A/D)	<b>28.77%</b>
F	Target Obligated Workload (30%)	30.00%
G	Officer Workload Hours Available at 30% (B*F)	539.70
H	Patrol Officers Required to Meet Target Workload (A/G)	29
I	<b>Additional Primary CFS Response Officers Needed (H minus C)</b>	<b>-1</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

Based on the full analysis of the data in Model 1, the DPD requires 29 staff assigned as patrol officers to manage the overall volume. However, as discussed above and in reference to Table 4.5, there is also a need to consider the distribution of CFS across the hours of the day and how this distribution factors into staffing determinations. BerryDunn provides additional discussion on patrol staffing needs below, including a formal recommendation on patrol staffing additions.

## Administrative Labor

Precise information is not available in CAD for many administrative activities due to variances in the way agencies and officers record these activities. The interviews and field observations by BerryDunn suggest that administrative time for the DPD appears to be at the norm. Industry-wide, administrative time generally accounts for approximately 25% – 30% of an officer's average day, which appears to be the case at the DPD. This percentage can seem high to those not acquainted with the patrol function. However, a review of typical patrol activities supports this average.

In order to attempt to illustrate allocations of administrative time that are unaccounted for in CAD, BerryDunn asked the patrol officers to complete a worksheet and survey during two of their patrol shifts. The average time reported for supplemental work by each officer for each shift was approximately 113.5 minutes.<sup>58</sup> This does not include reports associated with CFS. It is also noteworthy that this survey spanned only two of the officers' normal shifts (BerryDunn did not identify which shifts to use). While representative of the supplemental workload, it is possible that a longer period of analysis might provide varied results. Regardless, the numbers above help to demonstrate a substantive administrative workload, which is otherwise not typically captured or considered. This data is consistent with prior BerryDunn studies.

## Uncommitted Time

The cumulative operational and administrative labor that officers must engage in should not be so significant that they are unable to respond to emergencies in a timely fashion or engage in mission-critical elective activities and problem-solving efforts. A proportion of the workday must be uncommitted to any other type of labor. Uncommitted time allows officers to do the following:

- Have and initiate public service contacts
- Participate in elective activities selected by the agency, such as community policing and problem-solving
- Make pedestrian and business contacts
- Conduct field interviews
- Engage proactive traffic stops and proactive patrol efforts

Uncommitted time is the time left over after officers complete the work associated with both obligated/committed time and administrative time. A general principle for distribution of time for patrol is 30% across the board for administrative, operational, and uncommitted time, with a 10% flex factor. Ideally, particularly for service-driven organizations, the remaining 10% becomes uncommitted time, allowing officers more time for proactive community engagement.

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<sup>58</sup> SDI Figure 4.4

For a jurisdiction like the DPD, with its stated focus on exceptional service and community policing, no less than 40% uncommitted patrol time is ideal.

In BerryDunn's experience, the percentage of administrative time generally mirrors operational labor totals. In other words, if a patrol officer is spending 35% of their time engaging in obligated workload, administrative time will likely capture 35% of their daily responsibilities. This is likely due to the types of administrative duties that typically follow the obligated workload, such as conducting follow-up, processing evidence, and writing reports. Essentially, if either the operational or administrative percentages are over 30%, then the percentage of uncommitted time will be negatively affected.

### Additional Staffing Discussion

The DPD expressed to BerryDunn that an important organizational goal is for officers to have enough non-committed time to proactively police, which would include patrolling neighborhoods; however, due to high service volumes, the officers are not able to do that to the extent they have in the past. The DPD expressed that it has received community feedback about officers not being seen in the neighborhoods enough, and officers lack sufficient time to manage other complaints such as speeding, commercial vehicles, criminal trespass, potential drug activity, and graffiti, for example. The DPD reports officers do not have the time to conduct these types of secondary activities that are important to the safety of the community, because they are regularly tied up on other CFS. The DPD also reported that it regularly receives hits from the FLOCK camera system (integrated crime suppression cameras) about wanted vehicles moving through the community but often cannot respond to them because officers are busy. Additionally, the DPD expressed to BerryDunn that when DPD's staffing is compared to other similar-sized or even larger communities in the area, those agencies seem to be staffed at a higher level, and the DPD handles more Part 1 crimes per officer than many of those communities.

In Table 1.5, BerryDunn has provided crime comparisons from several neighboring communities, based on a list of comparison communities as provided by the DPD. Based on that data, the DPD is below the overall average in all Part 1 categories, except robbery, and in that category, the DPD had two more incidents than the average. Additionally, the total annual CFS response per officer for the DPD is within a typical range. Also, as BerryDunn has already shown in this chapter in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, Patrol staff at the DPD do engage in an appropriate and proportional level of self-initiated volume (though this could be improved during peak CFS periods).

BerryDunn recognizes that there is a strong sense from the DPD that the department as a whole, or at a minimum, the DPD, is understaffed. Various data BerryDunn has presented within this chapter provide calculations that assume full staffing levels in Patrol, but BerryDunn is aware the DPD has had significant attrition (see Chapter 10), and the department has been working short with some regularity (with minimum patrol staffing noted as the norm). As noted, when actual staffing is used in these calculations, the data can look very different.



The other dynamic, which BerryDunn has illustrated, relates to the DPD Patrol schedule configuration and the distribution of personnel, which does not align with peak CFS demands (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.5). Correcting this condition requires the appropriate amount of staffing, but also an adjustment in personnel allocation through a revised Patrol schedule.

The model that BerryDunn uses to calculate staffing needs is based, foundationally, on calculating workload demands against staff capacity to isolate the proper balance. The 30% obligated workload calculation BerryDunn uses to inform staffing needs is considered the standard within the policing industry. Although BerryDunn understands the natural tendency to compare one community—or department—against another, the multitude of possible variables makes this nearly impossible to do so without a detailed analysis. The data and conclusions BerryDunn outline in this chapter, and throughout this report, pertain to the specific and unique conditions of the DPD, and although BerryDunn does use comparison data to identify anomalies, staffing determinations are independently calculated for each department.

Another area of consideration in determining staffing levels relates to community growth and how that growth might affect workloads. As BerryDunn has mentioned previously, determining staffing levels should be based on workloads—not populations. However, it is possible to identify a ratio of CFS, based on current populations, and to calculate workload impacts, if population growth were to occur, and if workloads associated with that growth were consistent. Table 4.7 provides such a model.



**Table 4.7: Staffing Projections**

	Base Population	Base CFS Hours	Base Ratio CFS Hours per Person	Base Officer Hours	Base Officer 30% Hours	Staffing Patrol	Patrol % of Total Sworn
<b>Current</b>	51,683	15,526	0.30	1799	540	30	46.88%
<b>Next Year</b>	53,239	15,993				30	46.88%
<b>Year 2</b>	54,303	16,313				30	46.15%
<b>Year 3</b>	55,550	16,688				31	46.97%
<b>Year 4</b>	56,062	16,841				31	46.27%
<b>Year 5</b>	56,573	16,995				31	46.27%

	Base Invest.	Base Ratio Inv./Patrol	Staffing Invest.	Total Sworn	Non-Patrol Sworn	Total Sworn Ratio to Population	Total Non-Sworn	Total Non-Sworn Ratio to Population
<b>Current</b>	7	0.23	7	64	27	807.55	14	3691.64
<b>Next Year</b>			7	64	27		14	
<b>Year 2</b>			7	65	28		14	
<b>Year 3</b>			7	66	28		14	
<b>Year 4</b>			7	67	29		15	
<b>Year 5</b>			7	67	29		15	

Source: Calculations from Agency Provided Data

Table 4.7 starts with the base population and workload hours calculated by BerryDunn from the CAD dataset and then factors in the number of available hours for each Patrol officer. From these data, BerryDunn is able to develop a ratio of .30 CFS per person annually. Essentially, based on current workloads, .30 of a CFS can be attributed to each member of the City's population. Using this same logic, it is possible to determine the ratio of investigators and non-sworn personnel. Again, as the population grows, workloads will also increase. If the new population generates CFS in the same ratio, then calculating future staffing needs can follow the original CFS ratio.

The data in Table 4.7 rely on understanding projected community growth. Rather than utilize census projections, BerryDunn asked the City to quantify its anticipated growth over the next five years, and that data is provided in Table 1.2.

**Table 4.8: Projected Housing Growth by Type/Year (Table 1.2 Repeated)**

Property Growth	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
Single-Family Units	11	10	10	10	10
Multi-Housing Units	625	500	225	200	200

Source: City Provided Data

The City also provided BerryDunn with data on the percentage of single-family and multi-housing units within the City and the associated population for those units. Based on that data, BerryDunn calculated the average number of people per housing unit, by type. Using that information, BerryDunn calculated the anticipated population growth for the City and included this information in Table 4.7. If this data is accurate, it would represent a population increase in the City of about 5,000 people, or roughly a 10% growth factor over the next five years. As BerryDunn has already noted, the data in Table 4.7 presume that the ratio of CFS to the population will be consistent. However, as staff has explained, and as BerryDunn has outlined in Chapter 1, City growth will center around multi-family housing, and it will increase population density in those areas where the growth occurs.

For the City, population growth will not occur in equal ratio to the existing population. Nearly all the predicted growth will be multi-family housing, and this will almost certainly change the CFS ratio. Although there are no national standards, various project data demonstrate that the ratio of CFS for multi-family homes, as opposed to single-family homes, is very different. Statistically, multi-family homes can generate three times the volume of single-family homes. Accordingly, when performing workload projection calculations where growth is expected to occur disparately in favor of multi-family housing, it can be helpful to apply additional analysis and calculations. In Table 4.9, BerryDunn has outlined the anticipated additional CFS and workloads that might occur if the new multi-housing units in the City produce a CFS ratio of 3 to 1, as other communities have experienced.

**Table 4.9: Staffing Projections by Housing Unit/Year**

Year	Additional Units	Housing Units	Additional CFS	Total CFS	Additional Hours
2024	636	23,636	1,530	36,588	1,172.71
2025	510	24,146	1,225	37,812	938.91
2026	235	24,381	556	38,368	425.93
2027	210	24,591	495	38,863	379.30
2028	210	24,801	495	39,357	379.30

Source: Calculations from Agency Provided Data

Using the data from Table 4.9, BerryDunn has created Table 4.10. This table has the same population totals as Table 4.7; however, the workload hours have been adjusted to coincide with the predicted increased rate of CFS for multi-housing units. Based on the data in Table 4.7,

BerryDunn predicts a workload increase of approximate 1,500 hours, which translates into roughly three additional Patrol positions. Based on the data in Table 4.10, the predicted workload shift is roughly 3,330 hours, which translates into roughly six additional Patrol positions.

For the purposes of demonstrating these projections, BerryDunn has added several positions to the totals in Table 4.10. Those additions include:

- Three sworn officers for Patrol
- Four Community Service Officers (CSOs) for Patrol (non-sworn)
- One non-sworn administrative support position
- One PSR position
- Three investigators (sworn) for general investigations

All these positions are reflected in Table 4.10 in the Current line, because these are all positions BerryDunn has concluded should already exist based on workloads and staffing demands. These additions are also based on the current ratio of staffing against current workloads, and BerryDunn would expect workloads and demands to increase for those areas within the DPD as well.

The staffing model presented in Table 4.10 includes current staffing levels and those BerryDunn has recommended throughout this report; however, there is one notable exception. In Chapter 6, BerryDunn recommends development of a Street Crimes Unit, as described by the DPD. Although BerryDunn supports this and is making a recommendation to pursue it, there are several positions being recommended within this report, and it is BerryDunn's position that UPD should be staffed first, as this is where there is the greatest need. Additionally, if the data in Table 4.10 is accurate, the City will need to consider adding another five Patrol staff over the next five years in addition to BerryDunn's current staffing recommendations. The City and DPD will need to monitor these totals on an annual basis to affirm the predictions from the model.

**Table 4.10: Staffing Projections**

	Base Population	Base CFS Hours	Base Ratio CFS Hours per Person	Base Officer Hours	Base Officer 30% Hours	Staffing Patrol	Patrol % of Total Sworn
<b>Current</b>	51,683	15,526	0.30	1799	540	33	47.14%
<b>Next Year</b>	53,239	16,699				34	47.15%
<b>Year 2</b>	54,303	17,638				36	48.00%
<b>Year 3</b>	55,550	18,064				36	47.37%
<b>Year 4</b>	56,062	18,443				37	48.05%
<b>Year 5</b>	56,573	18,822				38	47.50%

	Base Invest.	Base Ratio Inv./Patrol	Staffing Invest.	Total Sworn	Non-Patrol Sworn	Total Sworn Ratio to Population	Total Non-Sworn	Total Non-Sworn Ratio to Population
<b>Current</b>	10	0.30	10	70	27	738.33	20	2584.15
<b>Next Year</b>			10	72	28	738.33	21	2535.20
<b>Year 2</b>			11	75	28	724.04	21	2585.84
<b>Year 3</b>			11	76	29	730.92	22	2525.00
<b>Year 4</b>			11	77	29	728.07	22	2548.25
<b>Year 5</b>			12	80	30	707.16	23	2459.70

Source: Calculations from Agency Provided Data


Based on the overall analysis of the data available, BerryDunn is recommending the DPD staff 33 sworn patrol officer positions. With efficient deployment of patrol personnel, and maintaining this staffing number as a minimum, the DPD should be able to manage patrol workloads without the need for supplanting (except in unusual or extreme circumstances). BerryDunn's conclusion is also predicated on the addition of CSO personnel as outlined later in this chapter. The addition of these personnel will relieve a portion of the low-level workloads currently being managed by Patrol and should help address peak CFS volumes.

As the data in Table 4.10 indicate, predicted growth will also affect staffing needs over the next five years. These projections include four additional patrol officers, one additional investigator, two additional non-patrol sworn personnel, and two additional non-sworn professional staff. Although these numbers are estimates, it is likely that workload increases will meet or exceed these estimates, and the City should consider using the data in this table in its budget planning processes going forward.

## V. Patrol Work Schedule

One of the most common areas of concern BerryDunn discovers in conducting operational studies is related to patrol staffing allocations. Figure 4.6 below provides a graphic visual snapshot of the staffing allocations for DPD (patrol officers only), as compared to average hourly CFS totals.

**Figure 4.6: Staffing Allocations vs. CFS Totals**



Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

Patrol staff across the industry typically indicate concerns about not having enough officers on the street at any given time to ensure that community complaints are handled in a timely manner. Staff also commonly indicate that patrol shifts often do not have a full complement of officers working and available to handle CFS, and that working at or below shift minimums is the standard practice. BerryDunn heard similar comments from the DPD.

The design of the DPD Patrol schedule is similar across all hours of the day and does not align with peak CFS volumes. In addition, the Patrol schedule does not account for leave time and the cyclical pattern of leave time use (see Figure 4.5). Although Figure 4.6 expresses maximum staffing levels across the day, DPD staff informed BerryDunn that typical Patrol staffing has been closer to four officers per shift, per day.

This information is important because it helps to illustrate actual staffing, as opposed to officer allocations. Based on these data, the DPD has generally staffed well below the optimal daily number (13 plus CSOs), as determined by the CAD data and BerryDunn's analysis. However, staffing 13 officers on a daily basis only works if the patrol schedule fully aligns with workload

demands. As Figure 4.6 and the DPD Patrol schedule self-evaluation indicate,<sup>59</sup> the patrol schedule does not distribute personnel in an optimal manner; BerryDunn elaborates on the patrol schedule later in this chapter.

BerryDunn also examined all CFS for the DPD based on the most common type of CFS by patrol zone. The top 10 CFS types involve 8,628 incidents or 54.9% of all CFS volume. Notably, of the top 10 incident types, none involve serious crimes, with only one (hit and run) being classified as a crime.<sup>60</sup>

## Patrol Schedule Discussion

Many law enforcement agencies struggle with designing work schedules that efficiently and optimally deploy available patrol resources. The path to developing an efficient work schedule that optimizes the effective deployment of patrol personnel requires thoughtful consideration of several overarching goals:

- Reducing or eliminating predictable overtime
- Eliminating peaks and valleys in staffing due to scheduled leave
- Ensuring appropriate staffing levels in all patrol zones or beats
- Providing sufficient staff to manage multiple and priority calls in patrol zones or beats
- Satisfying both operational and staff needs, including helping to ensure a proper work/life balance and equitable workloads for patrol staff

Designing a schedule that accomplishes these goals requires an intentional approach that is customized to each agency's characteristics (e.g., staffing levels, geographic factors, crime rates, zone/beat design, contract/labor rules), and there are several key components that bear consideration in that process. As part of this project, BerryDunn asked the DPD to complete a self-assessment of its patrol work schedule against a set of prescribed standards. Based on the self-assessment, the DPD scored 18 points on this assessment out of a maximum of 25 points.<sup>61</sup> In Figure 4.7, BerryDunn provides the scoring legend for the Patrol Schedule Assessment Tool.

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<sup>59</sup> SDI Table 4.26

<sup>60</sup> SDI Table 4.27

<sup>61</sup> SDI Table 4.26

**Figure 4.7: Patrol Schedule Assessment Score Legend**

25 – 22:	If the patrol schedule scored in this range, it is likely relatively efficient and generally meeting operational objectives. However, if there are any components within Section 1 that were scored as a 1 or 0, adjustments may be required.
21 – 18:	If the patrol schedule scored in this range, it is likely that adjusting the components of the schedule would improve its effectiveness and efficiency. Priority consideration should be given to any component in Section 1 that was scored as a 1 or 0.
17 or below:	If the patrol schedule scored in this range, there are several areas of effectiveness or efficiency that are not being met by the current design. It is likely that a full schedule redesign will be necessary to optimize effectiveness.

The DPD scored low in six of nine critical areas (as identified by the assessment instrument) in which the patrol schedule is lacking. Based on the DPD's self-assessment, and various observations noted in this chapter, BerryDunn recommends that DPD command staff review the patrol schedule section in the OARM report for additional information on patrol schedule designs and consider making adjustments to the Patrol work schedule.

## Patrol Staffing Summary

Based on a thorough analysis of the obligated workload for patrol, BerryDunn calculates that, when properly deployed, the DPD can manage CFS volume with an allocation of 33 officers to the Patrol Division. Later in this chapter, BerryDunn also recommends the addition of four non-sworn CSO personnel, and there is reason to believe that adding these personnel will reduce/balance the obligated workload for patrol. If the CSO positions are not added as recommended, it is possible that CFS patterns and workloads may push CFS volumes beyond optimal levels for patrol staff. Accordingly, BerryDunn's recommendation for Patrol staffing is tied to an expectation that CSO staffing will be added as well.

BerryDunn's recommendation of staffing 33 officers in patrol reflects the minimum number of officers required to operate and to respond to CFS effectively and efficiently (subject to ongoing monitoring and additional workload calculations). This number is considered the *operational minimum*, and it is the baseline for staffing, not the maximum.

To maintain minimum operational staffing levels, some agencies discuss using *over-hires* in order to cover the lag time associated with hiring and training personnel. Rather than discussing over-hires, BerryDunn suggests that agencies should establish a *minimum operational level*, which will help ensure maximum operational efficiency, and then set a new *authorized staffing level*, which offsets agency attrition levels and the vacancies that occur as a result of non-operational personnel. BerryDunn discusses this further in Chapter 10.

## VI. Traffic Enforcement

The DPD uses a dual approach to traffic enforcement within the City. Patrol officers are responsible for traffic enforcement within the City, but the CRT also performs this function. Patrol officers are expected to engage in traffic enforcement and/or to answer traffic-related

CFS during the course of their shift, as workload demands or allows. Based on the data in Figure 4.2, Patrol staff are finding time to perform this function. However, as Figure 4.2 indicates, officer-initiated activity is lower during peak CFS times, which also coincides with the heaviest traffic patterns within the City. This section provides additional details concerning traffic enforcement by the DPD.

## Activity

BerryDunn evaluated traffic violation data provided by the DPD for 2020 – 2021. The number of violations declined by almost 15% over this period, and average annual totals reflect 7,359 incidents.<sup>62</sup>

BerryDunn notes here that in recent years, many police agencies have experienced sharp declines in overall traffic enforcement and citation numbers. Those BerryDunn has interviewed on several projects have suggested that the national climate has discouraged officers from being proactive and writing citations. Despite industry trends or concerns expressed in other studies, BerryDunn notes that traffic enforcement is an important element of public safety, and one that requires continued effort.

As BerryDunn has shown in Figure 4.3, the DPD's officer-initiated activity, as a percentage of overall volume, is appropriate, despite lower volumes during peak CFS times. Still, persistent traffic enforcement—even with staffing challenges the DPD has endured—is an indication of persistence and operational focus on traffic safety.

## Motor Vehicle Crashes

In addition to reviewing traffic violation data provided by the DPD, BerryDunn also examined all traffic-related data within CAD. This data reflects nearly 1,500 hours of community-initiated activity relating to traffic. This data also shows 1,300 hours of volume associated with motor vehicle crashes.<sup>63</sup> Motor vehicle crash volume consumes the entire availability of more than two full-time police officers (see Table 4.6). This data is particularly important because managing motor vehicle crashes is a CFS type that can be diverted in whole or in part to CSOs, with obvious reductions to patrol workloads for sworn staff.

The DPD also provided data on injury and fatality motor vehicle crash reports, and this data is provided in Table 4.11. The number of overall crashes in the City, and the number of injury and fatal crashes, provide additional evidence of the need to direct specific efforts to traffic concerns within the City.

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<sup>62</sup> SDI Table 4.28

<sup>63</sup> SDI Table 4.29




**Table 4.11: Traffic Crash Reports**

Accident Category	2020	2021	% Change
Fatality	3	7	133.33%
Possible Injury	350	484	38.29%

Source: Agency Provided Data

## Trends

BerryDunn is aware that Dunwoody is a major connector to the Atlanta metropolitan area and that the daily traffic volumes are substantial. Accordingly, BerryDunn is not surprised to see that the number of motor vehicle crashes in Dunwoody totals nearly 3,000. As BerryDunn has mentioned, traffic enforcement is an important public safety function, and given the volume of motor vehicle crashes in Dunwoody, the DPD should continue its efforts in this area. BerryDunn also examined motor vehicle crashes by hour of the day, and this data is reflected in Figure 4.8. These data are consistent with the CFS volume patterns reflected in Figure 4.2. These patterns also demand appropriate staffing levels during pattern peaks to respond to service demands.

**Figure 4.8: Motor Vehicle Crashes by Hour**

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

## VII. Alternative Response

Many police agencies in the United States have been struggling with increasing CFS workloads, while simultaneously facing ever-tightening budgets and unprecedented attrition and vacancy rates. As a result of these challenges and national trends calling for police response reform,

many communities and police departments have started to consider revisions to the traditional police CFS response model.

Considering alternatives to police CFS response is not new; in fact, many agencies already use some form of CFS diversion, whether through a telephone response unit (TRU), online reporting, mobile apps, or the use of non-sworn personnel. What is different and new in the most recent discussion of CFS response alternatives is an understanding that this conversation is not simply about providing these alternatives as possible options—it is about considering fundamental changes to how police departments do business, including identifying collaboration opportunities with other organizations and in some cases outsourcing certain CFS types entirely.

Despite growing interest among police agencies in identifying alternatives to the traditional police CFS model, many have struggled to engage in an objective process that can produce appropriate and acceptable results. In some cases, suggested revisions have been met with resistance from staff, elected officials, and community members. At present, the DPD does not use a formal TRU, online, or any other alternative CFS response process.

To help objectively evaluate alternatives to the traditional police response model for the DPD, BerryDunn engaged a specific and collaborative methodology. The best-practice approach to evaluating alternatives to the traditional police CFS model should expand the level of collaboration beyond the walls of the police department. The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Task Force final report explains:

Law enforcement agencies should work with community residents to identify problems and collaborate on implementing solutions that produce meaningful results for the community...and; Do things with residents in the co-production of public safety rather than doing things to or for them.<sup>64</sup>

Making changes to the traditional police CFS response model is an involved process that requires a thoughtful approach. BerryDunn has developed a collaborative Essential CFS Evaluation process that considers numerous critical factors to produce data that police staff, community members, and elected leaders can rely upon in making critical decisions about future public safety needs. This report outlines BerryDunn's approach to this process and presents the findings of the evaluation conducted for the City and the DPD.

BerryDunn followed the Essential CFS Evaluation work plan steps listed below:

1. Facilitate initial discussions with DPD and project team
2. Finalize and distribute Essential Police CFS Evaluation tool internally
3. Distribute Essential Police CFS Evaluation tool externally

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<sup>64</sup> Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing – [http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce\\_finalreport.pdf](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf)

4. Conduct community feedback sessions
5. Staff and stakeholder interviews
6. Data analysis
7. Develop CFS Evaluation Report (included in this section)

## Essential CFS Evaluation Process

Determining possible alternatives to the traditional CFS police response requires substantial data collection and analysis to inform and guide outcomes and recommendations. The work plan above briefly outlines BerryDunn's collaborative approach to collecting and analyzing this type of data.

One aspect of BerryDunn's process involves analyzing the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data for the police department. This determines CFS types to be evaluated and also quantifies the level of annual work effort in full-time equivalent (FTE) sworn officer positions. For purposes of this analysis, calculating the value of a single FTE for patrol officers involves starting with the standard number of annual work hours (2,080), removing non-work time (e.g., vacation, sick leave, training), and calculating 30% of that value (which is the percent of time an officer is expected to be engaged in CFS activity), which for the DPD is approximately 508 hours (30% of 1,695 total working hours). Quantifying the data in this way helps determine the potential impact various CFS alternative responses could have on agency workload. If the FTE level is negligible, this data reveals that diverting a CFS category will likely provide little workload relief and add little value to the department and the community (although there may still be other reasons to divert some CFS types).

In addition to CAD data analysis, BerryDunn also uses a customizable CFS Evaluation instrument to collect quantitative data. This instrument is used to solicit data from members of the police department and various professional stakeholders, possible CFS response resources, and the community. Tables 4.12 and 4.13 reflect the numerous evaluative points of the instrument, which present a full range of areas to be considered in making decisions about future police response.

**Table 4.12: Essential Police CFS Evaluation Method - Sample**

CFS Activity	Police Mandate	Risk/Potential Danger	Immediate Response	Type: Crime, Traffic, Service	Other Resources Available	Alternative Response	Volume in FTEs	Community Value	Custom Field
Alarm									
Theft									
Domestic									
Medical									
Mental Health									
Traffic									

**Table 4.13: Essential Police CFS Evaluation Legend**

Category	Rating	Explanation
Police Mandate	Yes, No	Legal requirement for response
Risk/Potential Danger	High, Possible, Limited	As assessed by call type and category
Immediate Response	Yes, No	24/7 response necessary/expected
Type: Crime, Traffic, Service	Category	CFS category assigned
Other Resources Available	Yes, No, Limited, TBD	Current, to some extent, or possible
Alternative Response	Yes, No	TRU or online reporting options
Volume in FTEs	Calculated Value	Based on CAD analysis
Community Value	Calculated Value	Based on community input (1 – 5)
Custom Field	TBD	TBD

Lastly, BerryDunn’s process includes individual and group interviews with members of the department, stakeholders, service providers, and the community. This feedback is used to validate and support outputs from the quantitative data and to guide and shape final recommendations. As part of this project, BerryDunn held several meetings with the City, community, and relevant stakeholders.

Following the meetings and initial discussions, DPD administration was asked to provide additional coding using the criteria below, with full consideration of the combined responses from operational personnel.

**Criminal/Ordinance Incidents:**

- Does this CFS type require an in-person officer response?
- Could this CFS type possibly be handled in person by a non-sworn staff member?
- Could this CFS type possibly be diverted to a TRU or an online reporting portal?

**Non-Criminal Incidents:**

- Does this CFS type require an in-person officer response?
- Could this CFS type possibly be handled in person by a non-sworn staff member?
- Could this CFS type possibly be diverted to a TRU or an online reporting portal?
- Does this CFS type require a police response at all (assuming another resource can be identified)?
- Is it possible that this CFS type might not always require a police response?

**Category Removal:**

- Are there any categories of CFS types that do not apply to the DPD, or that cannot otherwise be diverted?

Using this process, several criminal and service CFS types were removed from further consideration, leaving 37 areas for internal, stakeholder, and community evaluation. BerryDunn provided the DPD with an evaluation worksheet, and 15 staff members from the department completed it, using the criteria in Table 4.13.

BerryDunn also developed an online survey from the evaluation data gathered for community and stakeholder review of the remaining CFS types. A link to this survey was posted online on the Social Pinpoint project site, and the City communications team promoted the survey opportunity through its various social media platforms. BerryDunn also directly emailed the survey link to a list of stakeholders identified by the City and DPD. The survey was active online for approximately three weeks. BerryDunn received 178 viable survey responses from the community and 11 survey responses from stakeholders. BerryDunn processed the data from the surveys and that information has been provided in its entirety in Appendix C, Table C.1.

The survey response data in Appendix C, Table C.1 generally reflect moderate to strong acceptance levels for alternative CFS responses, with many categories receiving an average response of three or four (with one being least accepting and five being most accepting). Not surprisingly, some incidents that appear to require a sworn officer response received lower alternative CFS response acceptance scores, averaging a response under three.

Based on work done around the country, along with alternative CFS research, BerryDunn is aware that many of the incident types provided in Appendix C, Table C.1 have been successfully diverted to external resources, non-sworn police staff, or to TRU or online resources. Even though some of the survey categories produced relatively low average scores, the DPD should be able to divert many of the listed CFS types, including some with relatively low response scores. In turn, this will reduce workloads for sworn staff, and in all likelihood, increase the DPD's effectiveness in providing service to the community. Despite these likely outcomes, the DPD should pay attention to the low scores—particularly those that averaged less than three. It may be best not to divert CFS types with these lower scores immediately, or at a minimum, the DPD may need to take additional precautions to help increase community comfort in the alternative processes the department intends to put into place.

In addition to the overall ratings for non-sworn, TRU, or online response, the bottom section of Appendix C, Table C.1 also reflects CFS types that could be diverted to resources external to the police department. The table also provides suggested alternative response resources, based on community and stakeholder feedback.

In Table 4.14 below, BerryDunn provides a small excerpt from the full dataset. Of the seven CFS types provided in Table 4.14, each has CFS volumes in CAD that exceed a .5 FTE. In other words, based on the CAD dataset, each of the CFS types required a minimum of one-half of the available time of one patrol officer to accomplish. The workload from four categories required more than a full-time officer to manage. In total, the CAD data indicates that the combined FTE commitment for these seven categories is 9.33 (FTE workloads for the entire dataset are 12.69).

**Table 4.14: Essential Police CFS Evaluation Legend**

	Volume in FTEs	Community Service Officer (Response Averages)			TRU/Online (Response Averages)		
CFS Type		Stakeholder	Community	Avg.	Stakeholder	Community	Avg.
WELFARE CHECK	1.65	3.27	3.38	3.33			
ACCIDENT NEGATIVE INJURIES	2.87	2.90	2.87	2.89	2.70	2.73	2.72
HIT AND RUN ACCIDENT	0.94	2.45	2.17	2.31	2.80	2.55	2.68
INFORMATION FOR OFFICER	1.41	3.54	3.68	3.61	3.63	3.63	3.63
LARCENY	0.66	2.72	2.35	2.54	2.90	2.60	2.75
SHOPLIFTING ALREADY OCCURRED	1.26	3.45	3.09	3.27			
TRAFFIC HAZARD	0.54	3.81	3.29	3.55			

The data in Table 4.14 is particularly relevant in consideration of the workload and staffing discussions that are provided in this chapter. As BerryDunn has noted, the DPD has significant peak CFS hours, and many of those CFS could be managed by non-sworn field response personnel, commonly referred to as community service officers (CSOs). These unarmed, uniformed personnel can manage many CFS types, including parking, animal complaints, minor criminal incidents (not in progress), traffic direction, vehicle tows and impounds, and a host of others listed in Appendix C, Table C.1.

Although CSOs could not manage all the volume identified for a variety of reasons, it is likely that these personnel could absorb a substantial portion of low-level obligated workload, relieving patrol officers of this volume. Also, given the pattern reflected in Figure 4.2, the DPD would benefit from staffing CSOs in the middle of the day. Because these personnel can manage this low-level workload with the same level of effort as officers, hiring CSOs should have a direct one-to-one relationship reduction in the number of additional sworn officers the City would need to add.

**Table 4.15: CSO Shift Relief Factor**

Shift Hours	Raw Shift Hours Total Annual	Shift Relief Factor	Number of Daily Shifts	CSOs Required to Staff Minimums
10	3650	2.15	2	4

In addition to adding CSOs, the DPD should carefully examine the results of the Essential CFS Evaluation to identify CFS that could be diverted to a TRU, online reporting, non-sworn field personnel (CSOs), or external partners (where appropriate). The DPD should develop a plan and appropriate policies, provide training for officers, DPD staff, and dispatch, and educate the community about access to these new resources.

## VIII. Patrol Operations

During this project, BerryDunn noted several other operational opportunities for the UPD, and those items are outlined in this section.

### Non-Consensual and Impartial Policing Data

Best practices dictate that police agencies should record all police-related contacts within their data systems. Collecting this information provides for data analysis and accountability.

Documentation of complete and consistent demographic data and outcomes of encounters by police agencies is necessary to provide complete supporting data to assess compliance with laws prohibiting bias-based profiling, address community complaints and concerns, and identify any patterns of behavior that might require intervention. At present, the DPD does not have a policy or practice that requires collection of this data.

All departments, including the DPD, should collect comprehensive data from all non-consensual law enforcement encounters including, at a minimum, reasons for encounter (e.g., community-initiated or officer-initiated), perceived gender and race, and outcomes of encounter (e.g., cited, arrested, searched, warned, handcuffed). DPD should require documentation of all non-consensual law enforcement encounters to enable meaningful bias-based policing analysis and should conduct that analysis on a regular and transparent basis.

The DPD should regularly monitor and evaluate its Impartial Policing Data (IPD) to identify patterns that reflect possible bias. The DPD should use the data to assist with development of strategies to correct possible biased policing patterns and monitor the data on an ongoing basis to evaluate the success of operational adjustments implemented to mitigate them.

### Victim Services Referrals

The Department utilizes a service referral form to advise victims and possible victims of their rights and the available support resources. This is a commendable and best practice to help ensure all victims understand their rights and resources. Research strongly supports that victims who engage in supportive services remain engaged with the criminal justice process longer than those who do not, so encouraging utilization of supportive services contributes to positive agency outcomes as well as improved individual outcomes. Employee interviews indicate the required service referral form may not be utilized consistently or universally as the department expects. BerryDunn recommends the DPD review this practice and policy and educate officers on its value and expected use.



## Solvability Factors

The DPD should review and revise how criminal cases are reviewed and assigned for follow-up. One critical element of case review and assignment involves the use of solvability factors. The DPD does not formally or consistently engage the use of solvability factors as an assessment tool in determining which cases should be activated for additional investigation. This means that Investigations supervisors spend a great deal of time reviewing reports that are never going to actually be assigned for follow-up investigation.

The reality of modern policing is that many CFS that include crimes reported to the police do not have actionable leads or those that would make investigation likely to produce a suspect. A great deal of research has been performed on what leads or evidence make a case likely to produce results and when the absence of such leads makes follow-up likely to be unproductive. These conditions are generally called solvability factors, and a weighted algorithmic scale of these factors can provide guidance on the anticipated effectiveness or efficiency of investigative follow-up.

There are numerous variations of this assessment model, but most emanate from the foundational work done by the Rochester, NY Police Department in the late 1970s. In that study, researchers isolated the common elements present in cases reported to the police that were successfully investigated. From that research, a series of common factors (solvability factors) were identified.<sup>65</sup> By considering whether one or more of these factors is present on any given case, police departments can focus their efforts on cases that have a reasonable opportunity for a successful resolution, and they can close those that are unlikely to be solved even with reasonable investigative effort.

Forwarding a case to Investigations consumes time and energy from both patrol and Investigations personnel who each must review and dispose of the case. Automated solvability factors deployed within RMS utilize software to make this process more efficient. The reporting officer documents the known factors about the incident, and the RMS automatically classifies and routes the case without Investigations personnel having to spend time and energy to receive, review, assess, and dispose of the case.

Solvability factors include information such as whether there is a known suspect, whether there is a vehicle description, whether there are witnesses to the crime, and whether there is physical evidence. The sum of these factors comprises the baseline of a thorough preliminary investigation. If officers do not collect this information and report on it, one could reasonably assert that the preliminary investigation and/or the report was incomplete.

By design, requiring patrol staff to collect and record this information helps to ensure a thorough preliminary investigation, and it can expedite the process of determining whether a case should be forwarded to a detective for additional investigation. BerryDunn has been told that the RMS

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<sup>65</sup> Managing Criminal Investigations in Rochester, New York – A Case Study  
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=92744>

in use by the DPD has the capability to collect solvability factors. This recommendation can provide significant efficiency for the DPD. Regardless of how it occurs, BerryDunn recommends the DPD revise the report-writing and approval process and include solvability factors as a required element within that process for all personnel generating criminal reports.

## Summary

The DPD is commanded by a major and two lieutenants. The authorized staffing level for fiscal year 2022 in the UPD includes 36 officers, eight sergeants, two lieutenants, and one major. These officers are responsible for patrolling the three designated zones and the sub-areas in the City. Despite the level of allocated personnel, the DPD has struggled with attrition and staffing vacancies, which has hampered continuity of staffing for Patrol. These vacancies have negatively affected the ability of the DPD to manage CFS volumes, and there is a need to correct this and fill these positions.

In addition to the need to fill vacancies and for additional staffing, the current patrol work schedule is limiting the effectiveness of patrol deployments, most notably because it lacks the flexibility to adjust to peak CFS volumes and leave patterns. Adjusting the patrol schedule should aid in balancing resources against service demands and provide ancillary benefits, such as reduced overtime and better availability for officers to take time off.

The DPD does not currently use any alternative CFS response processes. Adding limited TRU and online reporting would contribute to reduced workloads, and both of these solutions would help improve the ability of field staff to respond to work demands that require a sworn officer response.

BerryDunn conducted an Essential CFS Evaluation process to identify possible options for methods to mitigate workloads for patrol and to refer some CFS to more appropriate resources. The intended result of that process is to develop a more robust alternative service plan and strategy and to appropriately align CFS response with the correct resources. Due in part to that process, and in consideration of peak CFS volumes that are negatively affecting DPD workloads, BerryDunn is recommending the DPD add four CSO positions.

Based on a thorough review of the CFS data available, BerryDunn is recommending the addition of three sworn officers to the UPD for primary CFS response. These officers are recommended in addition to the CSOs, and BerryDunn notes that if the City were to choose not to add CSO positions, it is likely that additional sworn staff would be required beyond what BerryDunn is recommending.

The City is expected to experience significant growth over the next five years, and nearly all that growth will involve multi-housing units. Statistically, multi-housing units generate more CFS volume than single-family dwellings. Given the number of additional multi-housing units, and in consideration of the planned development, BerryDunn has provided a staffing projection model for the next five years. That model outlines expected growth and increases to workloads, as well as expected staffing increases for the UPD, CID, and other sworn and non-sworn personnel.

The DPD does not require collection of contact data for all non-consensual police contacts, including demographic, police-subject actions, and contact outcomes, and the DPD does not require entry of this data into its RMS. The lack of this data impedes analysis and monitoring of impartial policing activities for the department.


The process of referring cases for review and assignment by Investigations could be improved. Although there are various components to this process, a key element involves the use of solvability factors within the preliminary investigation process at the patrol level. Using solvability factors helps clarify which cases are potentially solvable, and it informs decisions on which cases to activate for investigative follow-up. The DPD currently does not use solvability factors, and BerryDunn is recommending implementation of their use.


BerryDunn's analysis of all relevant workload data is that staffing and operational challenges are impeding optimal service delivery for the UPD. BerryDunn has outlined numerous recommendations within this chapter that can help the DPD operate more efficiently and effectively.


## Recommendations

This section provides the formal recommendations from this chapter, presented chronologically as they appear within the chapter. Each recommendation in the table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, and details concerning the findings and recommendations.


**Table 4.16: Chapter 4 Recommendations**


Patrol Services		
No.	Patrol Staffing	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 4, Section IV: Patrol Staffing and Analysis</i>		
4-1	<b>Finding:</b> The staffing levels in Patrol are not optimized and do not meet operational demands.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should add three patrol officers to primary CFS response in the UPD, adjusting the allocated total of sworn primary response Patrol staff to 33.	
	Based on a thorough analysis of the obligated workload for patrol, BerryDunn calculates that the DPD needs to add three officers to the UPD, along with the four CSOs also recommended (see Recommendation 4-2). These additions intend to satisfy obligated workload totals and CFS distributions, as outlined throughout this chapter.	
	In addition, the City should regard Tables 4.7 and 4.10 as a roadmap for staff growth needs, based on predicted or actual growth that occurs over the next five years.	


Patrol Services		
No.	Use of Non-Sworn Field Personnel	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section VII: Alternative Response</b>		
4-2	<p><b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD dispatches officers to numerous CFS that do not require a sworn officer response. This volume of activity is impeding the ability to focus officer CFS response to more critical and demanding incidents.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should begin the process of hiring non-sworn field personnel, typically referred to as community service officers (CSOs), to supplement and augment the capacity of the Patrol Division. BerryDunn recommends the DPD hire four CSO positions to cover two daily shifts during peak CFS hours.</p> <p>This process should occur as soon as practical to assist the DPD with managing overall workloads and to assist with CFS as the department is working to fully staff the UPD.</p>	

Patrol Services		
No.	Alternative CFS Response	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section VII: Alternative CFS Response</b>		
4-3	<p><b>Finding:</b> The DPD does not currently use alternative CFS response, but opportunities exist to utilize alternative CFS response methods and resources.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should develop a comprehensive alternative CFS response plan and seek approval from the City Council on the new model. The alternative CFS response plan should consider numerous elements, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishing a limited TRU function utilizing existing and recommended personnel (CSOs, PSRs)</li> <li>Adding online reporting as a service option for crime victims</li> <li>Evaluating hybrid and collaborative responses for appropriate CFS types (e.g., mental health), and identifying whether there are existing resources for response or if these need to be created and/or augmented</li> <li>Developing policies and procedures for the diversion of CFS to the TRU, online reporting, non-sworn personnel, and other external resources; procedures should consider customer preferences and provide accommodations for those, whenever requested</li> <li>Training agency personnel, dispatch, and community partners on the new model</li> <li>Providing community education on the new model, including the various</li> </ul>	

Patrol Services		
	<p>reporting capabilities and how to provide feedback</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring the success of the new model and making appropriate adjustments</li> </ul> <p>Additional details on the Essential CFS Evaluation process and findings can be found in Appendix C of this report.</p>	

Patrol Services		
No.	Non-Consensual and Impartial Policing Data	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 4, Section VIII: Patrol Operations</i>		
4-4	<p><b>Finding:</b> DPD does not regularly and consistently collect standardized demographic data, such as perceived race and gender, or outcome data (such as searches, warning, citation, etc.) on all non-consensual law enforcement-related contacts in a single database that is easily accessed for analysis.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluating this data is a critical step in identifying possible biased policing patterns and in developing strategies to correct them.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should collect subject demographic and encounter outcome data from all non-consensual law enforcement-related contacts in a centralized database that can be utilized for meaningful reporting and analysis.</p>	

Patrol Operations		
No.	Victim Services Referrals	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 4, Section VIII: Patrol Operations</i>		
4-5	<p><b>Finding Area:</b> The Victim Service Referral Form might not be utilized universally or consistently by department personnel.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should review the service referral documents and related department policy for victim service referrals to ensure they are consistent with department values and goals. Review policy and accountability mechanisms to ensure victim service referrals are performed consistently and effectively. Institute audit procedures to ensure compliance with policy.</p>	

Patrol Services		
No.	Solvability Factors	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section VIII: Patrol Operations</b>		
4-6	<p><b>Finding:</b> The DPD does not currently formally engage the use of solvability factors as an element of conducting a preliminary criminal investigation. The use of solvability factors helps increase the quality of preliminary investigations and can assist decision-makers in determining which cases should receive additional investigation.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should require the use of solvability factors by all staff who conduct preliminary criminal investigations and complete the associated reports. Solvability factors should be reviewed by patrol supervisors as a part of the incident report approval process and used to assist with the case activation and assignment process.</p> <p>Solvability factors should include information such as whether there is a known suspect, whether there is a vehicle description, whether there are witnesses to the crime, and whether there is physical evidence. The sum of these factors comprises the baseline of a thorough preliminary investigation. If officers do not collect this information and report on it, one could reasonably assert that the preliminary investigation and/or the report was incomplete.</p> <p>By design, requiring patrol staff to collect and record this information helps to ensure a thorough preliminary investigation, and it can expedite the process of determining whether a case should be forwarded to a detective for additional investigation. It is possible, but unclear, whether the RMS at DPD has the capability to collect solvability factors. Regardless of that capability, BerryDunn recommends their collection as part of the preliminary investigation process.</p> <p>Additionally, BerryDunn recommends the DPD revise the report-writing and approval process and include solvability factors as a required element within that process for all personnel generating criminal reports.</p>	

## Chapter 5: Community Engagement

*Community Engagement: includes a review of community policing philosophies and actions by the agency, impartial policing strategies, engagement with the media, and problem-solving efforts and methods.*

### I. Community Policing

Although there are myriad definitions for community policing, the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Task Force final report explains:

Community policing emphasizes working with neighborhood residents to co-produce public safety. Law enforcement agencies should work with community residents to identify problems and collaborate on implementing solutions that produce meaningful results for the community...<sup>66</sup> Neighborhood policing provides an opportunity for police departments to do things with residents in the co-production of public safety rather than doing things to or for them.<sup>67</sup>

This concept is in keeping with the policing philosophy of Sir Robert Peel, crafted in 1829, that still holds true today, which states:

The police at all times should maintain a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that *the police are the public and the public are the police*; [emphasis added] the police are only the members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent upon every citizen in the intent of the community welfare.<sup>68</sup>

### Community Policing Philosophy

BerryDunn had an opportunity to examine the community policing efforts of the DPD, including discussions with staff and government leaders, a review of the policy and organizational goals of the department, review of public-facing statements such as department web sites, and feedback from community stakeholders. Based on this extensive review, it is clear that community outreach, deliberate engagement of the community, and the general concept of community policing are part of the core organizational philosophy of the DPD. BerryDunn notes leadership at DPD has been deliberate and intentional with respect to supporting and establishing relationship-building and basic community policing efforts as an organizational philosophy. For example, the Core Values articulated by the DPD include numerous references to partnership with and accountability to the community, and the DPD Mission

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<sup>66</sup> Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing – [http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce\\_finalreport.pdf](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing – [http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce\\_finalreport.pdf](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf)

<sup>68</sup> [https://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Documents/Peels\\_Principles\\_Of\\_Law\\_Enforcement.pdf](https://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Documents/Peels_Principles_Of_Law_Enforcement.pdf)



Statement commits to being a “trusted partner with our community.” Additionally, BerryDunn noted the following statement about DPD’s community policing philosophy on its website:

The Dunwoody Police Department works hard to engage the community in partnerships that help to reduce crime and improve the quality of life for Dunwoody citizens. By practicing a community policing philosophy throughout our organization, we get to know the community we serve and the community gets to know us. Our department provides a variety of community outreach programs designed to build relationships in the community and provide participants with important information.<sup>69</sup>

The DPD mission statement, its core values, and its statements about its approach to policing reflect a strong orientation to community engagement and relationship-building. The clear and formal expression of these ideas, which underpin community policing, is important because they set the stage for what is expected of all members of the organization. However, based on BerryDunn’s interviews and observations and an analysis of the data, those within the DPD have not fully engaged in meaningful community-oriented policing (COP) activities, particularly formalized problem-oriented policing (POP) efforts. This appears to be primarily due a lack of formal training and education on the fundamental application of core COP and POP principles, the development of specific problem-solving skills, and the absence of any system for measuring performance in COP and POP efforts. That is, although COP is a clearly articulated and supported operational philosophy promoted by DPD leadership, the department does not have a firm requirement for COP or POP efforts by patrol officers and does not provide advanced COP or POP training for patrol officers. Additional focus on each of these areas represents an opportunity for the DPD to expand its COP and POP philosophy and application throughout the organization to produce improved outcomes.

## Community Policing Training

BerryDunn also asked the DPD about pre- and in-service training for officers on COP and POP. New DPD officers go to a regional police academy to receive Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) certification. In addition to the curriculum offered under Georgia POST guidance at the regional police academies, new officers receive additional content and orientation directly from DPD. New officers are oriented to DPD policy and procedures, receive any additional training required by DPD in addition to the basic POST standards, and participate in a field training program. Throughout these phases of initial training, new employees receive the basic COP training required by Georgia state standards, which is not extensive. As noted elsewhere in this report, DPD clearly articulates a vision that embraces community policing and engages in significant community engagement. Additionally, the DPD has a requirement for completion of a community policing or problem-oriented policing activity as part of Field Training

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<sup>69</sup> [www.dunwoodyga.gov/police/about/mission-vision-core-values](http://www.dunwoodyga.gov/police/about/mission-vision-core-values)



Officer (FTO). Following this initial requirement, however, COP and POP expectations are not specifically outlined or monitored.

### Community Outreach Unit

DPD has a Community Outreach Unit that also serves as the department's Public Information Office (PIO). The Community Outreach and PIO Unit is staffed by two police officers who report to the administrative services sergeant. The administrative services sergeant reports to the administrative services lieutenant, who reports to the police major over administrative services and criminal investigations. That police major reports to the deputy chief, who reports directly to the chief of police. According to DPD, the community outreach function of DPD is responsible for "establishing effective communication with the community through Neighborhood Watch and other educational programs. Through the Community Outreach Unit, we build partnerships with residents, schools, and business owners to teach crime prevention and improve the overall quality of life."

## II. Community-Based Programs and Partnerships

To promote and engage the community-policing philosophy, the DPD uses a dual approach. DPD has a Community Outreach Unit whose purpose, as noted above, is to engage the community and build partnerships. DPD also expects all staff to engage in community policing, particularly those in patrol. As a part of the study, BerryDunn asked the DPD to provide a list of various events that outline community engagement efforts by the department. BerryDunn also researched open-source resources to identify additional DPD community engagement efforts. The following is a non-exhaustive sample of those community policing efforts and events:

- Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events (CRASE) community training
- Situational awareness community classes
- Child safety seat checks and events
- Community Ride-Along program
- Coffee With a Cop events
- Overdose awareness community classes
- Citizens' Police Academy
- Drug Take Back events
- Teen Police Academy
- National Night Out
- Sex trafficking awareness community classes

- Numerous events organized by the community such as Career Day, Walk to School Wednesdays, Read Across America
- Griffin Project (mentoring for special needs students)
- Special Olympics Law Enforcement Torch Run
- Cops on Donut Shops
- Polar Plunge
- Christmas for Kids and Santa Cop Charity Bowling
- Volunteer programs including Neighborhood Watch, Chaplain, Bailiff, Citizens on Patrol, and Police Cadet programs
  - DPD's volunteer "Citizens on Patrol" utilizes 10 Dunwoody residents who volunteer to report suspicious activity, identify safety hazards, and perform other non-enforcement actions such as vacation checks of homes and businesses. In 2022, Citizens on Patrol spent 703 hours performing 360 neighborhood patrols and performed over 900 actions in support of DPD.
  - DPD's Public Safety Cadet Program is a *"worksite-based program for young men and women who have completed the eighth grade and are between 14 and 21 years old"* designed to help "participants gain insight into careers in the field of law enforcement in a learning environment with lots of fun-filled, hands-on activities that promote the growth and development."<sup>70</sup> The cadets meet regularly to train in different aspects of law enforcement and volunteer at community special events and functions.

As a part of the study, BerryDunn asked the DPD about community relationships. DPD staff mentioned various partnerships with professional affiliates in the area and BerryDunn noted a particularly strong relationship with the local behavioral health system located in Dunwoody and a regional nonprofit called "I Care Atlanta." BerryDunn inquired about formal agreements or established goals for any community partnerships and learned that all the partnerships and collaborative efforts are informal and not memorialized by any memoranda of understanding or formal agreements. BerryDunn notes that effective and lasting community partnerships are valuable and fundamental to community policing. For such relationships to be optimally productive and long-lasting it can be important to have clear shared goals and objectives. Accordingly, BerryDunn suggests DPD inventory all its professional partnerships and consider a process of developing guiding documents for the ongoing partnerships. Dunwoody has an impressive array of relationships and cooperative efforts with the local community, which can serve as a strong foundation for enhanced COP and POP efforts.

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<sup>70</sup> 2022 Dunwoody Police Department Annual Report

## Community Policing Reporting Practices, Evaluations, and Accountability

BerryDunn observes that the DPD has clearly articulated and clearly supports a vision of community policing and recognizes DPD's substantial efforts and success in engaging the community through numerous outreach programs. This level of effort is substantial and commendable, despite recent local and national environmental challenges. In addition, BerryDunn is aware there are individual officers who engage in community policing efforts quite successfully. Overall, BerryDunn found substantial evidence that patrol officers enjoy productive relationships with their community and engage in significant community engagement. Simultaneously, there is little available evidence that individual patrol officers engage in significant collaborative problem-solving in any sort of structured manner. Because of current organizational and environmental limitations, the collaborative problem-solving prospects of community policing are not being fully realized, particularly by patrol. This is not to say that officers do not engage in community policing, engagement, and relationship-building. Based on staff and community feedback and observations, the department has built meaningful relationships and substantial social capital.

The DPD prides itself on community policing and expects community policing activity from all its members but does not specifically include community policing activity in its appraisal and review processes. BerryDunn asked staff about the documentation associated with officers engaging in COP and learned that employees have informal community-policing expectations, particularly in patrol, but their daily duties make this a challenge. BerryDunn also learned that COP efforts are reported and logged, which is a noted best practice. However, the absence of any meaningful measurement or analysis of community policing and problem-oriented policing efforts likely diminishes its perceived importance as a core department value.

Again, it is evident to BerryDunn that the DPD actively and visibly embraces the ideals of community policing, that it favors community policing as a philosophy, and that it engages in a wide range of community-policing-type efforts. However, without a consistent documentation and measurement process it can be difficult to discern the level of success regarding COP and POP efforts, either individually or as a department.

Accordingly, the DPD would benefit from providing additional COP and, particularly, POP training department-wide, reemphasizing the full range of efforts associated with community policing and problem-oriented policing, and establishing an expectation and accountability mechanism for tracking individual and department community-policing efforts. Tracking, measuring, and monitoring COP and POP efforts will certainly help supervisors in assessing the performance of officers in this area. Importantly, this emphasis will help ensure that officers are consciously working to engage meaningful community-policing outcomes with the public on a consistent basis. More fully implementing and monitoring COP and POP efforts is the source of the sole recommendation in this topic area from BerryDunn, with full acknowledgment of the good work being done within the department.

### III. Citizen Police Oversight Committee

Based on information provided by staff and interviews with City officials, the DPD does not have any form of a citizen complaint or review board. BerryDunn notes that developing a co-production policing philosophy, and an accompanying governing body, can provide a framework for enhanced and meaningful community collaboration and accountability. This approach to policing is discussed in detail below.

#### Co-Production Policing

Although it is mentioned in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Task Force Report and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice Report,<sup>71</sup> the term *co-production policing* is relatively new, and little has been written about it within the industry. As expressed in the task force report, co-production is about engaging in policing efforts collaboratively with the community. Traditionally, police agencies themselves have set the course for policing priorities within the community; however, making these decisions independently and without community input and involvement works against the notion of transparency and can foster mistrust and damage relationships.

In the past, as the profession sought to evolve, COP became a mainstay for those in law enforcement, as well as a process for communities to gain increased involvement with their police agencies. However, COP, as often practiced by American police agencies, tends to be mainly transactional with power and authority largely invested in police agencies. Alternatively, co-production policing seeks to rebalance that power dynamic and build authentic partnerships with the community in a way that shares the decision-making authority of policing.

Although COP is an effective strategy and true COP/POP involves the entire organization, these efforts often focus on individual issues or problems, leaving out the broader scope of community involvement. The key distinction is that although COP is informative, interactive, allows for community input, and is often collaborative regarding problem solving, co-production involves a greater level of *influence and involvement* by the community regarding the overarching policing strategies and priorities that ultimately affect those being served by the police agency. The DPD has established strong relationships and a positive reputation with the community and enjoys substantial community goodwill. However, maintaining those relationships with the community and building upon them through a deliberate process such as Community Co-Production Policing (CCPP) can improve public safety and continue to promote consistent social and procedural justice practices by the agency.

From a co-production policing perspective, influence and involvement from the community form the foundation for trust and confidence in the police agency and agreement in the processes, procedures, and practices used in pursuit of public safety for those who live in or visit the community. This level of involvement serves as a persistent external accountability process,

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<sup>71</sup> <https://www.justice.gov/ag/presidential-commission-law-enforcement-and-administration-justice>

which helps ensure consistent alignment between community desires and expectations and the actions the police use to meet them. To be clear, co-production is a collaborative process, not an oversight process; these two approaches are incompatible. Co-production involves working together to cooperatively co-produce public safety in a respectful and thoughtful manner that places value on mutuality. BerryDunn refers to its approach to this more collaborative notion of community policing as CCPP.

As indicated, the DPD already has a strong relationship with the community and enjoys substantial community goodwill. However, maintaining those relationships with the community and building upon them through a deliberate process of reform will improve public safety and continue to promote consistent social and procedural justice practices by the agency. There are numerous pathways the DPD can consider in moving toward a co-production policing environment. These can occur in one or more of the following areas:

- Professional Standards/IA Review
- Policy/Procedure Review/Development
- Ordinance Review/Development
- Recruitment, Hiring, and Retention
- Strategic Response Meetings (Data-Driven Policing)
- Training
- Research
- Diversity and Impartial Policing

Although the DPD enjoys strong positive relationships with the community, there is a pressing need for law enforcement agencies to evolve numerous practices. CCPP is a model that the DPD can pursue to strengthen community involvement and influence over the policing practices used to maintain public safety. Additional information on CCPP is available within the OARM.

## IV. Media

As noted above, the DPD Community Outreach Unit includes two full-time officers who perform the functions of both community outreach and public information. They are responsible for working with command staff to produce news releases, arrange interviews, provide requested information as appropriate in response to outside requests, and assisting the chief of police with responding to major breaking situations. Dunwoody is a part of the very large Atlanta metropolitan area, and this dynamic of being one of many police agencies in a large metropolitan area likely affects the rate and volume of media requests and interactions.

Developing productive media relationships and utilizing communication—both externally and internally—in an effective manner should be top priorities for any police agency. The commitment to staffing dedicated personnel to supporting these roles is a sign that they are a priority at DPD. This commitment is also reflected in DPD's active transparency efforts as

evidenced by DPD's Transparency and Data Sharing Initiative. To enhance and leverage these approaches and this capacity, top leadership should deliberately and visibly include public information personnel as regular participants in command-level meetings, strategic planning, and operational responses. Public information personnel should also have an opportunity to contribute to policy review and the creation of training opportunities. Doing so will reinforce their value and authority in the department and will help them be aware of important events, discussions, opportunities, and challenges to the department. This will also afford them an opportunity to provide perspective from their valuable areas of expertise.

DPD has an active presence on social media with a Facebook page that has 37,000 followers, an active Twitter account with 12,000 followers, and an Instagram presence with almost 7,000 followers. DPD posts content on all these social media sites regularly. BerryDunn notes that much of the content is redundant between these department social media sites and encourages DPD to obtain training and coaching on the different audiences and uses for the various social media sites to maximize reach, engagement, and communication effectiveness. The use of social media by the agency and its individual members is covered by a thorough and sophisticated policy.<sup>72</sup> The presence and nature of the social media policy is an industry best practice that is to be commended.

## V. Problem-Solving

As noted above, DPD acknowledges and values the importance of engaging the community to build relationships that support collaborative problem-solving. DPD clearly engages in deliberate relationship-building and community engagement to address underlying issues and concerns that might manifest in crime and negatively impact community feelings of safety. Many of the community outreach, engagement, and education opportunities between DPD and the community can be viewed as examples of problem-solving. For example, the child safety seat checks, active shooter training for community members, overdose awareness training for community members, and other similar events all seek to address problems likely identified by the community and the DPD in a proactive, if informal, manner. Also as noted above, DPD has an opportunity to increase its organizational and individual understanding of formal problem-solving processes and truly collaborative community policing. The core values and philosophy of the DPD position the organization and its staff to leverage additional training and exposure to these methods in future problem-solving efforts.

## VI. Community Survey/Feedback

BerryDunn utilized several mechanisms to solicit community feedback regarding the DPD, including a three-statement online survey, community stakeholder interviews, professional stakeholder interviews, and a community town-hall-type forum. Feedback varied within the different forums, and—as should be expected—was not uniform or monolithic.

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<sup>72</sup> Dunwoody Police Standard Operating Procedure A-50, "Social Media"

The online survey asked the respondents to provide feedback on the following:

1. Describe something the organization does particularly well.
2. Describe an area in which you feel the organization could improve.
3. Please use this section to explain any of your choices, and/or to express your view on any topic not covered.

The community engagement platform, Social Pinpoint, is a comprehensive online platform that facilitates engagement opportunities, and it utilized two questions:

1. What does the Dunwoody Police Department do well?
2. In what ways could the Dunwoody Police Department improve?

## Analysis

BerryDunn received approximately 101 community responses to the online survey. Because there were three prompts and 101 surveys were completed, there was a possibility of 303 discreet responses. Not every respondent answered all three prompts, so the actual number of responses was less than the maximum possibility of 303. The available responses from the 101 survey respondents did, however, provide a significant amount of qualitative data with which to identify some common themes about community perceptions of the DPD. The responses included positive feedback, critical observations, and—notably—specific suggestions for improvement. This review will summarize and categorize the survey responses into common and related themes to provide enhanced clarity regarding community perception and feelings about the DPD. In general, the responses indicate a community that is largely satisfied with its police services and approaches even though there are some distinct calls for enhancement of those services.

## Professionalism, Responsiveness, and Police Service

Numerous respondents in all the feedback formats had positive comments about DPD's active communication style, its community engagement—particularly its presence at events—and the professionalism of staff members. Other positive feedback included numerous observations that the DPD is timely and effective in its response to emergencies and calls for service and displays professional behavior. While the comments did not frequently use the term “community policing,” the behavior being described in favorable terms was consistent with a broader concept of community policing. This indicates the community has an active and positive perception of DPD community policing efforts.

## Traffic Enforcement

One consistent critique of the DPD was the observation that more traffic enforcement and visible patrolling is desired, particularly in some specific areas.



## Accountability and Transparency

There were several comments concerning a desire for increased accountability and transparency.

## Conclusion

The quantity and quality of responses to this survey indicate that the DPD enjoys a well-informed community with many neighbors who care deeply about the community, its safety, and the way it receives police services. The inclusion of observations about positive aspects of the DPD—often from the same respondent with critical observations—reveals an honesty and sincerity about perceptions of the department. This survey produced meaningful information that helps illuminate several themes affecting department performance, including positive attributes, areas for improvement, and areas that combine some aspects of both. Community responses indicated respondents feel the department is largely professional and responsive, and they would like to see increased traffic enforcement along with greater transparency and accountability.

## VII. Impartial Policing and Race Equity

### Social and Procedural Justice

Events of recent years underscore the challenges involved in policing within and for a diverse society. These events and community response bring to light the need for law enforcement to engage in policing practices that embody the principles of procedural justice and demand actions and behaviors by officers that ensure fair, impartial, and respectful treatment for everyone. Community members across the country have increasingly taken to the streets and the airwaves to demand what they deserve as a *starting point*: social and procedural justice. Social justice is an essential component of healthy, effective communities. It is based on a fair and just relationship between individuals and society. Social justice demands that those in the community feel safe, including feeling safe from the police. Feeling safe starts with procedurally just policing. Social justice is distinguished by four foundational concepts across a spectrum of basic human needs such as wealth, education, healthcare, safety, opportunities, and privileges:

- Equity
- Access
- Active participation
- Individual rights

Procedural justice is complementary to social justice. Procedural justice in policing is the concept that the community's willingness—individually and aggregately—to accept the actions of the police, obey laws, participate in the criminal justice system, and partner with law enforcement to reduce crime and disorder is dependent on the acceptance of policing actions as fair and equitable. Procedural justice consists of four primary pillars:



- Belief in the fairness and equity of the system and processes
- Transparency in actions and communication
- Opportunities for voice and agency (control or influence)
- Impartiality in decision-making

Any social and procedural justice efforts must start with an honest acknowledgment of the past and a commitment to improve future performance. Police departments should commit to principles and concepts that share a commitment to the fundamental belief that policing is accountable to the community for its existence, its purpose, and its approaches and that those approaches should support the welfare of the community as its priority in a fair, equitable way. All policing efforts must be socially and procedurally just and directly accountable to the people who empower the police in the first place—the community.

When conducting an operational study—such as the one BerryDunn is undertaking for the City of Dunwoody—policing strategies, specialized training, and operational standards and practices related to impartial policing and procedural justice are examined. Based on a review of the relevant data and information, BerryDunn found that the DPD has appropriate policies, procedures, and training in place with respect to impartial policing and procedural justice. Furthermore, during the study, and based on the information available and reviewed, BerryDunn found no evidence of biased policing on the part of the DPD. In addition, the DPD has received few biased-based or impartial policing complaints during the period of data requested and reviewed by BerryDunn.

## Data Collection and Agency Practices

DPD has launched a Transparency and Data Sharing Initiative that includes proactively sharing data and information about police activities with the community it serves. This is a commendable effort to allow all community members access to data for review and analysis. This initiative has promise to serve as a best practice, particularly when combined with the BerryDunn recommendation from Chapter 4 to enhance data collection via a department requirement to document all non-consensual law enforcement encounters.

BerryDunn notes, however, that the DPD Transparency and Data Sharing Initiative and associated statistical and other reports do not include any analysis of data relative to impartial or bias-based policing. As noted in Chapter 4, the DPD does not currently collect or track impartial policing data and it does not require documentation of all non-consensual law enforcement contacts. Again, BerryDunn recommends the DPD collect, review, and monitor these data, along with appropriate analysis of implications to department policies, procedures, and practices.

## VIII. Policy

BerryDunn conducted a general review of DPD policy and found that the department has a detailed policy that clearly prohibits impartial or biased-based policing. However, BerryDunn

recommends the DPD develop and implement a policy that requires documentation of all non-consensual law enforcement-related encounters in a manner that is archivable and searchable and includes both demographic data and details on officer actions, such as frisks or searches, to assist with future analysis of impartial or biased-based policing. The complete policy review can be found in this report in Chapter 7.

## IX. Training

As noted above, new DPD officers go to a regional training academy and receive additional department-specific COP and POP orientation and field training at DPD itself. All officers receive ongoing training that fulfills state and agency requirements on an ongoing basis. New employees receive basic COP training during the limited POST academy. Georgia POST requires that every officer receives a minimum of 20 hours of annual training, including firearms requalification, use of deadly force, de-escalation, and community policing. BerryDunn's observations reveal DPD's commitment to the core principles of community policing. DPD has an opportunity to build on this commitment to community policing, expand the basic training received by new and incumbent officers, and enhance the department's successful community engagement efforts to build a truly industry-leading effort. Such an enhanced effort would combine existing individual efforts into an agency-wide and career-long community policing and problem-solving approach by individual officers that understands fundamental concepts, skills, and tools while ensuring consistent delivery of community policing efforts by all department members.

## Summary

The DPD has a strong commitment to the concept of COP. That commitment has manifested itself in many ways, including building strong relationships with the community and engaging in significant cooperative efforts with the community. COP and POP are skills that can be trained, learned, and reinforced with proper training supported by active performance measures. DPD does not have any systems in place to ensure all employees have a sophisticated understanding of and ability to apply COP and POP skills nor does the department have an accountability system for participation in these efforts department-wide. The DPD would benefit from adding deliberate attention, training, and accountability to its COP and POP efforts.

Community feedback about the DPD was largely positive, whether received through community meetings or online forums facilitated by BerryDunn. Many community members praised the DPD, with several drawing a positive distinction between the current services provided by the DPD, and prior law enforcement services.

The DPD has a formal PIO function and maintains an active presence on various social media platforms. The DPD has also launched a Transparency and Data Sharing Initiative to proactively expand its data sharing efforts with this community.


BerryDunn found no evidence to indicate any concerns regarding impartial policing, and the DPD has received very few complaints in this area. However, the DPD does not collect impartial

policing or non-consensual contact data, and as noted in Chapter 4, doing so would provide opportunities for self-analysis and adjustments where appropriate.

## Recommendations

This section provides one formal recommendation from this chapter. The recommendation in the table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number, and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, as well as details concerning the findings and recommendations.

**Table 5.1: Chapter 5 Recommendations**

Community Engagement		
No.	COP	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 5, Section I: Community Policing</i>		
5-1	<p><b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD does not have clear metrics and expectations for community policing or problem-oriented policing activities, and these efforts are not formally included in its appraisal system. Although the DPD does record COP efforts and these activities are reviewed internally in a monthly report, lack of clear metrics and expectations impedes analysis or accountability functions.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should establish COP and POP metrics and expectations for all DPD personnel and formally include a review of each individual's activities as part of the appraisal process.</p> <p>The DPD should regularly review these efforts to promote accountability and positive reinforcement for COP activities. Specifically, DPD should build processes, opportunities, and expectations for all members of the DPD to actively support community policing by expecting all team members to engage in active, deliberate, and meaningful relationship-building and problem-solving with the community. Expectations for officers should include strategies for building community relationships, as well as specific goals, policies, and objectives. These steps should create an agency-wide philosophy of proactive community interaction and establish formal responsibility for each employee of the agency, including the importance of each member's contributions to the overall success of the department.</p>	

## Chapter 6: Investigations Services

*Investigations Services: includes an overview of the investigations bureau, examining staffing, case assignments, closure, routing, and supervision.*

Second, perhaps, only to patrol, the investigative function of any police organization is vital to operational and organizational success. The primary function of the investigations section of any agency is to provide follow-up investigations on a wide range of crimes and to work collaboratively with internal and external partners to provide a professional product that will further the goal of accountability for offenders. The investigations function at DPD is performed by Criminal Investigations, which has many duties and responsibilities including, but not limited to, investigating crimes against persons, investigating crimes against property, control of crime scenes, crime scene processing, evidence collection, and forensic examination of scenes/collected evidence.

There are many considerations involved in determining appropriate staffing levels for the investigative function. The wide range of factors affecting the investigative function and the large number of organizational structures used for the investigative function across agencies make traditional peer-to-peer comparisons challenging. Each agency is different, and the myriad of variables affecting an agency's investigative needs, resources, and responsibilities make it difficult and unproductive to conduct a straight agency-to-agency analysis. It is BerryDunn's assessment that no single analytical process fully assesses these staffing assessment needs.

For this project, BerryDunn has used a variety of calculations, methods, and analyses to draw the conclusions presented here. The narrative below outlines those findings. BerryDunn's assessments generally rely on an analysis of workload, work outputs, and available investigator-hours, which are all described further in this chapter. This analysis process also relies on the collective experience of BerryDunn in assessing staffing levels within police agencies and on national and other comparative data BerryDunn has gathered.

The information below provides BerryDunn's assessment of the investigations function within the DPD.

### I. Investigations Staffing

The DPD operates within a general investigations structure. While some investigators have stronger backgrounds and skills in certain categories, investigators at DPD are generalists and every investigator is available to be assigned to any case type. Criminal Investigations is currently authorized and budgeted for the following staffing:<sup>73</sup>

- Seven detectives

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<sup>73</sup> SDI Figure 6.1

- One narcotics officer
- One crime scene technician (non-sworn)
- One crime analyst (non-sworn)
- One sergeant

The sergeant of Criminal Investigations reports to the lieutenant of Criminal Investigations who reports to the major of Administrative Services and Criminal Investigations. That major reports to the deputy chief who reports to the chief of police. Actual staffing at the time data was gathered and analyzed for this report is listed below with the same chain of command as described above:<sup>74</sup>

- Five detectives
- One narcotics officer
- One crime scene technician
- One crime analyst
- One sergeant

Criminal Investigations detectives manage a significant caseload and collaborate routinely with the crime analyst to begin background analysis on each case and potential suspect. Crime scene personnel provide all evidence processing for each case including taking photographs, making crime scene sketches, collecting and processing fingerprints, collecting DNA evidence, collecting and preserving electronic media and devices, and other tasks as appropriate. The DPD also has an officer assigned as a task force officer (TFO) through the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on the Atlanta High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) task force. This TFO supports the task force with local knowledge for regional assistance regarding drug complaints and narcotics-related issues. Ideally, this TFO also utilizes the resources provided through the task force to address narcotics issues in and around Dunwoody.

Staff interviews reveal a common perception that each investigator at DPD receives about one case per day to work. While the assessment performed by BerryDunn indicates slightly fewer than a day per case when staffed at authorized levels, this anecdotal report indeed proves accurate at current actual staffing levels. This observation also reveals a valid point about staffing in investigations. A heavy caseload will inevitably cause lower-priority cases to receive less attention than they deserve even when there is a fair amount of solvability. DPD has begun to not even assign some cases, especially fraud and other financial cases, due to their time-consuming nature, particularly if the victim has been reimbursed for their loss. This need not be the case if Criminal Investigations had appropriate staffing levels.

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<sup>74</sup> SDI Table 6.1

The crime analyst is a one-person unit, assigned to Investigations, who supports the entire department. The crime analyst assists each detective on any case that needs suspect or victim background analysis. According to anecdotal accounts, there is enough need for analysis in Criminal Investigations to occupy a crime analyst's full-time efforts, independent of other analytical support for the department. The crime scene technicians (CST) work in an on-call capacity 24 hours a day, 365 days a year except for requested time off. The crime analyst assists with crime scene coverage when the CST is unavailable or on leave. The demands of being on call and supporting a second on-call position is professionally and personally demanding and makes maintaining a productive work and life balance extremely difficult. This can have direct ramifications on productivity and retention.

The proper and complete functioning of a Criminal Investigations unit within any police agency is vital to its operations and, like uniformed patrol, is susceptible to inefficiency and ineffectiveness when not properly staffed. Criminal investigations take considerable time, focus, and effort. When investigators are overwhelmed with a prohibitively burdensome caseload, it reduces their effectiveness. Accordingly, once appropriate staffing levels in Investigations are determined, authorized, and budgeted, the department should take concrete and affirmative steps to ensure those appropriate and budgeted staffing levels are maintained. As with patrol, the department should take the position that all authorized and budgeted Investigations assignments are essential and fill any vacancies in Investigations from personnel in less essential roles within the organization whenever possible.

## II. Work Schedules

The number of actual hours available for investigators to conduct productive work related to their assigned duties is an important consideration in determining staffing needs. BerryDunn examined the number of hours investigators have available to conduct their work at DPD. Based on the data provided by the DPD, investigators have 1,667 hours available annually for productive work related to their assigned duties.<sup>75</sup> Based on several prior studies, the average number of available hours for investigators is 1,725. The DPD number is consistent with expectations in comparison to the prior study averages. BerryDunn will use this number (1,667) in various calculations in the following sections.

## III. Policies and Procedures

The DPD has a policy manual containing various policies relevant to law enforcement operations. BerryDunn provides a general overview of the DPD policy manual in Chapter 7, along with a series of recommendations specifically about policy. BerryDunn also asked the DPD to provide specific policies relative to Investigations case assignments, case durations, and case supervision. The DPD provided BerryDunn with Policy I-1 (Criminal Investigations) as well as policies relating to crime scene management and other areas related to investigations.

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<sup>75</sup> SDI Table 6.2

Policy I-1 (Criminal Investigations) outlines the expectations for supervisors, including their duty to assign cases and monitor case progress. BerryDunn closely reviewed the sections in Policy I-1 addressing investigative case screening and case management. The policy outlines the use of weighted solvability factors, and although the use of this important tool is noted in policy and occasionally used in practice, BerryDunn learned that solvability factors are only occasionally, informally, and inconsistently used. BerryDunn has provided a recommendation in Chapter 4 regarding consistent and expanded use of solvability factors by the DPD.

## Procedures

BerryDunn asked the DPD to provide data on cases assigned, cases worked, and overall case durations. BerryDunn also discussed case monitoring by investigative supervisors and how supervisors track and monitor active and open cases. The Criminal Investigations supervisor reviews the RMS and reads every report that does not have a disposition or clearance and that has been queued to Investigations via case management each day. The supervisor then informally assesses solvability factors, determines which cases can be investigated, assigns those cases to investigators, and closes the remainder. Staff report an unspecified number of workable cases that must be deferred because of caseloads, particularly fraud and shoplifting cases. The RMS at DPD includes an automated solvability checklist, which is reported to be less than ideally functional. The RMS has the ability, if limited, to utilize solvability factors and to track and monitor case assignments and progress for Investigations. DPD is not maximizing the use of its RMS to incorporate solvability factors and to monitor case assignments.

BerryDunn recommends DPD revise its process for reviewing criminal cases to empower appropriate personnel, patrol line supervisors, to close cases as appropriate—using solvability factors—to save time for Investigations staff. The solvability factors in the current RMS may need to be enhanced so DPD should work with the RMS vendors and involve those who would use that portion of the RMS to tailor the system to the needs of the agency. Another advantage of adding a solvability factor component to the RMS is that in some instances, some systems can self-generate citizen contact follow-up reports based off criteria flagged by the RMS, which can be sent out by DPD personnel (sworn or civilian).

## Communication

As is typical in most police departments, patrol staff do not currently receive any active or automated notification when a case they submitted for investigation is closed. This lack of active communication can inhibit productive two-way exchange of information and lead to a feeling of disconnect between patrol and Investigations that inhibits collaboration in a mutually beneficial manner. A simple solution to this problem is for the DPD to create an automated feedback loop to ensure the officer who originated a case handled by Investigations is notified about its closure. This system will improve communication between patrol and Investigations and help ensure that patrol staff are aware of which cases are being pursued or closed. Open communication of this nature can also lead to improved preliminary investigations, report writing, and ultimately, to higher case-closure rates. BerryDunn recommends DPD take steps to



more appropriately use the RMS capabilities to track and monitor case assignments as well as progress by investigators and notifications with patrol. Supervisors should be required to conduct periodic case reviews for all open cases and to document case reviews and expectations, consistent with department standards on case updates and expected closure dates.

## IV. Workloads and Caseloads

The following section provides various narrative, data, and tables that describe the workload and caseloads of Criminal Investigations at the DPD. These data emanate from various sources and include CAD, RMS, and other data supplied by the DPD.

At the outset of this project, BerryDunn requested various case assignment data, and the DPD provided that data. Between 2020 and 2021, the DPD activated an average of 1,034 cases annually; see Table 6.1.

**Table 6.1: Cases Assigned by Year and Unit**

Case Assignments in Investigations	2020	2021	Two-Year Avg.	% Change
Investigations Unit	1164	903	1033.5	-22.42%

Source: Investigations Case Data Worksheet

A notable best practice for the DPD involves the use of the Domestic Assault Response Team (DART). This team has a focus on domestic abuse response and investigations and includes specific protocols designed to improve victim safety and offender accountability. The DART team responded to 35 incidents in 2021 and 16 incidents in 2022, while the department responded to 41 and 18 domestic violence incidents, respectively, inclusive of the DART responses.<sup>76</sup>

BerryDunn also reviewed the various case types assigned and found that the case types and associated volumes were consistent with typical investigations units. The five most common case types assigned for investigation include theft from vehicle, shoplifting, simple theft (larceny), theft of motor vehicle, and various fraud cases.<sup>77</sup>

One of the more significant analysis points for investigators involves understanding their caseloads, or the number of active cases they are assigned to work at any given time. Although there are no set industry standards for case assignments or caseloads for investigators, managing 10 – 15 cases at any given time is generally considered an acceptable range. This number can be greatly affected by the types of cases being investigated, including case complexity, severity, and time constraints. Generally, major crimes and persons crimes require more effort and are more complex, which lowers caseload expectations. Property crimes are

<sup>76</sup> SDI Table 6.4

<sup>77</sup> SDI Table 6.3



generally less time critical and less complex, which allows for slightly larger caseloads. BerryDunn calculated the average monthly caseloads for DPD investigators, and these data are reflected in Table 6.2.

**Table 6.2: Average Annual Caseloads Per Detective**

Investigations Unit*	Total Cases	Avg. Annual	Avg. Monthly
2020	1164	233	19
2021	903	181	15

Source: Agency Provided Data

\*Includes unit vacancies

Generally, the data in Table 6.2 indicate that monthly caseloads slightly exceed common and manageable volumes. However, these data reflect monthly assignments (on average). Because the data in Table 6.2 represents monthly case assignments, investigators must be constantly clearing the prior month's cases to avoid carrying a caseload that is comprised of multiple months of volume. This is why it is critical for Investigations supervisors to monitor active cases on a weekly basis and to prompt investigators in completing and closing them in a timely manner. For the DPD, monthly case assignments are comparatively high, and when coupled with the reality that some cases are not resolved within a month, the number of cases being carried by DPD investigators would be considered excessive.

## Investigations Staffing Discussion

In addition to understanding average caseload volumes, it is also important to examine the amount of time investigators have available to dedicate to each case. In Table 6.3, BerryDunn calculated the average number of hours each investigator has available for each case.

**Table 6.3: Investigations Capacity Per Detective (Model 1)**

Investigative Capacity	*Cases Assigned	**Number of Detectives	Annual Cases Per Detective	Monthly Average Per Detective	Average Available Hours Per Year	Average Hours Available Per Month	Average Hours Available Per Case
Investigations Unit	1034	5	207	17	1667.00	138.92	8.06
Investigations Unit (Seven Detectives)	1034	7	148	12	1667.00	138.92	11.29
Investigations Unit (Eight Detectives)	1034	8	129	11	1667.00	138.92	12.90

Source: Agency Provided Data/BerryDunn Calculations

\*Two-year average

\*\*Reflects personnel assigned who carry a full caseload

This model engages the workload hours available as described previously (1,667), based on the allocated Investigations personnel who conduct case investigations. Table 6.3 reflects the number of annual cases per detective, based on staffing levels of 5, 7, and 8 investigators, and

for each staffing level, BerryDunn has calculated the average number of hours available for each investigator for each case assigned. Because there are no set national standards for case assignments or caseloads, the process of conducting a workload analysis for investigations units is complicated. However, based on BerryDunn's national work and a national survey of investigators, typical caseloads per investigator range from 10 – 15 per month, with most expecting case closures within one to two months. A general range for annual cases per investigator would be between 80 and 120. Based on the data in Table 6.2, active case averages per month for the DPD appear elevated. Additionally, the number of hours available to investigate each case is comparatively low, as BerryDunn will illustrate later in this chapter.

The data in Table 6.3 are useful but can also be a bit misleading because investigators do not spend all of their available time conducting investigations. Based on experience, observations, and interviews with investigators and supervisory personnel, BerryDunn knows that other duties and responsibilities consume a substantial amount of daily activity for investigators. To quantify investigative and non-investigative work efforts, BerryDunn provided an internet-based survey to the investigators. The survey asked investigators to quantify the percentage of time they spend conducting various activities. Based on that data, DPD investigators reported spending roughly 23% of their time on activities that are generally associated with non-investigative duties.<sup>78</sup> The same survey also reveals that DPD investigators reported spending roughly 30% of their time conducting investigations. This percentage of time spent on active investigations—which represents a significant portion of their time—is higher than prior studies, which average of 23%, and the national data, which is 21% in the same category. If accurate, the percentage of time DPD investigators spend working on investigations would be an indication of a high degree of work effort dedicated directly to investigations.

Based on the survey responses, DPD investigators routinely spend—consistent with comparison sites and averages—about 23% of total available time on non-investigative tasks such as general administrative duties, meetings, phone calls, emails, and teaching. These self-reported supplemental duty figures (non-investigative duties) from the DPD are within the range of prior studies, which range from 20% – 25%, and they are comparable, if slightly higher than the national survey, which suggests investigators (non-supervisor) across the United States spend about 18% of their time on the same activities. Accordingly, any workload analysis should take this “administrative” burden into account when determining amount of investigator time available for investigations, the correspondingly appropriate caseload, and, ultimately, staffing levels.

Preliminary data shows that each DPD investigator has, after accounting for various leave, about 1,667 hours available for completing assigned tasks within their functional area of responsibility.<sup>79</sup> Because the survey response indicates that investigators reasonably spend about 23% of their time on general administrative duties, and this time is regarded as non-

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<sup>78</sup> SDI Table 6.5

<sup>79</sup> SDI Table 6.2

investigative time, it is appropriate then to reduce the availability of each investigator's hours available for investigative work by an additional 383 hours ( $1,667 \times 23\% = 383$ ). After removing 383 hours from the initial 1,667 available hours for each investigator, the result is that investigators have an average of 1,284 annual hours available to conduct case investigations. In Table 6.4, BerryDunn uses the new number of available hours (1,284) to illustrate the average number of hours available for case investigation for each case for investigators. Again, BerryDunn has provided examples of different staffing levels to illustrate the effect of adding personnel to the Investigations Division.

**Table 6.4: Investigations Capacity Per Detective**

Model 2 Investigation Unit	*Cases Assigned	**Number of Detectives	Annual Cases Per Detective	Monthly Average Per Detective	Average Available Hours Per Year	Average Hours Available Per Month	Average Hours Available Per Case
Investigations Unit (Five Detectives)	1034	5	207	17	1284.00	107.00	6.21
Investigations Unit (Seven Detectives)	1034	7	148	12	1284.00	107.00	8.69
Investigations Unit (Eight Detectives)	1034	8	129	11	1284.00	107.00	9.93
Investigations Unit (10 Detectives)	1034	10	103	9	1284.00	107.00	12.42

Source: Agency Provided Data/BerryDunn Calculations

\*Two-year average

\*\*Reflects personnel assigned who carry a full caseload

Arguably, the self-assessment documented in the survey and the data represented in Table 6.4 are likely a "worst-case scenario." It is more likely that some of the time investigators attribute to non-productive activities is supporting their investigations. It is also important to note that the time available per case is actual time focused on that investigation. When considering the actual productive work time per case, the numbers from the survey represent a significant amount of work effort. Still, these calculations demonstrate why it is so difficult to assess investigative staffing, and they illustrate how quickly investigator productivity can deteriorate when an investigator is tasked with multiple and competing objectives.

As noted previously, the number of hours available per case for DPD investigators is comparatively low. In Table 6.5, BerryDunn provides average hours available for case investigation types, based on multiple prior studies of investigations units that BerryDunn has conducted. Table 6.5 reflects substantially higher available hours per case as compared to the amount of time DPD investigators have at their disposal. For illustration purposes, in Table 6.5, BerryDunn has used 12.42 hours as the number of hours available to DPD investigators. However, this number assumes three additional allocated investigator positions for the DPD.

**Table 6.5: Investigative Capacity – Comparisons**

<b>Investigation Unit</b>	<b>Agency Hours</b>	<b>*Average Study Hours</b>
<b>Persons Crimes/Major Crimes</b>		
Crime Against Children		35.13
Child Crimes and Vulnerable Adults		43.27
Crimes Against Persons		25.63
Domestic Violence		9.21
Homicide		549.23
Major Crimes		244.12
Robbery		82.43
Sexual Offenses		39.08
Special Victims		47.20
Violent Crime		23.48
<b>Average Hours</b>		<b>100.97</b>
<b>Property Crimes</b>		
Auto Theft		27.10
District/General Investigations		25.52
Fraud/Financial Crimes		20.63
Homeland Security/Intelligence		32.56
Property		24.32
<b>Average Hours</b>		<b>19.81</b>
<b>Narcotics</b>		
Narcotics and Organized Crime		125.85
<b>Average Hours</b>		<b>125.85</b>
<b>DPD (With 10 Investigators) All Types</b>	<b>12.34</b>	<b>12.34</b>

Source: Calculations from Agency Provided Data

\*Table includes data from prior studies conducted by the IACP.

DPD criminal investigators are generalists and carry a mix of crimes against people and crimes against property cases, as opposed to the breakdown of specialty units shown in Table 6.5. As part of the same survey, BerryDunn collected information from DPD investigators on current and preferred caseloads, and these data are represented in Table 6.6.

**Table 6.6: Self-Reported Current and Preferred Caseloads**

Investigations Caseload	Dunwoody Current Avg.	*Prior Studies Current Avg.	National Current Avg.	Dunwoody Preferred Avg.	*Prior Studies Preferred Avg.	National Preferred Avg.
Fraud/Financial Crimes		13	18		11	11
Homicide/Violent Crime		7	15		8	9
Other Crimes Against Persons		12	18		9	12
Property Crimes		10	18		11	11
General Investigations		12	14		7	9
Other Specialized Unit		10	13		8	9
Task Force		9	10		7	7
Vice/Narcotics		8	11		16	7
Dunwoody PD	<b>27</b>			<b>14</b>		

Source: Investigations Survey

\*Table includes data from prior studies conducted by the IACP.

The data in Table 6.6 reflect prior study work by BerryDunn as well as national data collected by the IACP. This data indicates that DPD investigators report carrying roughly 27 cases at any given time, which exceeds comparison data. DPD investigators indicate they would prefer to carry approximately 14 cases, which is consistent with—if not slightly higher than—the comparisons.

Although Criminal Investigations has a high volume of cases per investigator, there does not appear to be a sufficient volume of cases to justify the creation of specialty units within the Investigations Division. However, the caseload volume reinforces why it is critical for Investigations supervisors to monitor active cases on a weekly basis and to prompt investigators in completing and closing them in a timely manner.

## Case Closure Rates

BerryDunn asked the DPD to provide data on the average number of days cases are active and assigned to investigators. In reviewing these data, BerryDunn notes that many reported average case durations were lengthy, ranging from almost 30 days for shoplifting to over 53 days for robbery with an average of about 35 days.<sup>80</sup> These case closure rates support other data that suggests DPD investigators are carrying a significant number of active cases at any given time.

<sup>80</sup> SDI Table 6.7

As part of the survey mentioned previously, BerryDunn also asked DPD investigators to identify what they felt the expected case closure timeline was within their agency, based on four categories: Fraud/Financial Crimes, Homicide/Violent Crime, Other Person Crimes, and Property Crimes. BerryDunn also asked investigators to identify what they felt would be an optimal timeline for case closures in the same categories. Investigators reported a belief that the current expectation for case closures ranges from 0 – 30 days to 30 – 90 days, with most reporting that cases should be cleared within 0 – 60 days. Investigators reported that the optimal time was significantly shorter than perceived current expectations with few cases optimally requiring over 60 days.<sup>81</sup>

DPD receives a high volume of criminal cases for investigative follow-up that are pending further investigation. One of the key components of building meaningful trust and effective relationships with the community is the belief by the community that the police will care about and follow through on their cases. DPD needs to address the workload and follow-up issue to ensure citizens are getting the assistance and follow through for investigations that they deserve and expect, and BerryDunn's recommendations regarding investigative staffing reflect this reality.

## V. Street Crimes Unit/Special Investigations Unit

Anecdotal accounts from DPD staff, as well as several cited examples, indicate there are a number of serious narcotics and vice crimes occurring within the City that are not being investigated or enforced because of a lack of staffing, specialized skills, and the ability to proactively pursue those responsible for these crimes. Violent crime has increased significantly in each year for the last three years, and DPD staff believe the sale and trafficking of drugs fosters violence and has contributed to this increase in violent crime. BerryDunn should note that these assertions are only anecdotal and not supported nor contradicted by any data available for review.

Currently, drug and vice cases are investigated by the general assignment detectives whose workload and capacity are assessed at length above. As was noted in that assessment, the Criminal Investigations Division is understaffed and overtasked, and BerryDunn is already recommending the addition of three additional general assignment detectives to provide additional capacity.

Drug and vice cases can be extremely complicated and frequently require specialized knowledge, skills, abilities, and time. Periodically, DPD conducts targeted enforcement details in specific areas where it is experiencing elevated drug and crime problems. Such operations and ensuing cases can pull general assignment detectives away from their normal investigations to conduct or support the drug or vice investigation. Drug and vice cases also require unique expertise to investigate properly, coordination with other similar units in the area, and ongoing commitments that require a singular focus to be successful. This additional tasking of general assignment investigators can negatively impact their primary investigations. Having a dedicated

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<sup>81</sup> SDI Table 6.6

street crimes problem-solving unit would give DPD the ability, flexibility, and scalability to conduct these types of operations more frequently without negatively impacting general investigations.

Many departments, specifically those supported by sound data-driven and intelligence-led policing systems, use street crime problem-solving units successfully. When implemented, deployed, and supervised properly in support of data-driven problem-oriented policing, these types of units can act as a force multiplier. Street crimes units can participate in problem-solving to help eliminate underlying crime and disorder problems that manifest in increased calls for service, elevated crime rates, and decreased perceptions of safety and quality of life. BerryDunn is aware DPD has crafted a proposal to create a Special Investigations Unit, which would serve as a street crimes problem-solving unit. The City and DPD have been waiting for the results from this study before moving forward on advancement of that proposal. At present, DPD has not developed a strategic plan, specific objectives, or supporting goals yet for this proposed unit. However, the DPD intends to do that planning if the unit is approved by the City Council.

BerryDunn supports DPD's and the City's desire and intent to develop a street crimes problem-solving unit and makes recommendations regarding the most effective and efficient way to develop, staff, and administer such a unit. BerryDunn recommends building a three-person unit consisting of two full-time street crimes investigators supervised by one working sergeant who both performs supervisory responsibilities and assumes caseload obligations as well. It is also important to note that units that enjoy wide discretion in enforcement activities also need and deserve strong supervision and oversight. That supervision and oversight begins with developing a clearly articulated mission based on data and supporting that mission with clear and specific performance measures. Additionally, direct and on-site supervision is very important to maintaining the high ethical standards such a specialized unit deserves.

DPD should follow up with its stated intentions to develop a formal strategic plan for the street crimes unit. Such a strategic plan should include sound and quantifiable metrics supporting the reason such a unit is needed. That plan should also include clearly articulable performance measures that allow command to determine if and how the unit is positively affecting the metrics that drive the need for the unit. The unit should plan to provide formalized training on problem-oriented, data-driven, and intelligence-led policing and document how it plans to incorporate those approaches in its mission. The street crimes units that enjoy the most success and face the fewest challenges are those whose mission includes active and regular collaboration with internal and external stakeholders to identify problems, develop a response, address the problem, and perform effective assessment of success.

## VI. Staffing Recommendation

Despite the lack of robust use of the RMS for case management, BerryDunn has assessed the totality of data available, including investigative caseload, available investigator-hours, projected investigator-hours, reported crimes, CFS data, workloads, comparison cities, and national averages and concluded that the current allocation of investigators for the DPD is insufficient for managing the volume of cases assigned. Accordingly, the data support additional staffing within



the Investigations Division. BerryDunn recommends adding three detectives to the current authorized staffing of seven authorized investigators, to bring that total to ten full-time investigators. The DPD should also plan to staff Investigations to those authorized levels.

Given the predicted community growth—especially the addition of significant multi-family housing—and the impact of that growth and change on workloads, there is a reasonable expectation that the staffing needs of DPD will increase. BerryDunn performed an assessment of those increased needs based on the details of anticipated growth patterns and the knowledge that single-family and multi-family housing units contribute to calls for service in different ways. That is, multi-family housing typically results in significantly more calls for service per unit than single-family housing, and much of the anticipated growth in Dunwoody will be multi-family housing. BerryDunn assessed those patterns and anticipated changes in the volume of calls for service and determined patrol staffing (discussed at length in Chapter 4) should be adjusted for these anticipated changes and related growth in call volume. BerryDunn recommends the DPD plan for the addition of one to two additional investigators over the next five years as well, as reflected in Table 4.7 and 4.9.

The data provided in this report also provide information on the caseload ramifications of other staffing levels above that BerryDunn has recommended. BerryDunn notes also that increasing the use of the RMS, implementing automated solvability factor use at the patrol level, adding non-sworn staff, and closing unsolvable cases on patrol have the potential to increase efficiency and reduce investigator workloads. BerryDunn also points out that if Investigations fully adopts the use of the RMS for more complete case management, the system will be able to produce better and more accurate data. BerryDunn encourages the DPD to use the RMS to the extent possible for these purposes and suggests the DPD reevaluate this data after using the system for a year to determine if workload calculations have changed and whether these data support additional staff in the future.

## Summary

The Investigations Division for the DPD is led by a sergeant who reports directly to a lieutenant. All investigators are assigned to general investigations. Investigations at DPD has clearly been working with an abundance of tasks and a lack of resources for some time. There are some ways to enhance the use of technology to increase efficiency. BerryDunn recommends DPD begin formally and consistently utilizing automated solvability factors by patrol along with empowering patrol chains of command to close cases that are not workable to add efficiency. These changes would include assigning preliminary case review and closure responsibilities to patrol sergeants and requiring the use of solvability factors at the patrol level. Also, the RMS of the DPD has the ability—if limited—to track and monitor case assignments and progress for investigations. DPD is not maximizing the use of its RMS to monitor case assignments. Fully utilizing this aspect of the system should provide the DPD with increased efficiency and additional data to monitor and analyze investigation efforts and staffing needs. BerryDunn recommends DPD more fully utilize the ability of the current RMS to automate the case management processes.




Based on a thorough review of the data available for workloads in the Investigations Division, BerryDunn finds that staffing in Investigations is insufficient to meet demands. BerryDunn recommends adding three detectives to authorized staffing and staffing actual levels to those new authorized levels.

Lastly, BerryDunn is aware DPD plans to create a specialized street crimes unit tasked with problem-solving for narcotics, vice, and other street-level crime problems. Such a unit could develop the specialized expertise necessary for addressing street-level crime while also leveraging resources, such as the HIDTA task force via the assigned DPD TFO, and even provide temporary specialized assignment opportunities for patrol officers. BerryDunn supports DPD's intention to develop a street crimes problem-solving unit and recommends such a unit be initially staffed with three personnel consisting of two investigators and a working sergeant who bears both supervisory and caseload responsibilities. BerryDunn further recommends that the development of a street crimes problem-solving unit include the development of a strategic plan that aligns the unit's mission with the department's overall mission and with desired outcomes for the unit supported by measurable performance metrics. The strategic plan and performance measuring system for this nascent street crimes problem-solving unit should coordinate with strategic planning and performance measuring for the DEA TFO at HIDTA.


## Recommendations


This section provides the four formal recommendations from this chapter, presented chronologically as they appear within the chapter. Each recommendation in the table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, and details concerning the findings and recommendations.


**Table 6.7: Chapter 6 Recommendations**

Investigations Services		
No.	Criminal Case Review and Assignment	Overall Priority
Chapter 6, Section III: Procedures		
6-1	<b>Finding:</b> Many reports lack sufficient basis for follow-up and having an Investigations supervisor review these is an inefficient process. DPD's RMS has the capability of utilizing solvability factors to help determine which cases have viable leads that would warrant further investigation.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should revise its process for reviewing criminal cases to empower appropriate personnel, patrol line supervisors, to save time for Investigations staff. Patrol sergeants, who are responsible for review of all incident reports, should be empowered to close criminal cases without the need for additional review. This decision should be based on the solvability factors (as completed by the originator of the incident report) and the supervisor's review of the substance of the case. Patrol sergeants should either close a case or leave the case open and forward it to Investigations for follow-up investigation. The	

Investigations Services		
	<p>solvability factors in the current RMS may be cumbersome, so DPD should work with the RMS vendors and involve those who would use that portion of the RMS to tailor the system to the needs of the agency.</p> <p>Another advantage of adding a solvability factor component to the RMS is that in some instances systems can self-generate citizen contact follow-up reports based on criteria flagged by the RMS, which can be sent out by DPD personnel (sworn or civilian), relating to Recommendation 6-3.</p>	

Investigations Services		
No.	Case Assignment and Monitoring	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 6 Section III: Communication</b>		
6-2	<p><b>Finding:</b> DPD is using an informal method of case monitoring and not maximizing the use of its RMS to incorporate solvability factors and monitor case assignments.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should take steps to more appropriately use the RMS to track and monitor case assignments as well as progress by investigators and notifications for patrol. Supervisors should be required to conduct periodic case reviews for all open cases and to document case reviews and expectations, consistent with department standards on case updates and expected closure dates.</p>	

Investigations Services		
No.	Investigations Staffing	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 6: Section VI. Staffing Recommendations</b>		
6-3	<p><b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD has a high volume of cases that are pending investigations. The DPD needs to address this issue to help ensure citizens are getting the assistance and follow through for investigations that they deserve.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> Investigators are carrying caseloads that are unmanageable. Due to the high volume of cases investigators are carrying month to month, there is insufficient time for investigators to do a complete and thorough follow-up to cases that have viable leads. This will lead to cases not being comprehensively investigated, which decreases the chances of a successful prosecution. BerryDunn recommends DPD increase the staffing of CID by three investigators.</p>	

Investigations Services		
No.	Specialized Investigative Function	Overall Priority
Chapter 6: Section VI. Staffing Recommendations		
6-4	<p><b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD sees a need for a street crimes problem-solving unit to address narcotics, vice, and other street-level quality of life crime problems. The creation and administration of such a unit requires a detailed strategic plan, specialized training, robust oversight mechanisms, and detailed performance measuring.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> BerryDunn supports the DPD's plans to create a specialized street crimes unit tasked with problem-solving for narcotics, vice, and other street-level crime problems and recommends such a unit be initially staffed with three personnel consisting of two investigators and a working sergeant who bears both supervisory and caseload responsibilities.</p> <p>Such a unit could develop the specialized expertise necessary for addressing street-level crime while also leveraging resources, such as the HIDTA task force via the assigned DPD TFO, and even provide temporary specialized assignment opportunities for patrol officers.</p>	

## Chapter 7: Operational Policies

*Operational Policies: includes an overall review of all department policies with a focus on critical policies, risk management strategies, and the process of policy creation, review, training, and dissemination.*

A set of complete, contemporary, and understandable policies that are easy to reference and navigate serves to guide staff in fulfilling their public safety mission is a critical element of every police agency. The policies should prescribe expectations for staff and clearly define what they can, cannot, should, or should not do. The policies should be consistent with state and federal law, best practices within the police profession, and to the extent it is lawful, they should align with community desires, needs, and standards. Developing a set of guiding policies that conform to these interests is an arduous task but one that is necessary to help ensure uniformity and fairness in policing practices and accountability for those who do not abide by them. BerryDunn conducted a general and limited review of the DPD policy manual (which DPD refers to as “Standard Operating Procedures”) with particular focus on critical high-risk and emergent policies as detailed below. BerryDunn will refer to all written procedures as “policy” throughout this chapter.

DPD provided its policy manual to BerryDunn in multiple (over 100) PDF documents that were each individually searchable by word or phrase. DPD did not provide a single, searchable policy document that incorporated all individual policy documents. The DPD policy documents used in this review appear to be the most instrumental documents in governing conduct and procedure for police activities and, consequently, BerryDunn has focused this review on those documents. BerryDunn did not review any other possible manifestations of departmental policy or any of the City of Dunwoody’s policies or procedures other than those included in the DPD policy manual by specific quotation. BerryDunn is aware of no other regulatory documents applicable to DPD officers or other employees of the DPD.

Policy A-1 (Written Directives) addresses policy creation, distribution, and maintenance. This policy states that all written directives—to include standard operating procedures, special orders, and executive memoranda—are binding on all agency personnel. It also states that a table of contents will be produced. BerryDunn was unable to locate either a table of contents or an index of key topics and phrases. A table of contents and an index are both important tools to assist users to find relevant information. Furthermore, a well-constructed table of contents will also ensure users understand both what is and what is *not* covered by policy and will also address any gaps in alphanumeric policy inventory systems. Policy should require that all memoranda and special orders that have the effect of policy receive a unique control and tracking number, are treated as policy (along with an incorporated statement to that effect) upon their creation and require review at least annually for permanent transition to formal policy content. In no case should a memorandum or special order remain in effect beyond the periodic review of department policy. Policy documents clearly include reference to first reading, final adoption, distribution, and effective dates but do not include any reference to most recent and/or scheduled review. All policy should be reviewed on a regular basis (review period to be

determined by the department) to ensure it is consistent with evolving case law, industry practices, department developments, and community expectations. Policy documents should include a reference to the review period and indication of most recent review.

Dunwoody Police recently launched a Transparency & Data Sharing initiative, which includes a web page dedicated to making select policies and supporting information and data available proactively to the public. This page is available through a simple open-source internet search. BerryDunn commends Dunwoody for this transparency initiative, which represents a possible best practice in building productive relationships with the community through shared information. The Transparency & Data Sharing page contains a clickable icon that directs you to select Dunwoody Police Standard Operating Procedures documents in PDF form.

The available policies are listed in alphanumeric order with clear titles indicating content. However, no table of contents was provided to BerryDunn. This makes interpreting gaps in the alphanumeric inventory system for policies challenging and incomplete. Additionally, the PDF files available via the Transparency & Data Sharing page are not all signed by the chief of police and some of them lack a signature line completely. It is important in progressive efforts like the DPD transparency initiative to ensure that all references on web pages are appropriately populated with the most current information, that all documents provided are current and complete, and that any apparent gaps in available information are clearly explained. DPD should ensure that all copies of policy are signed by the chief of police or that the authority of the chief of police is somehow otherwise indicated. Additionally, policy should be specific on how often review and update should occur, and each policy should clearly indicate latest dates of review and update.

DPD policy is categorized alphanumerically with a letter and number ranging from A-1 to T-5. However, not all letters are utilized and there are gaps in the number component. The alphabetical sections are not labeled for content. DPD policy would be much easier for users to reference, learn, and utilize effectively if it had a clearer organizational system with topics grouped under important activities. There are potentially as many ways to organize policy as there are agencies, but every agency will benefit by clearly organizing content by topic. DPD should consider reorganizing policy so that sections that support and complement each other are in closer proximity to each other, perhaps using subcategories within a limited number of clearly labeled primary topic sections.

One effective organizational structure for policy might be as follows:

1. Code of Conduct
2. Patrol Operations
3. Investigations
4. Special Operations
5. Property and Evidence
6. Administration

## 7. Other

Policy A-3 details the department's mission, vision, motto, and goals, while policies A-32 and A-4 include the Code of Conduct and Code of Ethics, respectively. Many agencies find that placing these foundational policies together and at the beginning of policy sends a strong message about core values and standards. DPD should consider combining and reorganizing the placement of important sections like the Code of Conduct to emphasize their importance.

Overall, BerryDunn found the policy to be comprehensive and professionally written. Policy is clearly produced to assist users in understanding their responsibilities. In addition, upon general review, policy appears to be materially reflective of contemporary police practices. Policy is generally well structured (in that individual sections are clearly titled), although policy organization appears to be slightly random, and topics are not organized such that related or commonly co-referenced topics are always adjacent to each other. This is a common situation as policy evolves and grows. DPD policy could benefit by reorganization, creation of an index, and production of a readily available table of contents incorporated into policy itself.

For this policy review, BerryDunn focused on three major objectives:

1. The overall organization of the policy manual, with emphasis on a user's ability to easily locate subject matter
2. The composition of the policy manual in terms of its inclusiveness of relevant and contemporary topics, with emphasis on those orders that are critical to officer safety and accountability, and departmental liability
3. Whether critical topics provide officers with enough guidance and direction to perform their duties in accordance with departmental requirements

## I. Critical Policies

In addition to a general review, BerryDunn reviewed policy for inclusion of several specific critical policy topics in two general categories—high-risk policies and emergent policies. The list of high-risk policies emanates from a study by Gallagher and Westfall, which identified the top risk areas for police departments from a litigation standpoint. According to the research by Gallagher and Westfall, these policy areas combine for 90% of litigation issues against police agencies. Emergent policies are those BerryDunn has identified as important for police operations, particularly as the demands within the profession continue to evolve.

### High-Risk Policies

1. Off-Duty Conduct
2. Sexual Harassment – Discrimination
3. Selection/Hiring
4. Internal Affairs

5. Special Operations
6. Responding to the Mentally Ill
7. Use of Force
8. Pursuit/Emergency Vehicle Operator Course
9. Search/Seizure – Arrest
10. Care, Custody, Control/Restraint of Prisoners
11. Domestic Violence
12. Property-Evidence

## Emergent Policies

1. Crime Analysis and Intelligence Led Policing (ILP)
2. Officer Wellness
3. LGBTQ+ Policies
4. Impartial Policing (Biased Policing)
5. Unmanned Aircraft Systems

BerryDunn located policies either directly titled relevant to all high-risk policy categories, or BerryDunn located a policy section or sections containing direction that addresses the identified critical policy areas in a relatively thorough manner. Several high-risk policy areas include guidance across multiple policy sections. DPD policy would provide clearer guidance if such distributed policies were consolidated into single, comprehensive policy sections as discussed above and again individually below as appropriate. Of the five listed emergent policies, BerryDunn found specific policies on four of the five. BerryDunn did not locate specific policies that substantively address working with people who are LGBTQ+.

## Off-Duty Conduct

DPD policy does not include a specific, centralized, and stand-alone policy regarding off-duty conduct. Policy does include references—notably within A-32 (Code of Conduct), A-4 (Oath of Office & Code of Ethics), and A-50 (Social Media)—regarding off-duty conduct. There is also Policy A-24, which addresses Extra & Off Duty Employment and appears to be robust and comprehensive on this topic. While some sections of policy address aspects of off-duty conduct, this is an area of frequent confusion and difficulty for employees and an area that often leads to complaints and investigations. Having minimal and unconsolidated references to a critical high-risk policy area such as off-duty conduct can lead to gaps in understanding and/or inconsistencies in conduct, especially as various policy sections may be updated over time. Because there are multiple policies addressing off-duty behavior, off-duty conduct is a critical policy topic, and it is a policy to which officers often turn for important guidance, DPD might



consider developing a single policy that summarizes and references all policy regarding off-duty behavior in a single location for easy reference, consumption, and guidance.

### Sexual Harassment – Discrimination

Policy A-32 (“Code of Conduct”) includes Subsection 20.02 (Harassment). This section references the City of Dunwoody Employee Handbook—for which all employees are responsible—for the definition of sexual and other forms of harassment. DPD Policy A-32 specifically prohibits sexual harassment and “intimidation, humiliation, insulting or subjecting individuals to offensive or verbal abuse because of a gender, age, ethnicity, race, religion, national origin, political affiliation or disability.” DPD policy would benefit from a clear statement defining sexual harassment without a need to reference the City of Dunwoody Employee Handbook as well as an articulation that prohibition includes a policy of zero tolerance with established mechanisms for bypassing the chain of command to report sexual harassment directly to City Human Resources.

### Selection/Hiring

Policy contains Sections A-42 (Recruitment) and A-41 (Selection), which address “selection, hiring, hiring standards, and personnel selection.” These policy sections include subsections specifically addressing recruitment strategy, equal employment opportunity plan, and a detailed guidance on the selection and background investigation processes. These are well-written, comprehensive, and thoughtful policies.

### Internal Affairs

Policy includes two significant sections: A-21 (Internal Affairs) and A-22 (Officer Involved Shootings), which combine to address internal affairs, complaints, and the administrative investigation process. These policies appear to be comprehensive, thoughtful, and well-written with a useful definitions section, description of incidents to be investigated, supervisor responsibility, Internal Affairs responsibility, standard procedures, and reporting. The Internal Affairs function at DPD, including policy, will be described and analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 11 of this report.

### Special Operations

Multiple policy sections address special operations and situations such as traffic, K9, SWAT, active shooters, bomb threats, VIP security, emergency operations, interagency response, and others. Policy E-1 (Emergency Operations) specifically addresses “all hazards”-type situations, which include interagency coordination utilizing established command and control protocols like National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS). Dunwoody is located firmly within a major metropolitan area that is densely populated with myriad law enforcement and public safety agencies and jurisdictions. Because of the very real possibility of a critical incident requiring response from multiple agencies and jurisdictions, it is commendable that DPD has such a well-established policy on interagency cooperation and all-hazards emergency response.



## Responding to the Mentally Ill

Section P-12 (Mentally Ill Persons) describes the department's procedures for responding to events involving persons with mental illness and describes procedures for various referral, support, and service options that might assist responses to persons with mental illness. During on-site data collection, BerryDunn observed that DPD has an especially strong and positive working relationship with a significant local mental health care provider.

## Use of Force

Policy Section A-8 ("Deadly & Non-Deadly Force") describes policy regarding the use of force including both deadly and non-deadly force. Policy also includes separate Section A-21 addressing officer-involved shootings. BerryDunn expands on its analysis of DPD use of force policy under the discussion of the National Consensus Use of Force Policy and the 8 Can't Wait Core Policies later in this section. It is notable that Policy Section P-17 provides unique policy, tools, and training for de-escalation response.

## Pursuit/Emergency Vehicle Operator Course

Policy Sections P-2 (Routine Emergency Driving), P-4 (Police Vehicles), and P-3 (Pursuits) represent comprehensive policy addressing emergency vehicle operations both during routine patrol operations and during a vehicle pursuit. Topics covered include routine response, emergency driving, emergency equipment, pursuit initiation, pursuit continuation, pursuit termination, inter-jurisdictional pursuits, supervisor responsibilities, and roadblocks.

## Search/Seizure-Arrest

Policy Sections P-13 (Legal Process) and P-14 (Search and Seizure) categories of arrest, alternatives to arrest, arrests without warrants, arrests with warrants, immunity, obtaining warrants, pretrial release, civil process, consent searches, searches with and without a warrant, vehicle searches, vehicle stops, frisks, reporting, and other topics. BerryDunn recommends elsewhere in this report that DPD develop policy and procedure to document all non-consensual encounters and further recommends here that DPD include specific and consolidated policy guidance that requires documentation of all detentions and all non-consensual law enforcement-related encounters in a manner that is consistent, archivable, and searchable and includes both demographic data and details on officer actions, such as frisks or searches (both consensual and otherwise). DPD policy includes specific guidance on consent searches. Consent searches are frequently the source of complaints about disparate treatment. DPD policy states, "The officer obtaining consent has the burden of proving that the defendant's consent to a warrantless search was given freely and voluntarily, and that it was not the product of an illegal detention or coercion..." BerryDunn recommends DPD update policy to include specific guidance on consent searches including a requirement for documenting consent (either in writing or on video) and a process for analytical review of consent searches to identify any potential patterns in outcomes including effectiveness and equity.

## Care, Custody, Control of Prisoners

Policy Section P-5 (Prisoner Transport) addresses securing arrested subjects, searching arrested subjects, observation of detainees, opposite sex transports, medical care, and other topics. This policy covers many of the fundamental topics of the care, custody, and control of prisoners, but DPD policy would benefit by having a stand-alone policy addressing the fundamental requirements for the care, custody, and control of detainees and prisoners regardless of whether they are being transported or not.

## Domestic Violence

Policy P-6 (Domestic Violence) describes policy and procedures for responding to calls for service related to domestic violence. This section includes detailed guidance on procedures for responding to domestic violence events including victim assistance and referrals for support services. Policy does not make any mention of the department's position on making dual arrests during the field investigation of domestic violence. DPD should update policy to reflect its stance on dual arrests, taking into consideration that it is widely considered best practice to prohibit dual arrests or, absent such a prohibition, to strongly discourage dual arrests and require on-scene supervisor approval before dual arrests are initiated. DPD Policy A-43 (Employee Related Domestic Violence) addresses response to incidents involving employees of the Dunwoody Police Department. Having a law enforcement-perpetrated domestic violence policy is a best practice that is not yet ubiquitous at police departments in the United States, and BerryDunn commends the DPD for having a specific policy addressing law enforcement-perpetrated domestic violence. Survivors often recount that their decision on whether and how to engage the criminal justice system includes a perception of how members of law enforcement, tasked with enforcing domestic violence laws, are held accountable to those same laws. How police departments hold their own members accountable for domestic violence can contribute directly to community members' perception of the existence of procedural justice, which contributes to their willingness to report domestic violence. Consequently, DPD should consider this policy as an opportunity to highlight language that clearly expresses a zero-tolerance approach to law enforcement-perpetrated domestic violence.

## Property/Evidence

Policy Section A-30 3.02 (Property and Evidence Maintenance) addresses property and evidence control procedures in a detailed and comprehensive manner including inspections and audits.

## Crime Analysis and Intelligence-Led Policing

Policy A-36 (Crime Analysis) addresses the use of data, intelligence, and victimology to perform modus operandi, geospatial, and temporal analysis.

## Officer Wellness

DPD does not have a specific wellness policy but does have Policy A-52 (Peer Support) and Policy T-3 (Employee Fitness), which address components of employee wellness including

critical incident stress management, interventions, peer support, confidentiality, and recognition for maintaining physical fitness. In a profession with as many stressors as policing, employee wellness is a vital concern. Additionally, retention is an increasingly important topic as agencies struggle with staffing levels and turnover. Addressing employee wellness is not only the right thing to do in support of employees who encounter significant work-related stresses upon their health and wellness, it is also an important part of any retention and staffing plan. Consequently, BerryDunn recommends DPD develop an employee wellness plan that is documented in policy and incorporates City benefits, peer support, and employee fitness.

### LGBTQ+ Policy

DPD does not have a specific policy regarding community members who identify as LGBTQ+. The sexual harassment and discrimination policy does not refer to the LGBTQ+ community, sexual orientation, or gender identity in its prohibitions. Policy A-32 (“Bias Based Profiling”) does prohibit police action based solely upon sexual orientation. BerryDunn’s review of policy located no other references to the rights of the LGBTQ+ community or procedures for responding to community members who are transgender. There are practical and operational aspects of engaging people in the LGBTQ+ community, which are appropriate to outline in policy. Those include issues such as person searches, personal pronoun preferences, detention location (male or female population), and use of restrooms to name just a few. Other considerations might include a policy relating to staff members who may be amid gender transition. Because of the sensitive issues that surround those within the LGBTQ+ community, BerryDunn recommends DPD consider developing a separate policy for responding to and supporting this segment of the population as referenced in Recommendation 7-1.

### Impartial Policing Policy

Policy Section A-35 (“Bias Based Profiling”) addresses impartial policing and clearly prohibits biased-based policing with specific and detailed guidance on this topic. BerryDunn has encountered no evidence to suggest DPD engages in bias-based policing. DPD’s recent Transparency & Data Sharing initiative includes making reports available to the public that include Use of Force Reports, Arrest Reports, Citation Reports, and Complaint Reports. All of these reports except the Complaint Reports include racial demographics for analysis by the community. DPD could expand on its impressive posture for producing and sharing data by also preparing and sharing an annual report on Bias-Based Profiling that combines the racial demographics of all these reports into a single analytical document.

Additionally, to ensure DPD can respond to any future possible concerns regarding this topic, it is vital that the agency has adequate information on police encounters. Without comprehensive data on all police encounters, any agency is at a significant disadvantage to provide sophisticated analysis of its performance regarding impartial policing. As noted previously in this report, BerryDunn recommends including a clear and specific policy that requires documentation of all detentions and non-consensual law enforcement-related encounters in a manner that is archivable and searchable, and includes both demographic data and details on officer actions, such as frisks or searches and that all consent searches require written or video recording affirmative consent.

## Unmanned Aircraft Systems

DPD has Policy C-6 (“UAV”), which addresses unmanned aircraft systems.

## Victim Services/Victim Assistance

While not included among the high-risk or emergent policies isolated for specific review and comment, it can be beneficial to assess an agency’s policy regarding supporting victims of crime, especially because Georgia has a legislatively enacted Crime Victims Bill of Rights and a Crime Victim Compensation Fund, both of which may have obligations for local law enforcement. DPD has Policy C-2 (Victim/Witness Assistance), which addresses the Victims Bill of Rights, victim contact responsibilities, services provided by the department, additional available services, and other relevant topics. It is a detailed and thorough policy.

## Post-Conviction Investigations

Also not included among the high-risk or emergent policies isolated for specific review and comment, BerryDunn notes DPD has a policy addressing post-conviction investigations, which underscores a fundamental value of the pursuit of meaningful and procedurally sound justice. Few agencies have a stand-alone policy on post-conviction investigations, so DPD should be commended for its commitment to justice.

## II. Analysis of Use of Force Policy – National Consensus Policy

In 2017, amid significant debate concerning variations in use of force practices and policies across the nation, several law enforcement groups convened to develop a model policy that would help improve uniformity regarding police uses of force across the profession. The organizations involved in these discussions included the following:

- Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies
- The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies
- The Fraternal Order of Police
- The Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association
- The IACP
- The Hispanic American Police Command Officer’s Association
- International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training
- National Association of Police Organizations
- National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives
- National Association of Black Law Enforcement Executives
- National Tactical Officers Association

The convening of such a group, and their agreement on a model policy of this nature, is unprecedented within the law enforcement industry. Although there are aspects of the National Consensus Policy that some may disagree with, it is BerryDunn's position that this model provides strong guidance for law enforcement agencies to consider within the context of their operational policies and procedures. As part of this assessment, BerryDunn evaluated the DPD's use of force policy against the National Consensus Policy.

The DPD has well-written and comprehensive policies regarding the use of force as documented above with specific guidance on topics such as reverence for life, value of life over property, warnings, warning shots, de-escalation, alternatives, and medical aid. Several other policies provide guidance on topics related to the use of force.

This portion of the report is intended to provide observations to the DPD concerning areas of its use of force policy relative to the National Consensus Policy, which may be valuable to consider in terms of adjusting or revising the DPD policy. Although BerryDunn acknowledges that the National Consensus Policy is very good, BerryDunn also recognizes there are nuances within each agency that call for customization of various aspects of department operations. BerryDunn's recommendation in this section is for the DPD to review this information in relation to its own policy and to consider appropriate adjustments. Nothing in this section should be construed as a mandate for the DPD to adopt the National Consensus Policy, in whole or in part. Upon review and using a comparison of the National Consensus Policy, BerryDunn makes the following observations and recommends the DPD consider the following areas for possible adjustments and clarifications to the DPD policy.

- The National Consensus Policy on Use of Force states all officers shall receive training, at least annually, on the agency's use of force policy and related legal updates. DPD policy includes multiple references to maintaining proficiency and training on use of force-related topics but does not clearly indicate policy requirements about frequency, amount, and specific topics. BerryDunn recommends the use of force policy be enhanced to clearly state frequency of required recurring training and any required re-certifications regarding use of force-related policy, procedures, and skills. Policy should require concurrent training on related legal updates. Policy should require that all use of force training be provided in a manner designed to provide techniques for the use of de-escalation techniques. Policy should require that training include simulation of actual shooting situations and conditions. Policy should require that training be designed to assess and enhance officers' discretion and judgment in using less lethal and deadly force in accordance with this policy.
- DPD policy defines chokeholds identically to The National Consensus Policy on Use of Force as:

***A physical maneuver that restricts an individual's ability to breathe for the purposes of incapacitation. This does not include vascular neck restraints.***

DPD policy includes specific language prohibiting chokeholds or any control technique that places direct pressure on the front throat/tracheal area unless deadly force is warranted.

- The National Consensus Policy clearly defines excessive force as “force which is not objectively reasonable” and further defines objectively reasonable in very specific terms:

***The determination that the necessity for using force and the level of force used is based upon the officer’s evaluation of the situation in light of the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time the force is used and upon what a reasonably prudent officer would use under the same or similar situations.***

DPD policy states, “Every officer has the duty and obligation to intervene to prevent or stop the known and apparent use of excessive force by ANY other law enforcement officer. An officer also has the duty and obligation to immediately report any known or suspected excessive use-of-force incident to the on-duty watch commander.” DPD policy defines “objectively reasonable” consistent with the National Consensus Policy definition. DPD policy would benefit from specifically including a definition of excessive force that is consistent with the National Consensus Policy definition.

## 8 Can’t Wait Core Policy Solutions

In addition to the National Use of Force Consensus policy, BerryDunn also examined the DPD use of force policy against the specific core policy enhancements recommended by the 8 Can’t Wait initiative. This initiative comes from Campaign Zero, an organization that has been an advocate for limiting police interventions, improving community interactions, ensuring accountability for police officers, and ultimately, reducing deaths that result from police actions.

The website for 8 Can’t Wait suggests that more restrictive use of force policies accompanied by comprehensive training, meaningful oversight, and consistent accountability can reduce deadly use of force encounters by police and save lives while promoting collaborative and procedurally just policing; BerryDunn agrees. Indeed, the elements mentioned reflect best practices within the law enforcement industry, and they should be an imperative for every police administrator.

More restrictive use of force policies accompanied by comprehensive training, meaningful oversight, and consistent accountability can reduce deadly use of force encounters by police and save lives while promoting collaborative and procedurally just policing. Specifically, the following policies championed by Campaign Zero’s #8Cantwait campaign demonstrate the potential to dramatically reduce fatal police encounters:

1. Require all alternatives be exhausted before shooting.
2. Require all use of force be reported.
3. Prohibit chokeholds and strangleholds.
4. Require use of force continuum.
5. Require de-escalation.
6. Require duty to intervene.

7. Prohibit shooting at moving vehicles.
8. Require warning before shooting.

BerryDunn has reviewed DPD policy to determine whether it has addressed these eight core policy areas. BerryDunn finds that DPD policy addresses all of them to some extent. Although DPD policy does address all eight recommendations, some clarification and enhancement to existing policies may be warranted. It is important to note that the efficacy of these core policy areas is dependent on consistent reporting, oversight, and accountability of the behavior addressed.

### All Alternatives Exhausted Before Shooting

DPD Policy Section A-8 (Deadly & Non-Deadly Force) states, *“It is the policy of this department to value and preserve human life”* and *“Police Officers and Prisoner Transport Officers (PTO’s) are expected to achieve control, and when possible exhaust other reasonable de-escalation tactics before resorting to the use of deadly force.”* This section also details parameters for using deadly force, including attempt to identify themselves, risk to others, possibility of alternatives and de-escalation, and other factors.

### Comprehensive Reporting of All Use of Force

DPD Policy Section A-8 (Deadly & Non-Deadly Force) requires reporting by “each and every employee” of all force including:

1. Visible injury
2. Complaint of injury
3. Display or the deployment of oleoresin capicum (O.C.) spray
4. Display or the deployment of a Conducted Electrical Weapon (CEW) in a confrontational situation
5. Display or discharge of a firearm in a confrontational situation
6. Any incident in which the officer exercises physical force beyond that of an escort control technique used for guidance (i.e., escort)

There is no clear and specific requirement in this section that officers who *witness* use of force must document their observations. Also, use of force is required to be reported within “three working days.” BerryDunn recommends a policy requiring all employees to report any use of force immediately and that policy clearly require any employee who witnesses a use of force to document it thoroughly and immediately as well. BerryDunn recommends elsewhere in this report that the DPD require documentation of all non-consensual law enforcement encounters. While that recommendation is about encounters, not uses of force, the accumulation of use of force data complements this recommendation to support periodic analysis of both biased-based profiling and use of force.



## Chokeholds and Strangleholds

DPD policy includes specific language prohibiting chokeholds or any control technique that places direct pressure on the front throat/tracheal area unless deadly force is warranted.

## Use of Force Continuum

DPD Policy Section A-8 (Deadly & Non-Deadly Force) details a spectrum of control techniques ranging from officer presence to temporary incapacitation and includes an admonition to de-escalate, when possible, prior to the use of deadly force. Use of non-deadly force requires a consideration of several factors including the feasibility of de-escalation. Section A-8 (Deadly and Non-deadly Force), IV (procedures) A. Decisions and Control, is confusing because it states that control is achieved through a spectrum of bulleted possible techniques, but in the introductory paragraph it states that de-escalation should be used when possible prior to using deadly force. This section needs to be clarified about what portions apply to deadly force and which apply to non-deadly force.

## De-Escalation

As noted above, DPD Policy Section A-8 (Deadly & Non-Deadly Force) details a spectrum of control techniques ranging from officer presence to temporary incapacitation and includes an admonition to de-escalate, when possible, prior to the use of deadly force. Also, policy includes the use of de-escalation tools and skills. DPD policy does not specifically require a use of force continuum or de-escalation for non-deadly force and, instead, includes those topics in the parameters for non-deadly force:

“Use only that level of force that is objectively reasonably to bring the incident under control.

The amount and degree of force which may be employed are based upon, but not limited to, the following factors:

- the nature of the offense
- the behavior of the individual against whom the force is to be used
- actions by third parties who may be present
- physical conditions and tactical considerations
- the possibility of creating an unreasonable risk of injury or death to innocent persons
- the feasibility/availability of alternative actions to de-escalate the incident”

## Duty to Intervene

DPD Policy Section A-8 (Deadly & Non-Deadly Force) states, *“Every officer has the duty and obligation to intervene to prevent or stop the known and apparent use of excessive force by ANY other law enforcement officer.”* This policy clearly requires officers to intervene when observing excessive force.



## Shooting at Moving Vehicles

DPD Policy Section A-8 (Deadly & Non-Deadly Force) states, *“police officers will not discharge a firearm at or from a moving vehicle except as the ultimate measure of self-defense or the defense of another when the offender is employing deadly force. Firing the firearm solely to disable a vehicle is strictly prohibited. In every incident, the police officer shall take into account the location of vehicular and pedestrian traffic and the potential hazard to innocent persons.”*

## Warning Before Shooting

DPD policy does not require a verbal warning before shooting but does state that officers will attempt to identify themselves before using deadly force.

## III. Policy Advisory Committee

As noted, DPD has an extensive, thorough, and contemporary policy manual. Those governed by the rules have a vested interest in the development of the standards for which they will be held accountable and expected to follow. These same individuals often possess significant operational knowledge that leaders can call upon in the development of such processes. It is BerryDunn’s position that those who do the work on a consistent basis have the best vantage point from which to construct the rules and operating guidelines regarding operational functions. Persons in front-line positions often have ideas or suggestions, which, if not for their inclusion in the process, would be unknown to policy makers. Additionally, those involved in the development of those rules will be more likely to understand and embrace them.

Consequently, BerryDunn recommends DPD establish a formal committee responsible for review and input on any significant policy change or development of new policy. This committee should be made up of a cross-section of operational personnel, including both sworn and professional staff. All significant policy revisions, additions, deletions, or other modifications should be subject to the review of this committee. However, this committee should not completely replace the need to consult with subject matter experts within or outside the department, should the policy require additional review, scrutiny, input, or buy-in from others.

In addition, just as BerryDunn recommends inclusion of those within the department as an advisory arm of policy construction, the DPD should also consistently engage the public in the process of developing or revising critical agency policies. In keeping with the co-production policing philosophy, BerryDunn suggests the DPD adjust current policy and practices to regularly engage the public in policy decisions.

## IV. Redundant, Outdated, or Conflicting Policies

Other than the noted recommendations for policy adjustments or development, BerryDunn did not find any evidence of any materially outdated or conflicting policies.

## V. Risk Management

BerryDunn notes that the policies in place by the DPD appear to meet or exceed national standards. Many of these policies appropriately target high-risk areas, and they are constructed to mitigate these issues.

## VI. Training and Policy Dissemination

Per policy, employees will be provided access to the policy to read and become familiar with its contents.


## Summary


BerryDunn conducted a general and limited review of the current DPD policy regarding its organization, relevance to industry standards, and key policy areas. The policy review BerryDunn conducted was general in nature, as are the recommendations. None of the information in this section should be considered legal advice, and BerryDunn recommends that the DPD discuss any policy adjustments with its legal advisors prior to adoption and/or implementation. Based on its review of policy, BerryDunn noted the absence of a formal collaborative approach to developing policy, one policy area that should be enhanced, and minor possible structural and administrative enhancements. BerryDunn made three recommendations regarding these items and recommends that DPD consider making changes to the policy based on the review.


## Recommendations

This section provides the formal recommendations from this chapter, presented chronologically as they appear within the chapter. Each recommendation in the table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, and details concerning the findings and recommendations.

**Table 7.1: Chapter 7 Recommendations**

Operational Policies		
No.	LGBTQ+ Policy	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 7, Section I: Critical and Emergent Policies</i>		
7-1	<b>Finding:</b> The DPD has a policy manual that provides appropriate and relevant guidance for personnel for most critical and emergent operational areas. However, there is one emergent policy that is not addressed because DPD does not have a policy for responding to members of the LGBTQ+ community.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should implement a policy addressing how to respond to persons from the LGBTQ+ community, to include both community encounters and DPD staff members.	

Operational Policies		
No.	Policy Development and Review	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 7, Section III: Policy Advisory Committee</i>		
7-2	<b>Finding:</b> Although the DPD may seek input from internal and external stakeholders on policy development and revision, this process is not formally defined and the DPD does not have a formal collaborative policy development and review process.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should establish a standing policy development and review committee comprised of a diverse membership that is representative of all internal stakeholders. The DPD should also consider engaging community members in this effort as a pathway supportive of collaborative co-production policing efforts.	

Operational Policies		
No.	Policy Organization and Navigation	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 7, Section VI: Training and Policy Dissemination</i>		
7-3	<b>Finding Area:</b> DPD policy is thorough, easy to understand, and covers essential areas of operation, but some of the publicly available policies are not signed and the organization of the policy is not intuitive to navigate.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should ensure all policies disseminated, whether internally or externally, are current and complete and consider re-organizing the policy manual into several categories of related topics for ease of use with a usable table of contents and index.	

## Chapter 8: Data, Technology, and Equipment

*Data, Technology, and Equipment: includes a review of agency software and related technology resources, and access/use of crime and other call for service data for operational purposes. Includes a review of department equipment, facilities and space utilization, and fleet services.*

During this assessment, BerryDunn asked staff about the availability and use of technology within their work processes. BerryDunn found that officers embraced the technology available to them and, in fact, desired additional technological enhancements that could improve their capacity to perform their jobs. The current technology (both hardware and software) faces a typical conundrum that it is simultaneously effective for basic needs but could certainly be improved to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of police operations.

### I. Data and Technology

#### Software

The backbone of all effective police data functions is a robust Records Management System (RMS), which is the primary source for the receipt and documentation of data regarding crime and police response to calls for service (CFS). An effective RMS also provides easy access to data and supports obtaining and using that data for analysis. An effective and complete RMS is critical to leveraging data in support of operations, transparency, and impartial policing efforts. Police agencies with a good RMS that is integrated with other field technologies can create operational efficiencies that save time and effort for staff. Proper use of these systems can be valuable in leveraging a variety of police functions—including analysis—which can help combat crime more effectively and more efficiently. During this assessment, BerryDunn learned the RMS in use by the DPD may not be adequately supporting operational needs of the department and may need updating. The current RMS had multiple limitations identified by users, particularly in the areas of data availability—data is not always easily accessible or efficiently retrievable. As noted above, easily accessible RMS data is fundamentally necessary to support thorough research in specific cases or intelligence-led policing, in general.

Most modern RMS software products have significant capabilities, and BerryDunn has provided a sample list of the common features in Section 2 of the OARM document. Although the current RMS in use by the DPD does satisfy some of those elements, the system is outdated, and support from the vendor has been focused on newer products in its suite. Reportedly, the vendor has committed to continuing to support the current product used by the DPD, however, based on discussions with other clients using the same system, and BerryDunn's experience, end-of-life support for this product could occur at any time.

Based on BerryDunn's observations, the DPD should consider pursuing acquisition of a more modern and robust RMS that is capable of supporting its data needs. BerryDunn also notes here that acquiring a new RMS is not a small task. Doing so requires substantial time and planning and involves multiple significant steps. BerryDunn recognizes these challenges and acknowledges that the DPD cannot remain in a state of stasis as efforts to acquire a new

system proceed. Accordingly, BerryDunn recommends that the DPD cautiously make necessary adjustments to its current RMS to support immediate operational needs, while simultaneously pursuing a replacement system.

Additionally, because of the critical integration between RMS and CAD, the City should also examine the CAD (and mobile) system to determine whether it is capable of meeting the current and emerging needs of the DPD. Given the noted constraints with the RMS, it is likely that CAD has similar functional challenges, which may also suggest the need for replacement.

### Equipment and Field Reporting

BerryDunn notes DPD has significant field-based technology, including in-car mobile computer terminals (MCTs). These in-car computers have automatic vehicle locator (AVL) capacity built into them. Patrol cars also have in-car printers that can print citations and crash information (though the crash information capacity is not currently being used). DPD utilizes mobile ID scanners, and patrol cars have mobile radar units and in-car cameras. The department utilizes body worn cameras. Taken as a whole, this suite of hardware and software provides significant resources for patrol officers and represents a well-equipped department.

As part of this assessment, BerryDunn asked the DPD to complete a technology survey designed to capture the field-reporting capacity of the law enforcement agency. The maximum score for this instrument is 100, or 115 when all possible bonus points are included. The DPD scored a 93 using this assessment instrument.<sup>82</sup> This is one of the highest scores BerryDunn has observed and indicates a significant focus on the use of technology in the field. BerryDunn encourages the DPD to continue to monitor changing trends in field technology for opportunities to improve the effectiveness of officers in the field.

Policy and practice allow DPD officers to issue verbal warnings that require no documentation. Consequently, adequate data for regular analysis is not captured for future retrieval and analysis. As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, this lack of documentation of all non-consensual law enforcement encounters produces a gap in data that renders important analysis incomplete or misleading and makes a thorough assessment of impartial policing, either proactively or in response to complaints, not possible. BerryDunn has recommended all non-consensual law enforcement encounters be documented in Chapter 4. The technology suite enjoyed by patrol at DPD including MCTs, ID scanners, and in-car printers gives DPD the ability to quickly and efficiently issue written warnings, which would log that contact data in the database for future retrieval and analysis.

## II. Crime Analysis

Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) broadly consists of gathering information or data, converting that information/data into usable intelligence through analysis by trained professionals, and then

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<sup>82</sup> SDI Table 8.1

using that intelligence to guide decision-making by executives and commanders to positively influence public safety objectives that support the mission of the department and the needs of the community. ILP has become a best practice in modern law enforcement. These practices have proved to contribute to the effective and efficient use of organizational resources.

During this assessment, BerryDunn examined the capture, analysis, and use of crime and response data within the DPD. BerryDunn is aware that DPD has a desire to engage ILP strategies more effectively, and the DPD has held crime information/crime-abatement meetings, and/or ILP processes in the past. DPD has a need to clarify the goals and objectives for these ILP initiatives and to build a process that supports them. The DPD has made a commitment to broaden its ILP strategy, including fielding more robust ILP meetings. Although it is important for the chief and other department personnel to use data to make operational and strategic decisions, ILP calls for officers at all levels to use data to make effective decisions, positively address community problems, and proactively solve and prevent crimes. It is important to note that the DPD utilizes its available technology appropriately and uses data and intelligence in decisions and deployment strategies. However, the department also has the desire and opportunity to develop a deeper culture of data-driven decisions and ILP at all levels.

Based on observations about DPD's use of data and intelligence combined with the stated desires of department leadership, BerryDunn recommends the implementation of a professional performance measurement and accountability management system (commonly referred to as "Crime Meetings") that is supportive of both community-oriented/problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing (ILP) strategies. Such an effort will reinforce department goals and impose accountability for outcomes on department personnel. Relevant supporting information is included in the OARM, Section 6.

For the past ten years, the department has employed a crime analyst. Employees routinely advised that the crime analyst provides significant support, which makes sworn functions more effective and efficient. Having a full-time crime analyst for the department is a significant resource and opportunity. Many, if not most, departments the size of DPD do not enjoy access to a dedicated professional crime analyst. Crime analysts can assist with a variety of functions for integrating data-driven policing into regular operations and help create a more effective and efficient approach to combating crime. The value of crime analysis extends well beyond simple crime mapping or report production and can be used for predictive crime modeling, data-based decision-making, and intelligence-led planning, which all allow for more focused policing efforts. Utilizing non-police professional staff to increase efficiency and leverage capacity of the department also helps address the police staffing issues facing departments nationwide.

There exist additional opportunities to leverage the contributions of crime analysis. For example, there are substantial administrative duties that are currently being managed by the crime analyst that could be performed more efficiently by an administrative staff member. Simultaneously, multiple individuals—beyond the crime analyst—prepare various statistical reports for the department. Reducing the administrative tasks for the crime analyst would provide additional capacity for them to consolidate intelligence functions such as preparing statistical reports and to apply their unique skill set to supporting department data-driven and

ILP operations. To emphasize the value of data and intelligence and to expand access to this valuable resource, the department should include the crime analyst in any supervisor/command staff meetings to reinforce the value of the analyst's role and to ensure all supervisors have access to consistent two-way feedback with this vital function. The department should explore additional training for the crime analyst including Data Driven Approach to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS), which can often serve as a great foundation for the exploration of the principles behind ILP. The department should inventory, centralize, and standardize all statistical reporting and task the crime analyst as the primary responsible party. DPD should examine the benefit of an additional civilian crime analyst. Additionally, adding a dedicated crime analyst within CID would allow additional implementation of ILP, help investigators with targeted enforcement, help identify potential suspects, and assist investigators with monitoring non-active cases that may need minor follow-up to develop tangible leads, such as citizen contacts to obtain serial numbers or remote collection of evidence such as images or video. This would also help engage citizens who are victims of crime and help foster a better relationship between DPD and its citizens/community. Having two full-time crime analysts would allow one to dedicate efforts in support of Investigations while the other crime analyst could support patrol and their problem-solving efforts. Both crime analysts could contribute to supporting a professional performance measurement and accountability management system with regular crime meetings.

As with most departments, there are significant opportunities to improve the use of data for ILP to support the DPD. BerryDunn supports DPD's desire to fully embrace data-driven and intelligence-led policing and recommends it continue to develop these policing strategies, including implementing a robust performance measurement and accountability management (CompStat) system with support of resources provided by BerryDunn. To assist the DPD in further developing its ILP program and strategy, including the use of crime meetings, BerryDunn has provided an extensive sub-report on this topic, which can be found in Section 6 of the OARM document. BerryDunn recommends that the DPD use this resource to further refine and develop its ILP philosophy, along with the appropriate policies and procedures to help ensure that it is prioritized as an element of the operational culture of the organization.

### III. Department Equipment and Facilities

During this assessment, BerryDunn had an opportunity to discuss the equipment available and in use by the department and to discuss facilities, space utilization, and fleet issues with officers. BerryDunn's operational assessment of DPD includes a review of DPD physical facilities. The team from BerryDunn had an opportunity to tour the police facility during on-site visits and noted that the physical facilities utilized by DPD are modern, spacious, and conveniently located both to the community at large and relative to other City departments and services.

During the facilities tour, BerryDunn did note the inner property room where high-risk property such as firearms, narcotics, and money lacks some basic security controls. Property control best practices require separate and additional secure storage for high-risk property such as firearms, narcotics, and money. Dunwoody does, in fact, have this additional, secondary secure storage and should be commended for this as a well-established best practice. However, this



secondary storage lacks basic additional security controls that are relatively simple and inexpensive to implement and would provide significant additional protection to the department and the employees responsible for this high-risk property. Such controls include electronic proximity card access that records all instances of access, constant recorded video camera surveillance, and dual physical controls and procedures for all entry and access. See Recommendation 8-1.

## IV. Fleet Management

BerryDunn had an opportunity to conduct a limited inspection of DPD fleet resources by observing fleet vehicles staged at the Police Department as well as some vehicles as they were utilized by employees. The current fleet includes 96 total vehicles of which 60 are patrol vehicles (marked and unmarked) plus 35 non-patrol vehicles.<sup>83</sup> The current budget includes funding to replace nine patrol vehicles, which is a 15% replacement rate for current year. If this replacement rate were to be extended for future budgets, the entire fleet will be replaced every 6.67 years or, alternatively, no car would become older than 6.67 years.<sup>84</sup> Considering the limited geographical size of DPD's jurisdiction, this appears to be a reasonable replacement cycle for patrol cars. However, best practices include monitoring vehicle repair costs over time and balancing replacement decisions against ongoing maintenance issues. BerryDunn encourages the DPD to monitor individual vehicle maintenance costs and to consider expedited replacement of vehicles, where appropriate.

The current budget also includes funding to replace three non-patrol vehicles, which is an 8.5% replacement rate for the current year. If this replacement rate were to be extended for future budgets, the entire fleet will be replaced approximately every 12 years. While this turnover cycle is significantly longer than the patrol vehicle cycle, it appears reasonable for non-patrol vehicles that both accumulate significantly less mileage and wear and do not require emergency vehicle operations.

Currently DPD fleet is managed by the day shift lieutenant. This is a significant undertaking and impairs the lieutenant's ability to focus on staff development, shift management and leadership. BerryDunn has already recommended that DPD add a full-time civilian employee to manage the fleet, as well as other administrative functions (see Recommendation 3-1).

## Summary

BerryDunn identified several opportunities for improvement for DPD-related data, technology, equipment, and facilities. The RMS in use by the DPD is not robustly supporting operational needs and desires. The current RMS has multiple limitations, including data entry and data

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<sup>83</sup> SDI Table 8.2

<sup>84</sup> SDI Table 8.3


mining, both of which are critical to leveraging data in support of operations and impartial policing.


The enhanced use of field technology—such as in-car ticket and crash printing abilities—by the DPD can be improved in multiple areas. Doing so will help improve various efficiencies for the department. Best practices include utilizing ILP data to inform community needs and policing practices. Although the DPD has engaged some efforts in this area, there is an opportunity to formalize this process to make better use of available data. Additionally, the DPD should provide appropriate system access to crime analysts to access all relevant DPD data, and the DPD should provide appropriate training to crime analysts to access, retrieve, and evaluate operational impartial policing data.

## Recommendations


This section provides the four formal recommendations from this chapter, presented chronologically as they appear within the chapter. Each recommendation in the table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, and details concerning the findings and recommendations.


**Table 8.1: Chapter 8 Recommendations**

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	RMS	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 8, Section I: Data and Technology</i>		
8-1	<b>Finding:</b> The RMS in use by the DPD is not fully supporting operational needs. The RMS has multiple limitations, including data entry and data mining, both of which are critical to leveraging data in support of operations and impartial policing.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should consider pursuing acquisition of a more modern and robust RMS that is capable of supporting its data needs.	

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Use of Data and Intelligence	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 8, Section II: Crime Analysis</i>		
8-2	<b>Finding:</b> DPD intends to use crime and intelligence data proactively for data-driven and intelligence-led policing but, until recently, has not consistently utilized data or intelligence in a deliberate or meaningful way.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should pursue a robust performance measurement and accountability management (CompStat) system utilizing the support and resources provided by BerryDunn. The DPD should formally adopt a data-driven	

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Use of Data and Intelligence	Overall Priority
	philosophy supported by ILP. That philosophy should incorporate best practices in data use by police agencies and should include an operating performance measurement and accountability management system.	

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Crime Analysis	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 8 Section II: Crime Analysis</b>		
8-3	<b>Finding Area:</b> Crime analysis is performing some functions that do not require the skill of a crime analyst and, simultaneously, some functions that would benefit from the skills of a crime analyst are performed by others.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The department should include crime analysis in all supervisor/command staff meetings to reinforce the value of this role. The department should explore additional training for the crime analyst, including DDACTS. The department should inventory, centralize, and standardize all statistical reporting and crime analysis as the primary responsible party, redelegate any administrative tasks that do not require a crime analyst, and examine the benefit and feasibility of adding an additional civilian crime analyst to assist CID with cases.	

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	High-Risk Property Controls	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 8, Section III: Department Equipment and Facilities</b>		
8-4	<b>Finding Area:</b> The inner property room where high-risk property such as firearms, narcotics, and money lacks basic security controls.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should enhance property controls for high-risk property items through additional controls like electronic proximity card access, constant video recording, dual physical controls, etc.	

## Chapter 9: Training and Education

*Training and Education: includes a review of pre- and in-service department training, field training, and staff development.*

### I. General

The Training Unit coordinates all training for DPD. This unit is administered by a training coordinator who is a supervisor designated by the chief of police and who is responsible for planning and providing departmental training and the maintenance of training records. There is also a field training program called the Police Training Officer (PTO) program. The PTO program is administered by a PTO coordinator who is a supervisor designated by the chief of police.

DPD has a policy outlining the Police Department's commitment to providing all personnel with a continuum of training from basic training to specialized training schools. DPD offers its new hires additional training beyond what is required to earn a basic commission. This additional training includes department policy, firearms, O.C. (chemical pepper spray) certification, electrical weapon certification, ethics training, computer/report writing, and 911 training. There is also annual in-service training given for all sworn and non-sworn personnel.

### II. Initial Training

Training is often cited as one of the greatest responsibilities of a law enforcement agency. Adequate and appropriate training ensures employees are competent and confident while also reinforcing core department values and supporting accomplishment of department objectives. Employees consistently report that DPD takes training seriously and deliberately. Newly hired officers must be Georgia POST-certified (basic Georgia police officer training) or are required to attain this certification via a regional academy after being hired at DPD. The DPD also requires newly hired police officers to successfully complete the PTO program in compliance with the PTO manual prior to sworn, independent enforcement assignments. Non-sworn personnel are provided with on-the-job training customized to the position and responsibilities to which they are assigned.

The PTO program in use by the DPD includes a standardized model that is common within the policing industry and considered effective. The DPD requires that new officers complete a problem-solving exercise during the field training. Requiring new officers to engage in a community-based problem-solving project as part of their field training not only benefits the community, based on the outcome of their work, but it also solidifies an understanding of the processes involved in these projects, including the foundational ideals of community policing. Conducting a problem-solving project provides great context to the DPD's community policing philosophy and this is a notable best practice by the DPD.

### III. Higher Education and Officer Development

DPD provides advanced and specialized training in-house using POST-certified instructors and POST-approved lesson plans as well as utilizing outside training providers and sending employees to external training. As employees are promoted or transferred to other units in the department, staff receive training necessary for the position. Officers may be selected to attend advanced or specialized training at various locations such as Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and Georgia Public Safety Training Center. During the assessment, BerryDunn inquired about officer development within the DPD. Staff told BerryDunn that there is no formal officer development program at DPD. During this assessment, BerryDunn asked staff about incentives for education. Staff explained that there are some pay incentives for higher education; however, DPD does not have any specific partnerships with area educational institutions.

In many law enforcement agencies, including DPD, the rank of sergeant represents the first occasion when police officers assume formal leadership and supervision responsibilities. Transitioning from line-officer to line-supervisor requires major adjustments for most new supervisors. First-line supervisors play a critical role in the success of the organization and their personal success is imperative to agency success. Many new supervisors do not have extensive leadership training when they are promoted, and they often lack clarity of their role. Because police officers work relatively autonomously in the field, first-level supervision is a crucial role for ensuring police services are provided consistently and with an appropriate level of oversight and accountability. To accomplish proficiency in this important function, it is vital that all new police supervisors receive adequate training, coaching, and mentoring in a structured manner that supports department values and goals.

DPD provides newly promoted sergeants with a semiformal supervisory field training program. This effort is an orientation period consisting of two weeks with a senior sergeant to learn procedures, policies, and operations from a first-line supervisor perspective. Employee interviews suggested some sergeants need to be better prepared to provide regular and effective feedback to the employees they supervise. Interviews also indicated that the application of informal discipline procedures could be more standardized at the first-line supervisor level because some feel that officers are not held accountable for poor performance. Patrol officers also expressed a desire for additional mentoring and career development opportunities beyond PTO training.

While the informal training and mentoring opportunity is arguably more training and development than most new sergeants in many departments receive, DPD does not utilize a formal, structured Field Supervisor Training (FST) program supported by a detailed FST manual. An FST is a dedicated training program analogous to the PTO program for new officers but for new supervisors instead. An FST would incorporate a well-documented curriculum in a written manual that outlines all formal training required, mentoring and coaching opportunities, lists of tasks to be learned, and competency checkoffs. Implementing a more formal and well-documented FST program will help new supervisors realize greater effectiveness in acting consistently with basic supervisory responsibilities, maintaining discipline, completing performance evaluations, understanding the greater mission of the organization, and developing

advanced leadership skills. Ultimately, such a formalized and expanded program will foster cooperation and unity throughout the organization while providing newly promoted personnel with training, knowledge, and skills commensurate with their assigned duties.

Elements of an FST might include the following:

- Outlining supervisor expectations
- Clarifying supervisory responsibilities regarding policies and other general oversight duties
- Training on writing performance evaluations
- Identifying accountability and disciplinary processes to help ensure consistency throughout the organization
- Mentoring by a senior supervisor within the same division

All the employee-based concerns and suggestions noted above could be addressed through such a formal, structured training. BerryDunn recommends formalizing the training of new supervisors into a Field Supervisor Training program supported by a written manual with competency checkoffs.

DPD does not have a report-writing manual that explains how reports are to be written. Employee feedback revealed there are various ways in which employees are trained how to enter report information and what level of detail is appropriate. This orientation and training varies based on the officer's PTO and supervisor. Employee feedback also revealed the perception that frequently, had a responding patrol officer prepared a more thorough initial report, there would not have been a need for follow-up with victims of crimes, and the report could have more fully assisted with determining if an incident did or did not require further investigation. Needing an investigator or administrative professional to recontact a citizen due to incomplete reporting negatively impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of the department. BerryDunn recommends DPD develop a formal, written report-writing manual. Once developed, all staff should be trained on the new format.

The DPD has a very robust training budget and opportunities for training. In fact, this was frequently mentioned by employees as a highlight of working at the DPD and the City, and the DPD should be commended for this. However, the DPD does not have a formal professional development program or a rigorous format for receiving, reviewing, approving, and leveraging training requests. The lack of clear, standardized, transparent procedures for requesting and receiving training can lead to perceptions of inequitable treatment and may also fail to consistently support DPD's long- and short-term goals. BerryDunn recommends DPD institute a formal training review process, perhaps including an employee-based training committee, that reviews training requests in a consistent, transparent, and equitable manner in support of DPD goals, policies, and procedures and which includes alignment with a strategic training plan, professional development, and promotional preparation process.

## IV. Records, Required, and In-Service Training

The DPD provided BerryDunn with its annual training budget for the past three years, which reflected \$83,247 in 2019, \$41,231 in 2020 (decrease due to the pandemic restrictions), and \$68,070 in 2021.<sup>85</sup> BerryDunn observes that the training budget for the DPD is substantial, and the budget should be able to support the department's training needs. However, the DPD does not have a training plan to maximize the use of the training budget, ensure training efforts support and are aligned with the DPD's vision and strategic planning, and there is no defined plan for specific training for personnel development. Given the importance of training for officers from a variety of perspectives, the DPD should develop a strategic training plan for the department.

BerryDunn asked the DPD to provide data on training provided to staff, and based on that data, BerryDunn determined that officers assigned to patrol received an average of 147 training hours, and Investigations averaged 78 hours of training in 2021.<sup>86</sup> From prior studies, BerryDunn finds that departments average 63 hours per year for patrol, and for Investigations, the number is 72. Average training hours at the DPD exceed other training averages observed (although some of these hours could be attributed to academy training).

### Property and Crime Scene Technicians

DPD has two personnel who serve as property and crime scene technicians (CSTs), respectively. They can assist one another in their duties but neither is fully cross-trained on the other's job. Cross-training both personnel will help ensure the DPD has at least one person who is trained on both job functions to assist, if for some reason, Property or CST staff are not available. Accordingly, BerryDunn recommends the DPD cross-train the personnel in these two positions to be able to perform both position functions.

## VII. Training Request Process

The DPD also provided BerryDunn with data on officer requests for training, including those that were declined. Data from the past three years is provided in Table 9.1. Staff informed BerryDunn that most requests were approved, and Table 9.1 reflects this.

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<sup>85</sup> SDI Table 9.1

<sup>86</sup> SDI Table 9.2



**Table 9.1: Training Requests and Approvals**

Requests by Year	Total	Approved	Denied
2020	62	61	1
2021	111	110	1
2022	66	63	3

Source: Agency Provided Data

Although the DPD provides significant training opportunities for staff, there is no formal connection to a plan for strategic development of personnel, either by position or as part of a succession planning and personnel development process. Developing such a plan, as BerryDunn has already recommended, can help the DPD be more specific and effective in its training opportunities for staff.

## Summary

The State of Georgia has very basic training requirements for new police officers. DPD does not have its own basic academy and relies on hiring commissioned officers or having aspiring officers attend a regional police academy. In addition to the minimum commissioning standards required by Georgia POST, new hires at DPD must complete a formal orientation to DPD policies and procedures and participate in a formal police training program at DPD. The training program and structure in use by the DPD is common within the industry and is reportedly producing good candidates with some attrition—as is to be expected.

There are numerous formal training opportunities for new supervisors, and DPD has a commendable, if informal, new supervisor orientation and training opportunity. However, the DPD does not have a formal training program supported by a written manual with competency checkoffs for newly promoted supervisory personnel. The department and staff would benefit from the addition of a formalized FST program with an accompanying manual for new sergeants. DPD does not have a report-writing manual.

The lack of a report-writing manual allows for inconsistencies in the nature and quality of written reports. DPD should implement a formal report-writing manual.

DPD does not have a standardized, transparent process for requesting and receiving training that is supportive of department goals. The department should institute a formal training review process, perhaps including an employee-based training committee that reviews training requests relative to department goals, policies, and procedures and includes alignment and synchronization with a strategic training plan, a professional development effort, and a promotional preparation process.


Property and CSTs are not cross-trained in each other's job responsibilities. They can currently assist one another but neither is fully trained on the other's job in their absence. DPD should cross-train Property and CSTs to provide redundancy, capacity, and scalability.

DPD has an ample training budget and a strong emphasis on training, which reflects a fundamental value for professional abilities and employee development. This posture is reflected in positive employee feedback about training opportunities. As with any department, there are a few opportunities to improve the training process as highlighted in the recommendations below.


## Recommendations


This section provides the formal recommendations from this chapter, presented chronologically as they appear within the chapter. Each recommendation in the table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, and details concerning the findings and recommendations.


**Table 9.2: Chapter 9 Recommendations**

Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Field Supervisor Training (FST) Program	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 9 Section III: Higher Education and Officer Development</i>		
9-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> DPD does not have a formal FST program supported by a written manual. Transitioning from line-officer to line-supervisor requires major adjustments for most new supervisors. First-line supervisors play a critical role in the success of the organization, and their personal success is imperative. Many new supervisors do not have extensive leadership training when they are promoted, and they often lack clarity of their role.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> BerryDunn recommends DPD implement a formal FST program supported by a written manual that provides a structured training program with a formal field training component supported by competency checkoffs. In addition to the formal FST, DPD should task the majors and lieutenants to mentor new sergeants to impart experiential knowledge and reinforce department values. Such mentoring could be informal, or the department could incorporate it into the FST.	

Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Report Writing	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 9 Section III: Higher Education and Officer Development</i>		
9-2	<b>Finding Area:</b> DPD currently does not have a report-writing manual for patrol officers. This contributes to inconsistency in report writing and preliminary investigations.	

Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Report Writing	Overall Priority
	<b>Recommendation:</b> It is recommended the DPD create and utilize a report-writing manual to help ensure officers properly and adequately document incidents and to add consistency to produced reports, to improve preliminary investigations, and to make the most effective and efficient use of personnel time.	

Training and Education		
No.	Training Requests	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter Section IV: Records, Required, and In-Service Training</b>		
9-3	<b>Finding Area:</b> The department does not have a standardized, transparent process for requesting and receiving training that is supportive of DPD goals or a strategic training plan.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The department should institute a formal training review process, perhaps including an employee-based training committee that reviews training requests relative to DPD goals, policies, and procedures, including alignment and synchronization with a strategic training plan, professional development efforts, and a promotional preparation process.	

Training and Education		
No.	Property and Crime Scene Technicians (CSTs)	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter Section IV: Records, Required, and In-Service Training</b>		
9-4	<b>Finding Area:</b> Property and CST staff do not have backup if either is off work. They can assist one another but neither is fully trained on the other's job. The DPD should cross-train each of these personnel to help ensure that at least one person who is trained on both job functions is available to assist if, for some reason, Property or CST staff are not available (vacation/illness/injury/etc.).	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should cross-train Property and CSTs to provide redundancy, capacity, and scalability.	

## Chapter 10: Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion

*Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion: includes a review of agency practices related to hiring, retention, and promotion of personnel.*

As the law enforcement profession currently faces great challenges, one critical element is garnering and maintaining public trust, which includes, in part, staffing policing agencies with officers who are representative of the communities they serve. As the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Task Force Report noted:

To build a police force capable of dealing with the complexity of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is imperative that agencies place value on both educational achievements and socialization skills when making hiring decisions. Hiring officers who reflect the community they serve is also important not only to external relations but also to increasing understanding within the agency. Agencies should look for character traits that support fairness, compassion, and cultural sensitivity.<sup>87</sup>

The importance of attracting and hiring quality personnel is critical in today's law enforcement climate. Many police agencies contribute significant resources to their recruiting and hiring processes, and the DPD is no different. This section outlines the processes in use by the DPD, and BerryDunn offers insights and recommendations from some of the more recent studies done on this subject. As a part of this study, BerryDunn asked staff at the DPD to complete a worksheet designed to capture relevant data regarding recruiting, retention, selection, and hiring strategies. This worksheet has been used by BerryDunn to collect data from other agencies studied and from several agencies around the country that are demonstrating best practices in hiring. Throughout this section, BerryDunn references data from this worksheet and prior studies and how this data relates to the practices of the DPD.

### I. Personnel Experience and Diversity

DPD—like many, if not most, police departments—has experienced an increased rate of turnover in recent years. Despite this, the DPD continues to employ some very well experienced staff. This is particularly true for executive-level and command-level sworn staff and similar, if a bit less so, for first-level supervisors and detectives. Despite these positive observations, average experience levels on patrol—where most community interactions occur—are low and highlight the need for DPD, like all departments, to focus on retention and the professional development of personnel.

Readers of this report should note that the totals for various demographic tables do not all equal the same staffing levels presented elsewhere in this report, because the various demographic

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<sup>87</sup> Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; Published 2015; page 52

data were pulled by DPD at different times during the year, when total staffing numbers were different.

Thirty-eight percent (13 of 34) of those in the rank of police officer have less than one year experience. Eighty-two percent (28 of 34) of those in the rank of police officer have less than five years of experience. Twenty-three percent (13 of 57) of total departmental sworn staff have less than one year of experience. Fifty-one percent (29 of 57) of total sworn staff have five years or less experience while forty-nine percent (28 of 57) of total sworn staff have over five years of experience. The general youthfulness particularly at the police officer rank and, consequently, on patrol, is somewhat balanced by experience throughout the department and its ranks where almost one half of total sworn staffing has over five years of experience and over one third of total sworn staffing has more than ten years of experience. Civilian staff experience is distributed similarly to sworn staffing with 58% of civilian staff under five years of experience and 42% over five years of experience.<sup>88</sup>

The experience level of command staff, while generally a positive dynamic, could present a looming challenge for the DPD. Tenured leaders tend to have experiences that help guide executive decisions, and essentially all DPD command staff have significant years of experience. Consequently, there is a need to vigorously pursue leadership development (as discussed in Chapter 9 regarding training plans and professional development) and succession planning efforts so the department is prepared when command-level retirements inevitably occur. As will be discussed later in the report, attrition and staffing are significant issues to address, and making improvements in these areas will ultimately improve overall experience levels within the Police Department and positively affect service to the community.

BerryDunn also reviewed the racial diversity within the DPD, including an examination of diversity by rank. Two thirds of total staffing identify as white and, alternately, persons of color constitute about one third of sworn staffing. The demographic representation of DPD is highly consistent with the City population. The City of Dunwoody's population is 60.8% white, 13.5% Black, and the remaining percentage of the population is spread across multiple races and ethnicities. The City of Dunwoody's population includes 8.9% who identify as Latino or Hispanic. The percentage of sworn personnel at DPD who are Black is 17.24%, and the percentage of sworn personnel who are Latino/Hispanic is 13.79%.<sup>89</sup> Both the proportion of Black officers and Latino/Hispanic officers exceed the community demographic percentages.

A notable observation about diversity at DPD is that, while the department as a whole reflects the community, representation within the supervisory ranks at the Police Department is not nearly as reflective of the community or the department as a whole. Of the 17 supervisory

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<sup>88</sup> SDI Table 10.1

<sup>89</sup> SDI Table 10.2

positions within the DPD (including sergeants), only 3 supervisors or above are persons of color.<sup>90</sup>

It is common within the police industry for males to dominate the workforce, and DPD's workforce is 89.83% male.<sup>91</sup> BerryDunn observed that the ratio of males to females at the DPD is comparable to the prior studies and benchmark averages BerryDunn has observed. In other words, the percentage of women within the DPD is comparable to comparison departments.<sup>92</sup>

BerryDunn has examined the diversity issue extensively, has aggregated data from several prior studies, and has compiled data from benchmark cities and national data as displayed and discussed above. BerryDunn notes that diversity levels within DPD exceed all comparison cities in most categories. That is, the demographics of staffing at DPD compare favorably to national statistics where about 12% of police staffing are officers who are Black and about 11% of officers are Latino or Hispanic.<sup>93</sup> Staffing within the DPD is consistent with community demographics and this is a best practice example for the DPD.

Despite these positive observations, there does exist an opportunity to improve diverse representation within supervisory ranks. It is important to add here that BerryDunn favors the hiring and promotion of quality candidates, regardless of gender, ethnicity, or other status. Traditionally, various groups of individuals have been underrepresented within the law enforcement industry, and there is significant evidence to show that improving organizational diversity benefits the department and the community. There is also evidence to suggest that when organizations focus their efforts on improving organizational diversity, they get results across many metrics. Although the DPD workforce represents diversity of race and ethnicity in general, there is significant opportunity for growth regarding gender and racial diversity in the supervisory ranks.

## II. Hiring, Recruitment, and Retention

### Recruiting

DPD Policy A-42, dated 2010, outlines recruiting and the DPD's commitment to being an equal opportunity employer. The policy identifies various administrative duties related to the hiring process but does not include a strategic recruitment plan. Additionally, DPD does not have anyone formally assigned to recruiting efforts besides the deputy chief.

BerryDunn has observed, in multiple projects, that many police departments often adhere to an outdated, if persistent, recruiting model. Prior police recruiting was largely passive, and due to the sheer volume of applicants, there was historically no need to adjust this practice for many years. However, given current law enforcement hiring conditions, there is a need to develop

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<sup>90</sup> SDI Table 10.2

<sup>91</sup> SDI Table 10.4

<sup>92</sup> SDI Table 10.5

<sup>93</sup> SDI Table 10.3

more active and intentional recruiting strategies. Although the DPD policy describes the agency's recruiting plan, this information lacks active tasks, practices, and performance measures. A good strategic recruiting plan can establish and address priorities for the recruiting function. A recruiting plan also helps everyone in the department understand the recruiting goals of the department. A recruitment plan should identify areas where the department will advertise for and recruit candidates, including multiple traditional and web-based methods. An effective recruitment plan should also outline the relationships between the DPD and various educational institutions, law enforcement training organizations, and other community businesses, associations, and groups who can all potentially supply candidates to the Police Department. Such a plan should encourage and incentivize all employees to be part of the recruiting effort.

The recruiting plan should describe the commitment of the department to establishing a workforce that seeks an ethnic, racial, and gender balance representative of the community it serves. Further, the plan should include general strategies and specific steps that will be used to accomplish these goals. A productive recruitment plan will also include specific, measurable goals that support the department in assessing the efficacy of its recruiting efforts. BerryDunn recommends DPD develop a detailed strategic recruiting plan and has compiled a list of considerations the DPD should evaluate as part of its process to develop a strong recruiting plan. BerryDunn has included this information in the OARM, Section 1.

## Retention

At the beginning of this project, DPD staff explained to BerryDunn that hiring, recruiting, and retaining staff was an important issue and one that staff hoped this study would examine and address. This section outlines BerryDunn's evaluation of this area. As with many police agencies in the United States, the DPD has experienced some challenges in recruiting and retaining personnel. The industry has evolved as has the national climate surrounding policing. Additionally, modes of identifying, connecting with, and attracting candidates—including the right candidates—have made hiring more difficult for all of law enforcement, and DPD is no exception. This topic will be explored more fully in Section IV below about attrition.

## III. Selection

In addition to reviewing the recruitment efforts of the DPD, BerryDunn also examined the hiring process for the department. At BerryDunn's request, the DPD outlined the hiring steps involved for police officers.<sup>94</sup> BerryDunn observes that the process in use at the DPD is like many comparable police agencies. Notably, the DPD reports it takes many months for an applicant to move from the application to the conditional offer for an officer position. BerryDunn has found that long hiring timelines can be a challenge because candidates often apply to multiple agencies simultaneously, and oftentimes they are hired by another community more quickly. BerryDunn suggests the DPD look for opportunities to streamline the hiring process, including

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<sup>94</sup> SDI Table 10.6



using a rapid hiring program (as outlined in the OARM) and pursuing conditional employment during the application and background investigation process. The Public Safety Cadet Program might serve as a possible platform for such conditional employment of candidates, or DPD could even leverage the recommended CSO program, in which applicants could serve while processing to be a police officer candidate.

Like many departments, the DPD uses discretionary disqualifiers for police officer applicants. These disqualifiers are not mandated by state certification laws, but rather, have been identified by the DPD as relevant factors in making a possible hiring decision. BerryDunn recognizes that each department and community does and should establish its own hiring standards and disqualifiers. Such department and community-based disqualifiers, not required by the state, are discretionary by nature. The amount of reasonable discretion can change when significant time has passed since the disqualifying incident or when other mitigating circumstances might be involved. BerryDunn recommends the DPD consider a process where applicants who are disqualified due to a discretionary disqualifier could meet with a panel of incumbent employees from the department (or even the department and community combined) to offer explanation and mitigation. This can be an opportunity for the department to reconsider its position, for the applicant to continue in the process, or simply an opportunity for the candidate to learn how to remediate their background for future consideration.

## IV. Attrition

For many United States police departments, and for the DPD (as noted above), attrition and turnover present ongoing challenges to maintaining adequate staffing. Based purely on statistics, the average separation rate for officers for employees working in an environment with a 30-year retirement window should be about 3.33%—assuming departments only lose people through retirement, which will clearly never be the case. However, as a practical matter, BerryDunn recognizes that the distribution of hiring is often not consistently distributed (sometimes people are hired in blocks—as opposed to a fixed amount on an annual basis—due to budgetary or other factors); not everyone stays in policing for 30 years, and some environments (e.g., defined contribution retirement plans) are more conducive to lateral transfers among departments. Accordingly, in most agencies, annual turnover generally exceeds the anticipated separation rate if everyone stayed at a single department until retirement eligibility.

Determining what constitutes an unusually high separation rate is difficult, as myriad factors affect officers' decisions to leave a particular department or even policing in general. However, data can be compared from other sources to assess the level of attrition in different agencies. The average percentage of separations for the DPD from 2018 through 2022 is 15.91%. That is a significantly elevated rate of separation in comparison to recent data available for comparison from prior BerryDunn studies. That data, which was collected primarily during the same time

period (2018-2022), show an average separation rate of 6.56%.<sup>95</sup> It is important to note that many agencies, particularly mid- and small-sized departments without their own training academies or defined benefit pension plans, are experiencing higher-than-usual attrition rates. Other departments have experienced high attrition rates due to a shrinking candidate pool, and a highly competitive hiring market. The DPD rate, however, is an exceptional outlier from a comparison standpoint (although many departments across the country have experienced significantly higher, and even similar rates more recently). Additionally, the rate of attrition has certainly increased at DPD in recent years. While this is also a trend throughout the industry, the statistics at DPD should serve as a strong inducement to understand the factors affecting attrition and to focus aggressively on recruiting and retention issues.

Given the data and information provided in this section, the DPD should focus significant effort on hiring and retention planning because attrition is very costly to an agency, both operationally and fiscally. A very conservative estimate of the cost of recruiting, hiring, and training of one police officer is \$50,000. DPD has experienced almost 15% average voluntary resignation over the past five years. Given this cost and the local attrition rate, DPD is losing almost a half million dollars per year in recruiting, hiring, and training costs because of the attrition from voluntary resignations. Undeniably, some attrition will always occur. However, if the DPD could understand the reasons for attrition and positively impact the attrition rate, this could represent substantial savings to the City. More importantly, it would help the City and DPD maintain appropriate staffing and effective experience levels for managing the public safety functions of the Police Department. Additionally, it points out that budgetary resources spent on recruiting, hiring, and retention are investments that can pay dividends in savings if employees can be hired more quickly and retained longer.

Of particular interest and relevance regarding attrition is developing an understanding of what is causing the voluntary separations so that the DPD and the City can take steps to reduce these rates. BerryDunn made inquiries about exit interviews for departing police staff and were told that the city discontinued the practice of exit interviews several years ago over concerns that the information gathered was often incomplete (due to perceived hesitancy to share various details), and/or there were questions about the value of conducting these interviews. BerryDunn suggests the City and DPD continue this process, as it can be particularly valuable to understand what conditions are prompting voluntary resignations. Ultimately, any data derived from exit interviews should be shared with HR, executive staff at the City, and the DPD to facilitate any necessary discussions that may provide remedies.

## V. Promotion

Some personnel at the DPD have described the promotional process as inconsistent and have suggested there are, or it feels like there are, different processes used for different ranks and different processes used over time. Feedback indicates that the perception of inconsistent

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<sup>95</sup> SDI Table 10.7

promotional processes makes it difficult for employees to prepare for promotional opportunities. DPD does have a policy for promotions (Policy A-39), but it is an old policy and is likely in need of updating. The department should develop a current and comprehensive policy that describes the promotion process for all sworn and professional staff. There needs to be a consistent, knowable, and predictable promotion process for sworn and professional personnel. The City Human Resource (HR) Department can assist in developing a fair, consistent, and equitable process. This process needs to be documented in policy for all department personnel. DPD personnel want to know the requirements for each rank or position so they can prepare themselves for promotion. It will help the agency to investigate establishing a professional development plan or a succession plan to prepare for the growth into department leadership. There will be some personnel who have no intention of promotion to a higher rank, but they want to enhance their knowledge in specialty assignments or other topics inside law enforcement.

BerryDunn recommends the DPD develop a policy that outlines the processes to be used for the promotional ranks for both sworn and professional staff within the department, and that these guidelines be included within the department policy manual and consistently followed and supported by a professional development plan. As noted in Section I: Personnel Experience and Diversity in this chapter, while DPD as a whole enjoys diversity of personnel representative of the community, that diversity does not exist comparably in promoted ranks. The development of a new promotional process provides an opportunity to assess and address this dichotomy.

## VI. Staffing

Throughout this report, BerryDunn has made several observations regarding staffing, and specific hiring recommendations are summarized in Chapters 4 and 12. As noted in discussions throughout this report, it is important for the DPD to identify and establish its optimal staffing level, using this report as a resource, and develop a new authorized hiring level that accounts for the dynamics of both regular attrition and the time frame necessary to deploy staff in order to help ensure that optimal staffing levels are maintained. Staffing at an optimal level is intended to support the full range of departmental services and contribute to maximizing the outputs of each unit and sub-unit within the department. Once the optimal staffing level has been established, the City and the DPD need to take steps to attain and maintain staffing at that level. Due to attrition rates and the lag time involved in hiring and staffing sworn positions, the authorized hiring level must be adjusted to a level higher than the optimal staffing level. That is, the hiring level should exceed the staffing level by an amount that reflects both regular attrition and the time necessary to deploy field-ready officers.

BerryDunn recommends the City and the DPD assess the available data about annual separations and comparisons to predict and estimate an annual attrition rate. Then, the City and the DPD should then adjust the budgeted and authorized *optimal staffing* number to account for the anticipated attrition rate and developmental lag for new hires to establish a specific number of employees as the *authorized hiring level* for the upcoming year. That authorized hiring level should then become the target for hiring each year. BerryDunn notes here that the main point of this recommendation is that once the optimal staffing level is reached, the DPD and the City

should strive to maintain that level. Hiring in excess of optimal staffing to a higher authorized hiring level that accounts for attrition and development would help ensure this.

## Summary

Staffing to appropriate and effective levels is important for every organization and requires an in-depth understanding of recruiting, selection, attrition, and retention data and issues. It is important for any department to take steps to identify appropriate staffing levels, fill staff positions within the department, retain employees, and ensure the department can meet public safety demands. Attrition, particularly, is an important issue for every organization because it may reveal structural or systemic challenges that are contributing to employee turnover. Like many organizations, the DPD has experienced challenges in recruiting, hiring, and retaining personnel. Examining attrition and retention issues within the DPD should cover a broad range of work conditions and include a collaborative effort with City officials to develop strategies to attract and retain personnel.


The process for hiring officers within the DPD is very similar to that used by most law enforcement agencies and it follows a natural progression. There are no major concerns with the current hiring process from a validity standpoint. Although the DPD hiring process generally appears to be meeting department needs, there is an opportunity to improve the recruiting efforts of the department. To help ensure that recruiting is a more intentional process, and one that has clear goals and objectives, the DPD should develop and establish a recruiting plan. The recruiting plan should include numerous perspectives and operational components, including analyzing mechanisms for developing retention strategies. BerryDunn reviewed the general process involved in department promotions and found that such processes have not been viewed by employees to have been applied consistently over time. There is no indication that this has been intentional; however, having consistent promotional processes helps personnel understand the path to promotion, should they wish to pursue this, and it provides personnel with information critical to their development and eventual readiness for promotion. The DPD has a workforce that is generally representative of the community and, while the DPD is doing well in this area, it should continue to seek broad diversity in its supervisory and command positions as well as in the department in general. Accordingly, BerryDunn recommends the DPD work with the City HR Department to develop a consistent policy and practice for promotions that also seeks to provide equitable opportunities to develop a diverse corps of supervisors and commanders.


The DPD should establish an authorized hiring level, based on optimization of the department activities, consistent with this report. The authorized hiring level should also include and account for annual attrition rates. To maintain optimal staffing levels, hiring should always occur at the rate of allocated personnel plus the anticipated attrition rate. In collaboration with City leaders, the DPD should establish a minimum operation level and new authorized hiring level.

## Recommendations


This section provides four formal recommendations from this chapter, presented chronologically as they appear within the chapter. Each recommendation in the table below includes the chapter section, recommendation number and priority as assessed by BerryDunn, and details concerning the findings and recommendations.


**Table 10.1: Chapter 10 Recommendations**


Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Strategic Recruiting Plan	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 10, Section II: Recruitment</i>		
10-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> Attrition at the DPD has created a shortfall of experience, especially on patrol, and has the potential to contribute to overall staffing shortages. DPD does not have a formal strategic recruiting plan that supports a specific and focused effort at recruiting, utilizing all department employees in the effort.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should examine and revise its recruiting, hiring, and retention practices and develop a strategic recruiting plan to improve its ability to maintain a stable workforce, and to reach and maintain optimal staffing levels that includes specific steps intended to create an atmosphere that recognizes the long-term value of officers and other staff. BerryDunn has compiled a list of considerations that the DPD should evaluate as part of its process to develop a strong retention plan. BerryDunn has included this information in Section 1 of the OARM.	

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Selection and Disqualifier Review	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 10, Section III: Selection</i>		
10-2	<b>Finding:</b> DPD, like all departments, utilizes discretionary disqualifiers when engaging in the new hire selection process. Such disqualifiers can have complex and unique circumstances for each applicant and represent an opportunity to explore department standards and recruit development.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should create a panel of employees to review applicant disqualifications for three primary purposes: 1) Review the relevance of the disqualifying standard in general 2) Review the specifics of the disqualified candidate for mitigating factors 3) Review the applicant and disqualifying condition for remediation opportunities Applicants who are disqualified due to a discretionary disqualifier could meet with	

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
	this panel of incumbent employees from the department to offer explanation and mitigation. This can be an opportunity for the department to reconsider its position relative to the specific candidate or in general for the department. It can also serve as an opportunity for the candidate to learn how to remediate their background for future consideration.	

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Consistent Promotional Process	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 10, Section V: Promotion</i>		
10-3	<b>Finding:</b> Employee feedback indicates the current promotional process may be inconsistent or unpredictable.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should enhance existing policy to increase the detail and memorialization of the promotional process. This process should be consistently followed unless formal changes are made to the process.	
	Having a consistent and knowable promotional process is an important part of professional development as it allows employees to prepare for advancement in an informed manner. BerryDunn recommends the DPD formalize its promotional processes and follow those processes in any future hiring process.	

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Optimal Staffing and Authorized Hiring Levels	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 10, Section VI: Staffing</i>		
10-4	<b>Finding:</b> Authorized hiring levels at the DPD do not account for attrition rates. Hiring for officers at the DPD occurs when there are vacancies, and despite a recent increase in attrition, annual voluntary separations are generally knowable and predictable. Because of the lag time associated with hiring and providing initial training for officers, the DPD is constantly working without its full complement of personnel.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> To maintain optimal staffing levels, hiring should always occur at the rate of allocated personnel <i>plus</i> the anticipated attrition rate. In collaboration with City management, the DPD should establish a minimum operational level <i>and</i> a new authorized hiring level (consistent with the findings of this report) that helps ensure continuity of staffing.	

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Hiring and Retention	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 10, Section VI: Staffing</i>		
10-5	<b>Finding:</b> Attrition at the DPD has created a critical workforce shortage, particularly for sworn personnel, and the current hiring and retention practices for the department are not supporting operational needs.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should examine and revise its recruiting, hiring, and retention practices, to improve its ability to maintain a stable workforce, and to reach and maintain optimal staffing levels.	



## Chapter 11: Professional Standards/Internal Affairs (IA)

*Internal Affairs: includes a review of the internal affairs process, including case routing, review, dispositions, and dissemination of investigation results.*

Internal Affairs (IA) in every department has the unique responsibility of helping to ensure ethical conduct in the organization while providing an environment of transparent accountability that contributes to mutual trust and respect between the department and the community. IA at DPD is regulated by Standard Operating Procedures A-21 (Internal Affairs) and A-22 (Administrative Protocol), which articulate the process for receiving, classifying, investigating, and resolving complaints about employee conduct as well as the procedures for administering due process and discipline.

### I. Complaint Process and Routing

Complaints against department personnel can originate either internally or externally. The department investigates all misconduct complaints regardless of the source and including anonymous complaints. Complaints are accepted in all forms including verbally, in writing, by email, online, or by telephone. Policy specifically states DPD will investigate, *“all complaints filed against the department and employees of the department in a manner that will assure those individuals making the complaint, and the general public, of the professional interest of the department in the resolution of all complaints and of making corrective actions as may be required.”*

BerryDunn notes that citizens may make a complaint about DPD employee conduct via the DPD website, which is a progressive and commendable policy. That complaint portal includes, however, as the second item in the online complaint filing process, the requirement that the complainant click a button acknowledging that, *“any false or misleading statements, accusations, or allegations I make during the investigation of my concern - either electronically, orally, or in writing, may be subject to civil and/or criminal prosecution.”* The purpose of the complaint receipt, processing, and investigation function at any police department should include providing safe avenues for community members to report complaints. While it is reasonable to expect honesty and accountability from community members in their complaint reporting—including filing criminal charges when egregious complainant behavior warrants such charges—the presence of such an admonition early in the complaint receipt process serves as a significant hurdle for possible complainants. Such a deliberate hurdle will surely have a chilling effect on the report of complaints, which is contrary to a robust and progressive accountability system. Negatively impacting the community’s ability or desire to report possible misconduct is not in the best interests of any department as clearly committed to transparency and accountability as the DPD. BerryDunn recommends DPD remove this admonition about possible criminal prosecution from the online complaint portal, or at a minimum, move it to the end of the process.

A lieutenant (the commander of investigations) is currently assigned as the sole IA investigator. All complaints that are not based on misunderstandings or lack of knowledge of procedures and which cannot be resolved via consultation with a supervisor will be documented via a complaint form. Every complaint form is forwarded to the IA investigator who enters the complaint into the Guardian tracking system where the complaint receives a unique tracking identifier. Complaints will then be investigated by the employee's supervisor or by the IA investigator at the direction of the chief of police. The IA investigator will investigate complaints involving:

- Force resulting in death or serious physical injury
- Discharge of a service weapon other than as in approved firearms training
- Fatality or severe injury accidents
- Excessive force
- Criminal conduct
- Racial slurs
- Civil rights violations
- Abusive conduct by a supervisor toward a subordinate
- Negligence resulting in bodily injury or death
- Unethical conduct
- Sexual harassment
- Other incidents as directed by the chief of police

The employee's chain of command, including the employee's watch or unit commander, will investigate complaints of the following nature:

- Traffic violations not involving a pursuit or an accident
- Violations of department or City policy that do not include excessive or deadly force
- Discourtesy or rudeness
- Errors or inaccuracy in the completion of written reports and traffic citations
- Department or City policy or procedure that the complainant believes is unfair or improper

Furthermore, the chief of police may refer complaints to outside entities for investigation. The IA investigator or anyone else assigned to conduct IA investigations will report directly to the chief of police. Any officer assigned to conduct IA investigations must be at least one rank higher than the employee being investigated. The deputy chief is responsible for maintaining IA investigation files.

The current routing procedure for complaints is as follows:

1. Complaint is received
2. Complaint processed through chain of command up to chief who assigns to supervisor or IA investigator
3. If assigned to IA, subject of investigation will receive written notification of investigation and allegations
4. Investigation will be completed within 30 days of notice and the investigative report shall be completed within 5 working days of the receipt of the last pertinent information relating to this investigation
5. Upon completion of investigation, IA investigator will advise if allegations are “Found” or “Not Found”
6. Completed report will be provided directly to the chief of police
7. If allegations are “Found,” the chief of police will provide the investigative file to a designated supervisor for a second review and disciplinary recommendation
8. Once the layer(s) of review are complete and the disciplinary recommendation(s) are made, the chief will review all findings and make the disciplinary decision<sup>96</sup>

DPD policy is very clear on the process and procedures—including rigorous timelines—for complaints assigned to IA. DPD policy is somewhat less clear and specific for similar processes, procedures, and timelines for investigations handled by the chain of command. DPD policy could benefit by increasing the level of detail attributed to the investigation of complaints by the chain of command.

## Past IA Cases

BerryDunn is aware that a recent prior noteworthy IA case in the City has received significant scrutiny. BerryDunn did not evaluate that case, or any other prior IA case investigated by the DPD, as this was beyond the scope of this project. Instead, BerryDunn examined the DPD’s process for receiving, assessing, and routing IA complaints and investigations, and found that the DPD’s policies and practices are sufficient and consistent with common industry standards.

## Use of Force Investigations – Best Practices

As a part of BerryDunn’s ongoing work with the City and the DPD in conducting this operational assessment, BerryDunn was asked to provide an explanation of best practices by departments related to the investigation of uses of force by police officers. Specifically, the City asked:

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<sup>96</sup> SDI Figure 11.1

What are the best practices for a post use of force (UOF) investigation with or without injury?

BerryDunn provided a research-based response to this question, which has been included in Appendix B of this report.

## II. Dispositions

Policy requires administrative investigations to be completed within 30 days and the investigator's report completed within 5 working days of receipt of all information pertinent to the investigation. At the conclusion of each administrative investigation, the designated IA investigator will reach a conclusion of fact determining if each allegation is "Found" or "Not Found."

A disposition of "Found" indicates the officer or employee has violated a departmental or City policy or rule by means of a preponderance of the evidence. A disposition of "Not Found" indicates the allegation was false, that insufficient evidence exists to prove or disprove the allegation, that the officer or employee's actions were lawful and proper, or that the allegation was non-factual.

The department prepares an annual analysis of all complaints. Additionally, BerryDunn asked the DPD to provide a list of IA complaints and dispositions and was provided with data from 2018 – 2022 along with origin as internal or external.<sup>97</sup> Some complaints are forwarded to the employee's immediate supervisor following a preliminary review. It is worth noting that BerryDunn favors complaint processes that allow for resolution at the supervisor level. In many instances, when minor cases are managed at the supervisor level, officers have less stress about the process and are more likely to be comfortable with the outcome. DPD appears to have a reliable process for assigning cases to either IA or the chain of command, which includes consultation by the chief of police and formal documentation and tracking of all complaints. It is important to comment on the number of sustained or, in DPD parlance, "founded" cases. In other words, the number of cases in which the employee was found to have acted inappropriately and/or in violation of policy or law. BerryDunn notes that of the 12 IA cases over the last five years, 8 (or 67%) were founded.<sup>98</sup> While there are no reliable and useful national statistics on the origins of complaints or the rates at which complaints are sustained, the DPD statistics suggest a process that supports a professional response, that is effectively addressing improper behavior by staff, and that shows the existence of a culture that is committed to accountability.

## III. Oversight

One of the areas BerryDunn considers when assessing complaint processes within police agencies is the type and level of oversight that is involved. The routing of complaints for the

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<sup>97</sup> SDI Table 11.1

<sup>98</sup> SDI Table 11.1

DPD involves several steps and multiple layers of internal review by supervisors. This type of process, though perhaps time consuming, is commendable, as it helps ensure that multiple perspectives have been considered and that the final disposition is consistent with policy, departmental philosophies, and legal standards. While the process at DPD is effective, the level of detail provided by policy for regulating chain of command investigations could be improved as noted above.

## IV. Policy and Discipline

In addition to the policies administering investigation of complaints of misconduct, DPD also has Policy A-23 (Early Warning Systems), which provides a framework for identifying employees who may require intervention efforts to maintain adherence to department values and mission. Policies and systems of this nature are designed to act as an alert system to law enforcement leaders, signaling them to intervene in cases where an officer appears to be faltering and possibly heading down an unproductive and potentially destructive path. BerryDunn notes that the DPD policy outlines several appropriate thresholds and alerts for supervisors. The policy also outlines opportunities for employee assistance and responsibilities for supervisors. BerryDunn notes that this policy is comprehensive. The policy demonstrates an attempt by police leaders to positively address potentially destructive behaviors by officers and staff, which, left unattended, could have severe ramifications.

## Summary


The DPD has a robust system of professional accountability that is governed by well-constructed policy and administered by the chief of police through the deputy chief and the IA investigator. DPD shares relevant data and information actively and transparently with the community. Available data regarding IA complaints for the preceding several years reveals a department that appears ethical and committed to holding staff accountable whether that accountability originates externally or internally. DPD could improve its interface with the community by deleting or moving an admonition about criminality to potential complainants.

Staff interviewed by BerryDunn were largely positive about the IA process, which is remarkable and somewhat unusual. In many police agencies, IA is negatively regarded, but BerryDunn did not find this to be the case for the DPD. A significant reason for this may include the rigorous timelines for conducting and concluding investigations. Many agencies suffer from protracted timelines for IA investigations, which leads to stress, feelings of unfairness, and feelings that the process itself is punitive. That does not appear to be the case at DPD, and the department should be commended for the timeliness of its investigations.

## Recommendations

This section provides one formal recommendation regarding IA.

Table 11.1: Chapter 11 Recommendations

Professional Standards/Internal Affairs		
No.	Receipt of Complaints	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 11, Section I: Complaint Process and Routing</b>		
11-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD online complaint portal includes a requirement to acknowledge possible criminal prosecution for false statements, which can have a chilling effect on the filing of complaints and is not in the best interest of the DPD.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> BerryDunn recommends DPD remove the admonition about possible criminal prosecution from the online complaint portal.	

## Chapter 12: Conclusions and Recommendations

### I. Overall Summary

BerryDunn's analysis of the DPD suggests that leaders are consciously engaged in running the department in a progressive and positive manner, and that those within the organization, from command to line staff, take great pride in providing service to the public. Irrespective of the recommendations provided, BerryDunn found the DPD to be a full-service, community-oriented police agency that has worked hard to respond to increasing service demands, despite ongoing staffing challenges.

BerryDunn notes that the DPD is still a relatively new organization, having only been founded in 2009. As BerryDunn expressed early in this report, as a whole, the DPD is engaging in many best practices and Chief Grogan and the administrative team should be commended for their leadership and the professionalism of the organization.

Despite the positive aspects of the work environment observed at the DPD, there are opportunities for improvement, as the recommendations in this report suggest. The five most notable categories of recommendations involve:

- Leadership, Communication, and Staff Development
- Operations and Policy
- Staffing
- Technology
- Training

Each of the 33 recommendations in this report fall into one or more of these primary categories. BerryDunn notes that these categories are typical of such projects, and the number of formal recommendations in this report are one of the fewest BerryDunn has encountered.

During the course of this study, BerryDunn heard from several staff within the agency that the department is in need of additional personnel. Although BerryDunn agrees that the department would benefit from hiring additional sworn personnel, an equally pressing need involves retaining personnel after they are hired and adding non-sworn uniformed personnel to provide immediate capacity for managing workload volumes. Concurrently, and secondarily to the immediate hiring of non-sworn staff, the DPD needs to expedite the hiring of sworn staff to backfill a number of vacant sworn positions.

Another important staffing aspect for the DPD involves establishing a new *operational minimum* level of sworn staffing for the department, which BerryDunn has established at 73, along with a new *authorized* hiring level of 78. Hiring at 78 sworn positions will compensate for consistent attrition and other vacancies. These levels will help ensure that optimal operational minimums



are maintained, which will lead to the more efficient and consistent delivery of police services for the community. At the same time, there is a need to add various non-sworn positions.

As indicated in the beginning of this report, it was necessary for BerryDunn to freeze certain conditions in order to conduct this assessment. However, this does not mean that the DPD has been constrained from making various changes during this process. In fact, BerryDunn worked with the DPD during the course of this project to inform key leaders on areas requiring more immediate attention. DPD staff have responded positively in this regard, operating in a process of continuous improvement during the time of this study. Accordingly, some of the recommendations made by BerryDunn have already been acted upon by the DPD, and some others are in queue. At BerryDunn's request, DPD staff have provided a list of these efforts as they relate to the assessment recommendations, and these are outlined in Appendix B.

It is BerryDunn's sincere hope that this report and the associated recommendations serve to provide positive guidance, and that this report is viewed as a valuable resource, not only for the DPD, but also for the government officials for the City of Dunwoody, who work together on behalf of the public to provide policing excellence for the community.

## II. Staffing Summary

Table 12.1 outlines BerryDunn's recommendations for additional staffing.

**Table 12.1: Staffing Recommendations**

Action	Sworn	Non-Sworn	CSO	Recommendation Number
Administrative Support Position		1		3-1
Police Service Representative (PSR)		1		3-2
Patrol Officers	3			4-1
Uniformed Non-Sworn (CSOs)		4		4-2
Investigators (General Investigations)	3			6-3
Investigators (Street Crimes Unit)	3			6-4

In addition to the recommendations provided in Table 12.1, BerryDunn expects the DPD will experience additional staffing needs as growth and development drive overall workload volumes. Based on the data in Table 4.10, BerryDunn anticipates the following additional staffing needs:

- Two sworn officers
- One investigator – general
- One non-sworn administrative position
- Two non-patrol sworn positions

Based on the overall assessment of the DPD, BerryDunn recommends a minimum operational level of 73 officers; this will require an authorized hiring at a rate of 5 to maintain minimum staffing for the agency. Table 12.2 outlines the authorized hiring level calculations.

**Table 12.2: Authorized Sworn Hiring Level**

Description	Totals
Current Authorized Staffing Level	64
Additional Sworn Staffing	9
Minimum Operational Level	73
*Estimated Attrition Rate	5
Authorized Hiring Level	78

\*Estimated numbers

The numbers in Table 12.2 assume an attrition rate that is consistent with historical and typical industry rates the DPD has experienced. As the DPD approaches the suggested operational level, it will be important to monitor attrition rates and to adjust the authorized hiring level to match operational needs and to help ensure the minimum operational level of 73 officers is consistently maintained.

The proposed staffing changes and personnel deployment adjustments outlined in this report should result in optimized operations for the DPD. Still, it is up to the DPD and the City, including government officials, to make these determinations and to set staffing priorities. Accordingly, it is possible that after further discussion, the City and the DPD might suggest modifications to what BerryDunn has proposed. As noted early in this report, BerryDunn feels strongly that final decisions of this nature should be made at the local level, in consideration of the recommendations provided, and BerryDunn encourages the DPD and the City to discuss these decisions together.

BerryDunn once again thanks the DPD for its partnership and participation in this operational assessment. It is BerryDunn's sincere hope that this report and the associated recommendations serve to provide positive guidance to the City and Police Department in advancing the delivery of public safety services for the community.

## Appendix A: Acronyms

**Appendix Table A.1: Acronyms**

Acronym	Description
AVL	Automated Vehicle Locator
BJS	Bureau of Justice Statistics
CAD	Computer Aided Dispatch
CCPP	Community Co-Production Policing
CFS	Call for Service
CID	Criminal Investigations Division
COP	Community-Oriented Policing
CRT	Community Response Team
CSO	Community Service Officer
CST	Crime Scene Technician
DART	Domestic Abuse Response Team
DCSO	DeKalb County Sheriff's Office
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DUI	Driving Under the Influence
DPD	Dunwoody Police Department
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FMLA	Family Medical Leave Act
FST	Field Supervisor Training
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent
FTO	Field Training Officer
GCIC	Georgia Criminal Information Center
HIDTA	Atlanta High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
IA	Internal Affairs
IGA	Intergovernmental Agreements
ILCPA	Illinois Chiefs of Police Association
ILP	Intelligence Led Policing
IPD	Impartial Policing Data

Acronym	Description
IT	Information Technology
KPA	Key Performance Area
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Transgender, Queer, and or Questioning
MCT	Mobile Computer Terminal
NCIC	National Criminal Information Center
NIBRS	National Incident-Based Reporting System
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
OARM	Operational Assessment Reference Material report
PERF	Police Executive Research Forum's
PIO	Public Information Officer
POP	Problem-Oriented Policing
POST	Peace Officer Standards and Training
PSA	Public Service Announcement
PSR	Police Services Representative
PSAP	Public Safety Answering Point
PTO	Police Training Officer
RMS	Records Management System
SDI	Supplemental Data and Information Report
TFO	Task Force Officer
TRU	Telephone Reporting Unit
UCR	Uniform Crime Reports
UPD	Uniform Patrol Division

## Appendix B: Use of Force Investigations

As a part of BerryDunn's ongoing work with the City in conducting an operational assessment of the DPD, BerryDunn was asked to provide an explanation of best practices by departments related to the investigation of uses of force by police officers. Specifically, the City has asked:

What are the best practices for a post use of force (UOF) investigation with or without injury?

The context of the question at hand involves several sub-questions:

1. At what point should the involved police agency conduct or order a formal administrative investigation of a UOF, as opposed to a general review of the actions of its officer(s)?
2. If an administrative investigation of a UOF is conducted, should this be completed by personnel from the agency involved, by an external agency, or some combination?
3. At what point should the involved police department engage or order a criminal investigation of a UOF involving one of its officers, as opposed to only an administrative investigation?
4. If a criminal investigation of a UOF is conducted, should this be completed by personnel from the involved police department, by an external agency, or some combination; and when should this occur?

These questions seem straightforward; however, the challenge is there is no nationally recognized standard. Although there is broad agreement within the industry on many elements of these questions, agency size and expertise, legal mandates, and community expectations, and other considerations, are dependent factors that affect agency response. In the current policing climate, there is a growing demand from communities regarding independent, objective, and transparent investigations, and this pressure is highly relevant to the conversation.

BerryDunn's responses these questions are provided below.

### **Question 1:** When should a formal administrative review of a UOF be initiated?

Police departments generally have policies that outline when a formal investigation is required for a UOF incident. Within the industry there are generally common factors in policy that trigger this:

1. There is an external complaint alleging excessive force
2. The type or seriousness of the UOF is identified within policy to require that an investigation occur (e.g., officer-involved shooting (OIS) or other use of deadly force, serious injury to the officer, subject, or another)
3. When an initial review of an apparently minor UOF, indicates possible wrongdoing by the officer

In the State of Georgia, the decision of whether to conduct a formal investigation generally relies on the following factors (which align with common industry practices):<sup>99 100</sup>

- If the force employed by police officers on the individual resulted in death or serious bodily injury
- Whether there are allegations of officer misconduct while employing the use of force
- The severity of the incident
- Whether the department has the competencies to conduct an objective and thorough investigation, and
- Whether there are concerns over transparency and objectivity by the agency

Police agencies throughout the US are generally afforded broad discretion on this issue and the development of policies and procedures.

**Question 2:** If an administrative investigation is initiated, who should conduct it?

Generally, like the answer to the first question, this depends upon various factors including the severity of the incident, whether there is an external complaint, whether the department has the personnel and skillset to conduct an objective and thorough investigation, and to some extent, whether there are concerns over transparency and objectivity by the agency.

When an incident involves an OIS, various factors that can potentially influence community sentiments and expectations include but are not limited to:

- Pre-existence of negative police-community relations
- The nature of facts of the incident
- The circumstances of the incident (race, age, mental conditions of the citizen involved in the OIS)
- Police actions at the scene<sup>101</sup>

A 2018 study by the Major Chiefs Association, sponsored by the Department of Justice (DOJ) study, citing Savage, 2013, noted that “OIS outcomes are often judged on the extent to which investigations are conducted independently from those officers and agencies that are directly involved.”<sup>102</sup> Within the same document, the authors noted, “organizational transparency is probably easier to establish, improve, and maintain when investigations are conducted by

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<sup>99</sup> Georgia Department of Public Safety Policy Manual Policy Number 10.01 (Revised Date:11/14/2019)

<sup>100</sup> Georgia Bureau of Investigation Law Enforcement Use of Force Investigations Manual (2018)

<sup>101</sup> International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2016). Officer-involved shootings: A guide for law enforcement leaders.

<sup>102</sup> Savage, Stephen P. 2013. “Thinking Independence. Calling the Police to Account through the Independent Investigation of Police Complaints.” *British Journal of Criminology* 53(1): 94–112. <https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article-abstract/53/1/94/611422>.

external agencies, and increased transparency seems to help agencies during the difficult times that often follow an OIS.”<sup>103</sup>

Although these citations do not establish a specific standard, they reflect growing sentiments of both communities and key law enforcement leaders across the country.

**Question 3:** When should a UOF trigger a criminal investigation?

This is another area that lacks an agreed-upon standard, and one that is managed in different ways across the country. Factors such as the severity and type of the incident remain critical decision points regarding when a criminal investigation should occur.

Citing Savage, the Major Chiefs Association reports in reference to OIS criminal investigations that “a more specific challenge to police organizations is emerging—when criminal liability of an officer is to be decided, it is the “independence element” (and thus, the justness and fairness) of investigations that is increasingly being scrutinized.”<sup>104</sup>

Various papers address the issue of who should conduct a criminal investigation and how it should be conducted. In a DOJ-sponsored project from 2016, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) provided significant details on department actions for the investigation of OIS incidents. This document outlines various strategies and processes for on-scene personnel, including criminal investigators, but it does not specify when a criminal investigation should occur.

OIS incidents that result in death or serious injury are likely to prompt a criminal investigation as a matter of course. However, IACP model policy regarding OIS and other serious incidents describes a serious incident as “any use of deadly force, regardless of whether the employee’s actions resulted in injury or death.”<sup>105</sup> This definition, provided within the context of an OIS model policy, seems to elevate the serious nature of all deadly force uses and suggests that a criminal investigation would be warranted in all such instances.

**Question 4:** If a criminal investigation is initiated, who should conduct it?

Again, this question remains unresolved, and the industry lacks a clear standard. The President’s Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing concluded that agency policies should include and mandate “external and independent criminal investigations” and the use of “external and independent prosecutors in cases of police use of force resulting in death, officer-involved shootings resulting in injury or death, or in-custody deaths.”<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Kuhns, J. B., Cambareri, J. F., Messer, S., & Stephens, D. (2018). Independent investigations of officer-involved shootings: Current practices and recommendations from law enforcement leaders in the United States and Canada.

<sup>104</sup> *ibid*

<sup>105</sup> *ibid*

<sup>106</sup> President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. 2015. Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.



On the heels of the Task Force report, various states (e.g., New Jersey, Ohio, Florida, Colorado, Oregon) have enacted laws related to OIS investigations, both with respect to administrative reviews and criminal investigations. Some of these laws require or suggest an external investigation or a joint investigation.

Many national organizations have produced white papers regarding best practices for OIS investigation, and most recommend at least conducting bifurcated investigations with outside agencies to promote perceptions of unbiased and independent findings afterward.<sup>107</sup> For various reasons (cited in this document), determining a single, specific, and optimal OIS investigative process is difficult to achieve. However, many industry leaders agree that transferring responsibility to an external agency not directly affiliated by the agency under review promotes independence without hindering the accuracy of OIS investigations.<sup>108</sup>

## Summary

It's critically important for all law enforcement agencies to be prepared to address community concerns after an officer-involved shooting, especially in today's policing climate, where citizens demand increased transparency and accountability. As noted within this document, the industry lacks a specific standard concerning when an administrative or criminal investigation should occur following a UOF, serious UOF, or use of deadly force. Similarly, there is no specific standard on who should conduct those investigations. Regardless of a set standard, various law enforcement leaders, national police organizations, and studies suggest the need for thorough and independent investigation, both administrative and criminal, for all serious UOF incidents.

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<sup>107</sup> International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2016). Officer-involved shootings: A guide for law enforcement leaders.

<sup>108</sup> Kuhns, J. B., Cambareri, J. F., Messer, S., & Stephens, D. (2018). Independent investigations of officer-involved shootings: Current practices and recommendations from law enforcement leaders in the United States and Canada.

## Appendix C: Essential CFS Evaluation

Appendix Table C.1: Essential CFS Survey Results

	Police Mandate	Risk/Potential Danger	Immediate Response	Type: Crime, Traffic, Service	Other Resources Available	Alternative Response (TRU/Online)	Volume in FTEs	Police Department Value	Community Service Officer (response averages)			TRU/Online (response averages)		
CFS Type									Stakeholder	Community	Avg.	Stakeholder	Community	Avg.
ALARM FIRE COMMERCIAL BUILDING	Y	P	Y	S	Y	N	0.00	3	3.18	3.06	3.12			
DELIVER EMERGENCY MESSAGE	Y	L	Y	S	N	N	0.00	4	4.18	3.79	3.99			
FIRE REPORTED OUT	Y	L	N	S	Y	N	0.00	2	4.36	3.86	4.11			
TRANSFORMER PROBLEM	N	L	N	S	Y	Y	0.00	2	4.72	4.30	4.51			
TREE DOWN OBSTRUCTING ROADWAY	Y	P	Y	T	Y	N	0.04	4	4.45	4.23	4.34			
TREE DOWN W/ WIRES ARC	Y	H	Y	S	Y	N	0.00	5	2.90	3.02	2.96			
TREE DOWN W/ WIRES NO ARC	Y	P	Y	S	Y	N	0.00	4	4.09	3.73	3.91			

	Police Mandate	Risk/Potential Danger	Immediate Response	Type: Crime, Traffic, Service	Other Resources Available	Alternative Response (TRU/Online)	Volume in FTEs	Police Department Value	Community Service Officer (response averages)			TRU/Online (response averages)		
CFS Type									Stakeholder	Community	Avg.	Stakeholder	Community	Avg.
WATER MAIN BREAK	Y	L	Y	S	Y	N	0.02	3	4.63	4.12	4.38			
WELFARE CHECK	Y	P	Y	S	N	N	1.65	4	3.27	3.38	3.33			
WIRES DOWN OR ARCING	Y	H	Y	S	Y	N	0.06	5	3.00	3.00	3.00			
ACCIDENT NEGATIVE INJURIES	Y	P	Y	T	N	N	2.87	4	2.90	2.87	2.89	2.70	2.73	2.72
CIVIL DISPUTE 1 PARTY	Y	L	N	S	Y	Y	0.34	2	3.36	3.21	3.29	3.30	3.18	3.24
ENTERING AUTO	Y	P	Y	C	N	N	0.44	4	2.90	2.65	2.78	3.22	2.80	3.01
HIT AND RUN ACCIDENT	Y	L	N	C	N	N	0.94	3	2.45	2.17	2.31	2.80	2.55	2.68
INFORMATION FOR OFFICER	Y	L	N	S	N	Y	1.41	2	3.54	3.68	3.61	3.63	3.63	3.63
LARCENY	Y	P	Y	C	N	Y	0.66	4	2.72	2.35	2.54	2.90	2.60	2.75
FRAUD	Y	L	N	C	Y	Y	0.52	3				3.00	2.99	3.00
HARASSMENT	Y	P	N	C	N	Y	0.13	3				2.72	2.79	2.76
THREATS	Y	P	N	C	Y	Y	0.23	3				2.00	2.34	2.17

	Police Mandate	Risk/Potential Danger	Immediate Response	Type: Crime, Traffic, Service	Other Resources Available	Alternative Response (TRU/Online)	Volume in FTEs	Police Department Value	Community Service Officer (response averages)			TRU/Online (response averages)		
CFS Type									Stakeholder	Community	Avg.	Stakeholder	Community	Avg.
ABANDONED VEHICLE	Y	L	N	T	Y	Y	0.07	2	4.27	4.14	4.21			
ACCIDENT PRIVATE PROP NEG INJ	Y	L	N	T	T	Y	0.48	2	4.00	3.59	3.80			
ANIMAL ATTACK	Y	P	Y	S	Y	N	0.02	4	3.36	2.54	2.95			
ANIMAL CALL	Y	L	N	S	Y	Y	0.10	2	4.20	3.73	3.97			
ASSIST CITIZEN FLAGDOWN	Y	P	Y	S	N	N	0.00	3	3.40	3.29	3.35			
BUSINESS CHECK	Y	L	N	S	Y	Y	0.00	1	4.27	3.88	4.08			
FOUND PROPERTY	Y	L	N	S	T	Y	0.12	1	4.27	4.47	4.37			
ILLEGAL PARKING	Y	L	N	T	N	N	0.09	2	4.09	4.05	4.07			
LITTERING ILLEGAL DUMPING	Y	L	N	O	Y	Y	0.01	2	4.36	4.38	4.37			
LOCKOUT W CHILD OR PET	Y	L	Y	S	Y	N	0.01	5	3.72	3.46	3.59			
LOST PROPERTY	Y	L	N	S	T	Y	0.19	1	4.27	4.19	4.23			
ORDINANCE VIOLATION	Y	L	N	O	Y	Y	0.00	2	3.72	3.96	3.84			

	Police Mandate	Risk/Potential Danger	Immediate Response	Type: Crime, Traffic, Service	Other Resources Available	Alternative Response (TRU/Online)	Volume in FTE's	Police Department Value	Community Service Officer (response averages)			TRU/Online (response averages)		
CFS Type									Stakeholder	Community	Avg.	Stakeholder	Community	Avg.
PRISONER TRANSPORT	Y	P	Y	S	Y	N	0.04	4	3.54	2.16	2.85			
REPO/IMPOUND ENTRY ONLY	N	L	N	S	Y	Y	0.00	1	4.00	3.97	3.99			
RESIDENTIAL CHECK	Y	L	N	S	Y	Y	0.01	1	4.09	3.44	3.77			
SHOPLIFTING ALREADY OCCURRED	Y	P	Y	C	N	Y	1.26	3	3.45	3.09	3.27			
TRAFFIC HAZARD	Y	P	Y	T	Y	N	0.54	4	3.81	3.29	3.55			
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY	Y	L	N	C	N	Y	0.42	3	3.27	2.84	3.06			

CFS Type	Alt. Avg.	Possible Resources
ALARM FIRE COMMERCIAL BUILDING	3.42	Fire Department
DELIVER EMERGENCY MESSAGE	3.74	Text, Emergency Broadcast, Phone Call, CodeRed Alert System, Therapist, Clergy, Community Outreach
FIRE REPORTED OUT	4.05	Fire Department

CFS Type	Alt. Avg.	Possible Resources
TRANSFORMER PROBLEM	4.42	GA Power, Fire Department
TREE DOWN OBSTRUCTING ROADWAY	4.39	Public Works, Tree Company, County, Fire Department, Citizens on Patrol Unit
TREE DOWN W/ WIRES ARC	3.41	GA Power, Fire Department, Tree Company
TREE DOWN W/ WIRES NO ARC	4.11	County
WATER MAIN BREAK	4.47	City or County Public Works/Highway Department, Water Department
WELFARE CHECK	3.42	Trained Mental Health Worker, Social Workers, Fire Department
WIRES DOWN OR ARCING	3.48	Electric Company, GA Power
ACCIDENT NEGATIVE INJURIES		Citizens on Patrol Unit
CIVIL DISPUTE 1 PARTY		
ENTERING AUTO		
HIT AND RUN ACCIDENT		
INFORMATION FOR OFFICER		
LARCENY		
FRAUD		
HARASSMENT		
THREATS		
ABANDONED VEHICLE		
ACCIDENT PRIVATE PROP NEG INJ		
ANIMAL ATTACK		

CFS Type	Alt. Avg.	Possible Resources
ANIMAL CALL		Animal Control
ASSIST CITIZEN FLAGDOWN		
BUSINESS CHECK		Citizens on Patrol Unit
FOUND PROPERTY		Citizens on Patrol Unit
ILLEGAL PARKING		Citizens on Patrol Unit
LITTERING ILLEGAL DUMPING		
LOCKOUT W CHILD OR PET		Fire Department, Citizens on Patrol Unit
LOST PROPERTY		
ORDINANCE VIOLATION		Code Enforcement
PRISONER TRANSPORT		
REPO/IMPOUND ENTRY ONLY		
RESIDENTIAL CHECK		Citizens on Patrol Unit
SHOPLIFTING ALREADY OCCURRED		
TRAFFIC HAZARD		GDOT Hero
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY		





# Operational Assessment Reference Materials

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# Section 1: Recruiting and Retention

## Recruiting Strategies

The following information outlines several recommended practices that law enforcement agencies can engage to improve the effectiveness of their recruiting and hiring practices. For this information to have the best value, departments should evaluate their current practices against those listed here, in consideration of the need for possible adjustments.

### **Institute a continuous hiring program, or alternatively, a more frequent process that reduces lag-time for applicants**

In today's competitive environment, having open hiring processes only 1 or 2 times per year may not be sufficient. Qualified applicants who are eager to enter the profession may not be willing to wait for the next opening, and they may take their talents elsewhere. To guard against this, departments need to reduce the lag-time between hiring processes. This could occur either through a continuous process, or through adding additional hiring cycles, if they are currently limited to a small number annually. Most modern hiring systems have the capability to accept applications on a continuous or more frequent basis, and this is preferred over hiring processes that occur sporadically.

While moving to an ongoing hiring process, or increasing the frequency of the hiring process may be difficult from a logistics standpoint, the establishment of a more rapid or frequent process is essential to expanding the pool of quality applicants available to the department. In addition, once these candidates are identified, the department needs to act swiftly to secure their employment, in advance of other opportunities they may have available.

Along with receiving continuous applications, law enforcement agencies should institute a written exam schedule that makes it more convenient for applicants, for example, on weekends or in the evening. This scheduling will provide candidates more flexibility and improve the numbers of candidates appearing for this part of the process.

### **Implement a mentor program for new officer candidates**

Law enforcement candidates want to feel they are important and that the department values their application. The overall process can be daunting for many candidates, and they often have a sense of uncertainty throughout. Tending to their needs and answering their questions can provide applicants with a sense of care and belonging early in the process, which will reduce the likelihood that they will continue seeking employment elsewhere.

To meet these needs for candidates, departments should develop a cadre of carefully selected, highly motivated, and trained mentors, to guide new recruits through the application process, and ultimately, their transition into law enforcement for the department. These mentors need to be selected based on their ability to train, guide, and empathize with new recruits. They should be assigned to priority candidates immediately after they are identified within the hiring process, to help ensure that the candidate stays in the process and ultimately is hired.

### **Establish an early hire program**

One method to overcome the negative impact that time has on the hiring process is to establish an early hire program. Once a candidate is fully qualified (successfully clears all the steps), the department should consider hiring him or her immediately, particularly if the start of the academy is not imminent. Today's candidates have oftentimes applied to multiple agencies, and although they may have a preference of which agency they want, they tend to go with the first job offer. By hiring candidates early, departments will keep quality candidates and not lose them to other agencies who may have faster processes. The early hire candidate can be brought on at a full or reduced salary rate and assigned to assistance-type work in non-sworn areas. While similar to a cadet program, these positions involve vacant officer slots, rather than new positions, so they are effectively budget neutral or budget positive (depending upon the rate paid during the early hire period). Hiring these candidates early rather than waiting until sufficient numbers of applicants are hired to fill an academy class, will ensure a higher percentage of hires of quality applicants.

### **Provide a career fit tool, or day in the life training for applicants, to clarify work conditions and expectations**

In some cases, officer candidates have an unclear picture of what law enforcement work involves, and this can lead to lackluster performance, or candidates who choose to resign as they gain more understanding of what the job involves. To reduce this possibility, the department should include some type of unscored career fit tool at a very early stage of the process, describing real working conditions and tasks often performed. This could include things such as: a drunk person vomits in patrol car, trying to talk with an uncooperative witness, picking up the same person repeatedly for nuisance crimes. The candidates can then be asked about their willingness to do this kind of work. This would not be a scored tool, but it might help some applicants self-select out, as opposed to doing so after they are hired.

One way to orient candidates to the nature of the job is to create a video, similar to the IACPs Virtual Ride Along, which can be found on the Discover Policing website.<sup>1</sup> Again, the intent here is to help candidates understand the nature of the job as it truly exists within the department, as opposed to what they think it involves, based on information they might obtain from various sources.

### **Develop a brand that reflects the department commitment to the community, and its desire to protect and serve**

Having a strong brand can help create organizational pride, industry recognition, and enthusiasm for potential applicants. The brand should be concise, emotive, and simple, such as the longstanding slogan of the Marines; *The Few, The Proud*, or Verizon's, *Can you hear me now?* The brand should address community expectations and perceptions as well the reasons

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<sup>1</sup> [http://discoverpolicing.org/whats\\_like/?fa=virtual-ride-along](http://discoverpolicing.org/whats_like/?fa=virtual-ride-along)

officers have identified for choosing a career with department. Additionally, it should set the department apart from other law enforcement agencies.

Multiple tools are available to use in developing a brand, such as a mission statement, organizational values, and community expectations and perceptions. To assist with developing these tools, the department may wish to conduct a community survey to determine what the community expects from its law enforcement department and what qualities it desires in its officers. This survey can also be used to measure community perceptions. In addition, surveying first line supervisors can be an effective way to identify what qualities the best officers of the department possess, and this can help inform the branding process.

### **Conduct an internal assessment of employee benefits and job conditions, to ensure a competitive hiring environment**

The department should conduct an internal assessment of the benefits of working for the agency. Law enforcement leaders should ask themselves, and a core focus group of employees, what the department possesses that will attract the best possible officers. Effectively, the question to be answered is, “Why would I want to work for this department?” Conducting this inventory of benefits is a necessary first step in assessing what strategies will best succeed in attracting candidates. This inventory can also provide valuable tools to assist recruiters as well as potentially positively influencing turnover.

### **Establish a department philosophy that everyone is a recruiter**

Having a department-wide philosophy that emphasizes a recruitment potential in all public interactions can help overcome negative or unrealistic impressions of what law enforcement work entails and contribute to a larger strategic recruitment plan. Recruiting must become a part of everyday interactions between officers and the public. Establishing this mindset within the department to support recruitment can enhance community outreach efforts by making recruitment an overall philosophy for all, rather than a task to be performed solely by a specialized unit.

### **Create an inviting atmosphere within the department for potential applicants**

Outreach to potential applicants must be meaningful, genuine, and reflect a departmental desire to build true relationships with them. Making these contacts real requires going beyond traditional public appearances, and might require imaginative or creative techniques, such as citizen academies, open houses, facility tours, and ride-alongs. To enhance the personal touch, the department should routinely schedule open houses at their various facilities. Additionally, every officer should be equipped with a business card that on the back, has the department’s brand, as well as specific information on who to call to schedule a ride-along. This personal touch and referral will go a long way in opening the department to new applicants, and it will solidify the commitment of the department to a proactive and ongoing recruitment strategy.

It is also important to note that when prospective candidates inquire about a ride along, the department should ensure that the officer assigned to the task is genuinely interested in serving the best interests of the agency through this process. This means that the department should

seek volunteers for these assignments, and equip those officers with the information they need to help aspiring officers navigate their way through the hiring process.

### **Utilize youth outreach programs to enhance the department image and recruiting efforts**

The department should consider using youth outreach programs to enhance its recruiting and image among the youth of the community. These programs can range from a paid cadet/internship programs, to other less costly programs, such as an explorer program, and/or partnership/mentor programs with local colleges and high schools. Because many high school students are already thinking about and starting preparation for future careers, high school age students should be a primary focus for long term results. A series of youth leadership academies offered during the summer months, emphasizing self-discipline and core values, such as service to the community, can build a strong cadre of potential recruits and advocates in the community.

### **Use community liaisons for increased contact with underrepresented communities**

The department should use their community liaisons to spread the word about recruiting efforts. Recruiting notices should be placed in community-specific newspapers, to include specific community and/or neighborhood newsletters. Department recruiting information and links should be on the web pages of professional, academic, and fraternal organizations throughout the city. The chief law enforcement executive and other members of the command staff should make direct appeals to community organizations for help in recruiting, especially from diverse communities.

A complaint that is often heard nationwide is that recruiting information is not getting to members of minority communities. By having a direct solicitation from members of the department command staff, the likelihood for better community communications increases significantly. The department should partner with community leaders and organizations to garner their support in referring applicants to the department. This partnership should include seeking a presence on the website of these organizations, as well as direct referrals to the department's recruiting website. The department should also consider holding separate recruiting meetings for members of specialty groups, including providing assistance and support in understanding the application and testing processes.

### **Develop a strategy to maximize opportunities with second-career applicants**

For many agencies, second-career applicants are a largely untapped market, and today's volatile economic situation has many people seeking career changes later in life. With the economic downturn of the late 2000s, many departments noted an increase in applicants seeking a second career in policing, coming from fields as diverse as automobile manufacturing, construction, marketing, and business administration. Second-career applicants present opportunities for departments to expand their workforce to include individuals with prior experience in diverse careers.

Career military personnel are also a logical source of second-career applicants. The department should establish partnerships with the local military installations to provide presentations to

service members who are within two years of retirement. Many service members retire at a young enough age that law enforcement is a viable choice as a second career. To maximize the potential for gaining the interest of these applicants, the department should make these connections and establish regular dialogue with military command personnel.

### **Expand personnel assigned to career days/job fairs, develop a recruiting speech**

In many law enforcement agencies, shortfalls in staff resources often affect critical areas, such as backgrounds, attendance at recruiting events, recruit testing, and other functions. While career fairs do not typically produce numerous applicants, they are an effective marketing tool for the department by providing the opportunity to boost departmental visibility and recruit targeting. To expand the recruiting pool of personnel, the department should assign selected patrol officers or selected staff from other units to attend these events. With a department-wide *everyone is a recruiter* philosophy; more events can be targeted. The department also needs to develop a specific recruitment information packet, or *recruiting speech*, that all personnel are familiar with and can use.

### **Establish an employee referral incentive program**

Employee referrals provide applicants with realistic and trustworthy answers to their questions, as well as a realistic portrayal of how a law enforcement career affects family life. Employee referral strategies will both increase applicant pools and provide balance to other recruitment strategies, such as online processes, that lack human interaction. To boost referrals, the department should establish an organization-wide recruitment/referral incentive program offering an incentive (monetary compensation or some other type of incentive, such as annual leave) for critical positions such as law enforcement officer. Human resources, along with appropriate government leadership, should identify critical positions where vacancies have a severe negative impact on services. Employees who recruit a qualified applicant would receive an incentive when the applicant is hired.

### **Develop a new more customer-friendly web page, and an enhanced social media presence for recruiting**

The department should examine and update their recruiting webpage, to emphasize ease of use and to provide more information, focusing on why a person should become an officer for the agency. Certainly, benefits, job security, and job challenges are important factors, but to have a successful strategy, the department must develop a brand for itself. Social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, should incorporate those changes as well as the new brand.

The new website should also incorporate various materials and information concerning the hiring and testing processes. If appropriate, this should include any areas or materials applicants should study to prepare themselves for the written exam. Ideally, those seeking information should be connected with a hiring mentor within the department, to maximize the information provided to the candidate, and to develop an early relationship between the applicant and the department.



### **Develop a recruitment video**

With the prevalence and popularity of online videos, such as on YouTube and other sites, effective recruiting videos are a requirement. Recruiting videos can be widely distributed and used by all members of the department to assist in recruiting and community engagement. Care should be taken to incorporate realistic information about job requirements, without over- or under-emphasizing the negative aspects of law enforcement work. There is little to be gained by attracting applicants who might have the necessary abilities and skills to become an officer but lack the interest or will to do all of the duties the job requires. Accordingly, the recruitment video should highlight the positive aspects of law enforcement work, without ignoring those elements that might be detractors, for some people.

### **Establish an effective and measurable yearly recruiting plan**

Just as with any law enforcement operation, successful planning is key to success. The department should develop and implement an effective and measurable yearly recruiting plan. This plan should identify specific goals/benchmarks, task assignments, and tools to use to achieve the goals. The plan should include accountability measures, and a senior commander should be responsible for implementation and plan success.

### **Prioritize top applicants, based on agency criteria.**

In many departments, candidates are moved through the hiring process indiscriminately, without regard to their potential for successfully making it through the hiring process. In this sense, those who are highly-qualified candidates are treated the same as those who are clearly less qualified. Because of the competitive hiring market, this can lead to losing good candidates to other departments that act more swiftly, or who provide a greater level of focused attention to those candidates who are most likely to be hired.

The department should consider identifying a point within the hiring process at which they are able to distinguish those candidates the department would be most interested in hiring. Once this occurs, the department should assign them a mentor. In addition, the department should prioritize the background and other hiring processes for these applicants, to help ensure they remain highly engaged in the hiring process with the agency. This is not to say that the department should ignore or discard the other candidates. The idea here is to maximize the resources of the department with those who are the most likely to succeed. Focused attention should be afforded to as many applicants as the department can manage.

### **Re-evaluate the disqualification factors (both singular and combination) to more holistically evaluate the attributes they and their community**

It is important to note that while standards comprise an important part of a hiring process, certain steps, such as background investigations that impose unrealistic standards, can have a significantly negative effect on hiring the right people. Criteria that consider all criminal activity the same, regardless of type of offense or how recent the occurrence, or processes that screen out those who make voluntary admissions of drug use or other crimes (without any conviction), may impede an agency from hiring the diverse officers it needs for 21<sup>st</sup> century policing. The

department should be cognizant of the potential for extenuating factors and re-evaluate their disqualification factors (both singular and combination) to more holistically evaluate the attributes they and their community want in their officers. This assessment should include evaluating the applicant's overall life experience and skills in a broader context.

As part of this process, the department should evaluate all discretionary disqualification factors in use, to determine whether they represent the standards the department and community prefer. This exercise is not about reducing standards, but instead, it is about clarifying which standards the department and community want to prioritize and maintain.

### **Establish a review committee, to review questionable background information on candidates, which are non-disqualifying in nature**

Some applicants have items in their history, which may not immediately disqualify them as candidates, but which from a subjective view, may reflect poorly on the candidate overall. In the past, many departments have dismissed these applicants without further review or consideration. This can lead to the elimination of candidates who may have been a positive addition to the agency. The department should establish a secondary review committee to evaluate the details of any non-mandatory disqualification factors that may arise from the background investigation. This process could even involve an additional interview with the candidate. These processes often provide additional insight for the department about the candidate, and they can also provide an opportunity to provide feedback to the applicant.

Caution does need to be used to ensure that privacy laws are followed, and with regard to the committee makeup, especially if non-department members are used. To ensure compliance with these areas, the department should involve its labor attorney and human resources personnel at the outset of the development of this process, to establish a very clear and definitive policy on which cases will get a secondary review.

It is also important to note that it is likely impractical and counterproductive to offer to use this secondary review in every case. As a result, the department may wish to consider establishing specific standards for using secondary review. For example, secondary review might be restricted to cases that involve singular disqualification factors, as opposed to those that involve combination factors.

## **Retention Strategies**

The following information outlines several recommended practices that law enforcement agencies can engage to improve the effectiveness of their retention practices. For this information to have the best value, departments should evaluate their current practices against those listed here, in consideration of the need for possible adjustments.

### **Consider providing subsidies for city utilities for staff who live within the city**

Most cities provide utility services to residents, including electric, water, sewer, garbage, or other non-traditional services such as Internet and cable. To incentivize staff to live within the

community, and to create a retention incentive, the city could offer a monthly reduction on city utility expenses (e.g., \$100 per month).

### **Provide down payment assistance for purchasing a home**

For many new officers, purchasing a home can be a financial burden. One way to encourage new officers to live and stay within the community is to provide down payment assistance toward purchasing a new home. This can come in the form of a forgivable loan (e.g., \$10,000). As an example, the money is loaned to the officer, interest and payment free, and for each year of service, 10% of the loan is forgiven. At the end of the ten-year period, the debt is eliminated. If the officer separates employment during that period, the remaining balance is owed to the city.

### **Consider tax incentives for staff who live within the city**

To incentivize staff to live within the community, and to create a retention incentive, the city could offer a level of tax exemption or rebate, for staff who live in the community. This incentive could be established permanently, for a limited term, or on a declining scale over a specified period.

### **Create or expand educational incentives and tuition reimbursement plans**

Many cities have tuition reimbursement programs, however, most do not cover the full cost of education programs. The city could partner with area colleges and negotiate specialized rates, and establish full tuition reimbursement for certain degree tracks. In addition, the city could revise their compensation plans to include additional monthly salaries to staff, based on educational levels (e.g., Associate, Bachelor, or Master's degree).

### **Establish longevity pay at prescribed intervals**

For most cities, there is a prescribed pay scale for each position that has a specific cap. Once that cap is reached, staff can only expect cost of living adjustments. In addition, once staff reach the salary cap, pay among peers is equal, regardless of whether one person has six years of experience and another has twenty. Adding longevity pay at specific intervals, (e.g., three to five-year intervals following achieving the salary cap) recognizes the tenure of staff and helps them feel valued as their years of experience grow.

### **Adopt longevity-based prioritization for certain operational decisions**

Experienced officers want to feel that their tenure is recognized by the city and the department, and that it is valued in various decisions affecting them. The city should consider revising its practices to capture longevity as a factor in different operational decisions. Those areas could include the following:

- Overtime details
- Leave requests
- Shift selection, or beat assignments

- Vehicle assignments
- Voluntary training requests
- Promotions
- Specialty assignments

This list is not all-inclusive, but provides a framework for understanding which areas might be added to longevity-based decision making.

### **Assign a permanent/long-term mentor to all new officers**

New officers have a desire to fit in, and they tend to have lots of questions. Many times, officers are reluctant to ask questions of their supervisors, or even their field training officer, because they do not want to be viewed negatively. Mentors provide a safe haven for new officers to ask questions, and to develop a sense of comfort with their new surroundings. The right mentor can help a new officer understand the organizational culture, and make them feel welcome and valued. These sentiments can contribute to an officer's job satisfaction, and their retention.

## Section 2: Technology Considerations

### Field Technology Considerations

Function	Description
Driver's License Swipe or Bar Code Readers	These devices provide for easy data capture in the field, and they help ensure the integrity of the data that migrates into RMS.
Printers	Patrol vehicles should be equipped with printers, which are capable of producing e-citations, and printing of other custom forms (see below).
e-Citation	<p>An e-Citation system should be instilled in the squad cars. Here are some key elements of that system:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Auto-importing of data from driver's license (D/L) readers, and from state department of motor vehicle (DMV) and (D/L) files</li> <li>• Ability to select from citation, written warning, verbal warning, or fix-it ticket, as appropriate, and the ability to print associated fine or other warning information, unique and specific to the type of action the officer chooses (e.g. citation or warning).</li> <li>• Embedded location addresses from CAD or other data repository</li> <li>• Embedded statutes and ordinance numbers</li> <li>• Ability to export the citation and all associated data directly into RMS when printed, to include DMV and D/L files</li> <li>• Auto-generation of case/citation file upon creation of the citation</li> <li>• Ability to integrate officer notes into the e-Citation at the time of issuance</li> </ul>
Custom Forms	<p>Patrol vehicles should have the ability to use of custom forms, as developed for the department. These should include, at a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Crash Information Exchange: The ability to use imported data from DMV and D/L files to create, print, and export driver and vehicle owner data, for motor vehicle crashes</li> <li>• Towing Form: The ability to use imported data from DMV and D/L files, to create and print a vehicle impound form</li> <li>• In all custom forms cases, the system should push these forms to the associated case file, to include creating or appending the Master Name Index (MNI) file. A copy of the file should also push to the RMS for storage.</li> </ul> <p>Note: There are likely many other forms that would be helpful for this type of process, which could be identified through different sections of the department. In short, a system should be used that can generate and map these custom forms to the RMS.</p>
State Crash Report Integration	The system should integrate the Crash Information Exchange custom form, with the State Crash Reporting System. This system should auto-populate appropriate

Function	Description
	fields, and have the capability of pushing to the state system, as well as saving a copy of the state crash report to the local RMS.

## RMS Functional Considerations

Function	Description
e-Citation Push	The RMS should have the capacity to push citation data directly to the State/Municipal court system. This should include a review queue for the department prior to submission.
Criminal Complaint Push	The RMS should have the capacity to interface with local or state prosecutors, so that data can be pushed directly into their systems for review and/or the development of a criminal complaint.
Case Generation	Officers (sworn or non-sworn) should be able to generate a new record within RMS, either through populating/generating one of the custom forms, through e-Citation, or through just starting a record on their own. They should have the ability to fully populate the record from data collected in the mobile environment
Field Reporting	Officers in the field should have full access to the RMS from the field. This includes query capability, the ability to create, review, and print any police report, and the capacity to review any aspect of any case file, or documents or media stored within that file.
Media Storage	The RMS should have the capacity to store and hold any media files within the case record, to include: PDF or other Office documents (Word, Excel), digital photographs, and digital recordings. (This is not intended for body camera or surveillance footage).
Solvability Factors	The RMS should have the capability of using Solvability Factors (and/or weighted Solvability Factors) for each case, and these should be a user-accessible function.
Case Management	<p>The RMS should have a robust case management system, which includes, at a minimum:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A customizable routing system</li> <li>• Case management queues for each user</li> <li>• Case management views for appropriate supervisors</li> <li>• Tracking capabilities for time/effort on each case</li> <li>• Routing triggers associated with varied stages of the case review process</li> </ul>

## Section 3: Community Co-Production Policing

Due to recent events, community members have taken to the streets nationwide to demand what they deserve from the police as a starting point: social and procedural justice. Social justice is an essential component of healthy, effective communities. It is based on a fair and just relationship between individuals and society, see Figure 3.1.<sup>1</sup>

**Figure 3.1. Social Justice Foundational Concepts**

<b>Equity</b>	<i>Overcoming unfairness caused by unequal access to resources and power</i>
<b>Access</b>	<i>Greater equality of access to goods and services</i>
<b>Active Participation</b>	<i>Expanded opportunities for real participation in the decisions which govern their lives</i>
<b>Individual Rights</b>	<i>Equal effective legal, industrial, and political rights</i>

Social justice demands that those in the community feel safe—including feeling safe from the police. Feeling safe starts with procedurally-just policing. Procedural justice in policing is the principle that the community's willingness, individually and aggregately, to accept the actions of the police, obey laws, participate in the criminal justice system, and partner with law enforcement to reduce crime and disorder, is dependent on the acceptance of policing actions as fair and equitable. Procedural justice consists of four primary pillars<sup>2</sup>, as shown in Figure 3.2.

**Figure 3.2. Procedural Justice Pillars**

<b>Fairness</b>	<i>Being fair in process</i>
<b>Voice</b>	<i>Providing the opportunity for voice</i>
<b>Transparency</b>	<i>Being transparent in actions</i>
<b>Impartiality</b>	<i>Being impartial in decision-making</i>

Achieving social and procedural justice within policing requires meaningful change and reform that must extend beyond prior efforts.

<sup>2</sup> [https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/04-2015/a\\_new\\_procedural\\_justice\\_course.asp](https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/04-2015/a_new_procedural_justice_course.asp)

Across the United States, communities are calling for revised policies, targeted training, increased accountability, and better screening of police candidates. All of these efforts are important and they should be explored. However, these same processes have been pursued since community-oriented policing (COP) became popular in the 80's and 90's, and even as COP gained additional interest and momentum following a series of high-profile excessive-force incidents that trace back nearly a decade. As shown in Figure 3.3, despite substantial focus on these areas within the law enforcement industry, concerns over systemic racism, biased policing, and a lack of trust between the police and the community continue to persist.

**Figure 3.3. Influences, Outcomes, and Unresolved Challenges within the Current Policing Industry**





The current policing environment calls for broad and deep reforms in the operations and collaborative culture of police agencies. This level of reform will require a coordinated effort to reframe the police department as a community-owned resource and can be accomplished through engaging a Community Co-production Policing (CCPP) model. Implementation of the CCPP model, developed by BerryDunn in collaboration with practitioners and community members across the country, merges and unifies police agencies and communities through multiple collaborative pathways, resulting in shared responsibilities in areas such as guidance, oversight, and the development of policies, operational strategies, public safety priorities, and other shared goals.

Co-production expands the focus of traditional COP and includes a greater level of community participation and involvement in key policing strategies that affect the community. The key distinction is that although COP is informative, interactive, allows for community input, and is often collaborative with regard to problem solving, co-production involves a greater level of influence and involvement by the community regarding the overarching policing strategies and priorities that ultimately affect those being served by the police agency.

From a co-production policing perspective, influence and involvement from the community form the foundation for trust and confidence in the police agency and agreement in the processes, procedures, and practices used in pursuit of public safety for those who live in or visit the community. This level of involvement serves as a persistent external accountability process, which helps ensure consistent alignment between community desires and expectations and the actions the police use to meet them. Co-production is a collaborative process, not an oversight process. It involves working together to cooperatively co-produce public safety, in a respectful and thoughtful manner that places value on mutuality.

As shown in Figure 3.4, engaging the CCPP model involves determining which co-production pathways the community wishes to pursue and then formalizing the variables and considerations associated with each pathway. After identifying the pathways and outlining the variables and considerations for each, the next step is to develop a strategic plan for implementation.

Figure 3.4. BerryDunn's CCPP Model

CCPP Pathways	Pathway Variables
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CCPP Board</li> <li>• Diversity and impartial policing</li> <li>• Ordinance review and development</li> <li>• Policy and procedures review and development</li> <li>• Professional standards and Internal Affairs review</li> <li>• Recruiting, hiring, and retention</li> <li>• Research</li> <li>• Strategic response meetings (data-driven policing)</li> <li>• Training</li> </ul>	<b>1. Involvement and Structure</b> <i>Who will be involved? What is the level of balance between police, government, and community?</i>
	<b>2. Roles and Responsibilities</b> <i>What is the role of those in this group? In what ways will they interact with the department?</i>
	<b>3. Work Product</b> <i>What deliverables will this group produce? Who will receive these deliverables and at what frequency?</i>
	<b>4. Authority</b> <i>Who has ultimate decision authority for this group? What is the level of authority to make operational decisions or changes?</i>
	<b>5. Reporting and Appeals</b> <i>To whom does this group report? If there is a conflict, what is the appeal process and who is the final authority?</i>

For each pathway, considerations to pay, terms of service, application and member selection, and perquisite for appointment must be made.

In Figure 3.5, BerryDunn provides a graphic that reflects the goals and predicted outcomes of the CCPP model. Accomplishing the CCPP goals is expected to produce the predicted outcomes, and these new positive outcomes address the longstanding negative outcomes that remain unresolved within the policing industry.

**Figure 3.5: CCPP Goals and Predicted Outcomes**

CCPP Goals		Predicted Outcomes	
Reducing fractionalism	Reducing the inharmonious separation that has occurred between the community and those responsible for policing it	Increased community trust	Because the community shares decisional authority in substantive policing matters, it will have shared ownership over the results
Creating transparency	There can be no more secrecy in accountability of policymaking, or in determining strategies to address and reduce crime and disorder	Enhanced public safety	Trust is the cornerstone to solving crime, and once that is established, people will more readily assist in public safety matters affecting them
Balancing power	Those who police the community must have the authority to do so; however, police department governance should be a shared responsibility	Improved racial and diversity equity	Diverse partnerships lead to greater understanding, which, in turn, changes perspectives, beliefs, and behaviors

Public outcry for police reform provides cities, towns, and counties with a rare opportunity to affect how their communities are policed in the future. This opportunity involves transforming policing towards a collaborative model where the police departments of the future are increasingly community-based and community-operated. BerryDunn's CCPP model can help communities achieve this level of reform and transformation. To implement this model, BerryDunn's leverages a facilitation-based approach to engaging stakeholders across the community with the goal of collaborating on a future policing model that addresses the need for public safety in a way that is informed and inspired by the community that the police departments serve.

## Section 4: Patrol Schedule Designs

The following section provides a discussion on variations of patrol scheduling models.

### Balanced Schedule

It is of some value at this point to discuss *balanced* as opposed to *on-demand* schedules. In short, in a balanced schedule, the department fully schedules all its personnel based on 40 hours per week, or 80 hours per pay period, throughout the year (this also often results in scheduling more personnel than required, which is referred to as over-scheduling). This is the most common form of police scheduling, and it is the type of schedule in use for the GPD.

This type of schedule works reasonably well if the department has enough people on the schedule to accommodate vacancies due to leave. BerryDunn refers to this type of scheduling as over-scheduling because it relies on scheduling more staff than necessary for existing demands in order to respond to requests for leave. In theory, because the department has *over-scheduled*, if someone takes leave, there is no need to backfill the opening because the schedule still contains enough staff to cover shift minimums.

Although over-scheduling works, its effectiveness is impeded by peaks and valleys in the use of leave time by staff. Invariably, a, patrol staff within law enforcement agencies take leave in larger increments during certain portions of the calendar year (e.g., during summer months, over the holidays). This often results in an imbalance between the number of leave requests and the ability of the schedule to release staff on leave without creating a shortage in staffing or the need to pay overtime to cover peak demands. Conversely, during periods when nobody takes leave (e.g., February), staffing is at its peak. This also tends to happen when service volumes are lower, which results in a certain amount of inefficiency.

There is a delicate balance between using over-scheduling as a means to accommodate leave and having too many resources available. For those creating the schedule, it is also important to note that when using a balanced or over-scheduling system, it may appear that the schedule is very heavy with resources. This can create a tendency to think that there are too many staff assigned to a beat/zone, precinct, or division. In reality, as those staff take leave, which often averages 400 hours per staff member (for holiday, personal leave, and training), the schedule will thin out. Despite this, it is likely that there will be peaks and valleys in this type of system.

When there are peaks of resources, administrative staff can redirect personnel to specific projects or special enforcement duties (such as COP). When there are valleys (shortages of staff), the department will need to use overtime as a means to cover minimum staffing levels. Staffing using a proper shift relief factor will minimize this, but there will likely be some need to pay overtime to meet minimums, assuming that leave requests follow similar industry patterns.

So, although using a balanced schedule is the most common form of police scheduling, it is also the most susceptible to inefficiency and instability, due to the lack of flexibility in the schedule to adjust to leave and leave patterns and having *over-scheduled* personnel at various points in the schedule.

## On-Demand Scheduling

One alternative to using a balanced schedule is to use on-demand scheduling, or a *short schedule*. An on-demand or short schedule is a type of schedule that follows the fair labor standards act (FLSA) 7k exemption for public safety scheduling and does not use the traditional 40-hour workweek to define the schedule or payment of overtime. In a short schedule, the department schedules officers fewer hours than required during any given month. This results in a circumstance in which the agency can use the unallocated hours in a flexible manner to cover meetings, training, special events, or predictable leave (e.g., vacation) as the scheduling needs demand. This type of the schedule is substantially more efficient than a balanced schedule because it is possible to adjust the work schedule on an ongoing basis and to respond to shift demands without the need for overtime or substantial over-scheduling of personnel.

There are myriad variations of short schedules, but the theory is rather simple. In a short schedule, the department schedules officers fewer hours than required during any given month. This process typically involves the creation of a schedule shell, in which the department ensures filling all shift minimums. In this format, there is also some over-scheduling involved, which allows for immediate backfilling of shifts vacated due to leave requests; however, the design of these schedules does not include the significant peaks that often occur within a balanced schedule. Instead, the amount of over-scheduling of staff is reduced, which creates more efficiency in terms of personnel usage.

In contrast to a balanced schedule, when staff request leave time (for whatever purpose, other than unscheduled sick leave) and there are insufficient overscheduled resources to accommodate the request, the agency can use unallocated time from patrol staff to fill the void. This can provide tremendous flexibility for the agency, help ensure that staff are able to take leave time when requested, even during peak demand periods, and help reduce overtime costs. Unallocated hours can also be used to cover training time or other special work details.

Despite its efficiency, there are some drawbacks to this type of schedule. Administering the schedule is time-consuming, as it requires constant monitoring to ensure FLSA compliance, and there are many logistics involved in establishing the protocols for when and how unallocated hours will be scheduled. In addition, because some shift hours are unallocated and they are added to the schedule as the need demands, this type of schedule includes a level of inconsistency and unpredictability for officers in terms of knowing their work schedule in advance. On-demand scheduling is also new to most agencies, officers, and finance departments, and there are some bookkeeping complexities. In short, the agency pays each officer 80 hours of straight pay (a *salary* of sorts) per two-week pay period, regardless of how many hours they work. This means an officer may work 66 hours and collect 80 hours of pay, or the officer may work 95 hours and collect only 80 hours of pay. In some cases, moving to an on-demand schedule requires extensive coordination with the Finance Department so that it can understand and buy into the dynamics.

One other significant issue is that using an on-demand schedule will likely greatly reduce overtime within the agency. From a fiscal perspective for the agency, this is a very good thing;

however, some staff become reliant on a regular stream of overtime pay, and when the stream of overtime money is substantially reduced, they may face personal budget issues. The department must understand this possible side effect and take steps to ensure that staff are aware of this change.

## Base + (Base-Plus) Schedule

Another scheduling option for departments to consider is a Base +, or base plus schedule. A base plus schedule combines some of the factors of a balanced schedule with an on-demand schedule. In a base plus schedule, the main framework, including the schedule rotation (in terms of the number of days on and off) and the number of hours per shift, also results in a number of unallocated hours for each officer. As with an on-demand schedule, the unallocated hours can be structured and monitored based on a pay-period, work-cycle, or per-month basis. Once the main shell of the schedule is built, the department can then use the unallocated hours for each officer during the prescribed cycle (usually one to two shifts per month) to backfill gaps or holes created in the schedule due to leave time, training, or other expected/predictable absences.

The primary difference between an on-demand schedule and a base plus schedule is that in an on-demand schedule, the shifts are evaluated and added on an ongoing basis, usually in 30-day increments. In a base plus schedule, the unallocated shift time is added when the schedule is constructed (usually a year at a time), but after predictable leave and training needs for the schedule are identified.

Like the on-demand schedule, the base plus schedule carries with it the same operational requirements regarding schedule administration, FLSA compliance, and following established scheduling protocols. This type of schedule has less flexibility for the agency in terms of being able to adjust the schedule throughout the year, but it provides additional stability for officers in terms of knowing their full schedule for the year, including the placement of hours that were not initially allocated.

Despite the challenges associated with on-demand or base plus models, most of the issues can be overcome by developing strong protocols and procedures for implementing this type of schedule. In summary, the use of short scheduling has many benefits, and BerryDunn encourages agencies to consider this as an option.

## Section 5: Alternatives to Traditional Calls for Service Response by Police

### Introduction

Many police agencies in the U.S. have been struggling with increasing call for service (CFS) workloads, while simultaneously facing ever-tightening budgets and unprecedented attrition and vacancy rates. As a result of these challenges and national trends calling for police response reform, many communities and police departments have started to consider revisions to the traditional police CFS response model.

Considering alternatives to police CFS response is not new; in fact, many agencies already use some form of CFS diversion, whether through a telephone response unit (TRU), online reporting, mobile apps, or the use of non-sworn personnel. What is different and new in the most recent discussion of CFS response alternatives is an understanding that this conversation is not simply about providing these alternatives as possible options—it is about considering fundamental changes to how police departments do business, including identifying collaboration opportunities with other organizations, and in some cases, outsourcing certain CFS types entirely.

Despite growing interest among police agencies in identifying alternatives to the traditional police CFS model, many have struggled to engage in an objective process that can produce appropriate and acceptable results. In some cases, suggested revisions have been met with resistance from staff, elected officials, and community members.

The best-practice approach to evaluating alternatives to the traditional police CFS model should expand the level of collaboration beyond the walls of the police department. The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Task Force final report explains:

Law enforcement agencies should work with community residents to identify problems and collaborate on implementing solutions that produce meaningful results for the community... and; do things with residents in the co-production of public safety rather than doing things to or for them.<sup>3</sup>

Making changes to the traditional police CFS response model is an involved process that requires a thoughtful approach. BerryDunn has developed a collaborative Essential CFS Evaluation process that considers numerous critical factors, to produce data that police staff, community members, and elected leaders can rely upon in making critical decisions about

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<sup>3</sup> Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing – [http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce\\_finalreport.pdf](http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf)

future public safety needs. The model uses a customized data-gathering instrument and has several key elements:

- Collaborative discussions with the project team
- Distribution of the evaluation tool internally and externally
- Collection of community and stakeholder input
- Interviews with key operational staff
- Analysis of data outputs
- Development of a findings and recommendations report

As police organizations have contemplated adjustments to the traditional police response model, a common set of questions have emerged:

- What new alternatives to responding to CFS exist or are emerging in the field?
- What are comparable cities across the nation doing?
- Is there data available on the success of these alternatives?

Below, BerryDunn provides information from research on alternative CFS responses from selected models in use throughout the U.S. The information in this section has been collected from public sources. A summary of the selected models is also provided in Table 5.1 at the end of this section.

## Alternative CFS Response Models

The questions outlined above suggest research on alternative CFS models is needed to help determine the most cost-effective, appropriate, and/or innovative process for police departments to manage mental health incidents and other CFS not requiring a sworn police response. For many departments, the overarching goal of considering alternative CFS models is to identify an alternative system that provides high-quality CFS response for non-police-required services, specifically for those in need of mental health services, whether those resources are internal or external to the police department. Although alternative CFS response is commonly discussed in reference to mental health incidents (almost exclusively), nearly all active models BerryDunn researched or is familiar with involve a hybrid approach that places mental health CFS within a spectrum of incidents that could be diverted to alternative resources.

In reviewing the literature presented in support of this effort to determine the most cost-effective and appropriate ways to deal with mental health and other CFS, many of the reviewed publications and authors/researchers argue that the impetus for change started in 2020 with the murder of George Floyd. While Floyd's murder was an event that appropriately garnered worldwide attention and generated calls for police reform, historic and related research suggests that the police/mental health crisis, in particular, started long before recent events. Some have even suggested that the systematic closing down of publicly-funded hospitals and other service



reductions for people suffering from mental illness are largely responsible for the increasing challenges experienced by police personnel in managing these crisis events. So, although it may be accurate that Floyd's murder has been a catalyst for broader changes in CFS response, many agencies have been using alternative response for a long time. In fact, one of the most well-known models, Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Streets (CAHOOTS), has been in place for thirty years.

Despite the longevity of the CAHOOTS program, most models BerryDunn researched are relatively new, and accordingly, there is little data to validate program effectiveness. While there are various models in use, the three most common types appear to be (1) officer crisis intervention team (CIT), (2) co-responder, and (3) vendor/third-party response (definitions and explanations of these models are included in Table 5.2). Each method has various degrees of positives and negatives depending on the needs of the community, and each is affected by workload demands, available staffing, and budget conditions.

## Mental Health Statistics

In reviewing the literature, over the past 30 years, law enforcement has been inundated with CFS related to individuals experiencing a mental health incident or crisis. In the process, law enforcement officers have become de-facto social workers in responding to CFS involving suicidal ideation, self-harm, and those individuals who are in mental distress. Many of these individuals are also chemically dependent, homeless, and/or are transient and live off the grid, increasing the likelihood that their mental health needs are underserved.

Research suggests there are larger populations of those in need of mental health services in larger urban areas; however, this does not mean that smaller law enforcement agencies have any less of a problem. Although certain data indicate a greater need in urban areas, there is no data that suggests certain community types (e.g., urban, suburban, rural) will experience a specific CFS percentage that tracks with national statistics or averages. In short, the volume of need is not predictable based on community size, but rather, it is assessed based on the needs of each unique community.

One noted problem specific to mental health incidents is that mental health behaviors are often criminalized, and these subjects are commonly arrested and placed into the criminal justice system. Incarceration, whether at the local or state level, often further isolates individuals in need of mental health services. As an example of the volume of mental health incidents, the American Psychological Association (APA) estimates that approximately 20% of available patrol officer time is spent dealing with individuals affected by a mental health crisis in some manner. Further, a 2018 Study conducted by A. C. Watson, and J. D. Wood estimates that 6-10% of the CFS the Chicago Police Department responds to involve individuals with a mental health need.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Everyday police work during mental health encounters: A study of call resolutions in Chicago and their implications for diversion - PMC (nih.gov)

In addition, information presented by Mental Illness Policy Org. highlights the increases in mental health response by the New York City Police Department (NYPD). Reportedly, in 1976, the NYPD responded to an estimated 1,000 CFS for those in emotional distress. Those numbers rose to 20,843 in 1980; 46,845 in 1985; and to 64,424 in 1998. In a paper authored by Arthur Cotton in 2017 that explored mental health response issues facing law enforcement, the author found that an estimated 5-10% of CFS he reviewed were mental health related.<sup>5</sup> Although these studies point to a significant service need, reliable data on this volume is not available.

One significant complication to an accurate and true representation of how many CFS are mental health related involves inconsistent and inaccurate data collection and coding (a national condition and one BerryDunn observes with many police agencies). For example, some incidents are coded as criminal activity, some are coded as a medical-related, and others are coded as service-related (and numerous other inaccurate code categories). Moreover, many legitimate criminal, medical, or service incidents have mental health connections, even if a mental health crisis did not prompt the interaction, and even if professional mental health staff did not report to the scene. These coding issues—and failures to document a mental health connection with any CFS—create problems in developing a clear picture of the volume of mental health needs in any geographic area. This impacts the ability of the agency to quantify the need, which complicates the proper staffing level for alternative CFS response. Additionally, even if a particular agency codes these incidents in a manner that can be used to identify volumes, the lack of national standards in data collection and reporting makes cross-comparisons impossible, further complicating development of an appropriate staffing model.

It is also worth noting that as indicated above, mental health challenges are often interwoven into other police CFS responses. Accordingly, agencies considering alternative CFS response should do so with an understanding that many CFS that do not originate or present as having a mental health connection, may involve one. Capturing and coding this data could be an important aspect of developing a broad understanding of the need for mental health services.

## Methods of Service

A review of contemporary research across law enforcement in the United States, Canada, and Australia provides three primary styles of response to dealing with mental health crisis CFS. The first is the CIT model, which originated in Memphis, Tennessee. In this model, law enforcement officers are provided with a 40-hour training course on how to interact with those individuals in mental distress. This model still involves a law enforcement response, and officers handle everything from the start of the call to final disposition. Despite this focused training, there have still been problems related to unnecessary use of force (UOF), escalation, and criminalization of behavior in those CFS involving mental health issues. The overall cost of CIT training is somewhat varied, but costs around \$800 per officer.

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<sup>5</sup> <https://shsu-ir.tdl.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11875/2285/1723.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

A second primary model involves co-response, in which law enforcement is partnered with private/government social workers who respond as a collective unit to deal with those calls identified as someone experiencing mental health distress or crisis. Co-responding officers commonly do so in plain clothes to soften their presence, and they generally respond with a social worker or other professional staff member. Most often, these units are secondary responders who are summoned after a primary police department unit has arrived and assessed the situation. Many co-responder units only work Monday through Friday, typically from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. As part of this model, some agencies have also started to staff social workers and mental health professionals in dispatch centers, to help triage the CFS, and to help dispatchers determine appropriate uniformed response, diversion to CIT units, or diversion to other officers or social workers.

A third primary model involves private vendors who are contracted or hired by community agencies to respond exclusively to mental health CFS, or welfare checks and other identified CFS. These teams typically include non-sworn civilian personnel, and generally include a two-to-three-person response, most commonly in a van that is equipped with general service items for the team's use, and/or food, water, or other essentials, so they can provide some modicum of services to those who do not want additional or formal intervention. The most notable examples of this model include CAHOOTS in Oregon, Support Team Assisted Response (STAR) in Denver, and Canopy in Minneapolis. There are other programs that mirror this model in several ways; however, some of those programs target specific populations (e.g., unhoused) and/or do not have a mental health service focus.

BerryDunn notes here that there are innumerable variations and iterations of models (particularly for mental health and mental-health-related incidents) either in use, or proposed for implementation. However, succinctly, these models can be broken out into three main categories:

- Use of specifically trained sworn police personnel (CIT)
- Use of a co-response model with the police and professional personnel trained as social workers and/or mental health staff
- Contracted services, which operate largely independent of the police department, but which may request assistance based on certain conditions

Given the challenges associated with mental health CFS response, and recognizing that many CFS may include mental health issues that were not apparent at the time of the CFS, BerryDunn recommends that departments consider CIT training as a mandate for all primary responding police personnel. This is true regardless of whether or not the department chooses an alternative response model for CFS and known mental health incidents.

## Staffing Models

In reviewing the literature, websites, and related public information, there are a very limited number of 24-hour response teams; this is typically due to cost issues and workloads, but may also be affected by difficulty in securing and retaining qualified staff. Generally, 24-hour

response teams appear to be isolated to large urban areas such as Eugene, Oregon, and Minneapolis, Minnesota. For Denver's STAR program, the original pilot included a staffing model for only Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., with only one van working the entirety of the patrol response area. Stakeholders found this unacceptable, increased funding, and expanded the service hours to include longer days and the entire week; however, they do not staff a 24-hour model.

For smaller communities, staffing one or two daily shifts with professional co-responder personnel may provide for diversion of a significant volume of mental-health-related and other CFS, while balancing overall costs.

## Funding

Most of the funding sources for these projects appear to be direct line items created by governmental entities, or collaborative grants/partnerships with other government partners (i.e., county/state hospital with local law enforcement). CAHOOTS is a private collaboration between the White Bird Clinic, the City of Eugene, and the Eugene Police Department. Based on BerryDunn's research, expended resources/funds related to co-responder and contract/vendor services demonstrate a positive relationship between allocated budget dollars and services rendered, which allows law enforcement officers more time to respond to non-mental health issues. Despite this apparent/reported correlation, there is no known data that specifically quantifies and demonstrates this perceived/reported benefit.

In addition, it is worth mentioning that one of the challenges with the third-party vendor/contractor response model is the turnover and burnout of employees. This has become an even more significant issue recently, as some communities have had difficulty finding qualified candidates to fill these positions. It should also be noted that the vendor/contractors still commonly rely on police to respond first to an incident, and many regularly call police to respond to an incident because they feel unsafe, and/or because dispatching the co-responder unit was inappropriate, based on inaccurate or incomplete 911 information, or a misunderstanding of the person taking the call.

## Grants

There appears to be an increase in federal government grants that can be used toward creating units that deal with mental health issues. Federal grants have been available through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), for example. In some cases, grants have also been issued for sustaining alternative mental health services. There have also been community block grants, private foundation grants, and grants through the U.S. Department Health and Human Services. This is an area that interested agencies should explore as they pursue an alternative response model.

Health care insurance providers, as well as hospitals, have also been contacted recently by communities to help with funding of units to deal with mental health problems, and to triage patient entry into their own medical systems. Managing these conditions in the field frees up emergency rooms, and helps hospitals dedicate time to other emergent needs. Additionally,

depending upon qualifications and services provided, it may be possible to recover some costs through direct insurance billing.

## Creation of Unit

The research reviewed suggests that there are some keys to developing a successful unit to deal with mental health issues. These include:

- Development of a solid leadership foundation between all partners/stakeholders to utilize this new engagement methodology
- Standardized policies and procedures which demonstrate the duties, roles, and responsibilities (including communication center protocols)
- Clear contracts for services between partners that also demonstrate duties, roles, responsibilities, and costs
- Appropriate data coding, reporting, and analysis, to evaluate program success

There are also indications in the literature that workers assigned to these units should be offered and afforded the chance to seek mental health support through various means, and minimally, through an employee assistance program (EAP) model. This is important because many of these workers, like law enforcement personnel, experience secondary trauma in managing these incidents.

As with any program of this size and nature, continued programmatic review should be conducted to help ensure that performance metrics are clearly being met. There are various reasons for this, but chief among them is to demonstrate that the programs are successful and producing intended and expected results. Program evaluation can also assist in identifying process and policy improvements.

Despite the need for such programmatic review, there is very little research data with which to conduct a cost benefit analysis in the utilization of these programs. Although CAHOOTS has been operating for thirty years, and available data suggest it is successful, there has never been a full program review of the CAHOOTS model (or any other model BerryDunn identified in the literature).

## Criminal/Violent CFS with Mental Health

In all instances, research suggests that CFS with a criminal or violent nexus should continue to be managed by sworn law enforcement personnel, regardless of any known or suspected mental health overtone. This is also consistent with Essential CFS Evaluations BerryDunn has conducted for police departments.

## Conclusion

The research is clear that utilizing alternative CFS response methods has the potential to produce some important benefits:

- Freeing up sworn law enforcement time to manage more pressing CFS
- Providing more appropriate mental health interventions to those in crisis
- Reducing trauma (and UOF) for those in need of services

By all accounts, diverting CFS to other resources, internal or external, relieves a portion of the work burden typically managed by sworn officers. Given the service demands faced by a growing number of police departments, this is an important benefit.

Similarly, it is inarguable that providing professionally trained social workers and/or mental health workers improves the interactions between those in crisis and responding personnel. Additionally, because of their focused vocation, professional staff are better equipped to provide counseling and connections to other resources, and they are more adept in de-escalating tense situations involving mental health circumstances.

The common alternative response models include:

- Use of specifically trained police personnel (CIT)
- Use of a co-response model with police and professional personnel who are trained as social workers and/or mental health staff
- Contracted services, which operate largely independent of the police department

Departments can experience one or all of the above-listed benefits (among others) by engaging either a co-responder or contracted services model. However, cost remains a factor. Despite the potential for the above-listed benefits, there is a lack of data to confirm or refute the financial benefits of alternative CFS response models. Although it is well-established that certain non-sworn police personnel could manage certain CFS at a reduced cost, utilizing professional staff and/or engaging contracted services may not necessarily reduce costs to a city or department. This can be affected by the model used and the volume of service demands. Arguably, however, even if cost reductions do not result from implementing an alternative CFS response model, aligning responding personnel with appropriate CFS types will likely produce positive outcomes more consistently.

Although there are notable benefits to alternative CFS response, it would be cost prohibitive in all but the largest communities for departments to staff an alternative response program that operates 24-hours per day. This is because, for smaller communities, there is not enough workload volume to support development of a 24/7 alternative service response unit. In most cases, overnight personnel would be idle and underutilized. For these communities, utilizing a part-time/hybrid model is likely a more cost-effective solution.

Table 5.1: Summary Research on Prevalent Alternative CFS Models in Use

City	Model	Data/Notes	Costs
Eugene, Oregon	<p><b>CAHOOTS: Crisis Assistance Helping Out on the Streets</b></p> <p>Organization: White Bird Clinic.</p> <p>Alternative response, welfare checks, street, and dispatched-based workers. Each CAHOOTS response includes at least an EMT and a crisis response worker, and they may request assistance from police or paramedics as they see fit.</p>	<p>High-level data suggests that 20%* of the CFS appropriately triaged are resolved without law enforcement intervention.</p> <p>*This percentage may be inaccurate.</p> <p>CAHOOTS has worked with 13 cities during May/June 2021. Pilot programs are currently happening in Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Portland, Oregon, and Rochester, New York.</p> <p>Common CAHOOTS response categories:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Check Welfare</li> <li>• Assist Public – Police</li> <li>• Transport</li> <li>• Suicidal Subject</li> <li>• Disorderly Subject</li> <li>• Traffic Hazard</li> <li>• Criminal Trespass</li> <li>• Dispute</li> <li>• Found Syringe</li> <li>• Intoxicated Subject</li> </ul>	<p>Funding source: Contract/appropriation from City of Eugene. Direct funding from police department and city budget.</p> <p>Cost is approximately \$1M annually.</p>
Houston, Texas	<p><b>Mobile Crisis Outreach</b></p> <p>This is a new program that is in development and deployment.</p>	<p>Limited information and no published data.</p> <p>Changes proposed/enacted by the mayor:</p>	<p>Funding source:</p> <p>Proposed City funding:</p>



City	Model	Data/Notes	Costs
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Changed the Houston PD's policy on body-worn cameras to allow for the release of video within 30 days</li> <li>Instituted a ban on "no-knock" warrants for nonviolent offenses</li> <li>Appointed a Deputy Inspector General of the new office of Policing Reform and Accountability</li> <li>Signed an executive order to restructure the Independent Police Oversight Board (IPOB) and named a new board chair</li> <li>Changed how the public can file complaints and access information on a newly designed website with five data dashboards regarding police transparency</li> <li>Invest \$25 million in crises intervention over three years</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expand crisis case diversion; <b>\$272,140</b> annually to hire four additional counselors.</li> <li>Increase the number of Mobile Crisis Outreach Teams by 18 teams; hire 36 additional clinicians; local mental health authority will need funding to hire – <b>\$4.3 million annually</b></li> <li>Add six CIRT teams, six additional counselors, and six additional MHD at <b>\$2.4 million annually</b></li> <li>Implement Clinician Officer Remote Evaluation (CORE) proposal to provide telehealth technology to 80 HPD CIT-trained officers on patrol; <b>\$847,875 annually.</b></li> <li>Fund Citywide Domestic Abuse Response Team with a victim advocate and forensic nurse examiner; <b>\$800,000 - \$1.2 Million annually.</b></li> </ul>
Oakland, California	<b>MACRO: Mobile Assistance Community Responders of Oakland</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Community response program for non-violent 911 calls.</li> </ul>	<p>Limited information and no published data.</p> <p>Response Categories</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Intoxicated/Drunk in Public</li> </ul>	<p>Funding source:</p> <p>City</p>



City	Model	Data/Notes	Costs
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The goal is to reduce responses by police, resulting in fewer arrests and negative interactions, and increased access to community-based services and resources for impacted individuals and families, and most especially for Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Panhandling</li> <li>Disorderly Juveniles – group</li> <li>Disturbance Auto – noise, revving engine</li> <li>Disturbance Drinkers</li> <li>Loud Music – Noise complaint</li> <li>Drunk – Oakland term</li> <li>Evaluation for Community Assessment Treatment and Transport Team (CATT) response</li> <li>Incorrigible Juvenile</li> <li>Found Senile</li> <li>Indecent Exposure</li> <li>Standby Preserve the Peace</li> <li>Check Well Being</li> <li>Sleeper</li> </ul> <p>Three teams on two shifts, day and swing, seven days a week with functioning hours of 07:00 – 15:00 and 15:00 – 23:00</p> <p>18-month pilot program run by the Oakland Fire Dept. (OFD)</p>	
San Francisco, California	<p><b>CART: Compassionate Alternative Response Team</b></p> <p>Proposed alternative response program</p>	<p>Limited information and no published data.</p> <p>Proposed Response Categories</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Person attempting suicide</li> <li>Well-being check</li> </ul>	<p>Funding source:</p> <p>City (\$6M)</p>

City	Model	Data/Notes	Costs
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sit/lie ordinance violations</li> <li>• Aggressive panhandling</li> <li>• Homeless encampment</li> <li>• Trespassing</li> <li>• Suspicious person in a car</li> <li>• Suspicious person</li> </ul>	
Minneapolis, Minnesota	<b>Canopy</b> Two-member teams respond to 911 calls about behavioral or mental health-related crises to provide crisis intervention, counseling, or a connection to support services.	Limited information and no published data. 24-hour coverage	Funding source: Direct budget/contract with City of Minneapolis – (\$3M annually)
Memphis, Tennessee	<b>CIT-Trained Officers</b> Officers respond without other individuals	Limited information and no published data. Research suggests higher UOF/deadly force with subjects in mental health crisis	Funding source: Direct funding/trainings costs already incorporated into the agency through city budget allocations.
Denver, Colorado	<b>S.T.A.R.</b> Medical/social workers	Limited information and no published data. No 24-hour response Original: Mon-Fri 8 hours with 1 responder van Current: Mon-Sun 16 hours with 4 responder vans	Funding source: Provided through a mix of police/city/county and Health Services budgets.
Hennepin County, Minnesota	<b>Embedded Social Workers</b> Embedded in larger agencies as co-responders	Limited information and no published data. Day Shift 2019 Embedded PD/social workers started 2020 Social workers at dispatch	Funding source: County ballot initiative

City	Model	Data/Notes	Costs
		911 – Staffed 24hrs/day to determine and triage CFS	
Dakota County, Minnesota	<b>Crisis Responder/Social Worker</b> Assigned to 911 center and agencies	Limited information and no published data. 911 full coverage	Funding source: County budget
Boston, Massachusetts	<b>BEST</b> Co-responder; police w/trained masters-level degrees	Limited information and no published data. No information on shifts – but appears to be only assigned to two districts	Funding source: City funded
Victoria Police, Melbourne, Australia	<b>Original Response by Police</b> Follow-up once determined mental health issues/mental health unit responded	Limited information and no published data. Shifts and unit assignments are not identified	Funding source: Government/Health System

**Table 5.2: Alternative CFS Terminology**

Term	Definition
Call for Service (CFS)	<p>An action undertaken by a police patrol officer that starts with a call to law enforcement either via 911 or non-emergency number. Additionally, any time a law enforcement officer proactively engages with the public for any action that requires documentation by the organization.</p> <p><i>It should be noted that not all CFS are officially tracked, as some officer(s) engage informally with people and handle a public situation, which may or may not be a violation of law.</i></p>
Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)	A Memphis-created model in which law enforcement officers are provided training to specifically deal with those individuals in a mental health crisis
Co-Responder	A team of a mental health worker and law enforcement officer who are specifically trained to respond to CFS related to mental health situations.
Alternative Response/Social Worker Teams	Non-licensed law enforcement professionals (i.e., social workers/mental health professionals) responding to triaged CFS for those relating to a mental health crisis or need for intervention.
Welfare Check – Call for Service/CFS	Anytime law enforcement is called/contacted for a non-criminal intervention on an individual. Includes CFS of self-harm/missing individual/suicidal ideations.

## Section 6: Crime Meetings and Intelligence-Led Policing

### Crime Meetings and Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP)

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## Section 1: Introduction and Purpose

In today's policing environment, many law enforcement organizations have developed systems to utilize crime data to measure and gauge individual and agency performance, and as a tool to inform personnel deployments, enforcement operations, and other agency efforts to reduce crime (O'Donnell & Wexler, 2013). The primary purpose of these systems is to help guide leader decision-making and to aid in the development of intentional strategies that contribute to public safety within the communities served (Godown, 2009; LeCates, 2018). There are innumerable variations and titles for these systems, but most involve the use of data that is presented, analyzed, and discussed in some type of a coordinated crime meeting (O'Donnell & Wexler, 2013). Although there is no prescribed format for this type of meeting, the intent of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the typical elements and components of police accountability and performance measurement systems, as well as guiding information to assist law enforcement agencies as they consider developing or refining these processes.

## Section 2: CompStat-Based Systems in Policing

### Understanding CompStat

Virtually all police accountability and performance systems that engage crime data as a measurement tool emanate from the foundation of CompStat, which the New York Police Department (NYPD) implemented in 1994 under Chief of Police William Bratton (O'Donnell & Wexler, 2013). The term *CompStat* refers to computer comparison statistics (Godown, 2008) and involves the “scientific analysis of crime problems, an emphasis on creative and sustained approaches to solving the crime problems, and strict management accountability” (Reducing crime through intelligence-led policing, 2008, p. 2). CompStat emphasizes a strategic approach to identifying community and crime issues, and providing intentional and focused solutions to address them (O'Donnell & Wexler, 2013, p. 2). This CompStat process also includes accountability for leaders and managers who are responsible for carrying out these strategies and producing results (O'Donnell & Wexler, 2013, p. vii).

The CompStat process consists of four core components:

1. Accurate and timely intelligence
2. Effective tactics
3. Rapid deployment
4. Relentless follow-up and assessment

(O'Donnell & Wexler, 2013)

To provide additional context, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has expanded the description of these four core components, and includes the following summary of the CompStat process in its meeting materials:

1. Collect, analyze, map, and review crime data and other police performance measures on a regular basis
2. Create best-practice strategies to address identified issues and implement these strategies in real time
3. Hold police managers and employees accountable for their performance as measured by these data; and
4. Consistently review and repeat the process

(Godown, 2008, p. 2)

Although it contains four core components, CompStat has also been described in a more simplified manner as a process that involves a two-pronged approach. The first prong examines



the data, while the second prong examines the agency response to the problems, including consideration of the effectiveness, efficiency, and ability of the agency to address crime and community problems using the strategies the agency has engaged (Godown, 2008). Within this context; however, it is important to understand that CompStat is “not a solution. It’s a method to obtain solutions” (O’Donnel & Wexler, 2013, p. 2). Essentially, CompStat is a process that begins with data, but the operational value of the process builds as unit commanders and other leaders ask and consider the following questions:

- What is the problem?
- What is the plan?
- What are the results to date?

(O’Donnel & Wexler, 2013, p. 2)

With the answers to these questions, the agency can formulate a plan to address any crime issues or other community problems identified, and once the plan has been implemented, the agency can evaluate the level of success of those efforts; this is the CompStat cycle. Not surprisingly, the CompStat cycle follows the same problem-oriented policing (POP) method outlined in the Scan, Analyze, Respond, and Assess (SARA) model used in community policing. The effects of applying the SARA model as a POP strategy have been widely researched and assessed as producing significant positive outcomes (Weisburd, Hinkle, & Eck, 2008); a properly designed and implemented crime meeting system has the potential to produce similar results.

Although the term *CompStat* refers specifically to the system established by the NYPD in 1994, many police agencies have adopted variations of that process providing a wide range of nuances and an equally diverse set of titles. For the purposes of this paper, the term *crime meeting* will be used synonymously to refer to all iterations of the different accountability and performance measurement systems in use, including CompStat-based systems.

## The Value of Crime Meetings

In a study that sought to gather information concerning the purpose and value of crime meetings, researchers surveyed 166 police departments currently using them. The respondents cited five primary reasons for their use:

1. Identify emerging problems
2. Coordinate the effective deployment of resources
3. Increase accountability
4. Identify community problems and develop police strategies
5. Foster information-sharing within the agency

(O'Donnel and Wexler, 2013, p. 8)

The five reasons cited provide support, and form the foundation for, a series of positive operational outcomes that a successful crime meeting system can produce, as identified by the respondents, including:

1. Improved information-sharing throughout the organization
2. More autonomous decision-making, which helps empower supervisors to take action when necessary
3. An organizational culture in which all staff members recognize the opportunity for greater flexibility and creativity in problem-solving

(O'Donnel and Wexler, 2013, p. 8)

The responses to the survey mirror the experiences of other police organizations using a crime meeting system, and attest to the operational value of these meetings for law enforcement agencies in fulfilling their public safety mission (Godown, 2008; Shah, Burch, & Neusteter, 2018).

## Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP)

When it was created in 1994, CompStat established a formalized process to examine and measure the effectiveness of the NYPD and its efforts to address crime and other community problems. Subsequently adopted by many police agencies, this data-driven process has been used to examine crime trends to aid police commanders in the strategic deployment of personnel. This data-driven process of examination and analysis, referred to as *predictive policing*, helps police agencies position personnel and other resources in areas where the data suggests additional crimes will occur. In theory, due to increased police presence, this approach intends to increase the likelihood of apprehending offenders in the areas targeted, and to reduce the number of crimes committed (LeCates, 2018).

The creation of CompStat was foundational in building an intentional data-driven law enforcement strategy; however, as technology and analytical capabilities improved, many police agencies increased the depth of analysis they were applying to the data available. This expanded approach, identified as intelligence-led policing (ILP), involves a focus that considers additional factors, including potential victims and offenders (LeCates, 2018), and the multijurisdictional nature of crime (Reducing crime through intelligence-led policing, 2008). From an operational perspective, ILP involves “a collaborative law enforcement approach combining problem-solving policing, information sharing, and police accountability, with enhanced intelligence operations” (Navigating your agency’s path to intelligence-led policing, p. 4, 2009).

Understanding the difference between predictive policing and ILP is important. Both involve the strategic use of data, but ILP expands the use of raw data and information, converting it into

actionable intelligence. Though the terms *information* and *intelligence* are often used interchangeably; they are not the same. All data is information, but data that is analyzed becomes intelligence, and intelligence data provides a higher level of understanding, which can contribute to improved decision-making and policing strategies that have a greater potential for success (Navigating your agency's path to intelligence-led policing, 2009).

In the same way that ILP has expanded upon the predictive policing model, ILP deployment strategies also involve an expansion of the steps involved in a typical crime meeting system. The steps in an ILP process include:

1. Executive commitment and involvement
2. Collaboration and coordination throughout all levels of the agency
3. Tasking and coordination
4. Collection, planning, and operation
5. Analytic capabilities
6. Awareness, education, and training
7. End-user feedback
8. Reassessment of the process

(Navigating your agency's path to intelligence-led policing, 2009, p. 7)

To be clear, ILP is an expansion of the crime meeting system. It includes both the core elements of crime meetings and predictive policing, which are expected to be used in conjunction with a coordinated ILP process.

## Section 3: Implementing Crime Meetings

Many police agencies have successfully implemented crime meeting systems, and many have integrated predictive policing and ILP as key strategies (O'Donnel & Wexler, 2013). There are several areas that police agencies should consider to help ensure success in developing and implementing a crime meeting system. The first, and perhaps most important consideration, is that law enforcement leaders should start with the end in mind. The development of a crime meeting system should begin with two very important questions:

1. Why are we holding crime meetings?
2. What do we want to accomplish?

(O'Donnel & Wexler, 2013)

Like many other aspects of law enforcement, there is no one-size-fits-all solution for developing a crime meeting strategy. Each agency and community is unique, and it is incumbent upon law enforcement leaders to develop a process that will meet both agency and community goals and needs. Answering these questions can help the agency define the purpose and intended outcomes for the crime meeting system, which will ultimately drive numerous other operational aspects of the crime meeting system.

### Important Considerations

There are several things law enforcement leaders should consider and keep in mind when implementing a crime meeting system. It is important to recognize that crime meetings should be regarded as part of an overall agency strategy to improve individual and agency performance and to reduce crime. As mentioned previously, crime meetings are not solutions; they are methods for developing solutions. Additionally, crime meetings should be regarded as tools to aid in developing operational and deployment strategies, but they should not be the only methods used to address crime and community problems, and individual or agency performance (O'Donnel & Wexler, 2013).

In many agencies, the primary measure of success or agency performance involves an analysis of various statistics, including arrests, crime rates, traffic citations, and crash rates. Although these metrics are important, there are other operational areas that the law enforcement agency should consider quantifying and monitoring. Just as predictive policing evolved and paved the way for ILP, crime meetings can also be used to monitor and promote community policing efforts, leading to a host of positive outcomes, such as increased public trust and improved community relations. In addition, by their nature, crime meetings increase internal communication within police agencies, and as a result, can serve as platforms for promoting organizational and cultural change (Shah, Burch, & Neusteter, 2018).

When establishing a crime meeting and performance measurement system, police agencies also need to be mindful of the adage, “What gets measured gets done.” Most police officers are accustomed to having their performance monitored, and much of that monitoring has been volume-based (e.g., number of citations, arrests, complaints). If certain metrics are prioritized, police officers will generally adjust their work behaviors to match expectations. Accordingly, police agencies should carefully consider what items to prioritize and how to measure those items. To help ensure a strong strategy for performance measurement, police agencies should consider the following:

- If only activity data is measured, this can lead to prioritizing numbers over outcomes
- When leaders fail to engage line staff in developing measurement metrics, this can lead to inaccurate or incomplete information regarding their activities
- Although most traditional crime meeting models have not done so, agencies should measure and monitor community perceptions of safety, crime, or agency performance
- The crime meeting system should include measuring individual and agency efforts in community policing, and problem-solving

(Shah, Burch, & Neusteter, 2018, p. 7)

## Suggestions for Success

To help ensure the success of the crime meeting system, agencies should consider the following tips:

- The information used for the crime meetings must be current and provided in a timely manner; stale information is of little use.
- Any response or plan developed for addressing crime or other community problems must include a specific set of strategies; it is insufficient to simply throw resources at a problem. Part of the response process involves clearly identifying what staff members are expected to accomplish.
- The ability to rapidly deploy resources to address an issue is a critical element of the process. Leaders and managers must have access to personnel, and/or the ability to direct personnel to engage in activities that support the mission.
- It is also important to monitor the strategy deployed. Monitoring the agency response must include an analysis of whether the strategy produced the intended results, and what metrics can be produced to demonstrate this. If the strategy is not producing positive results, it will be necessary to adjust the response. (Godown, 2008)
- Developing performance measures (PMs) and key performance indicators (KPIs) should be a collaborative process that includes substantive involvement from those expected to

perform the work. Equal attention should be paid to the inclusion of the community in this process, so that identified PMs and KPIs align with community needs and expectations.

(Shah, Burch, & Neusteter, 2018)

## Operational Aspects

Although the following list is not all-inclusive, there are several operational aspects of crime meetings for agencies to consider as they develop their crime meeting system.

- **Agenda:** Crime meetings should follow a consistent and prescribed agenda. This is important to ensure continuity of the meetings and to clarify the progression of the meetings for anyone who may attend.
- **Attendees:** Although the list of attendees may vary, depending upon the scope and purpose of the crime meetings, attendance by command staff, and the agency head in particular, is vital to demonstrating executive buy-in. Once the base of attendees has been established, these meetings must take priority over all other work activity (except for true emergencies).
- **Frequency:** The regularity or frequency of crime meetings is an area that is widespread among agencies who conduct them, with weekly and bimonthly meetings being the most common. The interval for crime meetings should be considered and determined in conjunction with the intent and focus of the crime meetings.
- **Length:** As with frequency, meeting lengths vary greatly. Once the agency has identified the format, agenda, and purpose for these meetings, an appropriate timeline can be established. Meetings should be of sufficient length to manage the work to be completed, without being burdensome. Meeting lengths of one to two hours are commonplace. The agency may also wish to consider varied lengths for weekly meetings, with a larger scope meeting occurring monthly.
- **Format:** The agency should consider the format for the meetings, including who will moderate them. Additional items for consideration include how data will be presented and who will present it. This process might also vary from meeting to meeting, depending upon the area of focus.
- **Minutes, notes, and follow-up assignments:** The agency should assign a scribe to take meeting minutes, and to note any significant items, discussions, or developments from the meetings. Taking minutes and recording the activity of the meeting should include keeping track of any new assignments and documenting any reports on follow-up, based on assignments from the prior meeting or meetings.
- **Communication:** Minutes and all other pertinent information should be circulated throughout the agency following each crime meeting. This should be done in a timely manner, and prior minutes should be archived and stored for easy retrieval.

## Section 4: Summary

Crime meetings can be important tools for agencies to use as part of an overall strategy to address crime and community problems and issues. Engaging crime meetings that integrate both predictive policing and ILP strategies can add depth to the crime meeting system, and help equip law enforcement leaders with the information and intelligence they need to guide decision-making and personnel deployments. A successful crime meeting system can provide numerous benefits that extend beyond the obvious and important aspect of reducing crime. These benefits can include improving organizational communication and critical thinking, developing positive relationships, and building and sustaining community trust. Despite the many benefits of developing and engaging crime meetings as a performance measurement system and as a strategic element of reducing crime, each police agency and community is unique. Accordingly, each agency should tailor its approach to meet its unique demands, while keeping in mind the foundational elements of these systems.

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# City of Dunwoody, GA

## Police Department Operations & Management Assessment

Version 1.0



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
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# Chapter 1: The Policing Environment

**SDI Figure 1.1: City Map**



Source: Internet

**SDI Table 1.1: Population Trends**

	2000	2010	2020	2021	2030
Population	Census	Census	Census	ACS Est.	Projected*
Population	32,808	46,267	51,683	51,103	45,883
Increase/Decrease		13,459	5,416	-580	-5,220
% Change		41.02%	11.71%	-1.12%	-10.21%


Source: U.S. Census Bureau

SDI Table 1.2: Population Age Ranges

Population by Age	2010 Census	2010 Percent	2020 Census	2020 Percent	2010-2020 Pct. Change	2022 Projected	2022 Projected Pct.
0 - 4	3,540	7.92%	3,271	6.33%	-7.60%	4,015	7.95%
5-9	3,621	8.10%	3,698	7.16%	2.13%	3,722	7.37%
10-14	2,561	5.73%	3,396	6.57%	32.60%	3,058	6.05%
15 - 19	2,020	4.52%	2,995	5.79%	48.27%	3,273	6.48%
20 - 24	2,357	5.27%	2,721	5.26%	15.44%	2,363	4.68%
25 - 34	7,260	16.25%	8,417	16.29%	15.94%	7,669	15.18%
35 - 44	7,760	17.36%	8,512	16.47%	9.69%	8,370	16.57%
45 - 54	5,518	12.35%	6,672	12.91%	20.91%	6,260	12.39%
55 - 59	2,271	5.08%	2,770	5.36%	21.97%	3,076	6.09%
60-64	2,220	4.97%	2,228	4.31%	0.36%	1,684	3.33%
65 - 74	3,045	6.81%	3,556	6.88%	16.78%	3,876	7.67%
75 - 84	1,868	4.18%	2,488	4.81%	33.19%	2,378	4.71%
85+	648	1.45%	959	1.86%	47.99%	779	1.54%
Total	44,689		51,683			50,523	

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

SDI Figure 1.2: City Government Organizational Chart



Source: Agency Provided

**SDI Table 1.3: Government Budget**

Government Name	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21	FY22	% Change FY18 - FY22
Budget Expenditures	\$24,114,361	\$25,270,509	\$25,590,986	\$24,527,410	\$28,130,998	16.66%
Percent Change		4.79%	1.27%	-4.16%	14.69%	


Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 1.4: Police Department Budget**

Agency Name	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21	FY22	% Change FY18-FY22
Staff and Operations	\$6,692,308	\$6,457,239	\$6,632,907	\$6,353,019	\$7,010,210	4.75%
Overtime	\$298,592	\$330,063	\$257,796	\$200,000	\$200,000	-33.02%
Benefits	\$2,625,408	\$3,054,517	\$2,658,198	\$2,839,496	\$3,260,991	24.21%
Workers Comp. Costs	\$183,333	\$91,329	\$178,894	\$223,390	\$318,493	73.72%
Total Budget Allocation	\$9,317,716	\$9,511,756	\$9,291,105	\$9,192,515	\$10,271,201	10.23%
Percent Change		2.08%	-2.32%	-1.06%	11.73%	

Source: Agency Provided Data



**SDI Figure 1.3: Police Department Organizational Chart**

Source: Agency Provided

**SDI Table 1.5: Historic Staffing Levels**

Year	Population	No. of Sworn	No. of Non-Sworn
2018	48,884	59	10
2019	49,211	59	10
2020	49,371	62	14
2021	49,371	64	14
2022	51,683	64	14

Source: FBI NIBRS

SDI Table 1.6: Personnel Allocation Comparisons

	Population	Authorized Officers	Executive	Mid-Level Supervisors	First-Line Supervisors	All Officers
<b>Benchmark Averages**</b>	<b>172,795</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>3.19%</b>	<b>3.49%</b>	<b>11.75%</b>	<b>81.57%</b>
<b>Prior Studies ≥ 100+ Officers</b>	<b>221,256</b>	<b>327</b>	<b>2.63%</b>	<b>5.38%</b>	<b>11.82%</b>	<b>80.17%</b>
<b>Prior Studies &lt; 100 Officers</b>	<b>23,431</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>2.37%</b>	<b>6.51%</b>	<b>15.38%</b>	<b>75.74%</b>
<b>Dunwoody</b>	<b>51,683</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>45</b>
Percentages			<b>3.13%</b>	<b>9.38%</b>	<b>17.19%</b>	<b>70.31%</b>

\* Table includes data from prior studies conducted by the IACP.

\*\*Executive includes the Chief of Police and two steps below. Mid-level includes three steps below the Chief, to one step above line-level supervisor.

SDI Figure 1.4: NIBRS Crosswalk

Crimes Against Persons	Crimes Against Property	Crimes Against Society
Assault Offenses	Bribery	Animal Cruelty
Homicide Offenses	Burglary/Breaking and Entering	Drug/Narcotic Offenses
Human Trafficking Offenses	Counterfeiting/Forgery	Gambling Offenses
Kidnapping/Abduction	Destruction/Damage to Property	Pornography/Obscene Material
Sex Offenses	Embezzlement	Prostitution Offenses
	Extortion/Blackmail	Weapon Law Violations
	Fraud Offenses	
	Larceny/Theft Offenses	
	Motor Vehicle Theft	
	Robbery	
	Stolen Property Offenses	

SDI Table 1.7: Crime and Officer Comparisons

Department	Population	Part 1 Crimes	All Crimes	Sworn Officers	Crime Comparison (DPD)	Staff Comparison	Part 1 Crimes per Officer	All Crimes Per Officer
Dunwoody	49,621	1,563	2728	64			24.42	42.63
Alpharetta	66,000	940	1768	113	-39.86%	76.56%	8.32	15.65
Brookhaven	55,000	1,821	3883	89	16.51%	39.06%	20.46	43.63
Chamblee	29,000	1,430	2423	72	-8.51%	12.50%	19.86	33.65
Gainesville	39,425	1,472	3557	98	-5.82%	53.13%	15.02	36.30
Johns Creek	82,000	443	1014	72	-71.66%	12.50%	6.15	14.08
Marietta	61,000	1,853	3714	139	18.55%	117.19%	13.33	26.72
Milton	38,551	241	640	37	-84.58%	-42.19%	6.51	17.30
Newnan	38,137	1,363	2580	79	-12.80%	23.44%	17.25	32.66
Peachtree City	35,387	383	1023	63	-75.50%	-1.56%	6.08	16.24
Roswell	92,000	1,682	3377	160	7.61%	150.00%	10.51	21.11
Sandy Springs	100,000	1,952	4490	148	24.89%	131.25%	13.19	30.34
Smyrna	55,000	1,286	2886	98	-17.72%	53.13%	13.12	29.45
Valdosta	55,880	1,492	3182	135	-4.54%	110.94%	11.05	23.57
<b>Averages</b>	<b>56,929</b>	<b>1,280</b>	<b>2,662</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>-18.10%</b>	<b>52.57%</b>	<b>13.11</b>	<b>27.26</b>

Source: FBI NIBRS

SDI Table 1.8: Part 2 Crimes

Part 2 Offenses	2019	2020	2021	'19 - '21 Pct. Change
Simple Assault/Intimidation	298	300	365	22.48%
Human Trafficking/Commercial Sex Acts	2	6	2	0.00%
Kidnapping/Abduction	8	1	1	-87.50%
Bribery	0	0	0	No Change
Counterfeiting/Forgery	40	40	12	-70.00%
Damage/Vandalism of Property	146	149	197	34.93%
Fraud/Embezzlement	882	583	634	-28.12%
Computer Hacking	2	7	11	450.00%
Stolen Property Offenses	18	60	58	222.22%
Animal Cruelty	1	0	1	0.00%
Drugs/Narcotics	486	454	412	-15.23%
Gambling	0	0	0	No Change
Pornography/Obscene	0	0	0	No Change
Prostitution	82	32	20	-75.61%
Weapons Violations	12	13	8	-33.33%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>1,977</b>	<b>1,645</b>	<b>1,721</b>	<b>-12.95%</b>

Source: NIBRS Data

**SDI Table 1.9: Call for Service Totals**

<b>Service Category</b>	<b>2021</b>
Accident Negative Injuries	1,833
Information For Officer	1,556
Welfare Check	1,071
Domestic Dispute	993
Alarm Residential	880
Alarm Commercial	760
Noise Complaint	701
Traffic Hazard	636
Civil Dispute 2 or More Parties	535
Accident Private Prop Negative Injuries	406
Suspicious Activity	322
Damage To Property	317
Civil Dispute 1 Party	309
Suspicious Person	294
Suspicious Vehicle	220
Lost Property	203
Illegal Parking	185
Alarm Duress or Panic	184
Accident W Injuries	181
Reckless Driving Traffic Viola	146
Stranded Motorist	137
Demented Person	119
Animal Call	117
Found Property	116
Missing Adult or Child	97
Abandoned Vehicle	92
Trouble Unknown	84
Accident Unknown Injuries	83
Suicide Threat	70
Alarm Holdup	63

Fire Structural	63
Assist Other Agency	52
All Others	501
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>13,326</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

## Chapter 2: Organizational Leadership and Culture

**SDI Table 2.1: 21st Century Policing**

Area	Max. Possible	Average Score	Pct. of Max.
Building Trust and Legitimacy	18	14.25	79.17%
Policy and Oversight	30	17.75	59.17%
Technology and Social Media	10	8.25	82.50%
Community Policing and Crime Reduction	36	17.00	47.22%
Training and Education	18	14.25	79.17%
Officer Wellness and Safety	12	10.75	89.58%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>82.25</b>	<b>66.33%</b>

Source: 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing Survey

**SDI Table 2.2: Respondent Profile**

Unit Assignment	Total
Executive and Command Staff; Sworn Positions Only	8
Investigations Division - Sworn Officer (includes internal investigations); all ranks other than Command or Executive	4
Non-Sworn Manager or Supervisor	2
Other Non-Sworn Personnel (all divisions) or Non-Sworn Support Services Staff	11
Patrol Division - Sworn Officer; all ranks other than Command or Executive	35
Specialty Division or Work Assignment (e.g., COPS Unit, SRO) - Sworn Officer; all ranks other than Command or Executive	6

Source: Organizational Climate Survey Data

## Chapter 3: Operations and Staffing

**SDI Table 3.1: Call Received to Dispatched**

Incident Priority*	All Events		
	Count of Incidents	Total Hours Lag to Disp.	Average Lag per CFS
Unknown	6	0:44:00	7.33
1	5672	514:44:00	5.44
2	10593	1212:28:00	6.87
3	45	2:09:00	2.87
4	14	1:05:00	4.64
5	3	0:08:00	2.67
P	448	40:27:00	5.42
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>16781</b>	<b>1771:45:00</b>	<b>6.33</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data




# Chapter 4: Patrol Services

**SDI Table 4.1: Patrol Staffing and Distribution of Personnel**

Section	Total Number
<b>Command Personnel/Supervisors</b>	
Major	1
Lieutenants	2
Patrol Sergeants	8
<b>Other Units Assigned to Patrol (List All)</b>	
Patrol Officers (when fully staffed)	30
K-9 Officers	2
CRT/K-9 Sergeant	1
CRT/Traffic	3
<b>*Totals</b>	<b>47</b>

Source: Agency Provided

**SDI Figure 4.1: District/Beat Map**



Source: Agency Provided

**SDI Table 4.2: Patrol Watch Shift Hours**

Shift	Begin	End	# Of Hours	Maximum Number Scheduled per Day	Shift Minimum (formal or informal)	Corporal or Sergeant Y or N	Other Supervisor Y or N
Dayshift	600	1800	12	6	3	Y	N
Dayshift Sergeant	600	1800	12	2	1	Y	0
Nightshift	1800	600	12	5	3	Y	N
Nightshift Sergeant	1800	600	12	2	1	Y	0
Dayshift Lieutenant	700	1500	8	1	0	0	Y
Nightshift Lieutenant	1800	200	8	1	0	0	Y

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 4.3: Patrol and Supplemental Patrol Unit Hours 2021**

Unit	2021 Hours on Call		
Patrol	Community	Self	Total
Patrol	14165:34:00	6819:17:00	20985:04:00
Patrol Sergeant	572:11:00	549:02:00	1121:13:00
Crime Response Team Patrol	56:52:00	382:17:00	439:09:00
Crime Response Team Sergeant	39:00:00	354:14:00	393:14:00
K-9 Patrol	283:43:00	388:28:00	672:11:00
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>15117:20:00</b>	<b>8493:18:00</b>	<b>23610:51:00</b>
Patrol Supervisor/Supplanting	Community	Self	Total
Detective	100:33:00	55:03:00	155:36:00
Investigations Sergeant	2:04:00	3:25:00	5:29:00
Major Patrol	0:51:00	11:07:00	11:58:00
Patrol Lieutenant	40:48:00	73:41:00	114:29:00
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>144:16:00</b>	<b>143:16:00</b>	<b>287:32:00</b>
Other Units	Community	Self	Total
Administrative	17:07:00	13:02:00	30:09:00
Community Oriented Policing	4:16:00	133:07:00	137:23:00
Community Service Officer	0:33:00	32:20:00	32:53:00
Investigations Lieutenant		0:08:00	0:08:00
Major Investigations		13:54:00	13:54:00
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>21:56:00</b>	<b>192:31:00</b>	<b>214:27:00</b>
Non-Patrol/Unknown	Community	Self	Total
Brookhaven PD	0:21:00		0:21:00
Transport	71:53:00	787:13:00	859:06:00
Unidentified	7:04:00	20:06:00	27:10:00
Property and Evidence		0:06:00	0:06:00
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>79:18:00</b>	<b>807:25:00</b>	<b>886:43:00</b>
<b>Grand Total*</b>	<b>15362:50:00</b>	<b>9636:30:00</b>	<b>24999:33:00</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

**SDI Table 4.4: Officer Workload Survey – Reports**

Title	Dunwoody	*Prior Studies
Number of Responses	20	128
Number of Written Reports	49	301
Average Reports per Shift	2.45	2
Average Minutes per Report	37.35	34

Source: Patrol Workforce Survey

\*Table includes data from prior studies conducted by the IACP

**SDI Table 4.5: Officer Workload Survey – Calls for Service**

Title	Dunwoody	*Prior Studies Avg.
Number of Responses	20	132
Number of CFS Reported	181	1058
Average CFS Responses per Shift	9.05	9
Average Minutes per CFS	33.83	42

Source: Patrol Workforce Survey

\*Table includes data from prior studies conducted by the IACP; does not account for varied shift lengths

SDI Table 4.6: Most Frequent Agency Activity by Time Spent 2021

All Source		Hours on CFS	Pct. of Total
<b>Crime</b>			
Shoplifting in Progress	Criminal	658:43:00	4.49%
Shoplifting Already Occurred	Criminal	638:44:00	4.35%
Disorderly Person	Criminal	546:25:00	3.72%
Hit and Run Accident	Criminal	475:37:00	3.24%
Larceny	Criminal	336:43:00	2.29%
<b>Crime - Total Annual</b>		<b>5562:56:00</b>	<b>37.91%</b>
<b>Service</b>			
Domestic Dispute	Service	1376:08:00	9.38%
Welfare Check	Service	824:32:00	5.62%
Information for Officer	Service	699:46:00	4.77%
Civil Dispute 2 or More Parties	Service	399:45:00	2.72%
Suspicious Activity	Service	318:42:00	2.17%
<b>Service - Total Annual</b>		<b>6405:48:00</b>	<b>43.66%</b>
<b>Traffic (Motor Vehicles Crashes Only)</b>			
Accident Negative Injuries	Motor Vehicle	1446:26:00	9.86%
Accident with Injuries	Motor Vehicle	351:52:00	2.40%
Accident Private Prop Neg Injuries	Motor Vehicle	246:28:00	1.68%
Accident Unknown Injuries	Motor Vehicle	140:01:00	0.95%
Accident with Entrapment	Motor Vehicle	19:30:00	0.13%
<b>Motor Vehicle - Total Annual Hours</b>		<b>2204:17:00</b>	<b>15.02%</b>
<b>Traffic (No Motor Vehicle Crashes)</b>			
Traffic Hazard	Traffic	267:58:00	1.83%
Person Hit by Auto with Injury	Traffic	60:17:00	0.41%
Illegal Parking	Traffic	44:43:00	0.30%
Reckless Driving Traffic Violation	Traffic	41:17:00	0.28%
Abandoned Vehicle	Traffic	38:27:00	0.26%
<b>Traffic - Total Annual Hours</b>		<b>500:12:00</b>	<b>3.41%</b>
<b>Total Hours</b>		<b>14673:13:00</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

**SDI Table 4.7: Most Frequent Agency Activity by Volume 2021**

*Description	CFS Type	Count	Percent
Accident Negative Injuries	Motor Vehicle	1833	9.65%
Information for Officer	Service	1556	8.19%
Welfare Check	Service	1071	5.64%
Domestic Dispute	Service	993	5.23%
Alarm Residential	Service	880	4.63%
Alarm Commercial	Service	760	4.00%
Hit and Run Accident	Criminal	712	3.75%
Noise Complaint	Service	701	3.69%
Disorderly Person	Criminal	655	3.45%
Traffic Hazard	Traffic	636	3.35%
Civil Dispute 2 or More Parties	Service	535	2.82%
Larceny	Criminal	513	2.70%
Shoplifting Already Occurred	Criminal	509	2.68%
Fraud	Criminal	448	2.36%
Accident Private Prop Neg Injuries	Motor Vehicle	406	2.14%
Shoplifting in Progress	Criminal	326	1.72%
Suspicious Activity	Service	322	1.70%
Damage to Property	Service	317	1.67%
Loitering	Criminal	310	1.63%
Civil Dispute 1 Party	Service	309	1.63%
Suspicious Person	Service	294	1.55%
Entering Auto	Criminal	273	1.44%
Suspicious Vehicle	Service	220	1.16%
Vehicle Stolen	Criminal	204	1.07%
Lost Property	Service	203	1.07%
All Others		4005	21.09%
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>18991</b>	<b>100.00%</b>


Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

\*Top events by frequency with a minimum of 200 incidents


**SDI Table 4.8: CFS Volume by Category 2021**

<b>Call Category</b>	<b>Count of Calls</b>	<b>% of Total Calls</b>	<b>Sum of Time Spent (H:M:S)</b>	<b>% of Total Time Spent</b>
Crime	6,244	18.32%	6149:58:00	30.56%
Service	19,127	56.11%	11135:08:00	55.33%
Traffic	8,719	25.58%	2839:56:00	14.11%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>34,090</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>20125:02:00</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Call Category</b>	<b>Count of Calls</b>	<b>% of Total Calls</b>	<b>Sum of Time Spent (H:M:S)</b>	<b>% of Total Time Spent</b>
Crime	5,665	29.83%	5562:56:00	37.91%
Service	12,208	64.28%	8610:05:00	58.68%
Traffic	1,118	5.89%	500:12:00	3.41%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>18,991</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>14673:13:00</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Call Category</b>	<b>Count of Calls</b>	<b>% of Total Calls</b>	<b>Sum of Time Spent (H:M:S)</b>	<b>% of Total Time Spent</b>
Crime	579	3.83%	587:02:00	10.77%
Service	6,919	45.82%	2525:03:00	46.32%
Traffic	7,601	50.34%	2339:44:00	42.92%
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>15,099</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>5451:49:00</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

**SDI Figure 4.2: Call Volume by Month**

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

**SDI Figure 4.3: Call Volume by Day of the Week**

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data



**SDI Table 4.9: Patrol Allocations by Hour**

Hour	Day Shift	Night	Total	Hour	Day Shift	Night	Total
0600	6		6	1800		5	5
0700	6		6	1900		5	5
0800	6		6	2000		5	5
0900	6		6	2100		5	5
1000	6		6	2200		5	5
1100	6		6	2300		5	5
1200	6		6	0000		5	5
1300	6		6	0100		5	5
1400	6		6	0200		5	5
1500	6		6	0300		5	5
1600	6		6	0400		5	5
1700	6		6	0500		5	5

Source: Agency Provided Data

SDI Table 4.10: CFS by Hour – Shift Configuration 2021

Citizen			Officer		
Hour	CFS Total	Percent	Activity	Percent	
0700	501	2.64%	1099	7.28%	
0800	665	3.50%	1069	7.08%	
0900	817	4.30%	891	5.90%	
1000	923	4.86%	713	4.72%	
1100	994	5.23%	665	4.40%	
1200	1089	5.73%	633	4.19%	
1300	1196	6.30%	556	3.68%	
1400	1261	6.64%	373	2.47%	
1500	1272	6.70%	242	1.60%	
1600	1258	6.62%	524	3.47%	
1700	1117	5.88%	650	4.30%	
1800	1229	6.47%	628	4.16%	
1900	1059	5.58%	750	4.97%	
2000	931	4.90%	647	4.29%	
2100	799	4.21%	683	4.52%	
2200	766	4.03%	713	4.72%	
2300	638	3.36%	625	4.14%	
0000	564	2.97%	484	3.21%	
0100	450	2.37%	390	2.58%	
0200	350	1.84%	251	1.66%	
0300	307	1.62%	153	1.01%	
0400	263	1.38%	539	3.57%	
0500	223	1.17%	795	5.27%	
0600	319	1.68%	1026	6.80%	
<b>Total</b>	<b>18991</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>15099</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	

8-hour shift	Community
0700-1500	45.91%
1500-2300	37.70%
2300-0700	16.40%

12-hour shift	Community
0600-1800	60.09%
1800-0600	39.91%
1000-2200	69.13%

\*New Shift

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

**SDI Table 4.11: Count of Community CFS by Shift and Zone 2021**

Zone	0600-1800	CFS/Shift	1800-0600	CFS/Shift
20	1901	5.21	906	2.48
30	8933	24.64	4723	12.94
40	1197	3.28	881	2.41
<b>Pct. By Shift</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>33.13</b>	<b>35%</b>	<b>17.84</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

**SDI Table 4.12: Community-Initiated CFS by Priority Level 2021**

Incident Priority*	All Events		
	Count of Incidents	Total Hours Call to Arrive	Average Time Call to Arrive
Unknown	6	0:38:00	6.33
1	5672	690:38:00	7.31
2	10593	1341:58:00	7.60
3	45	4:50:00	6.44
4	14	1:01:00	4.36
5	3	0:18:00	6.00
P	448	33:42:00	4.51
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>16781</b>	<b>2073:05:00</b>	<b>7.41</b>

Source: CAD Data

**SDI Table 4.13: Response Time in Minutes by Priority and Beat 2021**

Priority	Beat			
	20	30	40	Other
1	0:07:37	0:07:09	0:08:10	0:06:39
2	0:08:10	0:07:08	0:09:54	0:07:02
3	0:01:30	0:06:46	0:05:20	0:07:00
4	No Data	0:04:33	0:05:30	No Data
5	No Data	0:06:00	No Data	No Data
P	0:04:11	0:04:29	0:05:19	0:04:40
Blank	No Data	0:10:00	0:05:36	No Data
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>0:07:58</b>	<b>0:07:03</b>	<b>0:09:13</b>	<b>0:06:43</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

**SDI Table 4.14: CFS Response Times in Minutes – Comparisons 2021**

Comparisons	Priority 1	Priority 2	All Priorities
Prior Studies - Under 100 Officers	0:03:12	0:04:11	0:08:16
Prior Studies - 100 + Officers	0:06:09	0:10:30	0:13:58
Dunwoody Police Department	0:07:18	0:07:36	0:07:25
<b>Total Average</b>	<b>0:08:06</b>	<b>0:11:23</b>	<b>0:15:35</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data/BerryDunn calculations

\*Includes Prior Study Data

**SDI Table 4.15: CFS Response Times – In vs. Out of Beat FY 2021**

Area Response (Beat)	Incidents	Disp. To Arrival	% of Total	Avg. Response Time
In Beat	11885	1530:18:00	64.0%	0:07:44
Out Beat	7016	861:24:00	36.0%	0:07:22
<b>Total</b>	<b>18901</b>	<b>2391:42:00</b>		<b>0:07:36</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 4.16: In vs. Out of Beat Comparisons 2021**

Department	In-Beat/Area Percentage	Dispatch to Arrive In-Beat/Area Response Time	Dispatch to Arrive Out of Beat/Area Response Time
Prior Study Averages	63%	0:09:43	0:12:42
Prior Study Ranges	34% to 78%	0:02:31 to 0:13:36	0:06:25 to 0:25:32
Dunwoody PD	64%	0:07:44	0:07:22

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data, Prior Study Data

**SDI Table 4.17: Back-Up Response 2021**

Call Origin and Unit	Count of Events	% of Events
<b>Primary Units</b>		
Crime	5,665	14.24%
Service	2,511	6.31%
Traffic (MV crashes only)	9,697	24.37%
Traffic (No MV Crashes)	1,118	2.81%
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>18,991</b>	<b>47.73%</b>
<b>Back-Up</b>		
Crime	6,971	17.52%
Service	2,129	5.35%
Traffic (MV crashes only)	10,798	27.14%
Traffic (No MV Crashes)	903	2.27%
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>20,801</b>	<b>52.27%</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>39,792</b>	

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data, Patrol Workload Survey

SDI Table 4.18: CFS Workload Calculations 2021

Patrol Workload Calculation	Count of Incidents	Time per Incident	Hours
<b>Primary CFS (Patrol Only)</b>			
Crime	5,665	36.95	3,488.45
Service	9,697	39.62	3,849.05
Traffic (MV crashes only)	2,511	23.82	1,657.95
Traffic (No MV Crashes)	1,118	18.79	350.05
<b>Primary CFS Totals</b>	<b>18,991</b>	<b>29.53</b>	<b>9,345.50</b>
<b>Back-Up (Patrol Only)</b>			
Crime	6,971	17.86	2,074.48
Service	10,798	15.40	2,556.75
Traffic (MV crashes only)	2,129	14.21	546.33
Traffic (No MV Crashes)	903	9.98	150.15
<b>Back-Up Totals</b>	<b>20,801</b>	<b>15.37</b>	<b>5,327.72</b>
<b>Patrol Workload Total</b>		<b>46.36</b>	<b>14,673.22</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

SDI Table 4.19: Back-Up Comparisons

Prior Studies	Community-Initiated Primary Response	Community-Initiated Back-Up
Averages	56%	44%
Range	72% to 46%	28% to 54%
<b>Dunwoody</b>	47.73%	52.27%

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 4.20: Call Types Averaging More Than Two Responding Units 2021**

Event Type	No. of Incidents	No. of Units	Avg. No. of Units
Fight	57	234	4.11
Armed Person	76	308	4.05
Shoplifting in Progress	223	797	3.57
Suicide Threat	60	192	3.20
Accident Unknown Injuries	67	210	3.13
Demented Person	105	326	3.10
Trouble Unknown	70	214	3.06
Discharging Firearms	75	220	2.93
Fire Structural	60	176	2.93
Person Drunk	56	164	2.93
Accident W Injuries	149	433	2.91
Domestic Dispute	814	2265	2.78
Suspicious Person	255	672	2.64
Suspicious Activity	285	749	2.63
Disorderly Person	570	1473	2.58
Assault or Battery	124	310	2.50
Missing Adult Or Child	84	208	2.48
Burglary	65	159	2.45
Civil Dispute 2 or More Parties	487	1101	2.26
Suspicious Vehicle	210	464	2.21
Welfare Check	959	2037	2.12
Alarm Holdup	60	126	2.10
Loitering	282	585	2.07
Alarm Duress Or Panic	173	347	2.01

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

**SDI Table 4.21: Shift Relief Factor Calculations**

Shift Hours	Raw Shift Hours Total Annual	Shift Relief Factor	Number of Daily Shifts	Officers Required to Staff Minimums
12	4380	2.58	12	31

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 4.22: Daily Shift Needs**

Daily Shift Needs					
Year	Primary Min/Day	Back-Up Min/Day	Total Min/Day	Officer Available Min/Day	Daily Officers Required
2021	1,536	876	2,412	216	11

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 4.23: Capacity by Shift Length**

Shift Length	Total Minutes	Total CFS Time	Number of CFS/Shift	Prior Studies Number of CFS/Shift
12	720	216	4.66	4.56
10.5	630	189	4.08	3.99
10	600	180	3.88	3.80
8	480	144	3.11	3.04
DPD Total Minutes per CFS				46.36
Prior Studies Minutes per CFS				47.37

Source: Agency Provided Data



**SDI Table 4.24: Daily Officers Required by Shift**

Current Daily Events	0600-1800	1800-0600	Total	Shift Relief Factor	Total Officers
<b>Zone 20</b>	1801	1006			
Officers	0.99	0.55			
<b>Zone 30</b>	8283	5433			
Officers	4.54	2.98			
<b>Zone 40</b>	1110	968			
Officers	0.61	0.53			
<b>Officers Required</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2.58</b>	<b>30.96</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data


\*Based on 46.36 min/CFS avg.

**SDI Table 4.25: Call for Service – Comparison Data**

Benchmark City	Population	Total Calls for Service	*First Responders	CFS Per First Responder
<b>Overland Park Study</b>				
Average Totals (29 Cities)	172,795	76,406	140	547
<b>**Prior Study Cities</b>				
<b>Prior Studies - Under 100 Officers</b>	24,674	14,845	25	684
<b>Prior Studies - 100+ Officers</b>	221,162	78,126	154	507
<b>Dunwoody</b>	<b>51,683</b>	<b>34,091</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>588</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Figure 4.4: Self-Reported Supplemental Workload**



Source: Patrol Workload Survey

**SDI Table 4.26: Patrol Schedule Assessment and Analysis**

Schedule Components	Rating
<b>SECTION 1</b>	
Maximized shift coverage during the periods of greatest need for services (assessed by hour, day, month, and/or season).	1
Providing overlaps in coverage across all shift changes.	1
Flexibility to accommodate vacations, individual training, holidays, and predictable sick leave.	1
Minimized use of overtime to manage predictable leave (e.g., vacation, training).	2
Reduction of significant peaks and valleys in daily personnel allocations that occur due to leave patterns.	2
Ensuring appropriate staffing levels in all patrol beats/zones.	1
Availability of supplemental staff to manage multiple and priority CFS in patrol beats/zones.	0
An allocation or allowance of time for in-service training and internal meetings.	1
Integration of first-line supervisors into the overall schedule in a manner that includes consistent supervision of personnel groups or teams.	2
<b>Sub-Total Section 1 (maximum of 18)</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>SECTION 2</b>	
Using a single shift duration.	1
Substantial consistency and continuity of shift rotations.	1
Limiting scheduled work hours to no more than 2,080, inclusive of leave time or holiday time (unless budgets or labor practices provide otherwise).	1
Reducing available scheduled work time for each patrol officer, based on holiday hours allocated as leave time (reducing work time from 2,080 hours).	1
Conformity with labor contracts, or Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) allowances for public safety employees, which prescribe the maximum hours allowed within a work cycle or year.	1
A plan for easy and consistent inclusion of additional work shifts as the workforce grows on a temporary or a permanent basis (e.g., school resource officers who are available during summer months).	1
A mechanism for adjusting patrol personnel deployments, without significant service disruption, following a temporary or permanent reduction in force.	1
<b>Sub-Total Section 2 (maximum of 7)</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>OVERALL TOTAL SCORE (maximum score – 25)</b>	<b>18</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 4.27: CFS by Beat and Type – Heat Map**

CFS Type	20	30	40	Total
Accident Negative Injuries	224	1244	70	1538
Information for Officer	204	1042	147	1393
Welfare Check	195	652	105	952
Alarm Residential	442	321	80	843
Domestic Dispute	66	555	176	797
Alarm Commercial	154	532	45	731
Noise Complaint	79	448	123	650
Hit and Run Accident	53	494	50	597
Disorderly Person	35	499	32	566
Traffic Hazard	44	493	24	561
Civil Dispute 2 or More Parties	58	353	73	484
Larceny	66	355	39	460
Fraud	56	308	46	410
Shoplifting Already Occurred	6	384	2	392
Accident Private Prop Neg Injuries	45	296	27	368
Suspicious Activity	69	165	48	282
Loitering	20	238	23	281
Damage to Property	34	202	42	278
Civil Dispute 1 Party	32	199	47	278
Suspicious Person	57	144	49	250
Entering Auto	17	206	22	245
Shoplifting In Progress	3	217		220
Suspicious Vehicle	66	106	37	209
Lost Property	21	149	16	186
Vehicle Stolen	9	119	53	181
Threats	22	134	23	179
Alarm Duress or Panic	61	95	16	172
Illegal Parking	24	135	9	168
Accident with Injuries	7	123	12	142
Reckless Driving Traffic Violation	22	103	8	133

CFS Type	20	30	40	Total
Assault or Battery	5	97	17	119
Stranded Motorist	4	110	2	116
Harassment	15	77	14	106
Panhandling	9	94	3	106
Demented Person	19	76	9	104
Animal Call	34	57	13	104
Found Property	13	85	5	103
Illegal Drugs	4	70	22	96
Abandoned Vehicle	14	56	19	89
Missing Adult or Child	13	59	10	82
Solicitations	16	57	7	80
Armed Person	5	48	20	73
Discharging Firearms	14	37	22	73
Trouble Unknown	8	45	15	68
Burglary	3	50	12	65
Accident Unknown Injuries	4	52	4	60
Alarm Holdup	15	45		60
Fire Structural	20	31	8	59
Suicide Threat	9	42	6	57
Person Drunk	4	41	11	56
Fight	4	43	8	55
Disorderly Juvenile	10	27	15	52
<b>Total</b>	<b>2562</b>	<b>12147</b>	<b>1824</b>	<b>15729</b>

Source: Agency Provided CAD Data

\*DPD Zone data only, minimum of 50 incidents

**SDI Table 4.28: Frequent Traffic Violations**

<b>Incident Type</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>Pct. Change 2020-2021</b>
Speeding	2280	1363	-40.22%
Driver to Use Due Care, Use of Phone or Radio	724	515	-28.87%
Obedience to Traffic-Control Devices	586	402	-31.40%
Following Too Close	396	578	45.96%
Expired Tag	471	448	-4.88%
Trucks Over 6 Wheels in Certain Lanes	389	190	-51.16%
Improper Lane Usage	213	265	24.41%
Handicapped Parking Violation	94	315	235.11%
Window Tint Violation	116	195	68.10%
Driving While Unlicensed	156	151	-3.21%
Speeding Construction Zone	272	30	-88.97%
Driving While License Suspended/Revoked	141	157	11.35%
Stop Sign Or Yield Signs	133	108	-18.80%
DUI	88	130	47.73%
No Insurance	81	136	67.90%
Reckless Driving	115	93	-19.13%
Prohibited Parking	66	131	98.48%
Safety Belts: Required Usage All Persons Over Age 5	106	64	-39.62%
Wrong Side of Roadway	86	67	-22.09%
Suspended Registration	52	95	82.69%
Turning Movement and Required Signals	73	72	-1.37%
Fail to Yield Turning Left	69	76	10.14%
Fail to Yield Entering Roadway	56	84	50.00%
Brake Lights and Turn Signals Required	92	45	-51.09%
Expired or No License Plates or Decal	57	45	-21.05%
Expired License	47	46	-2.13%
Fire Lane/Fire Hydrant Parking	31	61	96.77%
Headlights Required	44	42	-4.55%
Improper Driving on Divided Highway	67	18	-73.13%
Vulnerable Road User	47	34	-27.66%

Incident Type	2020	2021	Pct. Change 2020-2021
Pedestrians Right of Way In Crosswalk	38	42	10.53%
Basic Rules - Too Fast For Conditions	29	44	51.72%
Change Name/Address Within 60 Days	14	58	314.29%
Violation of Drivers Permits	33	36	9.09%
Duty To Stop at Accident (Hit and Run, Leaving Scene of Accident)	26	43	65.38%
Failure to Have License on Person	46	21	-54.35%
Open Container Violation While Operating Motor Vehicle	32	30	-6.25%
Taillights	30	26	-13.33%
No Proof of Insurance, Vehicle	47	8	-82.98%
False Representations to Police or Any City Department	27	27	0.00%
All Others	485	473	-2.47%
<b>Total</b>	<b>7955</b>	<b>6764</b>	<b>-14.97%</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

\*Minimum cumulative total of 50 incidents

SDI Table 4.29: Traffic Related CFS

Traffic Related Calls	Community-Initiated		Officer-Initiated		Total Time	Total Events
	Sum of CFS Time	Count	Sum of CFS Time	Count		
Abandoned Vehicle	22:13:00	89	12:38:00	56	34:51:00	145
Accident Negative Injuries	843:33:00	1623	60:03:00	120	903:36:00	1743
Accident Private Prop Neg Injury	127:04:00	373	5:53:00	17	132:57:00	390
Accident Unknown Injuries	31:52:00	67	0:00:00	1	31:52:00	68
Accident W Entrapment	1:42:00	5			1:42:00	5
Accident W Injuries	56:37:00	149	1:23:00	4	58:00:00	153
Hit And Run Accident	232:59:00	628	8:04:00	27	241:03:00	655
Hit And Run Accident W Injury	3:16:00	7			3:16:00	7
Illegal Parking	29:18:00	170	18:23:00	207	47:41:00	377
Impaired Driver	4:54:00	20	0:00:00	3	4:54:00	23
Person Hit By Auto W Injury	7:52:00	12	0:29:00	3	8:21:00	15
Reckless Driving Traffic Viola	18:51:00	136	1:22:00	12	20:13:00	148
Traffic Hazard	112:06:00	578	23:34:00	130	135:40:00	708
Traffic Stop	0:00:00	6	1255:58:00	6433	1255:58:00	6439
Traffic Stop W Susp Activity			0:32:00	5	0:32:00	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>1492:17:00</b>	<b>3,863</b>	<b>1388:19:00</b>	<b>7,018</b>	<b>2880:36:00</b>	<b>10,881</b>




## Chapter 5: Community Engagement

There are no tables or figures associated with this chapter.

## Chapter 6: Investigations Services

SDI Figure 6.1: Investigations Organizational Chart



Source: Agency Provided Data

SDI Table 6.1: Investigations Unit Staffing

Investigations Unit	Major	Lieutenant	Sergeant	Detective	Analyst	Totals
Investigations Unit *	1	1	1	5	1	9

Source: Agency Provided Data

\*Includes vacancies

**SDI Table 6.2: Investigations Availability**

<b>Annual Paid Hours</b>	<b>2080</b>	<b>Study Averages</b>
<b>Leave Category</b>	<b>Hours</b>	<b>Hours</b>
Annual Leave/Vacation	139	152
Sick Leave	45	36
*Holiday Time Off	111	46
Military Leave	30	14
Funeral	10	
Training	78	
<b>Sub-Total (minus)</b>	<b>413</b>	
<b>Average Annual Availability (Hours)</b>	<b>1,667</b>	1,725

Source: Agency Provided Data

\*Table includes data from prior studies conducted by the IACP

SDI Table 6.3: Cases Assigned by Type

Case Type	2020	2021	Total	Pct. Change 2020-2021
Larceny-Articles From Vehicle	191	127	318	-34%
Larceny-Shoplifting	128	102	230	-20%
Larceny-Other Offenses	105	92	197	-12%
Motor Vehicle Theft-Theft of Automobile	80	59	139	-26%
Fraud - Credit	59	43	102	-27%
Fraud - Swindle	43	36	79	-16%
Fraud- Impersonation	45	16	61	-64%
Information Report	36	19	55	-47%
Fraud - Check	28	25	53	-11%
Burglary - Forced Entry-Residence	18	24	42	33%
Burglary - Forced Entry Non-Residence	23	18	41	-22%
Larceny-From Building	23	17	40	-26%
Damage to Property - Private	25	14	39	-44%
Assault; Simple Assault/Battery	19	19	38	0%
Burglary-No Forced Entry Residence	15	16	31	7%
Death Investigation	16	15	31	-6%
Larceny-From Mail	21	10	31	-52%
Harassing Communications	19	9	28	-53%
Assault: Agg Assault/ Battery-Gun	7	17	24	143%
Identity Theft	15	6	21	-60%
Runaway Juvenile	12	9	21	-25%
Assault: Aggravated Assault/Battery-Other Weapon	8	10	18	25%
Burglary-No Force Entry-Non-residence	16	2	18	-88%
Larceny-Parts From Vehicle	8	10	18	25%
Missing Person	7	9	16	29%
Forgery- of Check	11	4	15	-64%
Larceny-Pocket Picking	11	4	15	-64%
Prostitution	13	2	15	-85%
Robbery-Street-Gun	10	5	15	-50%

Case Type	2020	2021	Total	Pct. Change 2020-2021
Assault; Intimidation	5	9	14	80%
Motor Vehicle Theft-Other Vehicles	5	9	14	80%
Sex Offense - Fondling	4	10	14	150%
Assault: Simple Assault	7	5	12	-29%
Rape - Strong Arm	5	7	12	40%
Child Molestation	4	7	11	75%
<b>All Other Case Types</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>-4%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1164</b>	<b>903</b>	<b>2067</b>	<b>-22%</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 6.4: Case Assignments in Domestic Violence and At-Risk Adults**

Offense	2021	2022
Domestic Violence*	6	2
DART Unit	35	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>18</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

\*Investigations Unit Cases

**SDI Table 6.5: Investigations Workload Survey**

Category Options	Dunwoody		Prior Study	National Survey Averages		
	Detectives	Supervisors	Averages*	Det.'s	Supervisors	Total
Administrative/Other	6.67	8.33	8.85	5	8	7
Arrest	0.33	1.67	2.60	3	3	3
Community Contact	0.33	5.00	2.81	3	3	3
Crime Lab	0.00	0.00	0.96	3	1	1
Crime Scene Processing	0.00	0.00	1.63	4	4	3
Court/Trial Prep	1.67	1.67	1.80	2	2	2
District Attorney Follow-Up	1.33	3.33	3.00	2	1	1
Evidence Views/Disposition	6.67	0.00	1.90	2	1	1
Interviews	3.67	1.67	6.60	9	8	8
Investigations	30.00	21.67	23.11	21	14	14
Legal (e.g. Search/Arrest Warrant)	6.67	6.67	5.60	3	3	3
Meetings	4.00	8.33	4.36	4	4	5
Phone Calls/Emails	12.33	18.33	8.91	8	8	7
Report Writing	17.67	0.00	14.03	22	16	16
Supervisory Duties	0.00	16.67	3.58	0	14	15
Surveillance	1.00	0.00	2.77	4	4	4
Teaching	0.00	1.67	1.01	1	1	1
Threat Assessment	0.00	1.67	1.10	1	1	1
Training	1.33	1.67	1.96	2	2	2
Travel/Driving	6.33	1.67	3.31	3	2	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>99.91</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Investigations Workforce Survey

**SDI Table 6.6: Self-Reported Case Closure Expectations in Days Active**

Current and Reported	DPD	DPD	Prior	Natl.	DPD	DPD	Prior	Natl.
Case Closure Timelines	0-30	Pct.	Cities	Pct.	31-60	Pct.	Cities	Pct.
Serious Persons Crimes	4	66.67%	42.36%	54.95%	2	33.33%	20.75%	17.77%
Other Persons Crimes	2	33.33%	34.02%	38.16%	3	50.00%	38.49%	40.32%
Property Crimes	1	16.67%	41.99%	30.04%	2	33.33%	27.05%	35.72%
Fraud/Financial Crimes	1	16.67%	25.31%	17.98%	1	16.67%	26.53%	25.17%

Current and Reported	DPD	DPD	Prior	Natl.	DPD	DPD	Prior	Natl.
Case Closure Timelines	61-90	Pct.	Cities	Pct.	Over 90	Pct.	Cities	Pct.
Serious Persons Crimes	0	0.00%	15.27%	11.68%	0	0.00%	21.61%	15.61%
Other Persons Crimes	1	16.67%	18.56%	14.61%	0	0.00%	8.93%	6.90%
Property Crimes	3	50.00%	18.86%	19.76%	0	0.00%	12.10%	14.48%
Fraud/Financial Crimes	1	16.67%	21.22%	27.39%	3	50.00%	26.94%	29.46%

Optimal	DPD	DPD	Prior Cities	Natl.	DPD	DPD	Prior Cities	Natl.
Case Closure Timeline	0-30	Pct.	0-30	Pct.	31-60	Pct.	31-60	Pct.
Serious Persons	5	83.33%	47.88%	52.02%	1	16.67%	33.87%	21.41%
Other Persons	2	33.33%	44.74%	37.78%	4	66.67%	49.23%	39.52%
Property Crimes	0	0.00%	41.24%	28.08%	4	66.67%	50.80%	40.00%
Fraud/Financial	2	33.33%	31.03%	17.16%	3	50.00%	38.34%	31.35%

Optimal	DPD	DPD	Prior Cities	Natl.	DPD	DPD	Prior Cities	Natl.
Case Closure Timeline	61-90	Pct.	61-90	Pct.	Over 90	Pct.	Over 90	Pct.
Serious Persons	0	0.00%	22.01%	12.47%	0	0.00%	17.12%	14.11%
Other Persons	0	0.00%	18.27%	15.35%	0	0.00%	7.54%	7.34%
Property Crimes	2	33.33%	25.85%	21.32%	0	0.00%	10.79%	10.60%
Fraud/Financial	0	0.00%	35.15%	27.84%	1	16.67%	22.69%	23.65%

Source: Investigations Workload Survey

\*Table includes data from prior studies.

**SDI Table 6.7: Average Days Active per Case by Unit**

Type	2020	2021	Average
Robbery	21.8	78.4	53.3
Burglary	29.0	61.8	45.9
Sex Offenses	33.7	52.2	44.8
Fraud	26.8	63.5	42.3
Other	23.0	51.1	35.6
Assault	23.4	40.5	34.5
Larceny	17.0	44.5	30.7
Homicide	31.5	27.0	30.0
Shoplifting	16.3	43.1	29.1
<b>Total*</b>	<b>21.4</b>	<b>50.1</b>	<b>35.3</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

\*9 cases with inverted (negative) values excluded



## Chapter 7: Operational Policies

There are no tables or figures associated with this chapter.

## Chapter 8: Data, Technology, and Equipment

**SDI Table 8.1: Technology Scorecard**

Description	Main Score	Bonus	Total
Field Technology: Primary Score	93		
Bonus Score:		0	
Agency Totals:			93

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 8.2: Fleet**

Fleet Vehicles Vehicle Description	Allocated # of Vehicles
Administration Vehicles (e.g., Chief, Deputy Chief)	7
Marked Patrol Vehicles (Excludes K-9 and Motorcycles)	56
Unmarked Patrol Vehicles (Excludes K-9 and Motorcycles)	2
Marked K-9 Vehicles	2
Unmarked K-9 Vehicles	0
Police Motorcycles (All)	0
Investigations Vehicles (All Units; Excludes Crime Scene)	12
Dedicated Crime Scene Vehicles	1
Marked Vehicles for Non-Sworn Personnel (e.g., Animal Control, Community Service, Police Reserves)	3
Unmarked Vehicles for Non-Sworn Personnel	2
Specialty Unit Vehicles (e.g., SWAT, Command Post)	1
All Other Standard Vehicles Not Included Above	9
All Non-Standard Vehicles (e.g., Golf Carts, ATVs)	1

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 8.3: Fleet Budget**

Budget	20/21	19/20	18/19	17/18	16/17
Maintenance Budget (Excluding Personnel)	\$ 146,500	\$ 120,000	\$ 135,000	\$ 130,000	\$ 130,000
<b><u>Capital Improvement</u></b>					
All Patrol Vehicles – Budget	\$ 349,497	\$ 210,918	\$ 85,698	\$ 140,825	\$ 190,694
All Patrol Vehicles – Number of Vehicles	9	6	3	5	7
All Non-Patrol Vehicles – Budget	\$ 87,189	\$ 69,683	\$ 52,317	\$ 21,427	\$ 29,580
All Non-Patrol Vehicles – Number of Vehicles	3	2	2	1	1

Source: Agency Provided Data

## Chapter 9: Training and Education

**SDI Table 9.1: Training Budget**

Section	2019	2020	2021
Officer-Staff Training	\$ 61,955	\$ 41,231	\$ 68,070
Academy Training	\$ 21,293	\$ -	\$ -
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$ 83,247</b>	<b>\$ 41,231</b>	<b>\$ 68,070</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

**SDI Table 9.2: Required Training Hours**

	Required Annual	*Estimated Additional Hours	Required and Estimated Total
<b>Patrol</b>			
Annual Training Hours Per Officer in Patrol (All Ranks)	20	127	147
<b>Investigations</b>			
Annual Training Hours Per Officer in Investigations (All Ranks)	20	58	78

Source: Agency Provided Data

## Chapter 10: Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion

SDI Table 10.1: Experience Profile

Years of Service	Less than 1 year	1-5 Years	6-10 Years	11-15* Years	Total Years
Chief	0	0	0	1	1
Deputy Chief	0	0	0	1	1
Major	0	0	0	2	2
Lieutenant	0	0	0	4	4
Sergeant	0	0	4	2	6
Detective	0	1	2	3	6
Police Officer	13	15	2	4	34
003200 (Sworn)	0	0	0	3	3
<b>Sub-total Sworn</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>57</b>
Civilian	4	3	2	3	12
<b>Sub-total Civilian</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>69</b>

	5 Years or Less	Pct.	6 to 15 Years	Pct.	Total
Sworn	29	51%	28	49%	57
Civilian	7	58%	5	42%	12

Source: Agency Provided Data

\*Dunwoody Police Department established in January 2009

SDI Table 10.2: Diversity Profile

Section	Race					
	Asian	African American	*Hispanic	Other	Native American	White
Executive (Chief, Assistant/Deputy Chief)	0	0	0	0	0	2
Mid-Rank (Below Chief – Above Sergeant)	0	1	0	0	0	5
Sergeants (All – Regardless of Assignment)	0	2	0	0	0	10
Patrol Officers (Excludes Supervisors Above)	0	7	7	0	0	13
Investigations (Excludes Supervisors Above)	1	0	1	0	0	5
<b>Other Sworn Personnel</b>						
Example: K-9, Traffic (List All Different Units)	0	0	0	0	0	2
K-9	0	0	0	0	0	1
CRT	1	0	0	0	0	2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Percentages</b>	<b>3.33%</b>	<b>16.67%</b>	<b>13.33%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>0.00%</b>	<b>66.67%</b>

\* Not a race; included here for diversity comparison purposes

Source: Agency Provided Data

SDI Table 10.3: Diversity Profile – Prior Study Comparisons

Position	Asian	African American	Hispanic	Other	Native American	White
Command/Executive	2.25%	19.10%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	78.65%
Mid-Rank (Lt. & Below)	1.62%	14.17%	3.24%	0.00%	0.40%	80.57%
Police Officer*	1.24%	15.43%	5.49%	0.30%	0.21%	77.33%
Totals All Ranks	1.34%	15.33%	4.94%	0.24%	0.24%	77.91%
<b>**Prior Study Pct. Totals</b>	<b>2.50%</b>	<b>12.30%</b>	<b>10.70%</b>	<b>0.30%</b>	<b>0.30%</b>	<b>73.90%</b>

\*Includes all officers below Sergeant, which includes Detectives, Corporals, and Trainees.

Source: Prior Study Data

SDI Table 10.4: Gender Profile

Section	Gender	
	Male	Female
Executive (Chief, Assistant/Deputy Chief)	2	0
Mid-Rank (Below Chief – Above Sergeant)	6	0
Sergeants (All – Regardless of Assignment)	10	1
Patrol Officers (Excludes Supervisors Above)	23	4
Investigations (Excludes Supervisors Above)	7	0
<b>Other Sworn Personnel</b>		
Example: K-9, Traffic (List All Different Units)	2	0
K-9	2	0
CRT	1	1
Community Outreach	0	0
<b>Totals</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Percentages</b>	<b>89.83%</b>	<b>10.17%</b>

Source: Agency Provided Data

SDI Table 10.5: Gender Profile – Prior Study Comparisons

Position	Male	Female
Command/Executive	88.64%	11.36%
Mid Rank	90.40%	9.60%
Police Officer*	88.01%	11.99%
<b>Percentage</b>	<b>88.45%</b>	<b>11.55%</b>
<b>Benchmark Cities Avg.</b>	<b>87.51%</b>	<b>12.49%</b>

Source: Prior Study Data

**SDI Table 10.6: Hiring Steps**

Hiring Step	Scoring/Decision
Oral Interview	Must meet minimum point level.
Background Investigation	Pass/Fail
Computer Voice Stress Analysis (CVSA)	Pass/Fail
Chief's Interview	Pass/Fail
Applicant File Review	Pass/Fail
Conditional Offer of Employment	Contingent upon successful completion of psychological exam, medical (physical and drug screen) exam, an employment history and reference review.
Psychological Exam	Hire/ Do Not Hire Recommendation
Medical Exam/Drug Screen	Pass/Fail

Source: Agency Provided Data



**SDI Table 10.7: Annual Separations**

Reason	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Average
Voluntary Resignation	2.41%	3.09%	3.70%	4.37%	4.42%	3.60%
Retirement	1.94%	2.06%	1.86%	2.34%	2.16%	2.07%
Discharged	0.85%	0.83%	0.78%	0.98%	1.01%	0.89%
<b>Grand Total Percentages*</b>	<b>5.20%</b>	<b>5.98%</b>	<b>6.33%</b>	<b>7.69%</b>	<b>7.59%</b>	<b>6.56%</b>

Dunwoody	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Average
Voluntary Resignation	8.47%	11.86%	12.90%	15.63%	14.06%	12.66%
Retirement	1.69%	1.69%	1.61%	3.13%	0.00%	1.62%
Discharged	0.00%	0.00%	1.61%	1.56%	4.69%	1.62%
<b>Grand Total Percentages*</b>	<b>10.17%</b>	<b>13.56%</b>	<b>16.13%</b>	<b>20.31%</b>	<b>18.75%</b>	<b>15.91%</b>


\*Table includes data from prior studies

\*\*Source: Police Department Provided Data

Separation rates shown as a percentage of the current sworn workforce. Totals reflect all sworn separations, including recruits. Discharged includes medical (death) and forced separations.

# Chapter 11: Internal Affairs

**SDI Figure 11.1: Complaint Routing**



**SDI Table 11.1: Internal Affairs Complaints and Case Dispositions**


IA Case Disposition & Origin	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Total
<b>Founded</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>
External			1			1
Internal	2	1		1	3	7
<b>Not Found</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>			<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>
External		1				1
Internal	1				2	3
<b>Annual Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>


Source: Agency Provided Data

## Chapter 12: Conclusions and Recommendations


There are no tables or figures associated with this chapter.


## Supplemental Appendix A: Findings and Recommendations


Organizational Leadership and Culture		
No.	Communications and Leadership Strategy	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 2, Section IV: Communication: Organizational Leadership and Culture</i>		
2-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> Because of its criticality, all agencies, including the DPD, need to continuously focus on positive, active leadership and communication. This project, and the recommendations that it will produce, provide an additional need, and opportunity, for the DPD to focus on these areas.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should work collaboratively to develop an intentional and strategic approach to communication and leadership. The DPD should engage in joint discussions to position leaders to manage current operations and to assist with prioritization and implementation of the recommendations produced by this study.	


Organizational Leadership and Culture		
No.	Personnel Development Plan	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 2, Section VI: Mentoring, Coaching, and Succession Planning</i>		
2-2	<b>Finding:</b> DPD does not have a formal staff development system that includes systems or mechanisms for consistent coaching, mentoring, or succession planning.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> BerryDunn recommends DPD develop a formal coaching, mentoring, and succession planning program for staff and that the program be memorialized in policy and executed consistently in practice.  In order to help ensure success within each operational role and to prepare those within the department for formal supervisory and command-level positions and/or informal leadership opportunities, the department must create an atmosphere that encourages personnel development and specifically prepares staff for opportunities through a deliberate and intentional process.	


Operations and Staffing		
No.	Professional Support Staff Position	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 3, Section III: Support Services, Specialty Programs, and Assignments</i>		
3-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD tasks sworn officers, usually those in formal leadership	


Operations and Staffing		
No.	Professional Support Staff Position	Overall Priority
	positions, with various adjunct responsibilities such as fleet, equipment, facilities, accreditation, etc., which consume a great deal of time and energy from sworn staff and may prevent them from fully engaging in basic supervisory responsibilities, or other primary duties, to the extent expected by their role.	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should hire one non-sworn administrative support staff member to support various administrative functions of the department.</p> <p>BerryDunn expects that this position would manage the DPD fleet as well as other administrative functions, and this person could also be cross-trained to support other support staff functions. BerryDunn recommends that the DPD evaluate any functions that could be performed by this position and reallocate them to the new staff member.</p>	


Operations and Staffing		
No.	PSR Staffing	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 3, Section III: Support Services, Specialty Programs, and Assignments</b>		
3-2	<b>Finding Area:</b> PSRs provide numerous support functions for the DPD that promote operational efficiency and effectiveness. Current staffing is insufficient to support operational workloads, particularly during daytime hours.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should add one PSR position to assist with workload demands. The position should be allocated within the work schedule in a manner that provides support during the period of the day with the greatest need.	

Operations and Staffing		
No.	Property and Evidence Duty Assignment Adjustments	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 3, Section III: Support Services, Specialty Programs, and Assignments</b>		
3-3	<b>Finding Area:</b> Professional staff assigned to property intake and storage are also responsible for RMS administration. This dual role creates a possible liability for the DPD, as it creates a possible gap in appropriate property and evidence controls. Property and Evidence Unit staff are also responsible for monthly UCR/NIBRS reporting. This is an RMS function, which should be reallocated.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should reassign RMS administration duties to staff who are not involved in the property intake and storage process. In addition, the DPD should reassign UCR/NIBRS reporting duties and consider any other unit functions that could be allocated to other personnel (e.g., PSRs, administrative position).	


Patrol Services		
No.	Patrol Staffing	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section IV: Patrol Staffing and Analysis</b>		
4-1	<b>Finding:</b> The staffing levels in Patrol are not optimized and do not meet operational demands.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should add three patrol officers to primary CFS response in the UPD, adjusting the allocated total of sworn primary response Patrol staff to 33.	
	Based on a thorough analysis of the obligated workload for patrol, BerryDunn calculates that the DPD needs to add three officers to the UPD, along with the four CSOs also recommended (see Recommendation 4-2). These additions intend to satisfy obligated workload totals and CFS distributions, as outlined throughout this chapter.	
	In addition, the City should regard Tables 4.7 and 4.10 as a roadmap for staff growth needs, based on predicted or actual growth that occurs over the next five years.	


Patrol Services		
No.	Use of Non-Sworn Field Personnel	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section VII: Alternative Response</b>		
4-2	<b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD dispatches officers to numerous CFS that do not require a sworn officer response. This volume of activity is impeding the ability to focus officer CFS response to more critical and demanding incidents.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should begin the process of hiring non-sworn field personnel, typically referred to as community service officers (CSOs), to supplement and augment the capacity of the Patrol Division. BerryDunn recommends the DPD hire four CSO positions to cover two daily shifts during peak CFS hours.	
	This process should occur as soon as practical to assist the DPD with managing overall workloads and to assist with CFS as the department is working to fully staff the UPD.	

Patrol Services		
No.	Alternative CFS Response	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section VII: Alternative CFS Response</b>		
4-3	<p><b>Finding:</b> The DPD does not currently use alternative CFS response, but opportunities exist to utilize alternative CFS response methods and resources.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should develop a comprehensive alternative CFS response plan and seek approval from the City Council on the new model. The alternative CFS response plan should consider numerous elements, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishing a limited TRU function utilizing existing and recommended personnel (CSOs, PSRs)</li> <li>Adding online reporting as a service option for crime victims</li> <li>Evaluating hybrid and collaborative responses for appropriate CFS types (e.g., mental health), and identifying whether there are existing resources for response or if these need to be created and/or augmented</li> <li>Developing policies and procedures for the diversion of CFS to the TRU, online reporting, non-sworn personnel, and other external resources; procedures should consider customer preferences and provide accommodations for those, whenever requested</li> <li>Training agency personnel, dispatch, and community partners on the new model</li> <li>Providing community education on the new model, including the various reporting capabilities and how to provide feedback</li> <li>Monitoring the success of the new model and making appropriate adjustments</li> </ul> <p>Additional details on the Essential CFS Evaluation process and findings can be found in Appendix C of this report.</p>	

Patrol Services		
No.	Non-Consensual and Impartial Policing Data	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section VIII: Patrol Operations</b>		
4-4	<p><b>Finding:</b> DPD does not regularly and consistently collect standardized demographic data, such as perceived race and gender, or outcome data (such as searches, warning, citation, etc.) on all non-consensual law enforcement-related contacts in a single database that is easily accessed for analysis.</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluating this data is a critical step in identifying possible biased policing patterns and in developing strategies to correct them.</p>	


Patrol Services		
No.	Non-Consensual and Impartial Policing Data	Overall Priority
	<b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should collect subject demographic and encounter outcome data from all non-consensual law enforcement-related contacts in a centralized database that can be utilized for meaningful reporting and analysis.	

Patrol Operations		
No.	Victim Services Referrals	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section VIII: Patrol Operations</b>		
4-5	<b>Finding Area:</b> The Victim Service Referral Form might not be utilized universally or consistently by department personnel.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should review the service referral documents and related department policy for victim service referrals to ensure they are consistent with department values and goals. Review policy and accountability mechanisms to ensure victim service referrals are performed consistently and effectively. Institute audit procedures to ensure compliance with policy.	


Patrol Services		
No.	Solvability Factors	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 4, Section VIII: Patrol Operations</b>		
4-6	<b>Finding:</b> The DPD does not currently formally engage the use of solvability factors as an element of conducting a preliminary criminal investigation. The use of solvability factors helps increase the quality of preliminary investigations and can assist decision-makers in determining which cases should receive additional investigation.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should require the use of solvability factors by all staff who conduct preliminary criminal investigations and complete the associated reports. Solvability factors should be reviewed by patrol supervisors as a part of the incident report approval process and used to assist with the case activation and assignment process.  Solvability factors should include information such as whether there is a known suspect, whether there is a vehicle description, whether there are witnesses to the crime, and whether there is physical evidence. The sum of these factors comprises the baseline of a thorough preliminary investigation. If officers do not collect this information and report on it, one could reasonably assert that the preliminary investigation and/or the report was incomplete.	




Patrol Services		
	<p>By design, requiring patrol staff to collect and record this information helps to ensure a thorough preliminary investigation, and it can expedite the process of determining whether a case should be forwarded to a detective for additional investigation. It is possible, but unclear, whether the RMS at DPD has the capability to collect solvability factors. Regardless of that capability, BerryDunn recommends their collection as part of the preliminary investigation process.</p> <p>Additionally, BerryDunn recommends the DPD revise the report-writing and approval process and include solvability factors as a required element within that process for all personnel generating criminal reports.</p>	


Community Engagement		
No.	COP	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 5, Section I: Community Policing</b>		
5-1	<p><b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD does not have clear metrics and expectations for community policing or problem-oriented policing activities, and these efforts are not formally included in its appraisal system. Although the DPD does record COP efforts and these activities are reviewed internally in a monthly report, lack of clear metrics and expectations impedes analysis or accountability functions.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should establish COP and POP metrics and expectations for all DPD personnel and formally include a review of each individual's activities as part of the appraisal process.</p>	
	<p>The DPD should regularly review these efforts to promote accountability and positive reinforcement for COP activities. Specifically, DPD should build processes, opportunities, and expectations for all members of the DPD to actively support community policing by expecting all team members to engage in active, deliberate, and meaningful relationship-building and problem-solving with the community. Expectations for officers should include strategies for building community relationships, as well as specific goals, policies, and objectives. These steps should create an agency-wide philosophy of proactive community interaction and establish formal responsibility for each employee of the agency, including the importance of each member's contributions to the overall success of the department.</p>	


Investigations Services		
No.	Criminal Case Review and Assignment	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 6, Section III: Procedures</b>		
6-1	<p><b>Finding:</b> Many reports lack sufficient basis for follow-up and having an Investigations supervisor review these is an inefficient process. DPD's RMS has</p>	


Investigations Services		
	the capability of utilizing solvability factors to help determine which cases have viable leads that would warrant further investigation.	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should revise its process for reviewing criminal cases to empower appropriate personnel, patrol line supervisors, to save time for Investigations staff. Patrol sergeants, who are responsible for review of all incident reports, should be empowered to close criminal cases without the need for additional review. This decision should be based on the solvability factors (as completed by the originator of the incident report) and the supervisor's review of the substance of the case. Patrol sergeants should either close a case or leave the case open and forward it to Investigations for follow-up investigation. The solvability factors in the current RMS may be cumbersome, so DPD should work with the RMS vendors and involve those who would use that portion of the RMS to tailor the system to the needs of the agency.</p> <p>Another advantage of adding a solvability factor component to the RMS is that in some instances systems can self-generate citizen contact follow-up reports based on criteria flagged by the RMS, which can be sent out by DPD personnel (sworn or civilian), relating to Recommendation 6-3.</p>	


Investigations Services		
No.	Case Assignment and Monitoring	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 6 Section III: Communication</b>		
6-2	<p><b>Finding:</b> DPD is using an informal method of case monitoring and not maximizing the use of its RMS to incorporate solvability factors and monitor case assignments.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should take steps to more appropriately use the RMS to track and monitor case assignments as well as progress by investigators and notifications for patrol. Supervisors should be required to conduct periodic case reviews for all open cases and to document case reviews and expectations, consistent with department standards on case updates and expected closure dates.</p>	


Investigations Services		
No.	Investigations Staffing	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 6: Section VI. Staffing Recommendations</b>		
6-3	<p><b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD has a high volume of cases that are pending investigations. The DPD needs to address this issue to help ensure citizens are getting the assistance and follow through for investigations that they deserve.</p>	


Investigations Services		
No.	Investigations Staffing	Overall Priority
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> Investigators are carrying caseloads that are unmanageable. Due to the high volume of cases investigators are carrying month to month, there is insufficient time for investigators to do a complete and thorough follow-up to cases that have viable leads. This will lead to cases not being comprehensively investigated, which decreases the chances of a successful prosecution. BerryDunn recommends DPD increase the staffing of CID by three investigators.</p>	


Investigations Services		
No.	Specialized Investigative Function	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 6: Section VI. Staffing Recommendations</b>		
6-4	<p><b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD sees a need for a street crimes problem-solving unit to address narcotics, vice, and other street-level quality of life crime problems. The creation and administration of such a unit requires a detailed strategic plan, specialized training, robust oversight mechanisms, and detailed performance measuring.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> BerryDunn supports the DPD's plans to create a specialized street crimes unit tasked with problem-solving for narcotics, vice, and other street-level crime problems and recommends such a unit be initially staffed with three personnel consisting of two investigators and a working sergeant who bears both supervisory and caseload responsibilities.</p> <p>Such a unit could develop the specialized expertise necessary for addressing street-level crime while also leveraging resources, such as the HIDTA task force via the assigned DPD TFO, and even provide temporary specialized assignment opportunities for patrol officers.</p>	


Operational Policies		
No.	LGBTQ+ Policy	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 7, Section I: Critical and Emergent Policies</b>		
7-1	<p><b>Finding:</b> The DPD has a policy manual that provides appropriate and relevant guidance for personnel for most critical and emergent operational areas. However, there is one emergent policy that is not addressed because DPD does not have a policy for responding to members of the LGBTQ+ community.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should implement a policy addressing how to respond to persons from the LGBTQ+ community, to include both community encounters and DPD staff members.</p>	


Operational Policies		
No.	Policy Development and Review	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 7, Section III: Policy Advisory Committee</i>		
7-2	<b>Finding:</b> Although the DPD may seek input from internal and external stakeholders on policy development and revision, this process is not formally defined and the DPD does not have a formal collaborative policy development and review process.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should establish a standing policy development and review committee comprised of a diverse membership that is representative of all internal stakeholders. The DPD should also consider engaging community members in this effort as a pathway supportive of collaborative co-production policing efforts.	


Operational Policies		
No.	Policy Organization and Navigation	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 7, Section VI: Training and Policy Dissemination</i>		
7-3	<b>Finding Area:</b> DPD policy is thorough, easy to understand, and covers essential areas of operation, but some of the publicly available policies are not signed and the organization of the policy is not intuitive to navigate.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should ensure all policies disseminated, whether internally or externally, are current and complete and consider re-organizing the policy manual into several categories of related topics for ease of use with a usable table of contents and index.	


Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	RMS	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 8, Section I: Data and Technology</i>		
8-1	<b>Finding:</b> The RMS in use by the DPD is not fully supporting operational needs. The RMS has multiple limitations, including data entry and data mining, both of which are critical to leveraging data in support of operations and impartial policing.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should consider pursuing acquisition of a more modern and robust RMS that is capable of supporting its data needs.	

Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Use of Data and Intelligence	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 8, Section II: Crime Analysis</i>		
8-2	<b>Finding:</b> DPD intends to use crime and intelligence data proactively for data-driven and intelligence-led policing but, until recently, has not consistently utilized data or intelligence in a deliberate or meaningful way.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should pursue a robust performance measurement and accountability management (CompStat) system utilizing the support and resources provided by BerryDunn. The DPD should formally adopt a data-driven philosophy supported by ILP. That philosophy should incorporate best practices in data use by police agencies and should include an operating performance measurement and accountability management system.	


Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	Crime Analysis	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 8 Section II: Crime Analysis</i>		
8-3	<b>Finding Area:</b> Crime analysis is performing some functions that do not require the skill of a crime analyst and, simultaneously, some functions that would benefit from the skills of a crime analyst are performed by others.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The department should include crime analysis in all supervisor/command staff meetings to reinforce the value of this role. The department should explore additional training for the crime analyst, including DDACTS. The department should inventory, centralize, and standardize all statistical reporting and crime analysis as the primary responsible party, redelegate any administrative tasks that do not require a crime analyst, and examine the benefit and feasibility of adding an additional civilian crime analyst to assist CID with cases.	


Data, Technology, and Equipment		
No.	High-Risk Property Controls	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 8, Section III: Department Equipment and Facilities</i>		
8-4	<b>Finding Area:</b> The inner property room where high-risk property such as firearms, narcotics, and money lacks basic security controls.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should enhance property controls for high-risk property items through additional controls like electronic proximity card access, constant video recording, dual physical controls, etc.	


Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Field Supervisor Training (FST) Program	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 9 Section III: Higher Education and Officer Development</b>		
9-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> DPD does not have a formal FST program supported by a written manual. Transitioning from line-officer to line-supervisor requires major adjustments for most new supervisors. First-line supervisors play a critical role in the success of the organization, and their personal success is imperative. Many new supervisors do not have extensive leadership training when they are promoted, and they often lack clarity of their role.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> BerryDunn recommends DPD implement a formal FST program supported by a written manual that provides a structured training program with a formal field training component supported by competency checkoffs. In addition to the formal FST, DPD should task the majors and lieutenants to mentor new sergeants to impart experiential knowledge and reinforce department values. Such mentoring could be informal, or the department could incorporate it into the FST.	


Training and Education/Dunwoody		
No.	Report Writing	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 9 Section III: Higher Education and Officer Development</b>		
9-2	<b>Finding Area:</b> DPD currently does not have a report-writing manual for patrol officers. This contributes to inconsistency in report writing and preliminary investigations.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> It is recommended the DPD create and utilize a report-writing manual to help ensure officers properly and adequately document incidents and to add consistency to produced reports, to improve preliminary investigations, and to make the most effective and efficient use of personnel time.	


Training and Education		
No.	Training Requests	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter Section IV: Records, Required, and In-Service Training</b>		
9-3	<b>Finding Area:</b> The department does not have a standardized, transparent process for requesting and receiving training that is supportive of DPD goals or a strategic training plan.	

Training and Education		
No.	Training Requests	Overall Priority
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The department should institute a formal training review process, perhaps including an employee-based training committee that reviews training requests relative to DPD goals, policies, and procedures, including alignment and synchronization with a strategic training plan, professional development efforts, and a promotional preparation process.	

Training and Education		
No.	Property and Crime Scene Technicians (CSTs)	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter Section IV: Records, Required, and In-Service Training</b>		
9-4	<b>Finding Area:</b> Property and CST staff do not have backup if either is off work. They can assist one another but neither is fully trained on the other's job. The DPD should cross-train each of these personnel to help ensure that at least one person who is trained on both job functions is available to assist if, for some reason, Property or CST staff are not available (vacation/illness/injury/etc.).	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> DPD should cross-train Property and CSTs to provide redundancy, capacity, and scalability.	


Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Strategic Recruiting Plan	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 10, Section II: Recruitment</b>		
10-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> Attrition at the DPD has created a shortfall of experience, especially on patrol, and has the potential to contribute to overall staffing shortages. DPD does not have a formal strategic recruiting plan that supports a specific and focused effort at recruiting, utilizing all department employees in the effort.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should examine and revise its recruiting, hiring, and retention practices and develop a strategic recruiting plan to improve its ability to maintain a stable workforce, and to reach and maintain optimal staffing levels that includes specific steps intended to create an atmosphere that recognizes the long-term value of officers and other staff. BerryDunn has compiled a list of considerations that the DPD should evaluate as part of its process to develop a strong retention plan. BerryDunn has included this information in Section 1 of the OARM.	


Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Selection and Disqualifier Review	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 10, Section III: Selection</i>		
10-2	<p><b>Finding:</b> DPD, like all departments, utilizes discretionary disqualifiers when engaging in the new hire selection process. Such disqualifiers can have complex and unique circumstances for each applicant and represent an opportunity to explore department standards and recruit development.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should create a panel of employees to review applicant disqualifications for three primary purposes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Review the relevance of the disqualifying standard in general</li> <li>2) Review the specifics of the disqualified candidate for mitigating factors</li> <li>3) Review the applicant and disqualifying condition for remediation opportunities</li> </ol> <p>Applicants who are disqualified due to a discretionary disqualifier could meet with this panel of incumbent employees from the department to offer explanation and mitigation. This can be an opportunity for the department to reconsider its position relative to the specific candidate or in general for the department. It can also serve as an opportunity for the candidate to learn how to remediate their background for future consideration.</p>	


Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Consistent Promotional Process	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 10, Section V: Promotion</i>		
10-3	<p><b>Finding:</b> Employee feedback indicates the current promotional process may be inconsistent or unpredictable.</p>	
	<p><b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should enhance existing policy to increase the detail and memorialization of the promotional process. This process should be consistently followed unless formal changes are made to the process.</p> <p>Having a consistent and knowable promotional process is an important part of professional development as it allows employees to prepare for advancement in an informed manner. BerryDunn recommends the DPD formalize its promotional processes and follow those processes in any future hiring process.</p>	

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Optimal Staffing and Authorized Hiring Levels	Overall Priority
<i>Chapter 10, Section VI: Staffing</i>		
10-4	<p><b>Finding:</b> Authorized hiring levels at the DPD do not account for attrition rates.</p>	



Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
	Hiring for officers at the DPD occurs when there are vacancies, and despite a recent increase in attrition, annual voluntary separations are generally knowable and predictable. Because of the lag time associated with hiring and providing initial training for officers, the DPD is constantly working without its full complement of personnel.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> To maintain optimal staffing levels, hiring should always occur at the rate of allocated personnel <i>plus</i> the anticipated attrition rate. In collaboration with City management, the DPD should establish a minimum operational level <i>and</i> a new authorized hiring level (consistent with the findings of this report) that helps ensure continuity of staffing.	

Recruitment, Retention, and Promotion		
No.	Hiring and Retention	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 10, Section VI: Staffing</b>		
10-5	<b>Finding:</b> Attrition at the DPD has created a critical workforce shortage, particularly for sworn personnel, and the current hiring and retention practices for the department are not supporting operational needs.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> The DPD should examine and revise its recruiting, hiring, and retention practices, to improve its ability to maintain a stable workforce, and to reach and maintain optimal staffing levels.	

Professional Standards/Internal Affairs		
No.	Receipt of Complaints	Overall Priority
<b>Chapter 11, Section I: Complaint Process and Routing</b>		
11-1	<b>Finding Area:</b> The DPD online complaint portal includes a requirement to acknowledge possible criminal prosecution for false statements, which can have a chilling effect on the filing of complaints and is not in the best interest of the DPD.	
	<b>Recommendation:</b> BerryDunn recommends DPD remove the admonition about possible criminal prosecution from the online complaint portal.	

## Supplemental Appendix B: Department Actions During the Assessment

The Dunwoody Police Department has worked very closely with the BerryDunn team as they collected the data to provide a comprehensive review of our department. In anticipation of potential recommendations, and in the spirit of continuous improvement, our department has tackled several projects designed to improve or address operational gaps, leadership development, communications needs, and enhance our recruiting, hiring, and retention strategies. The below list is not meant to be all inclusive but does represent our ongoing efforts to improve.

### **Recruitment Strategies**

- Increased hiring bonus from \$6,000 to \$10,000.
- Initiated a recruitment bonus of \$3,000.
- Paid for a recruitment hiring billboard on I-285 for one month that reached 240,000 motorists a day.
- The City Council increased starting pay for officers, which has led to an increase in applicants.
- Placed a sign trailer on Ashford Dunwoody Road advertising for applicants.
- Filmed and published a Recruitment video on website and all social media platforms.
- Created new Recruitment flyers, business cards, banners for use at Recruitment events and publishing on website, Dunwoody Newsletter, and all social media platforms.
- Participated in numerous Recruitment events.

### **Retention/Culture and Motivation Strategies**

- The City Council has provided two pay increases to police staff in the last eight months.
- Developed 10 “Catch Phrases” to represent DPD’s culture of “who we are”.
- Created “OUR DNA” plastic wallet cards displaying DPD’s 10 Catch Phrases, as well as our new Motto: “Ready to Protect, Proud to Serve” for staff to carry and easily familiarize themselves with it.
- Incorporated “Welcome Swag Bags” given directly by the Chief’s Office to each new hire, containing various DPD giveaway products, DPD challenge coin, Emotional Survival for LE book, etc.
- Publicly recognized 2 Officers and 2 Employees of the Quarter (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter) at a City Council Meeting with award plaques. (Aug. 2023)

### **Technology Improvements**

- Moving forward with the establishment of a Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) to better address crime issues.
- Ordered new Glock 17's, which included the red dot sights.

### **Communication Strategies**

- IT personnel now attend monthly staff meetings to improve communication and resolve issues.
- Intelligence & Crime Analyst now attends monthly staff meetings to discuss crime trends and better address ongoing issues.
- Chief Grogan continues to Email a quarterly "Chief's Update" to all staff members, providing a summarization on the latest dept. accomplishments as well as expressing his support and gratitude for staff's dedicated service to the community.

### **Transparency Improvements**

- The department launched a Transparency & Data Initiative Sharing webpage, which provides the public access to important information about the department.

### **Policy Updates**

- Updated various policies throughout the last year. Working toward reorganizing our online policy manual to make it more searchable.

### **Community Engagement**

- Conducted numerous safety classes for the community such as: Death by Overdose, C.R.A.S.E. (Civilian Response to Active Shooters), Teen Driving Class (rules of the road), Citizen's Police Academy, Teen Police Academy, Child Safety Seat Checks
- Conducted 2 public Community Meetings, in conjunction with Berry Dunn, to gather community perspectives on police services. (Nov. 2022 & Jan. 2023)
- Conducted several charitable events to raise funds and goods for special causes such as: Polar Plunge (SOGA), Pack-a-Police-Car (local school supplies), Cops on Donut Shops (SOGA)
- Hosted and/or participated in various community meet-and-greet events such as: 4<sup>th</sup> of July Parade, Coffee with a Cop, Lemonade Days, National Night Out, LE Appreciation events, Mental Health Fairs, Touch-a-Truck & more.
- Officers and K-9's visited several public and private schools to teach age-appropriate safety tips and to interact one-on-one with students, such as: Career Days and Read-with-a-Cop
- Hosting See & Be Seen campaign at City's Truck or Treat event (providing safety flashing reflectors for public) (Oct 2023)